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PREFACE 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence 
which cultural conditioning has on the interpreter in his- 
torical and biblical interpretation. It is our contention 
that the interpreter inevitably brings certain assumptions 
and attitudes, gleaned from his life situation, to the 
interpretive task, and that these assumptions and attitudes 
oflueAcc; 
have a telling affect on his interpretation. The broad 
comprehensive terra, we have employed to describe these assump- 
tions and attitudes is preunderstanding. Hence we have 
chosen to title our study "Preunderstanding in Historical 
and Biblical interpretation". 
The theme of prenderstanding has been developed in 
three major sections followed by a brief conclusion. In 
Section 1 there is an attempt to define preunderstanding, 
set up categories of type and function with which to discuss 
it and to trace its role in historical and biblical inter- 
pretation. Sections II and III are devoted to an application 
of the thence to representative historical and biblical 
interpretations. 
Tn any study there are choices that must be macle. One 
must decide, among other things, whether to treat the subject 
intensively or extensively, what method to employ in its 
treatment and how best to develop the theme of the study. 
Two choices which have been made in this study should perhaps 
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be mentioned. (1) I have chosen to briefly define and analyze 
preunderstanding rather than treat it exhaustively for the 
simple reason that an exhaustive study would be a thesis in 
itself, and would not have allowed me to trace the influence 
of preunderstanding on historical and biblical interpretation. 
(2) I have also chosen to deal with the suPject by surveying 
a large representative body of interpreters. This has the 
advantage of allowing us to see the role of preunderstanding 
in interpretation from several successive eras of history. 
The danger, however, of such an approach is that it opens one 
z wet, 
up to the charge of suc._erficiality. We were not, for example, 
able to do "in depth" historical, psychological and socio- 
logical analyses of each of the interpreters considered 
which might have been possible had we treated only one or 
perhaps two thinkers. Yet the advantage of seeing a broad 
spectrum of viewpoints seemed important enough to merit 
our choice. 
Among the lessons which I have learned from the examination 
of preunderstanding is that no one full; escapes its in- 
fluence. This holds true just as much for the one who 
analyzes an interpretation as it does for the one who interprets. 
It might therefore be in order for me to state in brief 
outline my own preunderstanding. I will restrict my comments 
to those aspects of my ;preunderstanding which I have consciously 
utilized in the study,-, though undoubtedly there are many 
olber factors of which 1 have been less conscious that have 
iv 
had an equal influence on my analysis. In the first place, I 
start from within Christian faith. This is foundational. 
My Christian faith supplies the basic frame of reference 
and the attitudes which undergird my examination. Secondly, 
and more specifically, I am guided by the school of thought 
which affirms that the central theme of the Bible is that 
God has made Himself known in a series of redemptive historical 
events which culminate in the appearance of Jesus Christ. 
This series of events is seen not as separate from the 
total fabric of histor but as supplying the pattern which 
gives meaning to the structure of history. Thirdly, I have 
insisted that faith, however it may be thought of theologically, 
can be analyzed as a preunderstanding. Faith, as it is 
expressed and experienced by the believer, is a set of 
assumptions and attitudes. Finally, I have tried, as far as 
my preunderstanding has allowed me, to be open to all points 
of view. I personally believe that no one has the corner on 
all truth, but that anyone who has the necessary skill and 
insight and who makes a conscientious effort will see some 
asimect of truth. To this partial vision of truth I have 
tried to be open. 
I would like to acknowledge the helpfulness of professor 
John McIntyre and Rev. D. W. D. Shaw in making suggestions for 
correction and improvement. Generally I have followed standard 
American spelling. In style and scholarly apparatus I have 
been guided by the manual, The Modern Researcher, by Jacques 
Barzun and Henry F. Graff. 
THESIS ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to discuss the role of 
preunderstanding in historical and biblical interpretation. 
We define preunderstanding as that set of assumptions and 
attitudes which a person brings to his apprehension and 
interpretation of reality or any aspect of it. ;ecause 
preunderstanding comes in a myriad of shapes, an effort is 
made to classify them by type and to suggest some categories 
of function. Once this is done the argument is able to 
proceed. The initial and foundational point which is made 
is that certain aspects of reality suggest, even demand, that 
a particular preunderstanding be present on the part of the 
interpreter if they are to be fully grasped and adequately 
interpreted. Judging the Christian revelation to be no 
exception to this general rule, we set about finding the 
appropriate preunderstanding for its apprehension and inter- 
pretation. We assert that it is faith joined with the 
historical method which constitutes the only adequate pre- 
understanding for the interpretation of the Christian revelation. 
We then turn our attention to the issues raised by this 
assertion. The first issue with which we deal is the precise 
role of a consciously articulated preunderstanding (a hermeneutic) 
in the interpretive task. This in turn leads us to a discussion 
of the problem of revelation ,,nd history. We next examine 
the central issue of the study, the role of preunderstanding 
in historical interpretation, and consider its implications 
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for the specific task of interpreting the Chri_.tian f<<ith 
I- laving defined and categorized preunderstanding and analyzed 
its role in historical and biblical interpretation, we are in 
a ,-osition to discuss representative interpreters of the 
faith as they have appeared in and during the life of the 
church. To this task we devote Sections II and III. 
In Section II we discuss the role of preunderstanding in 
six representative historical interpre cations of the Christian 
faith. In Augustine we see the influence of his exposure 
to °deo- platonism as he attempts to construct a biblical 
interpretation of history. Edward Gibbon, a rationalist in 
love with the glory of pagan Tome, depicts the Christian 
faith as an enemy of the progress of mankind. The philosopher, 
Hegel, forces the Christian faith into the confines of his 
metaphysical system. In Adolph von Har.nack we find a nine- 
teenth century liberal world view shaping the categories in 
which Jesus is understood. Reacting to this liberal mentality, 
the dialectical theologians of the 1930's, which we discuss in 
the person of Emil Brunner, attempt to remove the Christ - 
event from historical scrutiny altogether by creating a realm 
of super -history. We conclude Section II with an analysis 
of the views of the American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
whose deep involvement in the American social situation and 
wide reading in the thought of Western culture, influence 
his historical interpretation of the Christian faith. 
in Section ITI we turn our attention to six representative 
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interpreters of the Bible, again attempting to ascertain the 
role of each interpreter's preunderstanding in his efforts. 
Origen, under the influence of Platonism and the allegorical 
method, interprets the Bible as a source book for divine 
truth. The great reformer, Martin Luther, approaches the 
Pible in the light of his own unique historical situation and 
Personal exrerience. Spinoza, a Cartesian rationalist, views 
the Bible as the product of the popular "imaginations' and 
interprets it accordingly. John Wesley, the leading figure 
of the Pietist movement, comes to the Bible with the expectancy 
that it will speak to personal experience. In Charles Spurgeon 
we find an interpreter who, as a faithful representative of 
protestant Orthodoxy, understands the Bible as being the 
literal Word of God. As a contrast to Spurgeon we complete 
Section ?=Ii by examining the views of the liberal American 
preacher, Barry Emerson Fosdick, who views the BiLle as a 
thoroughly human book which nevertheless contains lessons of 
"abiding value". 
We conclude our study of preunderstanding in a final 
charter in which we attempt to restate the main thread of 
our theme, summarize the results of its application to 
representative interpreters and suggest some mandates for 
the general task of interpretation. 
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SECTION I 
PREUNDERSTANDING AS A CRITERION FOR ANALYZING 
HISTORICAL AND BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 
Chapter One 
The Phenomenon of Preunderstanding 
I. The Presence of Preunderstanding 
To doubt one's own capacity to be free from preunder- 
standing which necessarily colors the perception and inter- 
pretation of reality is the beginning of epistemological 
wisdom.' Few would claim an "Archimedean vantage -point" 
from which to peer at truth. C. S. Lewis makes the point 
by describing what happens when a human being encounters a 
strange creature on a foreign planet. He writes: 
It was only many days later that Ransom 
discovered how to deal with these sudden 
losses of confidence. They arose when 
the rationality of the hross tempted you 
to think of it as a man. Then it became 
abominable --a man seven feet high, with a 
snaky body, covered, face and all, with 
thick black animal hair, acid whiskered 
like a cat. But starting from the other 
end you had an animal with everything an 
animal ought to have -- glossy coat, liquid 
eye, sweet breath and whitest teeth- -and 
added to all these, as though Paradise 
had never been lost and earliest dreams 
were true, the charm of speech and reason. 
Nothing could be more disgusting than 
the one impression; nothing more delight - 
ful than the other It all depended on 
the point of view. 
1 See M. Merleau- Ponty, The phenomenology of Perception, 
tr. by Colin Smith, London, 1962, pássim, tor a serious 
philosophical examination of this issue. For the psycholog- 
ical implications, see Robert S. Woodworth & Mary R. Sheehan, 
Contemporary Schools of psychol ̂gy, London, 1965. 
2 
The Silent Planet, London, 1938, p. 38. 
(2) 
Point of view would seem to make a significant difference. 
Indeed it would appear that nearly all perception and sub- 
sequent understanding and interpretation of reality proceed 
in some measure from the preunderstanding of the partici- 
pant. To show that this is particularly so in the historical 
and biblical interpretation of the Christian faith is the 
primary purpose of this study. 
We choose the term "preunderstanding" to describe this 
phenomenon because it is comprehensive and includes within 
its scope a number of other words and phrases which have a 
similar but, on occasion, a slightly different and more 
specific and limited meaning.3 We define preunderstanding 
in a broad and open -ended way as a body of assumptions and 
attitudes which a person brings to his perception and inter- 
pretation of reality or any aspect of it.4 The breadth of 
this definition will allow us to consider a wide range of 
factors which influence any approach to the given and which 
constitute the sum -total of what we mean by preunderstanding. 
II. The Acknowledgement of preunderstanding 
In nearly every quarter where knowledge is pursued in a 
serious and disciplined manner there is a recognition that 
the preunderstanding of the observer enters into his appre- 
hension of reality. The pursuit of universal knowledge of 
3 See below, pp. 14 ff. 
4 
See Donald D. Evans, The Logic of Self- Involvement, 
London, 1963, p. 124. 
(3) 
things as they are in themselves, while still a worthy 
objective, is generally accepted as an extraordinarily 
difficult task. Almost all knowledge is conditioned in 
some measure by the assumptions and attitudes of the knower. 
The social sciences have helped us to understand how 
much of our background we bring to our truth seeking. 
Psychology and sociology have taught us that we are beings 
whose rational comprehension is contingent to emotional 
states and social conditioning. Our intelligence, shaped 
as it is by sensation, interest and feeling, gives less than 
true form and structure to sense experience. The influence 
of our environment affects the form we give to the world 
around us. 
The political scientist and the economist are also 
concerned with the influence of preunderstanding. H. Richard 
Niebuhr gives the example of their careful scrutiny of such 
noble phrases as "the natural rights of man", "all men are 
created equal ", "inalienable rights", etc. to see if they 
may not be historically conditioned.5 One does not need to 
be a professional economist or political scientist to recog- 
nize that many such phrases are more the product of prior 
assumptions than an objective statement of empirical fact. 
They may, as the Marxist asserts, be mere rationalizations 
for human activity which have economic considerations as 
5 
The Meaning of Revelation, New York, 1962 , , , pp. 9 ff. 
(4) 
their motive. Whatever the case, the point is made that the 
environmentally conditioned preunderstanding of the observer 
must always be given consideration in any analysis of his 
views. For no observer can get outside of his situation 
into a realm beyond space and time to give us an account of 
the way the world really is. 
Historians too have been quick to acknowledge different 
forms of preunderstanding in their work. That history is 
always understood and written from some point of view is 
generally accepted by most modern historians.6 That even 
the very selection of material is in large part determined 
by one's preunderstanding has been acknowledged in a recent 
manual on historical research: 
Since guiding ideas affect both search and 
selection, let us call the researcher's 
temperament (i.e. the whole temperament 
of his mind) and his present intentions 
and hypotheses his total interest. We 
may then say without implying any blame 
that his interests will determine his 
discoveries, his selection, his pattern 
making, and his presentation.7 
preunderstanding has been regarded for a long time 
among philosophers as a factor in perception and the debate 
as to its influence continues today. 
8 Something akin to 
preunderstanding is recognized by Immanuel Kant when he 
insists in The Critique of Pure Reason that we have no cer- 
tain knowledge of things in themselves but that our mind 
gives them shape. Kant argued that our mind imposes patterns 
6 See e.g. Carl Becker, Everyman His Own Historian, 
New York, 1935, pp. 233 ff. 
7 Jacques Barzun & Henry F. Grant, Thy Modern Research- 
er, New York, 1957, p. 160. 
8 See below, pp. 22 ff. 
(5) 
and groupings (e.g. time and space) on objects, and that in 
a sense our minds constitute reality. He takes account of 
sense experience but goes on to explain that 
although all our cognition begins with 
experience...all does not precisely 
spring up out of experience. For it may 
easily happen that even our empirical 
cognition may be a compound of that 
which we have received through our 
impressions, and of that which our 
proper cognition -faculty...supplies 
from itself.9 
The role of preunderstanding in the perception and formula- 
tion of reality has also been acknowledged in the existen- 
tial-ontological philosophy of Martin Heidegger. In discussing 
the ontological structure of man's existence, Heidegger 
writes that "understanding always touches on the whole 
constitution of being -in- the -world. "10 Magda King, com- 
menting on this Heideggerian theme, writes that "meaning does 
not lie in words, or in things, but in the remarkable struc- 
ture of our understanding itself. We move in advance in a 
horizon of understanding from which and in reference to which 
the things we meet are intelligible to us.... "11 A slightly 
different approach to the theme of preunderstanding is 
developed in the tradition of linguistic analysis by the 
philosopher Donald D. Evans.12 He is concerned to show 
in what ways man's utterances are logically connected with 
his practical commitments, attitudes and feelings. More 
9 The Critique of Pure Reason, London, 1838, p. 3. 
10 Being and Time, tr. by John Macquarrie & E. Robin- 
son, London, 1962, p. 144. 
11 Heidegger's Philosophy, New York, 1964, p. 8, italics 
mine. 
12 02. cit. 
(6) 
specifically, he attempts to provide a logic which will 
adequately deal with God's self -disclosure which, by its 
very nature, demands that an appropriate preunderstanding 
be present in man if he is to apprehend it. After a detailed 
description of the self -involving elements in everyday 
language, he applies the "logic of self -involvement" to 
the biblical doctrine of creation. Without going into a 
detailed description of his analysis let us pick from it 
one isolated point which will illustrate our theme. Evans 
refers to what he calls an " onlook" which is a comprehensive 
term used to describe the "core of many attitudes ".13 
Applying the notion of onlook to creation, he writes that 
"the recognition of God's glory in world- Creation depends 
on the onlook which a man adopts.... "14 In other words, 
one needs a certain type of preunderstanding (a parabolic 
onlook) to grasp the significance of the doctrine of creation 
(a complex parable). 
Even scientists, whose very method is designed to ex- 
clude the intrusion of the personal dimension, have had to 
acknowledge the presence of preunderstanding. Since Einstein, 
many authors have suggested that the theory of relativity 
"proposes a new view of space and time and brings the ob- 
serving scientist himself into the picture of the physical 
world. "15 One well -known scientist turned philosopher, Michael 
13 Ibid., pp. 110 -111. 
14 Ibid., p. 194. 
15 Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science, Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J., 1957, p. 173. 
(7) 
Polanyi, has faced this fact and has devoted his energies 
in recent years to formulating a theory of personal know- 
ledge suited for science. He writes: "ie must learn to 
accept as our ideal a knowledge that is manifestly perscnal."16 
Epistemologists sometimes distinguish between knowledge 
as recognition (as for example: I recognize a friend when 
I see him) and knowledge that a proposition is true (as when 
I know that 2 plus 2 equals 4). Polanyi's efforts have 
been directed toward diminishing if not contradicting this 
distinction. For Polanyi, recognition is essential to all 
acts of knowing.17 In The Tacit Dimension Polanyi states 
that 
The declared aim of modern science is to 
establish a strictly detached, objective 
knowledge. Any falling short of this 
ideal is accepted only as a temporary im- 
perfection which we must aim at eliminating. 
'Alt suppose that tacit thought forms an 
indispensable part of all knowledge, 
then the ideal of eliminating all per- 
sonal elements of knowledge would, in 
effect, aim at the destruction of all 
knowledge.18 
Polanyi's most systematic analysis of the personal dimen- 
sion in all knowledge is found in his Gifford Lectures 
entitled Personal Knowledge in which he argues that man 
must always make a commitment and assume responsibility 
in the quest for knowledge. He writes: 
16 The Study of Man, London, 1959, p. 27. 
17 Marjorie Green, "The Logic of d ology ", in The 
Logic of Personal Knowledge, London, 1961, p. 191. 
18 The Tacit Dimension, London, 1967, p. 20. 
(8) 
As I acknowledge, in reflecting on the 
process of discovery, the gap between 
the evidence and the conclusions which 
I draw from them, and account for my 
briding of this gap in terms of my 
personal responsibility, so also will I 
acknowledge that in childhood I have 
formed my most fundamental beliefs by 
exercising my native intelligence within 
the social milieu of a particular place 
and time. I shall submit to this fact 
as defining the condition within which 
I am called upon to exercise my 
responsibility.19 
In the field of theology the interest in preunderstanding 
has centered in hermeneutics. Here the work of Rudolf 
Bultmann is most influential.20 "Every interpretation ??, 
he writes, "incorporates a particular prior understanding."21 
Again he says: "It will be clear that every interpreter 
brings with him certain conceptions, perhaps idealistic 
or psychological, as presuppositions of his exegesis, in 
most cases unconsciously. "22 In one essay he asks the 
pointed question, "Is Presuppositionless Exegesis Possible ? ", 
to which he replies in some detail both yes and no. The 
"yes" however refers to the possibility of doing exegesis 
without presupposing the results whereas the "no" acknow- 
ledges that every exegete approaches the text with specific 
questions and a certain idea of the subject matter with which 
the text is concerned.23 For Bultmann, preunderstanding 
19 Personal Knowledge, London, 1958, pp. 332 -3. 
20 Bultmann's hermeneutic will be given a fuller 
examination in the next chapter. 
21 
"The Problem of Hermeneutics" in Essays, tr. by 
James C. F. Grieg, London, 1955, p. 242. 
22 Jesus Christ and Mythology, New York, 1958, p. 48. 
23 Existence and Faith, London, tr. & ed. by Schubert 
Ogden, 1961, pp. 289 -296. 
(9) 
(Vorverständnis) is not only an ever present factor to be 
accounted for but it is also necessary to the task of in- 
terpretation. Without it, understanding would not be pos- 
sible at all. For, as Gunther Bornkamm points out in refer- 
ence to Bultmann's use of the term, "Only the bearing of 
life on relevant matters that makes itself felt in preunder- 
standing can establish communication between the text and 
the interpreter and make possible a proper examination of 
the text, allowing the interpreter to ask himself about the 
text and to revise it on the basis of his own self -understanding. "24 
III. The Characteristics of preunderstanding 
From this brief survey of various disciplines we have 
attempted to show that some form of preunderstanding is 
generally recognized as an omnipresent feature in the appre- 
hension and interpretation of reality. It now becomes our 
task to delineate some of its most important characteristics. 
The following account is not intended to be a complete 
analysis of preunderstanding. Our concern is rather to draw 
attention to those aspects of preunderstanding which are 
of particular importance in the historical and biblical 
interpretation of the Christian faith. 
We turn first to a brief consideration of how we come 
to possess a preunderstanding. Here several factors need 
to be sorted out. Among them is what it is that may be said 
to possess a preunderstanding. Without getting immersed 
24 The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. by Charles 
Kegley, Loñ3on, 196, p. 7. 
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in the intricate psychological and philosophical problems 
that come to the surface at this point which would only 
take us away from our theme, we might say simply that what 
is needed is to isolate and define a synoptic term to refer 
to that which unites the various internal functions of man, 
i.e. his capacity to think, feel, choose, imagine, remem- 
ber, etc. Except for the strict behaviorists, most stu- 
dents of man would not object to speaking of such a unitive 
entity. Perhaps the least problematic of the terms commonly 
used is the word "self". Other terms such as ego, psyche, 
mind, soul, person, etc. have been used in a far too tech- 
nical sense by assorted disciplines to suit our purpose. 
The "self ", as we will employ the term, is essentially the 
center of man's inner life. It is the self then which we 
might describe as coming to possess a preunderstanding, 
But how does the self come to possess a particular 
preunderstanding? Quite obviously, the answer is "from 
our environment ". Alfred North 'Whit_ head draws our atten- 
tion to the influence of the environment and of science in 
particular on our preunderstanding: 
The mentality of an epoch springs from the 
view of the world which is, in fact, domin- 
ant in the educated sections of the commun- 
ities in question. There may be more than 
one scheme, corresponding to cultural divi- 
- sions. The vari ̂ us human interests which sug- 
gest cosmologies, and also are influenced 
by them are science, ethics, and religion. 
In every age each of these topics suggests 
a view of the world. Insofar as the same 
set of people are swayed by all, or more 
than one of these interests, their effective 
outlook will be the joint production of 
these sources. But each age has a dominant 
pre -occupation; and during the three cen- 
turies in question the last three, the 
cosmology derived from science has been 
asserting itself at,the expense of older 
points of view with their origins else - 
where.25 
This environmental conditioning, as Whitehead implies, 
includes a wide range of historical, cultural, social and 
psychological factors. We are conditioned by our nation- 
ality, our identification with our nation's political and 
economic developments, its traditions and its institutions, 
and its current place in world affairs. We are influenced 
by our culture and by the very language we speak. No less 
important in the formation of our preunderstanding are re- 
ligious, political and educational exposures, social and 
economic status, family relationships, group associations 
and our vocational choice. The list could be extended in- 
definitely. We perceive and interpret reality in a parti- 
cular hay because of this conditioning. This is not to 
suggest a simple reductionist determinism. It is merely 
to acknowledge the obvious influence of factors such as 
these and to suggest that they help shape the preunderstand- 
ing out of which we view reality. 
25 Science and the Modern World, New York, 1927, p. ix. 
(12) 
We should also note the way in which the self interacts 
with our conditioning. Here we would underline the distinc- 
tion between the terms Itself" and "preunderstanding".. The 
former refers to that which is given in existence itself, 
i.e. that which is common to all men such as intelligence, 
feeling etc., whereas the latter refers to that which is a 
product of the interaction between our environmental condition- 
ing and the self. One way to describe this process is to 
say that our environment supplies the raw material out of 
which we (i.e. the self) frame a preunderstanding. But this 
is an oversimplification. It is true that there is an 
external environment which surrounds us and internal givens 
with which to react to the environmental stimuli, but it is 
difficult to separate the two and to clarify their relation- 
ship. The history of philosophy and psychology is sprinkled 
with efforts to solve this, problem, and it is not our purpose 
to offer another possible solution. However there are spe- 
cific reasons why we call attention to this'interaction which 
itself is the important point for our study. 
We do so in the first place to point out that a pre- 
understanding is a product of this mutuality between the 
internal and the external. Few would question that our 
environment feeds and gives form to our mind and emotions. 
Yet it is equally true that the self shapes and "makes sense" 
out of the environment. One resulting product of this mutual 
interaction is a preunderstanding. Another reason for 
(13) 
calling attention to the interaction process is to emphasize 
that man is not just acted upon by his environment. He may 
be a. participant in the formation of a preunderstanding. 
He may exercise his intelligence and freedom in the cons- 
cious endorsement of assumptions and attitudes with which to 
approach any given subject. This leads to the final reason 
for mentioning the process of interaction which is that the 
quality of the self (the level of intelligence, the depth of 
feeling, etc.) and the richness of the environment, and the 
way in which they mingle, willdetermine the type and function- 
al value of the preunderstandings which we possess. 
In addition to a. consideration of the way in which we 
come to possess a particular preunderstanding, it is neces- 
sary to suggest a possible way of classifying the varinrs 
types. We defined preunderstanding as t"a body of assump- 
tions and attitudes which a person brings to his perception 
and interpretation of reality or any aspect of it." The 
question is: How do we classify the myriad forms in which 
these assumptions and attitudes appear? 
One way of coming at the task of classification is to 
list several terms which are used in reference to the phe- 
nomenon of preunderstanding, noting as we do the shades of 
difference in their meaning. This will add clarity and 
precision to our own use of these terms as well as suggest 
a means of classifying the various types. For simplicity, 
we will place the terms into their natural groupings. 
(14) 
Because the meaning of most of the terms is self- evident, 
we will not attempt elaborate definitions but merely call 
attention to the slightly differing connotations of the 
most frequently used terms and list their synonyms after them. 
A. Those terms which begin with the prefix pre: 
1. Preunderstanding: the broad, inclusive term already 
defined in a general way above. Also prepossession. It 
should be noted that as we go along we will use the term 
"preunderstanding" in a general way to refer to all of the 
assumptions and attitudes which a person may possess and in 
a specific way to refer to that body of assumptions and 
attitudes which relate to a particular subject. 
2. Presupposition: that which is an antecedent con- 
dition. 
3. Preconception: an idea or opinion formed prior to 
observation. Also prenotion, predetermination. 
4. Predisposition: an attitude in light of which 
judgments are made. 
5. Prejudice: a feeling or idea which inclines one to 
make a choice or judgment without forethought. Also bias. 
B. Those terms which are analogous to seeing: 
1. Point of view: manner of regarding any particular 
subject. Also viewpoint, perspective, onlook, outlook and 
standpoint. 
2. World view: way of looking at the total complex of 
reality. 
(15) 
C. Those terms which contain a reference to life: 
1. Life -attitude: way of feeling and thinking about 
life and the world. Also life -posture. 
2. Life- relation: the relationship which one has to 
a given subject. Also life- bearing. 
D. Those terms which suggest a structured pattern of thought; 
1. Frame of reference: the categories which are em- 
ployed in giving. order to the world. Also framework, horizon 
of understanding. 
2. Construct: a conceptual pattern employed in refer - 
ence to a specific subject. 
From this list of terms we are able to discern at least 
four types of descriptive categories of preunderstanding.. 
It should be borne in mind that there will be some over- 
lapping between them and that any one preunderstanding may 
and most often does contain elements of all four categories. 
The first type may be described as informational, that 
is the information which one already possesses about any 
given subject prior to approaching it. This is preunder- 
standing of the most basic kind, and terms such as prepossession, 
and, on occasion, preconception, prenotion and predetermin- 
ation belong in this category. Seldom, if ever, can one 
isolate this category from the other categories which we 
shall mention, In our analyses of various interpretations, 
therefore, we shall generally subsume the informational 
element in the other categories. 
(16) 
A second type of preunderstanding may be termed atti- 
tudinal. Though this is a broad category, essentially what 
we have in mind is the temperament which one possesses in 
his approach to the given. Here such terms as predisposi- 
tion, prejudice, bias, life - bearing and life -relation are 
appropriate., 
A third type of preunderstanding may be called ideo- 
logical. In this category we would include both the way we 
view the total complex of reality (world view, life -atti- 
tude, life- posture, frame of reference, framework and hori- 
zon of. understanding) and the way one views a specific 
subject (point of view, viewpoint, perspective, outlook, 
onlook, and standpoint). The terms preconception, prenotion 
and predetermination also belong to and actually fit better 
in this category. 
The final category we give the label methodological, 
that is the actual approach which one takes in the explica- 
tion of a given subject. Terms such as presupposition and 
construct have meaning in this context. It may be question- 
able tb call a method (e.g. scientific, historical, inductive, 
etc.) a preunderstanding, but in one sense they do function 
in the same way as any other type of preunderstanding, i.e. 
they are assumed in an interpretive piece of work and will 
influence the results. Yet in another sense these methods 
are neutral tools employed to insure impartiality and ob- 
jectivity. In our study we will include methodology in 
(17) 
our analysis of preunderstanding, but give special attention 
to how the attitudinal and ideological factors influence 
the use of any particular method (in our case the historical 
method). 
The classification of the various types of preunder- 
standing leads us on to another important issue which is 
to find a means of categorizing the ways in which a pre - 
understanding may function within an interpretation of 
reality. By interpretation we mean quite simply at this 
stage of our discussion the task of explaining or telling 
the meaning of any given subject. We would suggest the 
following functional categories as a working hypothesis. 
We will set them up in terms of opposites for clarity al- 
though in most cases a particular preunderstanding will 
not function at one extreme or the other but somewhere along 
a continuum which has an infinite number of points. 
1. A preunderstanding may function as either a major 
or a minor influence on an interpretation. It may largely 
determine the conclusions which an interpreter reaches, or 
it may only be distantly related to his conclusions. This 
point becomes evident when we make a distinction between 
those forms of preunderstanding which necessarily lead to 
a specific conclusion and those which do not. James Barr 
makes such a distinction when he says that 
We might distinguish between cases where 
a particular position will, if presupposed, 
necessarily lead to a certain result, 
and cases where the (presupposition'... 
(18) 
has proved useful in all sorts of relations 
but which nevertheless has not resulted 
in uniform results such as might be 
expected to follow from a logically 
coercive presupposition.26 
This latter type of presupposition, of which the historical 
method serves as a good example, will merely set the broad 
limits within which a judgment may be reached, 
2. A preunderstanding may function as either a nega- 
tive or positive influence on an interpretation. The nega- 
tive influence is relatively obvious. It is possible that 
our preunderstanding may be such that our perception of 
things as they are is so clouded that we are really not 
in touch with reality at all, or only minimally. The fact 
that our minds are filled with all sorts of ideas, exper- 
iences, customs and aspirations, many of them unconscious, 
is certainly the source of much of our trouble.27 On the 
positive side, it should be recognized that there is no 
understanding of reality without some frame of reference 
in which to receive it. Without some prior structure reality 
would appear altogether strange, and we could only stare in 
uncomprehension. The fact that our minds are not tabula 
rasa makes knowledge possible.28 To illustrate this, we 
would call attention to the fact that certain approaches 
to truth lend themselves to filtering and controlling the 
26 
Old and New in Interpretation, London, 1966, p. 178. 
27 Ibid., p. 185. 
28 John Macquarrie, God -Talk, London, 1967, p. 149. 
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possible negative influence of preunderstanding (e.g. a 
distorting prejudice) while others may require its positive, 
creative influence. The scientific method with its controls 
and checks is designed to produce the maximum degree of 
objectivity, whereas a work of art will have no value with- 
out the artist's creative participation in the subject. It 
is important to note that some aspects of reality are either 
so subtle or so constituted that only those observers with 
a certain kind of preunderstanding.are able to perceive and 
interpret them at all. 
3. A preunderstanding may function in either a com- 
prehensive or a limited area. It may influence the way an 
interpreter views the total sphere of reality or only the 
way he views fragments of it. For example, if a person 
believes in God, this preunderstanding, at least theoreti- 
cally, should influence the way he views all of reality. 
It is a preunderstanding which is comprehensive in scope. 
On the other hand, if a person assumes that all men are 
entitled to equal rights before the law, this preunderstand- 
ing will influence his legal and political views but may 
have nothing at all to do with the way he studies the stars. 
This preunderstanding has a more limited application. Im- 
plicit in what we are saying is that a person may have any 
number of preunderstandings which apply in different contexts. 
4. It would follow from this that a preunderstanding 
may function either dependently or independently in relation 
(20) 
to the other preunderstandings which the interpreter possesses. 
A particular person may, for example, have one comprehensive 
preunderstanding which contains within it a number of more 
limited presuppositions. In this case there will exist 
some kind of dependency relationship between the comprehen- 
sive preunderstanding and the limited presuppositions. On 
the other hand, between limited presupposit.ons held in re- 
gard to totally different subjects, there may exist complete 
independency. In our studies in Sections II and III we will 
be concerned primarily with the dependency which exists 
between the more comprehensive assumptions and attitudes 
which the interpreter holds with respect to history and 
Scripture, and the more limited presuppositions which under - 
gird his actual method of historical or biblical interpretation. 
5. A preunderstanding may function consistently or in- 
consistently. It may contain only harmonious elements or 
it may contain elements'which are mutually contradictory. 
One may, for example, because of a preunderstanding which 
affirms the equality of all men before God, strongly disap- 
prove of policies which exist in South Airica. Consistency 
requires that similar disapproval be displayed in other con- 
texts where racial discrimination exists. Yet this same 
person may be instrumental in blocking the entrance of a 
negro Christian into church membership. Somewhere within 
this person's preunderstanding regarding man there are 
assumptions or attitudes which are operating at cross 
(21) 
purposes. We should also note on this matter of consistency 
the distinction between what may be logically prior, i.e. 
factors upon which an argument depends for validity, and 
what is temporally prior, i.e. what an individual may 
have assumed in his rreunderstanding before he began an 
interpretive piece of work. An interpretation may be in- 
herently consistent (e.g. a Marxist view of history) but 
unacceptable because of its starting point (that all history 
can be understood in terms of class conflict). Consistency 
does not imply acceptability. 
6. A preunderstanding may function consciously or 
unconsciously. An individual may interpret reality without 
knowing that he does so from a particular frame of refer- 
ence or, on the other hand, be very aware of his own start- 
ing point. A person may, for instance, consistently prefer 
Democrats to Republicans, but he may or may not be aware 
of why he has such a preference. The presence of an un- 
conscious element points us to another category of classifi- 
cation. 
7. A preunderstanding may function rationally or ir- 
rationally. It may be soundly based or the product of fear. 
It may be logical or the result of a deep -seated neurosis. 
It may be as rational as the law of contradiction or as 
irrational as a conviction that all Oxford dons are malicious.29 
29 See R. M. Hare's essay about "bliks" in Anthony Flew 
& Alastair MacIntyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical 
Theology, London, 1965, pp. 99 -105. 
(22) 
Generally, because of the nature of our study, we will not 
be centrally concerned with the psychological dimension of 
the irrational aspects of preunderstanding. This is not to 
say they are unimportant but only that this is not our 
primary purpose. 
8. Finally, a preunderstanding may be open -ended or 
closed- minded. It may allow itself, by virtue of its struc- 
ture, to be corrected and altered by evidence, or it may, 
conversely, reject a priori anything which does not nicely 
fit into its mold. 
IV. Preunderstanding and Knowledge 
If it is true that various types of preunderstanding, 
functioning in a variety of ways, are always present in 
the perception and interpretation of reality, then the 
question which inevitably arises is whether knowledge of 
things as they are in themselves is possible. It is beyond 
our scope to trace the history and issues of epistemology, 
but a few comments in this area as they relate to our theme 
should be made. 
From what has been said so far, one might assume that 
a case was being made for subjectivism, i.e. that a proposi- 
tion may be called true only from the standpoint of any given 
observer, and that all knowledge then would refer merely to 
what is in the knower's mind. There is certainly the temp- 
tation to engage in the denial of objectivity because every 
man inevitably sees the world and all that is in it, including 
(23) 
himself, from his own particular point of view. But we would 
argue that there is a real world of objects which have 
independent existence about which we can gain knowledge. In 
the first place, the subjective hypothesis simply does not 
account for all of reality. There are objects in the external 
world which give evidence of their own continuity even 
when they are not observed by human minds. Secondly, we 
would maintain that even thou :gh we peer at reality through 
the shaded glass of our own preunderstanding, this does not 
mean we do not see reality as it is. It only means that we 
have to account for the shaded glass in some way. Our point 
then is not to advocate epistemological subjectivism but to 
stress that all knowledge is elusive, and to grasp it demands 
a great deal of effort on our part, not the least of which 
is keeping a watchful eye on oie's preunderstanding. 
We would reject not only total subjectivism but also 
doctrinaire positivism with its exclusion of traditional 
metaphysics and theology as legitimate forms of knowledge. 
The positivists' solution to the epistemological problem 
was to limit what we may legitimately call "knowledge" to a 
particular kind. They argued that only that which is em- 
pirically verifiable is legitimate knowledge and proceeded to 
show by linguistic analysis that other traditional forms of 
knowledge (e.g. knowledge of God) were invalid. "God- talk" 
was an emotive expression, not a description of reality. 
But in the last few years there has been a softening of 
(24) 
this position due in part to the general recognition that 
it rested too heavily on a closed- minded preunderstanding. 
There is now a more general willingness to recognize as 
acceptable other types of knowledge and language if a good 
case can be made for them. Jacques Maritain remarks: 
We are emerging from a positivistic 
period during which the science of phe- 
nomena was regarded as the only valid 
knowledge, the only one worthy of man. 
This was the upshot of a long history 
which began with Descartes' deniàl that 
theology could exist as a science, and 
continued with Kant's denial that meta- 
physics could exist as a science. We 
may say that, despite a number of rem- 
nants or fossils this positivistic 
period is over.3a 
The passing of logical positivism's dominance on the philo- 
sophical scene has opened the way for new efforts at under- 
standing how it is that man gains knowledge of that which 
is external to him.31 
Our particular concern is to see how it is that man's 
preunderstanding is related to his gaining knowledge of God 
as he interprets what he considers to be traces of God's 
presence and activity in history (including his own history) 
and in the biblical literature. To do this it will be help- 
ful to distinguish what have been traditionally called levels 
of'knowledge.. Though there have been many formulations 
30 The Range of Reason, London, 1953, pp. 3 -4. 
31 Linguistic concerns are central in this new effort, 
but a discussion of them at this point would take us too 
far afield. 
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of the various levels, we will follow Trueblood in distinguish- 
ing five: (1) knowledge of bodies, (2) knowledge of other 
minds, (3) knowledge of one's own mind, (4) knowledge of 
values and universals, and (5) knowledge of God.32 
It is our contention that in order to gain knowledge at 
these levels it is necessary to possess an appropriate pre - 
understanding which will correlate with that which is to be 
interpreted at the given levels. By an appropriate preunder- 
standing we mean that generally four factors must be present: 
(1) There must be a certain amount of correct information 
about what is to be interpreted. (2) There must be an 
attitude present which is open and receptive to making 
contact with the subject to be interpreted. (3) There must 
be an ideological structure which is sufficie.tly flexible and 
adaptable to treat fairly and objectively that wh-_ch is to be 
interpreted. (4) There must be a methodological approach 
which is appropriate to the subject to be interpreted. 
We would not suggest that the correlation between the 
preunderstanding and the subject to be interpreted is always 
a simple one -to -one relationship, i.e. one specific rreunder- 
standing for every subject. On the contrary, one comprehen- 
sive preunderstanding may be adequate for any number of 
subjects. Our point is rather that certain subjects demand 
that a particular preunderstanding be present before their 
32 David Elton Trueblood, The Philosophy of Religion, 
London, 1957, pp. 54 ff. 
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full comprehension is possible. The fact is that often the 
understanding of certain aspects of reality eludes those 
whose preunderstanding is inappropriate. Some "get nothing 
out of" Beethoven and others still believe the earth is 
flat. Their preunderstanding makes them closed to the 
meaning of the signals sent in their direction by musical 
tones and scientific evidence. John McIntyre underscores 
this general point when he argues for the necessity of an 
attitude which can adequately deal with the given in 
Ghristology.33 
He makes the further point that the given also deter- 
mines the method which must be employed in the analysis of 
the given. He says: "We are, therefore, in fact now taking 
a further step and saying that the given not only determines 
the appropriate attitude to adopt towards it; it also prescribes 
the method we must follow in its explication. "34 Since 
our concern is with the knowledge of God, our task becomes 
one of finding the appropriate preunderstanding for such 
knowledge. Such a preunderstanding will include information- 
al, ideological, attitudinal and methodological elements. 
We shall limit ourselves in this discussion to the 
biblical framework and say that the knowledge we seek is 
33 The Shape of Christology, London, 1966, p. 16. 
34 Ibid., p. 17. 
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not knowledge in general about an abstract Being but know- 
ledge of God as He has disclosed Himself in Jesus Christ. At 
this point we are marking off the perimeters which limit 
this study as well as affirming the preunderstanding which 
guides it. The Bible is quite clear that such knowledge 
comes by faith.35 Faith is the preunderstanding which is 
able to rightly grasp God's self- disclosure. Human faith 
is the correlative preunderstanding of divine revelation. 
It is by faith that we are able to perceive and interpret 
the reality of God. 
At this point the question arises as to whether it is 
legitimate to refer to faith as a preunderstanding. It 
might be argued that faith is rather that which preunder- 
standing influences. Such a view would tend to emphasize 
that aspect of faith which directly apprehends God. Faith 
so conceived would then be more of an immediate apprehension 
of God than a prior understanding about God. While this 
emphasis may call attention to one important dimension of 
faith, it does not mean that faith cannot still be correctly 
classified as a preunderstanding. In the first place, under - 
lying this view of faith are assumptions about God's exis- 
tence and attitudes of trust and openness to the divine 
presence. Such a body of assumptions and attitudes is 
35 We are not saying here that faith can prove the exis- 
tence of God. That is another question altogether. We are 
saying that if God's existence is assumed, we may be said to 
know Him if we have faith. Ronald Hepburn in his Christianity 
and Paradox, London, 1958, pp. 122 ff., argues against the 
question-begging procedure of attempting to prove God's exis- 
tence from within a position of faith which already assumes it. 
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certainly within the range of our definition of preunder- 
standing. Secondly, it is true that faith is influenced 
by particular prior assumptions and attitudes as we shall 
argue a little later on. But this still does not mean that 
faith cannot be called a preunderstanding. As we have point- 
ed out, one preunderstanding may influence another. Finally, 
this conception of faith as an immediate awareness of God 
does not exhaust all that the biblical authors and the church 
have understood by faith. Faith also contains another 
dimension. 
This brings us to the place where we must examine in 
general terms what the Bible does mean by faith. Faith as 
it is described in the Bible has at least two dimensions, 
though we must bear in mind that faith is essentially one 
act which involves the total person. First, faith contains 
a cognitive element, i.e. faith that God is and has acted 
in certain ways. The word is used as bare intellectual 
assent by only one author of the New Testament (James 2:14 -26) 
and then with an ironic twist. The cognitive element is more 
often regarded as right belief about God (e.g. Jude 3). 
Such a use of the term implies both informational and ideo- 
logical assumptions. Although this cognitive element is 
not the only one, it is certainly foundational. To say 
that we have knowledge of God we must at least have some 
correct information and ideas about Him. For our purposes, 
we will say that the minimum cognitive component consists 
(29) 
of a belief that God is and that He has made himself known 
in Jesus Christ. 
A second dimension of the biblical doctrine of faith 
is the attitude or complex of attitudes called trust, i.e. 
faith in God. We are exhorted to trust God, His promises and 
all that He has done for us. Such trust becomes efficacious 
(e.g. Ephesians 2:8,9). In Pauline terms, we are justified 
by faith. This category of faith involves a personal dimen- 
sion which carries us beyond the first category of cognition. 
To know God by trusting Him is not so much to say that we 
know about God as it is to say that we know Him as a person 
who relates Himself to us. John Hick describes the nature 
of faith in the following way: 
Thus the primary religious perception, or 
basic act of religious interpretation, is 
not described as either a reasoned conclu- 
sion or an unreasoned hunch that there is 
a God. It is, putatively, an apprehension 
of the divine presence within the believer's 
human experience. It is not an inference 
to a general truth, but a 'divine -human 
encounter',3p mediated meeting with the 
living God. 
Thus we may be said to be in a position to gain know- 
ledge of God when we possess a minimum of correct informa- 
tion and ideas about Him and are personally related to Him. 
Faith is the necessary preunderstanding for a full compre- 
hension of God because it corresponds to the nature of the 
given. It alone contains the appropriate assumptions and 
attitudes which make it possible for us to apprehend God. 
36 
Faith and Knowledge , Ithica , N.Y. , 1957, p. 129. 
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Several issues regarding this assertion that faith is 
the necessary preunderstanding for the knowledge of God now 
come to the surface. The first is this: When we speak about 
faith, are we implying that the man of faith is somehow free 
from a spatio- temporal point of view in reference to his 
understanding, of God? The answer of course is no. The be- 
liever's faith may be genuine and efficacious, but this does 
not mean that its contours are not shaped by the environ- 
ment of which it is a part. We might describe the process 
by saying that our relationship with God is made secure by 
faith but that we understand that relationship of faith in 
terms of the thought -forms of our surroundings. The assump- 
tions and attitudes of which our faith consists will always 
be influenced by our time and place in history and will be 
expressed in the categories which are a part of our life 
situation. 
This means, secondly, that if we are to have the clear- 
est possible conception of God, our environment must be such 
as to continually expose us to God's revelation of Himself 
in Jesus Christ. The preunderstanding of faith must be sus- 
tained in a community (the church) which is both continuous 
with the historical act of revelation and through which God 
continues to reveal Himself. It means also that if our con- 
ception of God is to be accurate, we need to constantly test 
and refine the content of our faith by placing it over against 
the biblical documents which attest to historical revelation. 
(31) 
Only in this way can we keep our faith close to the biblical 
description. 
A third matter is the way in which faith functions as 
a preunderstanding. Though we shall dwell on this point at 
length throughout our study, it might be well to make two 
initial observations: (1) While faith may be a gift of 
God,37 it is still a human possession. It may, for example, 
contain inconsistent and irrational elements and function 
as a negative influence on an interpretation. Our point is 
that there is really no such thing as "pure faith?', and that 
the preunderstanding of faith may be functionally described 
in the same manner as any other preunderstanding. (2) 
Because our faith is formed out of and ex!ressed in terms 
of our life circumstances, our understanding of God and 
interpretations of the historical and biblical material 
which attest to His revelation in Jesus Christ will tend to 
reflect these circumstances. It follows that the preunder- 
standing of faith will serve merely to set the broad limits 
within which a wide range of interpretations may be reached 
depending on the interpreter's total life environment. 
While faith may be said to contain the minimum necessary 
informational, attitudinal and ideological factors for know- 
ledge of God, it only implies an adequate method of explica- 
tion of that knowledge. We have mentioned already that the 
knowledge of God which we seek is that which comes by God's 
37 See Siren Kierkegaard, philosophical Fragments, 
tr. by David Swenson, Princeton, 1936, p. 47. 
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self- disclosure in Jesus Christ. We have clearly cast our 
lot on the side of revelation rather than natural theology. 
If knowledge of God comes via Jesus Christ, our method of 
explication will necessarily involve us in the doing of 
history. As John Hick says: "In Christianity the catalyst of 
faith is the 'person of Jesus Christ. It is in the histor- 
ical figure of Jesus the Christ that, according to the 
Christian claim, God has in an unique and final way disclosed 
himself to man. "38 To give a full account of our knowledge 
of God as He has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ we shall 
need to employ the critical tools of historical study as 
part of an adequate preunderstanding for the interpretation 
of the Christian faith.9 
There is one final matter which has been implied but 
- needs to be made more exrlicit in our discussion of preunder- 
standing, namely the trecise relationship between knowledge, 
preunderstanding and interpretation. We have suggested that 
the knowledge with which we are concerned in this study is 
knowledge of God.40 We said further that one may be said 
to gain such knowledge only when one possesses the preunder- 
standing of faith. But the preunderstanding of faith is 
dependent upon God's historical self -disclosure in Jesus 
Christ which is attested to in Scripture. We might therefore 
38 Off. cit., p. 196. 
39 The implications of this point are broad enatgh to 
merit extended treatment, and we have therefore devoted 
three chapters to the "problem of history ". See ohms. 3 -5. 
40 See above, p. 24. 
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clarify the relationship of these elements by saying that we 
endeavor to gain knowledge of God by interpreting the his- 
torical and biblical data surrounding the Christ -event from 
within the preunderstanding of faith. We would readily admit 
the circularity involved in this relationship, i.e. that the 
preunderstanding of faith in interpretation presupposes some 
knowledge of God. Yet all inters ;retation proceeds on the 
condition that the interpreter has some prior understanding, 
however limited, of that which he is to interpret. There is 
a reciprocal relationship between our preunderstanding and 
the matter to be interpreted (the hermeneutical circle). 
The preunderstanding which we already possess gives us the 
capacity to penetrate the work to be interpreted. As we do 
so, the content of what we are interpreting acts upon our 
preunderstanding to enlarge it, modify it or change it as 
the case may be. 
Several issues have been raised along the way in our 
discussion of the phenomenon of preunderstanding. Four of 
them demand further special atention as we attempt in this 
section to examine preunderstanding as a criterion by which 
to analyze the role of prior assumptions and attitudes in 
historical and biblical interpretation. The first one is 
the relationship between preunderstanding and hermeneutics. 
In what way is preunderstanding related to the interpretive 
method of the Christian theologian as he approaches the 
(34) 
historical and biblical data seeking knowledge of God? 
This in turn raises a second issue, viz. the nature of 
God's revelation. Are we justified in calling revelation 
historical? If so, this will point us to a third question. 
What is the role of the interpreter's preunderstanding as 
he employs the historical method in his effort to "get at" 
the historical revelation: Finally, we will turn our attention 
to the relationship between faith as a preunderstanding and 
history as a method of explication. 
Chapter Two 
Preunderstanding and Hermeneutics 
I. Preliminary Considerations 
It is in the area of hermeneutics where the concept of 
preunderstanding has been most widely discussed and where 
it has special relevance. Buitmann's emphasis on the im- 
portance of preunderstanding (Vorverständnis) in the her - 
meneutical task, and the widely used model of presupposition 
as a means of controlling the quality of interpretation1 
have brought the issue to the center of the theological 
discussion. The fact that the interpreter inevitably has 
"tacit assumptions embodied in the premises from which he 
starts, assumptions of which he may not be barely conscious, 
assumptions...which may be long established starting- points 
which he has never seen fit to question "2, has forced inter- 
preters to take cognizance of the pivotal nature of pre- 
understanding. 
But before examining the current hermeneutical discussion 
as it relates to the concept of preunderstanding, we would 
do well to draw attention to two preliminary matters. The 
first is that some caution should be exercised in the use 
of preunderstanding as a category for analyzing interpretation.3 
For example, one cannot disprove the validity of an inter- 
See Barr, óp. cit., p. 176. 
2 McIntyre, op. cit., p. 34. 
3 Barr, op. cit., pp. 179 ff. 
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pretation merely by pointing to the frame of reference of 
the interpreter. The critic must produce a better organ- 
izational structure or show why the preunderstanding neces- 
sarily diminishes the quality of interpretation. One has 
to guard against the temptation of thinking that a refuta- 
tion is complete simply by revealing "hidden" presupposi- 
tions. It is also true that preunderstanding is not always 
the decisive element in an interpretation. It is possible 
that in certain cases, the interpreterts preunderstanding 
may have very little to do with his results. And of course 
there may be another approach to analyzing a particular in- 
terpretation which facilitates far more understanding. To 
analyze'an interpretation in terms of preunderstanding is 
only one way among many in which it could be done. Finally, 
as we mentioned earlier, this model can lead down the futile 
epistemological road of subjectivism and skepticism. Even 
given these cautions, it is still nevertheless necessary to 
weigh the influence, both positive and negative, of the 
whole complex of antecedent ideas, attitudes, methods and 
customs with which the interpreter approaches his material. 
As we explore this subject, it will be helpful to keep in 
mind the distinction between how the interpreter himself 
makes conscious use of some form of the concept of preunder- 
standing as a guide to interpretation, and how the interpre- 
ter, often less consciously, is influenced in his interpre- 
tation by assumptions and attitudes which are the result of 
(37) 
historical conditioning. In this chapter we will pay par- 
ticular attention to the former. 
A second matter to note is the shitting emphases in 
hermeneutics since the Reformation. The Roman Catholic 
assertion that the revelation testified to in Scripture 
can only be understood in light of the tradition presented 
by the church, which became for the' Catholics the solution 
to the hermeneutical problem, was rejected by the Reformers. 
Against this Cátholic view of tradition, the Reformers posited 
the doctrine of sola scriDtura and maintained that Scripture 
had its own illuminating power. As Gerhard Ebeling observes, 
this becaine:onerimportant aspect of the hermeneutical posi- 
tion of the Reformation, though the implications of it may 
not have been fully understood by the Reformers or their 
immediate followers.4 Following the Reformation, Protestant 
hermeneutics dealt primarily with the rules to be observed 
in exegesis. In Protestant Orthodoxy, because of the iden- 
tification of Scripture as the Word of God, the hermeneutical 
problem was focused on the study of each biblical document, 
both the literary context and the wider situation in which 
it appeared. This tendency was given further impetus by the 
rise of critical biblical scholarship in the nineteenth 
century. Understanding Scripture required the study of: 
(a) the structure and idioms of the biblical languages; 
(b) the type of literature represented, i.e. prose or poetry, 
4 Word and Faith, London, 1963, pp. 305 ff. 
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history or allegory, literal or symbolic, or perhaps a 
particular genre found in the Bible such as apocalyptic; 
(c) the historical background; (d) the geographical condi- 
tions; and (e) the life -setting (Sitz im Leben).5 This 
hermeneutical tradition, with few but very important ex- 
ceptions, continued in full sway into our own century. 
These important exceptions, as they appeared most 
noticeably in Schleiermacher and Dilthey, have greatly in- 
fluenced the development of hermeneutics in our own time, 
especially the work of Rudolf Bultmann. Largely due to 
Bultmann, following the tradition of Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, the word "hermeneutics" has taken on a much broader 
reference. It is generally used to describe the attempt 
to span the gap between past and present. The gap is not 
only temporal; it is also cultural, dealing with world views 
and ways of thinking. Carl Braaten defines hermeneutics 
as "the science of reflecting on how a word or an event in 
past time and culture may be understood and become existen- 
tially meaningful in our present situation." 6 It involves 
"both the methodological rules to be applied in exegesis as 
well as the epistemological presuppositions of historical 
understanding. "7 James Robinson, among others, describes 
5 
James M. Robinson & John B. Cobb Jr . , eds., The 
New Hermeneutic, New York, 1964, pp. 12 -15. 
6 




this wider reference of hermeneutics as a shift from "ex- 
plaining" ( Erklärung) to "understanding" (Verstehen).8 
It is in the broader sense that we will employ the plural 
term "hermeneutics ". The singular, "hermeneutic", is gen- 
erally used in reference to a particular frame of reference 
from which to, proceed to interpretation. A given hermeneutic 
is essentially a self -consciously chosen preunderstanding 
containing informational, ideological, attitudinal and meth- 
odological components. It is designed to be a major positive 
influence and to operate consistently, rationally and open - 
endedly throughout the work of interpretation in order to 
facilitate maximum understanding. 
With these preliminary considerations in mind, we can 
proceed to analyze the role of preunderstanding in the present 
discussion of hermeneutics. This will enable us to see more 
clearly the place of preunderstanding in the general task 
of interpreting the Christian faith. We will turn first to 
a review of the hermeneutical theories of two influential 
nineteenth century thinkers, Friedrich Schleiermacher and. 
Wilhelm Dilthey, especially as they form the backdrop for the 
work of Rudolf Bultmann. From there we will consider briefly 
the influence of Martin Heidegger with his emphasis on the 
understanding of Janruage as the vehicle of expressing what 
is taking place in the life of a culture, and indeed as a 
vehicle for Being itself. We will then be in a position to 
8 
Robinson &" Cobb, eds., The New Hermeneutic, 
pp. 19 -20. 
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look at Bultmann's views. 
In a second section we will attempt to sketch how the 
hermeneutical debate has recently branched out in a number 
of new directions. The chief figures in the discussion 
are Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs who see language as 
the key to unlocking the hermeneutical treasure chest, 
Heinrich Ott who endeavors to combine the insights of Barth, 
Bultmann and Heidegger into a meaningful hermeneutic, and 
Wolfhart Pannenberg who attempts to gather up the various 
strands of the debate with his concept of Universal History 
( Universalgeschichte). 
How and why these developments have taken place and 
the role of preunderstanding in the various points of view 
represented is now where we must turn our attention. 
H. Hermeneutics From Schleiermacher to Bultmann 
It was Schleiermacher who was particularly conscious 
of the fact that more was needed to understand the contents 
of the Bible than the mere employment of the methods of 
scientific exegesis. To understand the biblical texts, the 
interpreter must join literary and historical analysis with 
intuition and imagination. The gap between author and in- 
terpreter cannot be spanned by objective analysis alone. 
The critical historical method must be supplemented by an 
imaginative reconstruction of the selfhood of the speaker 
or writer. This imaginative reproduction of the creative 
act by which the work was first produced goes far beyond the 
principles of philological science and moves into the realm 
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of art.9 Such a movement does not discount the impor- 
tance of the grammatical and historical. The interpreter 
must know all he can about the language used by the 
author and about the total historical complex in which 
he lived. Only by a thorough study of the author as 
one who is both objectively and subjectively conditioned 
by the language he employs and the history of which he is 
a part can the process of empathic interpretation begin. 
The often quoted statement of Schleiermacher bears this 
out as he asserts that the "task can also be expressed in 
this way: to understand the text just as well as and then 
better than the author himself understood it."10 However 
once this goal is realized, the interpreter is then in a 
position to get on with the real work of interpretation 
which is to "divine" the meaning of the text by identifying 
himself with the author in such a way as to grasp his in- 
dividuality and purpose. This is made possible because every 
man has a sensitivity for all others. It "appears to rest 
only on this fact, that each individual carries in himself 
a minimum of all others. "11 So for Schleiermacher the her- 
meneutical task begins with an initial study of the historical 
9 
Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher an Christ and 
Religion, London, 1965, p. 79. 
10 Hermeneutik, Nach den Handschriften, ed. by H. 
Kimmerle Hie delberg, 1959, p. 87. Schleiermacher writes: 
"Die Aufgabe ist auch so auszudrücken die Rede zuerst eben so 
gut und dann besser zu verstehen als ihr Urheber." 
11 Ibid., p. 109. "Die divinatorische ist die welche 
in dem man sich selbst gleichsam in den andern verwandelt, 
das individuelle unmittebar aufzufassen sucht." 
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circumstances and the linguistic symbols of the author, 
followed by an effort of psychological re- creation or "div- 
ination". 
Schleiermacher's contribution was to widen and deepen 
the scope of hermeneutics by making "understanding" its 
central core. Both his scientific philological work which 
gave new light on the way. human speech is used and his 
emphasis on artistic penetration which encourageda sympathetic 
and intuitive reproduction of the author's individuality 
in the interpreter had a profound influence, even on those 
who disagreed with him. 
But certain potential dangers are inherent in a her - 
meneutical approach which gives primacy to subjective iden- 
tification with the author, though this is not to say that 
such an effort is not necessary in any interpretation. The 
first is that in a psychological re- creation it is extremely 
difficult to take into account all the differences between 
historical situations. Even by granting the common elements 
of experience between author and interpreter, it is still 
next to impossible to span the centuries. These common 
experiences shared by all men do not offset the divergent 
outlooks and temperaments of men of different historical 
eras. A second potential danger in a psychological hermeneutic 
is that it would seem inevitable that the interpreter, in 
spite of a thoropgh historical preparation which Schleier- 
macher emphasizes, would still unconsciously impose his own 
(43) 
preunderstanding upon the interpretation. He would be inclined 
to read into the author's internal frame of reference his 
own feelings and attitudes. This leads us to a third possible 
danger in Schleiermacher's method of interpretation which 
is the failure to freely acknowledge that the author is not 
trying to describe and discuss his soul or inner life, but a 
real subject, a subject which in fact easily gets lost with 
the emphasis on subjective identification with the author. 
The implications of this for biblical hermeneutics becomes 
serious when God as subject is ignored or denied because of 
an overemphasis on discerning the faith or attitude of the 
author. 
It is obvious that the role of preunderstanding in 
Sch.leiermacher's hermeneutical system is an important one. 
His own personal background and his cultural and historical 
surroundings had their influence on the formation of the 
preunderstanding out of which he approached the Christian 
faith.12 His early experiences with the hioravians with 
their stress on personal piety, and his later social contacts 
in Berlin and Halle involving as they did emphasis on earnest 
and frank conversation, embued him with a sensitivity to the 
subtle innuendo of nuances and tones in the speech and gestures 
of others. Also, living in the age of Romanticism, he was 
made particularly conscious of the meaning and importance 
12 See R. R. Niebuhr, 22. cit., pp. 78 ff. 
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of personal experience and creative imagination, as well as 
rigor, in scholarly work. But what is even more important 
for our purpose is to see Lie place he gives to artistic 
sensitivity and proper attitude as a necessary "preun!er- 
standing" for interpretation. The interpreter must have a 
sympathetic affinity to do justice to a given text. 
A similar place is given to the role of preunderstanding 
in the hermeneutical theoryof W. Dilthey. He too stressed 
the need to go beyond traditional hermeneutics by giving a. 
greater role to understanding, understanding which can only 
be realized by an appropriate frame of reference with which 
to ar_proach the text. For Dilthey, as with Schleiermacher, 
the interpreter must experience or re- ex perience the original 
creative moment of the author in order to do justice to the 
text. True understanding only conies about when the inter- 
preter, after a thorough study of the grammatical, linguistic 
and historical background, projects himself into the life of 
the author by an imaginative act, recreating the author's 
own situation.13 In Dilthey's own words: 
Understanding is a rediscovery of the I 
in the Thou; mind rediscovers itself on 
higher and higher levels of systematic 
connection; this identity of mind in the 
I, in the Thou, in every subject within 
a community, in every system of culture, 
and finally in the totality of mind and 
of world history, makes possible the 
joint result of various operations per- 
formed in the human studies.14 
13 H. A. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction, 
London, 1949, p. 27. 
14 Ibid., p. 114. 
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Such understanding in the interpretive process defies exact 
scientific explication and can only be learned from inter- 
preters of genius. 
While both Schleiermacher and Dilthey stressed the need 
for creative empathy on the ,part of the interpreter, it was 
Dilthey who s ?w more cle2 rlv that historical events in the 
past must be read as expressions of historical life. The 
historian, according to Dilthey, is able to interpret the 
past because all historical events are effects of the human 
spirit in whose structures and capacities the historian also 
participates.15 -,Yet Dilthey did not altogether escape the 
potential limitations of the psychological method. The 
danger of reducing the understanding of a historical document 
to the possibilities of common experiences between author 
and interpreter does not allow for adequate interpretation 
of the new and uncommon. These events are in danger of being 
ruled out by the limitations of the hermeneutical method. 
When it comes to biblical interpretation, all that can be 
heard is what common human experience allows. This of 
course excludes the possibility of a unique revelatory act 
of God in history, an event which by definition cannot be 
handled in a psychologically determined hermeneutic. 
15 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I., 
Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Versuch einer 
GrundlegungTür das Studium der Gesellschaft und der 
Geschichte, Stuttgart, 1959, pp. 375 ff. 
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Before we consider the central figure in the modern 
hermeneutical scene, Rudolf Bultmann, it is necessary to 
examine the method of interpretation of one more writer who 
has influenced Buitmann's hermeneutical position, in addition 
to Schleiermacher and Dilthey, viz. the philosopher Martin 
Heidegger in whose thought preunderstanding plays a signi- 
ficant role.16 The concept of hermeneutics is first intro- 
duced by Heidegger in Being and Time where the phenomenology 
of Dasein (human existence) is called a "hermeneutic ". As 
his theme is developed Heidegger uses two words which mean 
interpretation: (1) Auslegung, which is an informal kind 
of interpretation that accompanies every act of understanding. 
It is the frame of reference (Vorstruktur) which we bring 
to any situation and which makes possible understanding; 
and (2) Interpretation, which describes the more specific 
and explicit interpretation of a text. In this'case there 
will also be preunderstanding which we bring to the task that 
constitutes for Heidegger what he calls the hermeneutical 
si tua tion.17 
With this brief background we will follow John Macquarrie 
in dividing Heidegger's hermeneutical position into three 
phases which are not separate and unrelated, but constitute 
a unity.l$ phase one, found in the writings of the so- called 
16 See Hans -Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 
Tubingen, 1960, pp. 240 ff., 250 ff. 
17 Being and Time 
18 
pp. 147 -150. 
O9. cit., pp. 147 ff. 
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Pearlier Heidegger" and which had the greatest influence 
on Bultmann, interprets the text in terms of man's self - 
understanding. Here preunderstanding is given an important 
place. Phase two represents a shift away from preunderstand- 
ing as defined in phase one to an attitude which receives 
the text itself as it confronts the interpreter. Here the 
interpreter has a more passive role. As Ieidegger says: 
"Hence in interpreting it 1he poem he is considering we 
must avoid not only inappropriate ideas of man but all ideas 
of man whatsoever. We must attempt to hear only what is 
said." 
19 
In phase three the poet has a kind of direct rap - 
port with his theme and his language is the language of 
Being. The interpreter listens tb the language of the poem 
as the self- expression of Being.20 Maquarrie summarizes his 
understanding of Heidegger's hermeneutic by saying that 
"language is to be understood as both an existential and an 
ontological phenomenon; interpretation demands both question- 
ing and listening, a sense of direction and a willingness 
to be directed. "21 What is important to note for our theme 
about Heidegger's view of hermeneutics, as was the case with 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, is the emphasis on an appropriate 
preunderstanding in order to hear what is being said, whether 
the message is existential or ontological, whether we question 
19 An Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. by Ralph Manheim, 
New Haven, p. 146. 
20 See Jrmes M. Robinson & John B. Cobb, eds., The Later 
Heidegger and Theology, New York, 1963, p. 14. 
21 
2E, cit., p. 167. 
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the text or merely listen to it. 
The hermeneutic of Rudolf Bultmann, which has been so 
important in Protestant theology, has as its foundation 
Heidegger's phase one, viz. that the text is to be interpreted 
in terms of man's self -understanding. The movement of Bult- 
mann's method of interpretation is away from language --of 
which mythological language 'serves as a model- -back to an 
understanding prior to, and more authentic than, the language.22 
The way to grasp the real meaning of historical phenomena 
is by the analysis of human existence via Heidegger's philo- 
sophical categories. Bultmann's concern is to discover the 
condition under which any historical understanding is possible. 
It consists, he believes, in the interpreter's relationship 
in his life to the subject which is expressed in the text. 
As with Schleiermacher and Dilthey, there must be a certain 
common element between the author and the interpreter, i.e. 
a common interest in a common subject. This interest can 
take a different form in author and interpreter, yet, without 
a living relation to the message of the text, the interpreter 
will never comprehend ít.23 Bultmann writes that "the pre- 
supposition for understanding is the interpreter's relation- 
ship in his life to the subject which is directly or indirectly 
expressed in the text." 
24 This relationship to the text, 
22 Robinson & Cobb, eds., The New Hermeneutic, p. 38. 
23 Heinrich Ott, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of 
History" in Kegley, ed., óp. cit., p. 55. 
24 
Essays, p. 256. 
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which Bultmann describes as preunderstanding, shapes the 
question which is put to the text and to which the text 
will respond. The preunderstanding which may or may not 
be explicit is the understanding of one's own existence 
in its relationship to the subject of the text, and it is 
this preunderstanding which makes possible the understanding 
encounter with history. 
When it comes to the biblical writing, the task of 
the interpreter is the same as it is for all other kinds 
of literature. The interpreter brings to the biblical text 
his preunderstanding and his openness to the meaning of man 
and proceeds to interpret the original mythological state- 
ments of Scripture in terms of the understanding of human 
existence before God which they adequately express. It is 
a question of how man's existence is understood in the Bible. 
As Bultmann expresses it: "If the object of interpretation 
is designated as the inquiry about God and the manifestations 
of God, this means, in fact, that it is the inquiry into the 
reality of human existence."25 
If preunderstanding plays such a central role in inter- 
pretation, does it prohibit objectivity? Bultmann argues 
that it does not on the grounds that historical inquiry is 
different from scientific. The interpreter cannot be detached, 
25 
Ibid., p. 259. 
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"for facts of the past only become historical phenomena 
when they become significant for a subject which itself 
stands in history and is involved in it. "26 So every for- 
mulation has the potential of leading to an unamLiguous, 
objective understanding, if the interpretation is system- 
atically carried out. For Bultmann, to "demand that the 
interpreter must silence his subjectivity and extinguish 
his individuality, in order to attain to an objective 
knowledge is, therefore the most absurd one that can be 
imagined." 
7 
But the question which immediately rises to the sur- 
face is whether Bultmann's concept of existential self - 
understanding is too - limiting as a hermeneutical principle. 
We would grant that it forms an integral part of any adequate 
interpretive method, but when it is used exclusively as the 
only norm of interpretation does it not in fact censor the 
text? Does his commitment to the hermeneutical principle 
that the life - bearing of the interpreter is the condition 
for understanding prevent him from making use of statements 
about God, the world, Christ, and man as they are contained 
in the objectified language of the New Testament ?28 Is 
this not a violation of the biblical texts? Also one wonders 
if his assertion that the Bible should be interpreted by 
26 
Ibid., p. 25V. 
27 
28 
Ibid., p. 255. 
Bornkamm, "The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann" Gunther 
in Kegley, ed., 22. cit., pp. 10 ff. 
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the same method as other literature does not contain am- 
biguity. He does believe that the word of God is heard in 
Scripture, and, as Gadamer points out, Bultmann does oper- 
ate with a preunderstanding full of theological assumptions.29 
Perhaps the theologians should admit the possibility of 
a sacred and profane hermeneutic, and acknowledge that in 
biblical interpretation they do employ a preunderstanding 
which is conditioned by experiences and interests which 
are less than universal, viz. the personal insight of 
faith. Perhaps the category of human existence as the 
only appropriate preunderstanding in biblical interpreta- 
tion is too narrow and room should be made for faith as 
given in the community of believers which understands the 
Bible as primarily the testimony of God's rëdemptive acts 
in history, and only secondarily though also necessarily 
as an explication of human existence.30 
III. Hermeneutics Since Bultmann 
Bultmann's work in hermeneutics has been continued by 
a number of theologians with varying emphases. Ernst Fuchs 
and Gerhard Ebeling have attempted to go beyond Bultmann 
toward a more ontological hermeneutic bearing similarities 
29 G cit., pp. 314 -315. Gadamer writes: "Auch als 
wissenschTtl ci he Auslegung des Theologen muss sie stets 
festhalten, dass die Heili go ge Schrift die ttliche Heilsver- 
kundigung ist. Ihr Verstandnis kann daher nicht allein die 
wissenshaftliche Erforshung ihres Sinnes sein. Bultmann 
schreibt einmal: 'Die Interpretation der biblischen Schriften 
unterliegt nicht anderen Bedingungen des Verstehens als 
jede andere Literature.' Aber der Sinn dieses Satzes ist 
zweideutig. Denn es geht eben darum, ob nicht jede Literatur 
noch anderen Bedingungen des Verstehens unterliegt als denen, 
die in- formaler Allgeneinheit jeden Text gegenuber erfullt 
sein assen." 
30 
Braaten, op. cit., p. 135. 
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to the later phases of Heidegger's work. Heinrich Ott, con- 
cerned with how the Word of God can be understood, has sug- 
gested a hermeneutic which centers on meaningful proclama- 
tion. Wolfhart Pannenberg has gone in a new direction, 
toward an analysis of history in an effort to solve the com- 
plex questions of hermeneutics. 
The so- called "new hermeneutic ", whose central exposi- 
tors are Ebeling and Fuchs, defines hermeneutics as the theory 
of understanding how the Word of God which was once proclam- 
ation in the text moves into fresh proclamation, that is into 
the situation in which it can again produce faith. The ac- 
cent falls upon the reality which is communicated in exis- 
tential understanding. The Word of God, functioning hermen- 
eutically, both removes obstacles to faith and engenders 
faith, as is the intention of the biblical text.31 It is 
the oral character of the Word which is decisive, which pro- 
duces faith, or authentic existence. hence the new hermen- 
eutic is really a theory about words and what happens as an 
event through words. For Ebeling, hermeneutics is the under- 
standing of the Word of God becoming event again and again 
within the sphere of human language. He says: "Whatever 
precise theological definition may be given to the concept 
of the Word of God, at all events it points us to something 
that happens, viz. to the movement which leads from the text 
31 
John Dillenterger, "On Broadening the New Hermen- 
eutic ", in Robinson & Cobb, eds., The New Hermeneutic, 
p. 148. 
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of holy scripture to the sermon.... "32 And "Whatever pre- 
cise definition may be given to hermeneutics...it has to 
do with the word- event."33 Whereas Bultmann wants to probe 
beneath the language of the Bible to the understanding of 
human existence which it enshrines, Ebeling sees the language 
itself as the voice of being. "The primary phenomenon in 
the realm of understanding ", he maintains, "is not under- 
standing of language, but understanding through language. "34 
Fuchs also is concerned with language and describes man as 
a linguistic creature who answers the call of being. This 
call is heard by,man through history, for history is basically 
the history of language, of being coming to expression through 
language. The coming of the Word of God is the coming of 
authentic language, the language of love in Jesus. Jesus 
himself is the "language event ", and he teaches us the lan- 
guage of faith and encourages us to try out this language 
ourselves in order that we may become familiar with God. 
35 
Hence with Fuchs there is a renewed interest in the histori- 
cal Jesus. In both Fuchs and Ebeling there is an attempt 
to find an authentic language through which the Word of God 
can express itself as an event producing faith, and to avoid 
a counterfeit language which objectifies man and which 
32 EE. cit., p. 311. 
33 Ibid. p. 313. 
34 ibid., p. 318. See also Robinson & Cobb, eds., The 
New Hermeneutic, p. 93. 
35 Ernst Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical 
Problem" in Robinson & Cobb, eds., The New Hermeneutic, p. 141. 
See also Ernst Fuchs, Hermeneutik, Bad Cannstatt, 1954, 
pp. 126 -134 & 265 -271. 
(54) 
becomes an obstacle to faith. 
In the new hermeneutic, language has become the key 
to understanding the biblical text rather than the inter- 
preter's relationship to the subject of the text as in 
Bultmann. But should language itself be singled out as the 
only legitimate medium of the biblical revelation? What, 
for example, happens to history as a means of God's self - 
disclosure? Once again it would appear that the content 
of the kerygma as an object of faith has been obscured. 
There is little recognition that the crucifixion and resur- 
rection as historic events were themselves creative of lan- 
guage, not merely "language events ". Language as the only 
hermeneutical guide fails to do full justice to history. 
Neither will it do more than a small part of the hermeneutical 
task of spanning the years which lie between the redemptive 
events and contemporary life, for this comes to us in many 
non -verbal ways, e.g. the sacraments. 
We turn now to a slightly different formulation of her- 
meneutics in the theology of Heinrich Ott. For Ott, the her - 
meneutical -issue is one of finding a mediating position among 
Barth, ljeidegger .and Bultmann. As a student of and successor 
to Karl Barth, he has inherited the emphasis on the Word of 
God as clarified in dogmatics for the task of preaching. 
But the problem for Ott is how the Word of God is able to 
be understood in its proclamation. To this end he proposes 
that theology must turn more toward the human realm, to 
(55) 
man's situation. From neidegger and Bultmann, Ott finds 
the direction for this turn. In Heidegger he discovers and 
appropriates an ontology of human existence and langu'ge, 
and from Bultmann he receives an impetus to shape his her- 
meneutic toward man himself to whom the Word of God must 
be existentially meaningful. Ott works out the implications 
of these influences on his thought in his book Theology and 
Preaching 
36 
where he struggles with the problem of how dog- 
matics is able to facilitate the movement from the Bible to 
preaching. He is concerned to show how genuine preaching 
is possible today. By genuine preaching he means proclama- 
tion which enables the biblical message to be understood in 
terms of human existence. He employs the figure of the "her - 
meneutical arch" to describe the total process of under- 
standing. 37 The arch stretches between the biblical text 
and the sermon. In between exegesis and homiletics stand 
dogmatics to clarify the subject matter of the text and phil- 
osophy to help shed light on the concrete existence of men 
today. Thus preaching, built on the foundation of theology 
and ontology, is able to answer the real existential concern 
of man. At this ,point, he would appear to be breaking from 
Barth and moving closer to Bultmann's existential hermeneutic. 
Yet he acknowledges the danger of allowing a philosophical 
36 
Theology and Preaching., London, 1965. 
37 Heinrich Ott, "What is Systematic Theology ?" in 
Robinson & Cobb, eds., The Later Heidegger and Theology, 
pp. 78 -80. 
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point of view to determine the scope and content of the 
dogmatic formulation of the gospel. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg attempts to find a solution to the 
hermeneutical questions in terms of world history. He defines 
the hermeneutic problem as how a given content can be re- 
peated in a completely changed situation. As he asks it: 
"How can the distance between the past of the texts and the 
present of the interpreter be bridged ? "38 In that the mod- 
ern historical method of exegesis requires us to interpret 
Scripture in light of its original intention, we are grad- 
ually made more conscious of the distance which separates 
us from the text. The solution, he argues, lies in the con- 
cept of merging horizons, a notion which is developed by 
Gqdamer.39 This concept involves the enlargement of the 
intellectual horizon of understanding of the interpreter to 
such an extent that it can also include the horizon of under- 
standing of the text. The gap between our horizon and that 
of the text must be spanned without either being effaced. 
Whereas Liberalism tended to swallow the past in the pre- 
sent and Orthodoxy is inclined to ignore the present by 
emphasizing the past, a concept is needed which will give 
an overarching perspective. Neither does Pannenberg think 
38 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The Crisis of the Scripture 
Principle in protestant Theology," Dialog, Vol. 2 (Autumn, 
1963),-312. 
39 E g. Gadamer, op. cit., p. 289. "Vielmehr ist 
Verstehen ipmer der Vorgang der Verschmelzung solcher ver- 
meintlich fur sich seiender Horizonte." 
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that Bultmann's demythologizing or Bonhoeffer's non- 
religious interpretation is adequate. In both theology 
loses its object and ceases to be theology. It is only 
Universalgeschichte which serves as an adequate perspec- 
tive.40 As Pannenberg says: 
Thus the present situation may be related 
to that of early Christianity in terms of 
that horizon which alone connects both 
without blurring their differences, namely: 
the horizon of the historical process. 
The hermeneutical differences between 
the traditional texts and our present 
time would be at once respected and 
superseded in a concept of history con- 
necting both, if this history can again 
be regarded as the work of the biblical 
God.41 
The key of course is in the last phrase which describes 
history as God's unfolding plan for the world. One must 
speak of God in relation to reality as a whole, and not 
limit His domain. The biblical God is one true God who 
must be seen in relation to universal history as the 
ultimate horizon of reality. Universal history can bridge 
the distance between the time of Jesus and the twentieth 
century, and make possible a solution to the hermeneutical 
problem,42 
IV. Concluding Observations: 
What may we learn about our theme from this survey of 
40 
See 6'dolfhart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universal - 
geschichte," in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 60 
(1963), 90 -121. 
41 
"The Crisis of the 5crinture Principle ", p. 312. 
42 
Ibid., p. 313. 
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contemporary hermeneutical options? We have observed that 
preunderstanding is always present in the interpretation of 
the Christian faith. Invariably hermeneutics proceeds from 
some "horizon of understanding". In fact it would appear 
that there is a general agreement that some clearly arti- 
culated hermeneutical approach, i.e. a self -consciously 
chosen preunderstanding, is an essential ingredient in in- 
terpretation if understanding of the text is to be facilitated. 
More particularly, we have noticed that certain quali- 
ties in the interpreter have been suggested as necessary 
for a sound interpretation. For example, he must have em- 
pathy and rapport with the author of the historical docu- 
ment (Schleiermacher and Dilthey); he must be open and 
listening (Ebeling and Fuchs); and he must have a living 
relation to the message of the text ( Bultmann). In other 
words, the interpreter's preunderstanding must consist of 
an appropriate body of assumptions and attitudes if an ac- 
curate knowledge of the text is to be achieved. 
Now the question is: Is there a general preunderstand- 
ing which, if held by the interpreter, supplies him with 
the minimum prerequisite assumptions and attitudes? Is 
there a foundational preunderstanding within which a person 
must work to adequately interpret the Christian aith? We 
would again point to the biblical contention that it is faith 
which is this broad ideologicál and attitudinal frame of 
reference. The man of faith has a certain amount of 
ideological affinity with the authors of the biblical records 
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in that he shares with them a common belief in the subject 
(God) about whom they speak. The man of faith has a living 
relation to the message of the text in that he believes 
that he stands in relationship to the One to whose word 
the text testifies. And the man of faith possesses (or 
should possess) an open and attentive attitude in relation 
to the message of the texts, believing that they somehow 
contain or point to the revelation of God. In short, faith 
as a body of particular assumptions and attitudes is the 
preunderstanding necessary for an adequate interpretation 
of the Christian revelation. 
This is not to say that merely because a person has 
faith he will be a competent interpreter. Possession of 
faith is in no way a guarantee of sound interpretation. 
Certain other skills and training are of course required 
in addition to a healthily functioning faith. Nor are we 
saying that all interpreters who have faith will come to 
the same conclusions. Faith is rather a minimum requirement 
within which a number of conclusions may be reached depend- 
ing on the interpreter's background and the orientation 
of his specific hermeneutical position. The man who stands 
outside of faith, however, is out of rapport with the sub- 
ject to be interpreted. Inevitably he will impose a pre - 
understanding onto the subject which is alien to it and 
which will result in a distorted interpretation.43 
43 
This is of course a statement of faith, One who 
stands outside of faith could make the same charge to the 
believer. 
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We have one final concluding observation to make from 
our survey of contemporary hermeneutical options. With 
only a few exceptions (most notably Pannenberg) these men 
tend to deemphasize history (as it is commonly understood) 
as the milieu of God's self- disclosure. The psychological 
hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the existential 
hermeneutics of Bultmann and Ott, and the linguistic her- 
meneutics of Ebeling and Fuchs offer a less than signifi- 
cant place to history as the avenue along which God has 
made Himself known. Of course they are interested in his - 
tory,44 especially that which surrounds the Christ- event. 
Here it is more a question of emphasis. Staying within 
our own declared preunderstanding, we would affirm that 
the central message of the Bible is that God has made Him- 
self known on the plane of history and centrally so in 
Jesus Christ. It follows that any hermeneutic which takes 
its cue from scripture must deal with the concept of revel- 
ation in history, a concept we shall consider in our next 
chapter. 
44 Bultmann is particularly interested in history, 
but not history as it is ordinarily understood. His concern 
is with the history of the individual, not with past events. 
Chapter Three 
Revelation and History 
I. The Issue: History 
We have seen that preunderstanding is always present in 
some form in the interpretation of the Christian faith. Our 
task now is to examine the unique problems this poses for the 
interpreter as he turns to the foundational tenet of the 
Christian faith, God's self- revelation in Jesus Christ.1 
The pivotal issue in our examination of the role of 
preunderstanding in the interpretation of God's self -dis- 
closure is the relation of revelation and history. Whereas 
other religious traditions have knowledge of God in 
mystical and rational experience or in nature, the biblical 
faith has found revelation centered primarily in certain 
historical events, chief of which is the coming of Christ.2 
This understanding of revelation has involved the Christian 
theologian in the complex task of interpreting history. 
It is in this effort that the role of preunderstanding is of 
crucial i^'portance to the church's theological endeavor. 
But before we deal directly with the role of preunderstanding 
in historical interpretation, we must first make some effort 
to examine the claim that revelation is in some sense tied to 
See above, p. 27. 
2 William Hordern, New Directions in Theology: Intro- 
duction, Philadelphia, 1966, pp. 55 -56. Note: The way in 
which we employ the term "history" will be given a full 
explanation in Chapter Four. 
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history. This is necessary because, as an adjustment to 
biblical criticism of the last two centuries, much of Prot- 
estant theology has attempted to shift the ground of revela- 
tion from objective historical footing to subjective experience. 
Some theologians have suggested that the facts of biblical 
history do not matter so much for the life of faith as does 
our subjective understanding of Jesus. It has been argued 
that anthropology, not history, should be the primary concern 
of Christian thinkers. This argument certainly contains a 
part of the truth, for there is more to the biblical faith 
than mere historical fact. A purely historical approach 
cannot prove that an event has value for the life of faith. 
And of course relationship with God is essentially subjective 
and personal. But to divorce such subjective experience 
from its objective basis is to deny the heart of the biblical 
witness. As H. D. Lewis has pointed out: "If the conclrsion 
is reached that no reliance can be placed at any point on 
Biblical accounts of alleged historical events, it becomes 
hard to see how the specific affirmations made about the 
work and person of Jesus can be justified. "3 It is our 
contention that the Jesus who actually lived in Palestine is 
at the center of God's revelatory activity and that he gives 
faith its objective base and supplies its content. Hence our 
purpose in this chapter is to show how any view of revelation 
3 Philosophy of Religion, London, 1965, p. 236. 
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which places Jesus at the center of God's self -disclosure 
must take his history and consequently historical inter- 
pretation seriously. Perhaps the best way to do this is to 
survey the way the doctrine of revelation has been dealt 
with by representative theoloical positions of the nine- 
teenth and twentieth centuries. This will enable us to see 
why it is that "history" is the critical issue. We will then 
be in a position to move on to an analysis of the role of 
preunderstanding in historical interpretation. 
II. The Increased Emphasis on Revelation and History 
Roman Catholicism and Protestant Orthodoxy have broken 
very little with the historic concert inn of Scripture as the 
unified web of revealed truth. Both root revelation in the 
historical appearance of Jesus, yet their positions have the 
tendency to avoid the real complexities of historical inter- 
pretation by stressing that these events have been given an 
infallible interpretation by an inspired prophet or apostle. 
Both views see the Bible as the written Word of God and assert 
that it contains clear cut propositions about the Christ - 
event and other doctrinal matters which can be rationally 
discerned. Hence the answers about what harpened in the 
history surrounding the revelatory events are already in. 
Historical investigation may fill in the background, not 
change the conclusions. While being miles ai:art on many 
other issues, these two groups have in common this positing 
propositional revelation as contained in Scripture.4 
4 John Hick, philosophy of Religion, Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, 1963, p. 61. 
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For the Catholic, what is not revealed by the light of 
nature or rational knwledge comes from God by direct "com- 
munication delivered for our belief "5, and is maintained 
in-tact by the tradition of the church. It is true that some 
modern Catholic theologians have given more emphasis to 
historical "event" as a mode of revelation, but they still 
fall back on "revealed dogma" as the primary locus of our 
knowledge of God.6 
Protestant Orthodoxy, even in the stiff winds of biblical 
criticism, continues to identify the words of Scripture with 
God's revealing Word.7 Edward J. Carnell, a leading spokesman 
for the conservative wing of the church, has defined "ortho- 
doxy as that branch of Christendom which limits the ground of 
8 
argues that in the  He religious authority to the Bible."  
Bible, and the Bible only, do we have the Word of God written, 
and this written word is the propositional revelation of 
Christ's will. 
9 
Further, he maintains that "only propositional 
revelation can clarify the state of the sinner before a holy 
God."° Carnell is careful to point out that Jesus Christ 
is the central revelation of God, and that "to conceive of the 
5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, Ch. 1, 
quoted by John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent 
Thought, London, 1956, p. 4. 
6 See e.g. Hans Kling, The Structures of the Church, 
London, 1964 and Karl Rahner, Theological Investi?:ai on 
More Recent Readings, Vol. IV, London, 1967. 
7 See Carl F. H. Henry, ed., Revelation and the Bible, 
London, 1959 and James I. Packer, Fundamentalism and the Word 
of God, Grand Rapids, Mich., 195 . 
8 The Case for Orthodox Theology, Philadélphia, 1959, p. 13. 
9 Ibi -1., pp. 34 ff. 
10 Ibid., p. 140. 
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Bible as the primary revelation is heresy 11, yet by postu- 
lating biblical inerrancy, he evades the real problem of 
historical interpretation. Thus both Roman Catholicism and 
Protestant Orthodoxy, while anchoring revelation firmly to 
history, have nevertheless found it possible to stay on the 
edges of the difficult question of the interpretation of 
history by equating revelation with Scripture or with Scrip- 
ture and tradition. 
Yet this sort of conclusion hardly solves the problem. 
Historical questions cannot be so easily pushed aside. In 
fact since the rise of biblical criticism, few Christians 
have been able to make so easy an identification of God's 
Word with the written words of Scripture. In Protestant 
theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there 
has been a continuous search for a category of experience 
.which would get to the root of revelation buried beneath the 
layers of tradition documented in Scripture. The Protestant 
theologian has asked the question of revelation in a much 
more radical way than the Catholic, who, in Vatican II, . 
continued to debate over the sources of revelation -- whether 
all of revelation was contained in Scripture, or whether 
tradition was also a source. But the Protestant has asked 
. with some intensity: 'Where can revelation be found at all if 
one cannot equate it with Scripture? 
11 Ibid., p. 49. 
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Not only the rise of historical criticism but also 
Yantis rejection of natural theology and his emphasis on 
epistemology in his critiques has pushed the concept of 
revelation to the forefront of theological discussion. 
Nearly every modern theology has first established itself 
as a theology of revelation, assuming that the concept of 
revelation is the most comprehensive expression of the 
uniqueness of the Christian faith.12 It is interesting 
to note that the term "revelation" has acquired this cen- 
trality and importance only within the last century, and 
that the church up until that time found other categories 
in which to express its faith.13 Some have argued that the 
concept of revelation has been given far more significance 
than it merits, and that other categories (e.g. reconcil- 
iation) are better suited to describe the essence of Christian 
faith.14 One author has specifically questioned whether 
Christianity has a revelation at all and others on the "front- 
line" of theological change have preferred to theologize 
in other frameworks.15 Yet on the whole it has been diffi- 
cult in modern theology not to begin by answering the ques- 
tion, "how do you. know ?" (which modern man's heightened 
epistemological concern forces him to ask) with either some 
12 
Braaten, óa. cit., p. 12. 
13 John McIntyre, The Christian Doctrine of History, 
London, 1957, p. 2. 
14 
E. Paul Althaus, pie Inflation des Begriffs 
dgr Offenbarung in der gegenwartigen Theologie," Zeitschrift 
fur systematische Theologie, 18 (1941), 134 -149. 
15 
F. Gerald Downing, Has Christianity a Revelation, Tondon, 
1964. See also Dean Peerman, ed., Frontline Theology, London, 
1967. 
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statement regarding revelation or at least a declared al- 
legiance to the uniqueness of Jesus as the revealer of God. 
The concept of revelation which is at the center of 
contemporary theology reflects modern man's historical and 
epistemological sensitivity. In contrast to the theologians 
of the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment who saw revelation 
either in reason or in direct communication from God, the 
modern theologian invariably links revelation to history in 
some manner. Prior to the nineteenth century there was 
"little appreciation of revelation mediated through succes- 
sive situations in history. "16 But the modern theologian, 
it appears, must bring his view of revelation under the scru- 
tiny of an age which has a sharpened historical consciousness. 
Characteristicall, Reinhold Niebuhr asserts that "the Chris- 
tian faith begins with, and is founded upon, the affirmation 
that the life, death and resurrection of Christ represent 
an event in history.... "17 The category of history has be- 
come essential for any theology which postulates that the 
eternal God has revealed Himself in Christ. "History has 
become our fate ", says Carl Braaten, "and, like it or not, 
theology will persist in correlating history with revelation 
in one way or another. "18 But before we examine current 
16, 
' Alan Richardson, History Sacred and profane, 
London, 1964, p. 65. 
17 Faith and History, London, 1949, p. 26. 
18 Ob. cit., p. 20. 
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views of revelation and history, it would be well to go 
back to the nineteenth century for the beginning of the 
story. 
III. Revelation and History in the Nineteenth Century 
In 1793 Immanuel Kant published Religion within the 
Limits of Reason Alone and left as a legacy for the nine- 
teenth century three options for revelation: (1) Natural- 
ism which denies the supernatural revelation of God; (2) 
Rationalism which accepts historical revelation, but as 
only a preparatory step to the religion of reason; and 
(3) Supernaturalism which maintains the need for a religion 
revealed in a supernatural way.19 Nineteenth century theo- 
logy was heavily influenced by Kant, and struggled in large 
measure to free itself from the confines of these three 
possibilities. The effort at emancipation took essentially 
two forms, although there were many variations. We shall 
look briefly at the most influential figures of each of 
these two responses to Kant's challenge. 
One direction which the nineteenth century turned was 
toward subjective religious experience, and here the name 
of Friedrich Schleiermacher is most important. Although 
he devoted little more than a postscript to discussing 
revelation 
20 
his whole theological system has direct bearing 
on it. Schleiermacher, influenced as he was by Kant and 
German pietism, turned his attention on man as the knowing 
19 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, New 
York, 1960, p. 143, quoted by Braaten, TIT-Frt., p. 18. 
20 
The Christian Faith, New York, 1963, Vol. I, 
pp. 49 -50. 
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and feeling subject. Man, he argued, is more than just a 
rational and moral being, as Kant had said, but also a re- 
ligious being whose highest religious experience is the feel- 
ing of absolute dependence on God. From this starting point 
he proceeds to examine what he calls man's religious con- 
sciousness as he finds it expressed in the Christian commun- 
ity. he discovers by his inductive investigation that man, 
whose religious consciousness has not been awakened, is 
in bondage to the "flesh" and stands in need of redemption. 
Man needs to be liberated to realize his true dependence 
on God. It is Jesus, as the perfect embodiment of a reli- 
gious consciousness completely open to God, who becomes 
the redeemer. Jesus, as the supreme archetype of man's 
religious consciousness, secures man's salvation. The memory 
of Jesus, hallowed within the religious community, has ef- 
ficacious influence. 
21 
The significant point to note for 
our purpose is that Schleiermacher rests revelation "neither 
on authoritatively communicated truths nor on truths excog- 
itated by the speculative reason hut on...the religi ̂ us self- 
")2 
consciousness of the community."- Schleiermacher sees 
within the experience of man the source of revelation, and 
this determines his basic theological conclusions. His 
anthropocentric presuppositions do not allow him to give 
primacy to history as the milieu where the event of God's 
self- disclosure in Jesus Christ takes place. Jesus is a 
21 
Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 478 -480. 
22 
F:aillie, 22. cit., p. 12. 
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perfect man but not the Word which has become flesh. But 
even though Schleiermacher finds "revelation" in the reli- 
gious self- consciousness of the community, he cannot alto- 
gether escape linking revelation and history. The point 
where they inevitably intersect is in Jesus, who, as the 
supreme archetype of man's religious consciousness and 
therefore a revelatory figure, can only Le known to us "through" 
history. 
A second response to Kant's options came in the form 
of Hegel's historical pantheism. Hegel, taking his cue 
from Herder's historicism, locates revelation securely 
in history which he defines as the process where the infinite 
Spirit comes to consciousness in the finite. Through the 
dialectical process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis God 
comes to self- realization. As with Schleiermacher, Hegel 
argues that man's grasp of this divine truth of God's self - 
realization comes through his religious consciousness. But 
the apprehension is in the form of images which confuse 
symbol with reality, and it is the task of rational philo- 
sophy to translate these inadequate images into concepts, 
purging them of their merely imaginative and symbolic char- 
acter. Jesus in such a framework becomes the symbol which 
enshrines the idea thr,t divinity and humanity are one in 
essence, a necessary feature of Hegel's historical pantheism, 
rather than the unique once for all and absolute revelation 
of God in history. In Hegel's thought the biblical emphasis 
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is largely vitiated,23 but revelation remains tied to history. 
Given these two options as possible trays of overcoming 
the hegemony of eighteenth century rationalism, nineteenth 
century theologians vacillated between them. Schleiermacher's 
thought can be detected in varying degrees in the work of 
Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack and Bousset. Following Hegel's 
lead were David Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach, Alois Biedermann 
and Ernst Toeltsch. Schleiermacher's emphasis on man as 
the knowing subject opened up whole new avenues of theologi- 
cal reflection which continue in full force today, yet in 
his followers his theology of pious sell-awareness degen- 
erated into psychologism. The biblical historical drama 
became the victim of massive internalization. The value of 
Hegel's thought was his emphasis on progressive revelation 
expressing itself in the particulars of history, but its 
weakness, especially evident in his followers, was its des- 
truction of the biblical revelation of God in Christ by ab- 
sorbing it into historical pantheism. 
24 
There were attempts by nineteenth century theologians 
to find a mediating point between the historical and psy- 
chological poles of religious knowledge. Many thought it 
was possible to validate the manifestation of God in history 
by uniting it with genuine religious experience. Martin 
Kahler and Adolph Schlatter suggested such an alternative 
in their theology. They argued that God's revelation 
23 
H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, London, 
1937, pp. 102 -116. Also see below, ch. 8. 
24 
Braaten, 2. cit., pp. 20 -23. 
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"history by uniting it with genuine religious experience. 
Martin K_ahler and Adolph Schlatter suggested such an alterna- 
tive in their theology. They argued that God's revelation 
in history must be accompanied by the word of interpretation. 
Both the acts and the words, the Tat -port, are part of the 
revelation. The only Jesus we know is the Jesus whom the 
biblical writers preached as the risen Christ who is Lord. 
They stressed both the objectivity and the suprahistorical 
character of the biblical Heilsgeschichte over against sub- 
jective religious experience and historical relativity. 
Yet their efforts were not as fully appreciated in their own 
time as they would be a generation later. They were unable 
to stem the tides of historicism and subjectivism. The 
focus of theology had shifted' to the theological liberalism 
of.Harnack and the Religionsgeschichteschule of Troeltsch. 
Historical studies were testing the uniqueness of the Chris- 
tian revelation and historical relativism had become the 
order of the day. All philosophical ideas, religious dog- 
mas and moral imperatives seemed so historically conditioned 
or psychologically rooted that they were in danger of losing 
their authority. History and religious experience were prov- 
ing to be difficult concepts in which to contain revelation.26 
25 
H. Richard Niebuhr, commenting on the relativism from which 
he could find no escape, says that "no other influence has 
affected twentieth century thought more deeply than the 
25 See Martin Kahler, The So- Called Historical Jesus 
and the Historic9 Biblical Christ, Philadelphia, 1964. -2 Braaten, 22. cit., pp. 23 -24. 
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discovery of spatial and temporal relativity. "27 These 
relativizing effects had produced a kind of theological ennui 
and the stage was set for theological change. The systematic 
study of one aspect of preunderstanding had sapped the vi- 
tality of the theological endeavor. 
IV. Revelation and History in the Twentieth Century 
The change had already been anticipated in a sort of 
prophetic fashion by S$ren Kierkegaard who, in reaction to 
Hegel, began his discussion of revelation and history with 
the haunting question: "Is an historical point of departure 
possible for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point 
of departure have any other than mere historical interest; 
is it possible to base an eternal happiness upon historical 
knowledge ? "28 The twentieth century rejected the notion that 
the personality of Jesus really could provide a solid his- 
torical foundation upon which the Christian faith could be 
established, as theologians of the Ritschlian period had 
thought.29 The nineteenth century view of the Jesus of his- 
tory, as Schweitzer had conclusively shown, was not the Jesus 
of the Bible.30 The nineteenth century search for the his- 
torical Jesus had, presupposed that the Gospel records were 
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Qp. cit., p. 
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and theological speculation, but by applying the methods of 
historical criticism, they believed that one could locate 
the hard core of historical facts and uncover the real Jesus 
who would be the foundation of Christian faith. 31 But the 
rise of historical relativism had changed all this, and the 
new dialectical theologians were more inclined to echo S,óren 
Kierkegaard's sentiment: "If the contemporary generation 
had left nothing behind them but these words: t e have 
believed that in such and such a year God appeared among 
us in the humble figure of a servant, that he lived and 
taught in our community, and finally died', it would be 
more than enough. "32 Nineteenth century historiography, 
based on an immanenta3.ist and evolutionary world view, 
stressing the liberal idea of progress and applying methods 
modelled after the natural sciences did not provide a solid 
foundation for revelation. 
Twentieth century views of revelation have in varying 
degrees attempted to disengage Christian faith from the re- 
lativities of history without losing the historical dimension 
altogether or reverting to pro;rositional revelation. Nearly 
all theologians have had to relate revelation to history 
in some fashion, but have tried to do so in a way which would 
free it from historical relativism. 1 survey of representa- 
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See James I. Packer, "Contemporary Views o 
tion ", in Henry, ed., on. cit., np. 99 ff. 
Revela- 
(75) 
1-leading the list in terms of influence is of course 
Karl rth, who in dramatic fashion broke away from his 
theological teachers, Herrmann and H rnack, and asserted 
that what man needed was an authentic word from God, not 
the words of man. 2arth maintained that the order ot ques- 
tions for theology must be determined by the framework given 
in divine revelation itself, not by one artificially im- 
posed by man. His position is based on the idea that be- 
tween God and man there exists an absolute gulf, and that 
man is (totally) ignorant of any knowledge of God. Divine 
revelation must create in man the capacity to receive it. 
Man's knowledge of God depends solely on the miracle of 
God's redeeming action in Christ who is the.only bridge over 
the chasm. Jesus Christ, the Word of God, is the mediator 
4 
of the knowledge of God.' 
Revelation makes contact with man by virtue of the 
power of the Word of God. Revelation touches history as a 
tangent touches a circle, and provides the content of with 
from above not from history below. The Jesus of history 
remains elusixre :gut real. Parth describes him as "the Rabbi 
of Nazareth, historically so difficult to get information 
about, and ',:Hen it is got, one whose activity is so easily 
a little commonplace alongside more than one founder of a 
34 Alan Richardson, The Bible in the AYe of Science, 
London, 1961, p: 93. 
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religion and alongside many later representatives of his 
own 'religion'."35 Yet he is also 
the real and active revealer of God and 
Reconciler with God, because in him, His 
Son or ':mord, God sets and gives to be 
known, not something, be it the greatest 
and most significant, but Iiimself ex- 
actly as He posits and knows H rself 
from eternity and in eternity. 
For Barth, revelation remains related to history, but is 
safely removed from its relativizing influences. 
Emil Brunner also would place revelation "outside the 
circle in which human knowledge and human doctrine -- acquired 
by man's own efforts --can move, and with which they are 
competent to deal. Knowledge of God exists only insofar 
as there is a self- disclosure, a self -manifestation of God, 
that is, insofar as there is a 'revelation'."37 The Word 
has become flesh, the Eternal has entered into the sphere of 
historical fact, but faith alone, not historical science, can 
grasp it.38 It is only by "personal encounter" or the "I- 
Thou relationship" that man knows God. 
Bultmann, who as a form critic, saw even more cle- rly 
what he thought to be the dangers of basing revelation on 
a search for the historical Jesus. Revelation for Bultmann 
30 
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, tr. by G. T. Thomson, 
Edinburgh, 1936, Vol. I /i, p. 188. 
36 Ibid., p. 476. 
37 
;runner, The Christian Doctrine of God, tr. by Olive 
Wyon, London, 1949, r. 14. Seo below, ch. 10. 
38 
irunner, The Mediator, tr. by Olive Wyon, London, 
1934, p. 153. 
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rests on the insight that the Scriptures are confessional 
documents which witness to the saving act of (:od. They are 
not a series of revealed propositions or a body of dogma, but 
a testimony that the object of revelation is the living God. 
Revelation occurs in preaching (kerygma) when man encounters 
God Himself, and obeys God's Word in relation to his own 
existence. It follows that revelation comes to man in the 
present, not in the historical past.39 Bultmann does "not 
deny that the resurrection kerygma is firmly rooted to the 
earthly figure of the crucified Jesus40 ?t yet does not see 
how faith can derive any support from a historical inquiry 
concerning him. But Bultmann is careful to say that without 
the historical figure, there would be no kerygma. 
Many contemporary theologians have not been content with 
so radical a separation of the Jesus of history and the Christ 
of faith. Gerhard Ebeling, a disciple of BulLmann's, has 
attempted to root the Christian revelation more firmly in the 
historical appearance of Jesus Christ. Revelation "is 
primarily and properly a definite event -- namely, the event 
attested in holy Scripture --which again, to define it still 
more closely and state its absolute peculiarity, is the 
appearance of Jesus Christ.041 He maintains that Christianity 
39 H.. P. Owen, "Révelátion'; in Kegley, ed., 22. cit., 
pp. 42 -44. 
40 rultmann, "Kerygma and Myth ", in Kerry ma and Myth, 
ed. by Hans Werner Bartsch, New York, 1961, p. 112. 
41 
Ebeling, 22. cit., p. 29. 
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stands or falls with its connection to its historical 
(historisch) origin, "for faith is manifestly not Christian 
faith if it does not have a basis in the historical Jesus 
himself. 
"42 
Reinhold Niebuhr also would anchor revelation solidly 
to history. He says: "The historical revelation is by 
no means simply the history of man's quest for God or the 
record of man's increasingly adequate definitions of God.... 
It is rather the record of those events in history in which 
faith discerns the self -disclosure of God. "43 The life and 
death of Christ are the revelation of God's character44 
and Christ is the final " Word" which God has spoken to man.45 
Also Dietrich Bonhoeffer in his lectures on Christology 
asserted that "this present- historical (geschichtliche) 
Christ is the same person as the historical (historische) 
Jesus of Nazareth. Were this not so, we would have to say with 
Paul that our faith is in vain and an illusion.'? 
46 
Even Paul 
Tillich, whose phenomenological analysis finds revelation 
in many sources, acknowledges that "Christianity claims to 
be based on the revelation of Jesus as the Christ as the 
final revela ti on. "47 
History has also been the primary category for under- 
42 Ibid., p. 204. 
43 The Nature and Destiny of Man, New York, 1941, 
Vol. I, p. 136. 
44 Ibid., p. 142. 
45 Ibid., p. 67. 
46 Christology, tr. by John Bowden, London, 1966, p. 71. 
47 Op. cit., p. 147. 
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standing revelation among biblical theologians who conceive 
revelation as being a series of historical events in which 
God has acted redemptively.48 The concern of this group has 
been to see revelation from the biblical point of view which 
is that history is the medium through which the eternal God 
has revealed Himself. The foundation for revelation is God's 
action in the history of Israel which reaches its culminating 
point in Jesus Christ.49 This divine history (Heilsgeschichte) 
perceives God as cming withthe orbit of man's experience by 
acting in human history.5° The work of Christ upon the earth 
has cosmic implications because he is none other than God 
Himself in His self- revelation.S1 Revelation is not a Body 
of revealed, propositional truths, but God addressing man in 
an "event" or "deed" which commits Him to man and which 
e ;presses His inner self.52. 
G. Ernest Wright says it strai.ghtforw_lydly when he 
asserts that "history is the chief medium of revelation. "53 
Wright argues that biblical man saw himself as existing in a 
unique and specific history whicL1 had significance l ecalise God 
through it revealed Himself as the redeemer of all history.54 
God, for Wright, can only be described in relati on to the 
48 Mcint\ re, The Christian Doctrine of History-, p. 3. 
49 Paul K. Jewett, "Special Revelation as Historical and 
Personal ", in Henry, ed., op. cit., p. 46. 
50 Hick, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 70. 
51 Richardson, The Bible in the Age of Science, 134. 
52 Donald D. .Evans, op. cit., p. 14. 
53 God Who Acts, London, 1952, o. 13. 
54 Ibid., p. 42. 
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historical process. God's acts in history are the means 
by which God communicates with men. These events are made 
meaningful and interpreted by chosen heralds or messengers. 
Biblical revelation is history interpreted by faith.55 
Oscar Cuilmann underlines the centrality of Christ in Heils- 
geschichte. He wr -. tes : 
For although individual basic facts of 
this Biblical history are subject to 
historical investigation, and joining of 
events with the historical action of 
Jesus, it taes on meaning only when this 
central historical action of Jesus of 
Nazareth is recognized as absolute 
revelation to man.56 
Hendrikus Berkhof finds the meaning of history in "the 
revelation of God in Israel and in Jesus Chri.st."57 The 
Israelites came into contact with God as he changed events 
into history by His acts before them.58 Jesus, living by 
and from the Old Testament, saw himself as the one in whom 
and around whom the crisis of history's fulfillment would 
take ply ce.59 
James Barr, a lone dissenting voice among biblical 
theologians, has pointed out that while history is a necessary 
category for revelation, :it is not the only one and has in 
fact been overemphasized. He argues that positing history 
as the supreme milieu of God's revelation is more an apol- 
ogetic effort to counter nineteenth century materialist, 
55 Ibid. , p. 107. 
56 Christ and Time, tr. by Floyd V. Filson, London, 
1962, p. 22. 
57 Christ the Meaning of History, London, 1966, p. 35. 
58 Ibid., p. 37. 
59 Ibid., p. 60. 
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skeptical and immanentalist philoso.hies60 than it is a 
biblical category. 
61 
Barr argues that to make the concert 
of history mandatory and central for revelation involves one 
in contradictions and antinomies. As an example he points 
out that history, for the Heilsgeschichte theologians, is 
both the milieu in which God acted and the field which can 
be described ty human historical science. "Thus ", he con- 
cludes, "it is a real difficulty in many views centered in a 
revelation history that, in spite of a primary assertion 
of God's actions in history, they come to have their actual 
centre in historical emphasis, or a historical way of thinkin, 
or a historical form of self- understanding or perception of 
life rather than in actual history. "62 According to Barr, 
history- is redefined and the biblical material is divided up 
arbitrarily to fit the theological system. Yet even Barr 
accepts the fact that "the biblical evidence, and the evidence 
of the Old Testament in particular, fits with and supports 
the assertion that "history" is the absolutely supreme 
milieu of God's revelation."63 
Even those theologians who have a more philosophical 
orientation have given primacy to history in discussing 
revelation. William Temple, stressing the personal quality 
of the supreme and ultimate Reality whicr is God, affirms 
60 James Barr, " Revela tion through History in the 01cí 
Testament and in Modern Theology", Interpretation, 17 (1963), 195. 
61 Barr, _Old and New, u. 69. 
62 Ibid., p. 67, 
63 "Revelation through History", p. 193. 
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that all existence is a. medium of revelation.64 It follows 
that there is no such thing as a specific reveaicd truth 
concerning God, but rather what is offered in revelation is 
the living God Himself. °5 But history becomes important in 
Temple's vier, .hen he makes it clear that such an offering was 
made to us in the historical personage of Jesus Christ. 
John Baillie, continuing in the same line, maintains 
that "revelation consists nei ther in the dictation of writings 
nor in the communincation of information but in personal 
communion - -the self -disclosure of Personalitv."66 The 
revelation which the Bible describes is one of personal 
relationship which can only be given by God through a person. 
Jesus Christ, the Incarnate One, is such a pers «n and in him 
"all other revelation is comprehended and summed up.,,67 
Jesus is the event through which man can comprehend God's 
revelation. 
History and revelation nave been linked in one other 
significant v.a in recent thought in the theolot y of Wol i hart 
Pannenberg. For Pannenberg, revelation comes not in or 
through history, bet as history. ° To sever the kerygma from 
what really happened in history is to cut faith off from its 
source, for the kerygma is the declaration of God's acts in 
the affairs of men. The I- Ieilsgeschichte theologians, according 
64 Nature, Man and God, London, 1934, u. 306. 
65 Ibid., P. 32 :`. 
66 Our Knowledge of God, London, 1939, p. 37. See also 
The Sense ói the presence OTGod, London, 1962, passim. 
67 Baillie, The Idea of Revelation, p. 80. 
68 Pannenberg, ed., Offenbarung als Geschichte, Gottingen, 
1961. 
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to Pannenberg, failed to show how revelation and history are 
really connected. Revelation, he argues, does not exist 
above history, entering in from outside, but is present in 
universal history for anyone who has eyes to see. This 
motif of revelation as a universal historical process has been 
accused of being a relapse into Hegelianism69 but Pannenberg 
is conscious of avoiding the dangers inherent in Hegelian 
pantheism, and rreser.ving the uniqueness. of God's self - 
d_sclosure in Jesus. 70 His concern is to overcome the cleavage 
between salvation history and world history by placing reve- 
lation within the universal historical process.71 
V. History as the Uniting Theme 
The central conclusion which comes from this brief 
survey of modern views of revelation is t. at history is an 
inescapable category for revelation. "It remains true ", say's 
H. Richard Niebuhr, "that Christian faith cannot escape 
partnership with history, however many other partners it 
may choose."72 In fact some statement of revelation in 
through or as history may be, as fames Barr has pointed out, 
the one unifying factor in modern theology and biblical 
scholarship.73 All who see Jesus as central in God's 
69 E.g. Lothar Steiger, "Offenbarungsgeschichte und 
theologische Vernunft ", Zeitschrift fUr Theologie und Kirche, 
59 (1962), 93. 
70 See Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, Philadelphia, 
1968, yip. 115 ff. 
71 Carl Braaten, "The New Controversy on Revelation ", 
The Journal of Religion, Vol. XLV, 3 (1965). 
72 Op. cit., p. 59. 
73 "Revelation through History ", p. 193. 
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redemptive activity, Whatever ot_er distinctive theological 
emphases they may have, must figure out some way to span 
the two thousand years which ultimately forces them into 
the problem of historical interpretation. The real issue, 
it appears, is the "use and abuse of history." So now 
we must turn to the role of preunderstanding in historical 
interpretation. 
Chapter Four 
Preunderstanding and Historical Method 
ï. The problem: The Presence of Preunderstanding in His- 
torical Interpretation 
We have observed the ubiquitous presence of preunder- 
standing in its various forms, and paid particular attention 
to its role in hermeneutics which we described as the science 
of how a word or an event of the past can be comprehended 
and made meaningful in the present. We then turned to the 
Christian concert of God's revelation in Jesus Christ, noting 
the close relationship between revelation and history. Our 
task now is to examine the function of preunderstanding in 
historical interpretation. The develop..ent of oHr theme 
so far may be summarized in the following propositions: 
A. Preunderstan. ling is -present in any apprehension 
and interpretation of reality. 
B. It is self -consciously present in the systematic 
interpretation of the Christian revelation commonly referred 
to as hermeneutics. 
C. The Christian affirms that the self -disclosure of 
God has taken place in history and uniquely so in the' person 
of Jesus Christ. 
D. It follows that since the Christian conceives of 
revelation as being closely tied to history, to adequately 
interpret that revelation, he must carefully consider the 
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relationship of preunderstanding to historical study. 
It is proposition D which we must now attempt to unravel, 
analyzing its many implications. 
There is now a general acceptance by historians that 
preunderstanding is ari ever present factor in historical 
interpretation. Beyond the bard facts which are the mere 
skeleton of history, historical writing inevitably proceeds 
from some point of view. This hardly needs extensive sub- 
stantiation. Historians know that they cannot divorce the 
doing of history from life as it is seen and experienced. 
Carl Becker, tor example, accepts a form of \preunderstandine 
as a historical fact of life. He says: 
It must then be obvious that living his- 
tory, the ideal series of events that 
we affirm and hold in memory, since it 
is so initially associated with what we 
are doing and with what we hope to do, 
cannot be precisely the sanie for all 
at any given time, or the sanie tor one 
generation as for another.- 
Allan Nevins, in a discussion of the problems of historical 
interpretation, recognizes "that historians can only prescnt 
a number of varying theories, each supported by more or 
less plausible evidence.112 it goes without saying that one 
of the determining factors on which a theory is chosen is 
the historian's prior assumptions and attitudes. 
1 Op. cit., p. 242. 
2 The Gateway to History, Garden City, New York, 1962, 
p. '.28. 
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H. The Implications of the problem for the Inters :retation 
of the Christian Faith 
To get at the implications of this general acceptance of 
preunderstanding in historical interpretation for interpreting 
the Christian revelation, it would be well to start at the 
beginning and see how the word "history" has been variously 
defined and used.3 At least four possibilities come to mind. 
First, history is a word which is often used to describe 
what has hapLened. To describe something as historical is 
to distinguish it from the realm of make -believe. Myths, 
legends and fiction are not said to be historical. History 
describes an actual series of events that once occurred. To 
say this or that is historical is to say that if we tiad been 
there with a television camera, we would have been able to 
catch a sequence of events on film. History in this sense of 
the term refers only to those events or that series of events 
which constitute the minimum core of factuality. it only 
asserts "happenedness", not meaning. There is, ther_eiore, 
when history is defined at this level., no actual inte.rureta- 
tion to be influenced by preunderstanding. That there was a 
series of events in which Jesus vas the central ligure is all 
that can be said when history is understood at this level. 
Second, the term is used in a more restrictive sense to 
describe only those events which we affirm and hold in memory. 
History comes to mean not simply what harpen:d, but the 
sionif_ cant events that happened. We use the terni Tthistoric'T 
3 Hordern, op. cit., pp. 63-72. 
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to describe these events. To judge an event as historic is 
already to move into the area of interpretation and to see 
the potential for one's preunderstanding to be an influence. 
This kind of history, is relative, and varies in response to 
the influence of preunderstanding and the increase and 
refinement of knowledge. The historic, as opposed to that 
which merely happened, is that which is `till alive for the 
historian, history in which the interpreter finds meaning for 
himself. It should be noted that the historic is not to be 
separated from type one, for people can only remember what 
actually happened. The history of Jesus may be said to be 
historic in that it is judged to be so by the believing, i.e. 
it gives meaning to their lives, and it is remembered because 
it actually happened. 
Still a third way in which the word "history" is used 
is to describe the work of the professional historian. 
History for the historian is an inquiry into the "actions 
of human beings that have been done in the past,"4 "the 
science of men in time, "5 "the memory o: things said and 
done."6 Such a task is not simply a discovery of facts, but 
an interpretation of.the facts based on evidence. The 
interpretation categorizes the facts, weighs their significance 
and relates them to each other meaningfully. In this 
p. 9. 4 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, London, 1946, 
5 Marc Bloch, The Historians Craft, Manchester, 1954, p. 27. 
6 
Becker, óp. cit., D. 235. 
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responsibility the historian becomes both an artist and a 
scientist. He is an artist in that he deals with the unique, 
with events which cannot be repeated for observation, and 
because he is personally involved in the creative task of 
reproducing the past in meaningful form. He is. a scientist 
insofar as he does not allow his own prejudices to cloud 
his judgment regarding the evidence, but allows the evidence 
as far as possible to speak its own truth. Here again the 
preunderstanding of the historian will have an important 
role to play both as a more or less unconscious influence 
in terms of his env *ronmenta.l conditioning and as a conscious 
influence in terms of his understanding of and approach to 
history. It will certainly make a difference in the inter- 
pretation of the whole complex of events surrounding the life 
of Jesus. 
Finally, the term history is often employed in describing 
a particular conception of historical causality which rules 
out any event which is not exrlainaL:le in terms of presently 
known laws of nature and psychology. As many have pointed 
out, this position is itself a metaphysical one. It has its 
roots in eighteenth century attempts to wed scientific and 
historical epistemology. It is this usage of the term 
tthistorvtt, built on a particular preunderstanding, which we 
believe the Christian must challenge if he is to maintain 
that God has made Himself known in history in the person of 
Jesus Christ. This problem we must consider in some detail. 
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III. The Positivist Challenge 
In order to see more clearly the questions which this 
"positivists" view of history poses for the assertions of 
faith, it would be well to place the problem in historical 
perspective. While this cannot be done in detail here, and 
has been treated adequately elsewhere,7 it is nevertheless 
important to sketch some generalizations which will -uide us 
in our present discussion. 
Tn the Middle Ages there was little historical awareness 
as we know it today. History was carefully divided into sacred 
and profane, and it -vas a matter or citing authoritative 
sources to establish a historical truth. The seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries saw little change as the m dieval view 
of history continued its unchallenged reign. In these 
centuries, history was little more than the handmaid of 
philosophical and polemical writing. Men looked for progress 
in knowledge toward the mathematical and philosophical 
sciences and awa y from history which appeared to be beyond 
the possibility of verification. Lessing's (1729- 1761) 
often quoted statement in his über den Leweis des Geistes und 
der Kraft epitomized the era: "Incidental truths of history 
can neve± become the proofs of necessary truths of reason. "8 
The "ugly ditch" between the accidental truths of history 
and the necessary truths of reason co ld not be leaped. 
7 See e. g. Richardson, History Sacred and Profane. 
8 Henry Chadwick, ed., Lessing's T'heolorical Writings, 
London, 1956, p. 53. 
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In the nineteenth century there came a gradual brak 
with authoritative tradition and a general rejection of the 
classical outlook of the whole medieval scheme of world 
chronology. The change in outlook had many roots and causes, 
two of which we will mention. First, historical thinking was 
given intellectual footage by the Enlightenment which provided 
a point of view critical of the traditional teac,,ing of the 
church, a necessary advance if history was to proceed out 
of the medieval world view. To the intellectual stimulus 
provided by the Enlightenment, one might also add the changes 
on the human scene, and in rarticular the industrial revolv- 
tion s a cause for the change in historical thinking. Alan 
Richardson remarks that "the first half of the nineteenth 
century had witnessed a greater change in the human scene 
than had ,-ver taken place in the whole span of recorded 
history.,.., "9 A new outlook upon man's history and poten.ial 
came as a natural sequence as new machines replaced hand- 
operated tools. It was inevitable that the dramatic changes 
in man's way; of life would affect his concet of history. 
Bernhard Lohse underlines the significance of the revolution 
in historical thinking by arguing that "the rise of his- 
torical thinking is one of the greatest movements in the 
intellectual history of mankind."10 
9 The Bible in the Age of Science, p. 47. 
lu Short History of Christian Doctrine, tr. by Ernest 
Stoefflef, Philadelphia,-T966, i . :ß'Zó. 
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in the nineteenth century western man +ecame historically 
minded as he had become scientifically minded in the seven- 
teenth century. An amazing effort at historical activity 
began. Historians sought, under the aphorism of Leopold von 
Ranke who became Professor of History at Berlin in 1825: 
T'ie es eigentlich gewesen --as it really happened, 
"11 
facts 
for their own sake. History became "scientific" in both its 
methods and tools. Yet with all their effort in the disinter- 
ested ;pursuit of facts, the nineteenth century historians did 
not entirely succeed in emancipating themselves from a pre- 
understanding which they inherited from their rationalist 
predecessors. In the first place, these historians were 
inclined to view past history, not from the perspective 
of the era in question, but from their own era. A smug 
superiorit.: about nineteenth century culture gave them little 
appreciation for previous eras and clouded their judgment. 
Secondly, they viewed history largely through the twin - 
lensed snectacies of rationalism and progress. perfection 
was the goal of mankind and reasoned science was tuie means 
by which it could t:e achieved. Finally, nineteenth century 
historiography hitched its epistemological uuagon to the 
star of the natural sciences. According to this positivist 
vies, of history, historical facts could be scientifically 
ascertained and arranged into a pattern of general laws 
11 These words a,):ear in Ranke's Geschichte der romanischen 
und germanischen Völker_, 1494 -1534, quoted by Richardson, 
Hi tory Sacred and Profaney n. 104. 
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concerning human behavior.- 12 
These presuppositions of historical understanding 
inevitably affected the interpretation of the New Testament, 
and were particularly influential in what has come to be 
called the"Life of Jesus Movement ". The underlying assump- 
tion in this movement was that the personalit'_ of Jesus could 
provide a solid historical foundation and guarantee the truth 
of his teaching on the Kingdom of God. The first century 
legends could be stripped away, leaving the authentic Jesus. 
The ironic element was that these "scientific" biographies 
of Jesus differed so widely in their views that it became 
obvious that their various authors were reflecting their own 
preunderstaudings in the accounts. This whole nineteenth 
century effort failed "because it became alarmingly and 
terrifyingly evident how inevitably each author brought the 
suirit of his own age into his presentation of the fignre of 
Jesus,'t 
1 3 
Twentieth century theologians, influenced by the ;positivist 
conceti.on of history, saw that the historical Jesus was an 
insecure shelf on which to lay their faith.14 The "neo- 
orthodox" theologians,. led Lv Karl Barth, a ttem nted in their 
various wa's to disengage Christian faith from the relativ- 
ities of history. Both Barth and Emil Brunner iiosited a 
12 Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 126 ff. 
13 'Anther Hornkamri, Jesus of Nazareth, tr. by Irene and 
Fraser McLusky with James M. Robinson, London, 1960, p. 13. 
14 A more thorough and careful study of this point will 
be made in Chapter Ten. 
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realm of super- history where the events of the gospel have 
taken place, and hence freed them from the skeptical scrutiny 
of historians. Paul Tillich developed his concetion of 
Christ as "the center. of history" which is given credence, 
not by historical verification, LA: by the meaning which it 
gives to our lives. Bultmann sought to interpret the Christ - 
event existentially, freeing it from its historical ground. 
What all these views have in common, although there is much on 
which they disagree, is their uncritical acceptance of the 
nineteenth century- view of history and of the naturalistic 
presuppositions of the historical critical method. They did 
not radically challenge the inherent preunclerstanding on which 
this view rests, but assumed it and were driven off the plane 
of history as a ground for revelation. The result w:' s a 
divorce between faith and historical knowledge, a position 
which appears contradictory if one maintains that history 
is the milieu of God's self -disclosure. So we ar left with 
the problem of how to overconie this. contradiction. 
To get at a possible solution, it is necessary for us 
to exa ine the naturalistic presuppositions of the historical 
critical method to see if they are necessary to its operation. 
Is it possible to reconcile modern historiography with a 
faith which affirms God's activity in history? 
Along with others, David Hume helped to establish the 
traditional pattern for an exclusion of God's intervention 
in history to be treated as a factor in historical explanation.15 
15 See AntonY Flew, God and Philosophy, London, 1966, 
!-P. 145 ff. 
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He argued that the criteria which we use to evaluate historical 
testimony and the general assumptions which make it possilld 
for us to analyze historical evidence rule out any possibil- 
ity of establishing on purely historic' ll grounds that a 
miraculous event has occurred. Hume made his case in three 
propositions: (1) The present documents of the past cannot 
be handled as historical evidence at all unless we presume 
that the same basic regularities held then as hold today; 
(2) The historian, in trying to determine what in fact hap- 
pened, must utilize as criteria all his present knowledge 
of what is pro:,able or improbable, possible or impossible; 
(3) Since God's intervention (miracle) is defined in ' ter.ms 
of practical impossibility, the application of these criteria 
precludes the possibility of a "supernatural" event. 
While each of these propositions has the overtone of 
self- evident truth about it, it is questionable if they 
hold for history as well as they do for science. Proposition 
one, for example, rules out any possibility for the unique 
to occur in history, but there is a sense in which history 
is full of the unique. Free man, with his creative energies, 
and new combinations of forces continually produce historical 
"events" which are novel. This does not mean that analogy 
is not still the basic tool of historical explanation, but 
it does caution the historian against projecting a simple 
deterministic scheme onto the drama of human history. Indeed 
a careful scrutiny of the whole panorama of human events 
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dictates against a closed view of history which Hume's 
proposition presupposes. History has far too many sur- 
prises to say prior to investigation what is póssible or 
impossible as a historical occurrence. 
It is propositions two and three which get at the 
heart of the matter. What the historian considers prob- 
able or improbable. will depend in large measure upon his 
preunderstanding. The danger is that the historian's 
preunderstanding will be closed- minded and exclude by 
definition the possibility of dealing with God's interven- 
tion in history. But such an exclusion, without a care- 
ful examination of the evidence, is to beg the question. 
The whole argument, resting on a rationalist preunder- 
standing, has haunted the historical critical method and 
has been assumed by many modern historians and theologians. 
Rudolf Bultmann is a good example of one so influenced. 
He makes it clear that there is no room to treat super- 
natural events within the confines of the historical criti- 
cal method. He argues that "the historical method includes 
the prestw position that history is a unity in the sense of 
a closed continuum of effects in which individual events 
are connected by the succession of cause and effect." He 
goes on to assert that "this closedness means that the con- 
tinuum of historical happenings cannot be rent by the inter- 
ference of supernatural, transcendent powers and that there- 
fore there is no 'miracle' is this sense of the word."16 
16 Existence and Faith, np. 291, 292. 
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The key phrase is "includes the presupposition that...." 
But does it? Why does he insist on a view of history 
which by definition excludes the possibility of dealing 
with God's activity on the plane of history? The nns\ :er 
of course is his accet >tance of a naturalistic world view 
of historiography. But do these Positivist assumptions 
necessarily inhere in the historical method itself? We 
would argue that the historical method is neutral in regard 
to what can and cannot happen in history. Its job is to 
aid the historian in determining what did happen, not in 
determining what can happen. 
IV. The Historian's Task 
This brings us to the point where we must look more 
carefully at the relationship between the historical method 
and preunderstanding. 4e shall examine this relationship 
under three headings: Explanation, Epistemology and Objectivity. 
A. Historical Explanation. 
If we were to ask a modern historian what it is he 
seeks to uncover he would probably reply, "the signifi- 
cant events of the past," or eerhaps, "the significant 
human events of the past. "17 If drawn out further in the 
conversation, he would no doubt add that the process of 
historical explanation involves more than just discovering 
what significant events have occurred, but also why they are 
significant and how they have occurred. He would explain 
17 
Collingwood, 22. cit., p. 9. 
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that the historian's responsibility is to make sense of the 
whole of history by explaining causes, patterns and pro- 
cesses. Continuing his explanation, he might say that 
history is a descriptive and analytical narrative of past 
events or facts written in a spirit of critical inquiry 
for the whole truth. 
To further clarify historical explanation, let us 
compare it with scientific explanation and observe their 
similarities and differences as they both in their own 
ways seek the truth. One obvious way to distinguish 
their difference is to call attention to the factor of time. 
The historian seeks to uncover individual facts about the 
past whereas the scientist endeavors to discover individual 
facts about the present. But this is not their only differ- 
ence and in order to see the others we might list at least 
four essential features of scientific knowledge:18 (1) a 
body of systematically related material, arranged in an 
orderly way; (2) a series of general propositions drawn 
from the arranged material; (3) the capacity to predict 
and control; and (4) an objective account so that every 
unprejudiced observer ought to accept its validity if the 
evidence were out before him. 
History does share some common concerns with science, 
namely the effort to be both systematic (1) and objective 
(4). But it does not try to state explicit propositions 
18 
See H. W. Walsh, An introduction to the 1 hilosophy 
of History, London, 1964, pp. 34 ff. 
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about the nature of human development, th_)ugh it may use 
some form of generalization. Nor is it concerned to predict 
and control the future. The historian is conscious that 
history is altogether too complex and filled with the 
unique to force into an artificial mold. The freedom and 
subtleties of human nature inevitably embarrass a too 
simple scientific effort at precision. Reinhold Niebuhr 
states: 
Historical patterns are in a category of 
reality which cannot be identified with 
the structures of nature. They are to 
be sharply distinguished from natural 
structures because they represent a 
compound of freedom and necessity. 
On the same page he says: 
It is because historical causation is 
endlessly complex, and historical dramas 
overlap one another in bewildering con- 
fusion, that history is not subject to 
the generalizations of either the 
scientists or the philosophers, who in- 
sist ón trying to comprehend its multi- 
farious themes in terms of either natural 
or ontological necessity. -9 
Cne might even wonder whether the scientist and the 
historian share a common concern for objectivity, if one 
means by objectivity a complete' detachment from the oiject 
of study. While the historian does seek at one level to 
discover, examine and criticize by objective criteria 
documents of history and ascertain from them a body of so- 
called factual material, at another level he is personally 
19 The Sell and the Dramas of History, London, 
1956, p. 37: 
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involved with his material creatively re- presenting it in 
an understandable fashion. It is at this pint where the 
historian's preunderstanding has an important part to play 
in bis interpretation. And it is this latter function 
of the historian which is ignored by the positivist con- 
ception of history which insists th -t all branches of 
knowledge depend on the same basic impersonal procedures 
of observation, conceptual reflection and verification. 
At the other extreme of the positivist view of 
history is the idealist view which gives full considera- 
tion to the role of the historian in the historical pro- 
cess. The idealist historian postulates that the doings 
and experiences of human L:eings are the doings and exper- 
iences of human minds, and we are able to grasp them in 
their concrete detail because we have minds. By the act 
of re- thinking or re- living the historian is able to 
secure historical knowledge. His task is not so much 
to play the spectator as to imaginatively participate in 
the thoughts and decisions of the men who have made his- 
tory. This of course involves some preunderstanding. 
This roint of view was noteably articulated by W. 
Diltiley who maintained that the distance between the his- 
torical object and the interpreting subject vanishes, for 
they are united by virtue of the soul which lives in them 
both.2° perhaps the most thorough going advocate of the 
20 Hodges, 22 cit., p. 29. 
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idealist view of history was Benedetto Croce who defended 
the view that historical knowledge is at the same time self - 
knowledge and knowledge of mind. As he puts it: "the con - 
ceptin of history that we have reached...identifies history 
with the act of thought itself.tt21 For our purpose what is 
important to observe is that both Dilthev and Croce drew the 
conclusion that the historian cards within histor\ and 
participates in it. Both argued ghat we knew now what 
happened then by what has been termed an act of mediation. 
One of the best known exponents of the idealist point 
of view in historical expiana ion is R. G. Collingwood. 
According to Collingwood the historian does not apprehend 
his or_ical phenomena in the same way that the scientist 
perceives natural facts. Rather he understands them by 
re-enacting the process of thought. Fundamentally, history 
is the "re- enactment of past thoughts in the historians's 
own nmind." 
22 
Further, "historical knowledge is the knowledge 
of what mind has done in th:: past, and at the same time it 
is the re -doing of this, the perpetuation of Last acts in the 
present..."" by an autonomous critical act of re- thinking. 
It is not necessary to be a philosophical idealist to 
sympathize with these points they are making. The historian's 
task, while attem!ting to uncover truth with the same dili- 
gence as the scientist, proceeds on a different course, a 
21 rlitory: Its Theory and practice, tr. l.:y Douglas 
Anslie, New orLc, 1921, r. 117. 
22 Coll_ingwood, on. cit., p. 215. 
23 Ibid., P. 218. 
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course which throws him into contact with his material in a 
much more personal way. History is a vicarious experience, 
one in which subject and object do not exist independently 
of each other, and this fact opens the way for the preunder- 
standing of the historian to play a significant role. 
The historian.'s task then is to explain to the present 
the significant events of the past through the recorès which 
he possesses. This will rest on a combination of knowledge, 
creativity, common sense and intelligent guessing. He must 
try to reach meaningful decisions in regard to the evidence 
and make them rationally c evincing not only to tur:isClf bt 
to of :lei s. He must clear up obscurities, bring his material 
together in understandable categories, sift the fitting from 
the false and in general unravel and explain. His responsi- 
bility is "to study events not accessible to our observation, 
and to study these events inferentially, arguing to them 
from something else which is accessible to our observation, 
and which the historian calls'evidence' for the event in which 
he is interested. "24 But the crucial point to note is chat 
the final results of his explanation will depend to a large 
extent on the preunderstanding which he brings to his handling 
of the evidence. After the "scientific" work is done, judg- 
ments must still be made, and they will be made largely in 




B. Historical Epistemology 
The historian not only must explain what it is that he 
tries to uncover, he must also give some account of the 
trustworthiness of the judgments he makes. His problems 
are increased because the facts he seeks to explain are no 
longer accessible to direct insLection. The historian cannot 
test the accuracy of historical statements by simi ly seeing 
whether they corresuond to a reality which is independently 
known. The chief solution to his difficulty lies in turning 
to historical evidence, traces of the past which we possess. 
These "tracks ", as Marc Bloch calls them,25 come in an in- 
finite variety, and neither their meaning nor their authen- 
ticity is always clear. Hence it is icumbent on the historian 
to be clear concerning his epistemological presuppositions 
and.careful regarding the way he handles the evidence which 
he uses to support his case. 
Let us look first at a possible theory of truth which 
the historian might utiiire.26 Traditionally, philosophers 
have worked with two thecries of truth, the corrc:srnndence 
theory and the coherence theory. The correspondence theory 
says that a statement is true if it corresponds to the facts, 
and conversely, if it corresponds to the facts, it is a true 
statement. The fundamental problem for employing this theory 
of truth in history is that the facts are not available 
25 Op. cit., p. 55. 
26 a1:=h, op. cit. , . 72 ff. 
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for direct oL nervation. It is difficult to grasp the given 
as given because we are separated in time from it. 
The coherence theory, of truth argues that truth is not 
so much a matter of the., relation h tween a statement and fact 
as it is between one statement and another. A statement is 
true ii it can be shown to cohere or fit in with all other 
statements we are prepared to accept. The dif,iculty with 
this themry is that all truth is essentially relative. It 
depends to a large extent on the preunderstanding that one 
already pos-esses whch determines what stints are accept- 
able or unacceptable. Also it implies that all historical 
knowledge, in that it rests on knowledge of the present, 
becomes not knowledge of the past, but of the present. This 
last objection to the coherence theory of truth as applied 
to history does not carry nearly the force of the first. 
It is .true the t evidence for the past is present in the sense 
of being presented to the historian now, but it d es not 
follow from this that it must refer to present time. 
;here then is the historian to turn to justiiti- the 
truth of his conclusions if he has no direct access to the 
past and if all historical stAements are relative? A possible 
solution, as 'Ú. H. Walsh suggests,27 might be a synthesis of 
the two theories. be would argue that, there is an attempt in 
history, as in percertion, to treat an objective and indepen- 
dent reality. There is a given element in historical thinking, 
27 Ihid. , D. 90. 
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even thovTh the historian has no direct vision of it, nor 
can cue isolate it for observation. His access is via the 
evidence which the past has left in the present. The way 
the historian handles this given element will'depend on how 
it coheres with all other statements which he is prepared to 
acceît. The validity of this theory of historical episte- 
mology will depend in large measure onhow the historian 
handles the evidence which supplies the given element to 
which he gives his attention. Because the evidence is sub- 
jected to the action of the historian's preunderstanding, 
he must establish certain checks and balances to prevent the 
negative influence of preunderstanding (e.g. prejudice) from 
taking its toll, and allow as far as possible for the evidence 
to speak for itself. This will necessitate the presence of 
a self-consciously formulated preunderstanding which, containing 
certain attitudes and assumptions, makes the goal realizable. 
A list of the attitudes which the historian should possess 
in handling his material would have to include open -mindedness, 
curiosity,. patience, accuracy, love of order, a logical mind, 
honesty, self- awareness and imagination.28 If the historian 
does not possess these virtures, then his work is in vain 
and there is no possibility of spanning the gap between 
past and present in any meaningful ay. There is no room 
in historical writing for a blurring of the horizon between 
28 Larzun and Graff, on. cit., pp. 57 t 
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fact' and fiction, and without these qualities the historian 
can make the evidence say almost anything he wishes. 
The possession of these attitudes forges the historian 
to ask certain fundamental questions about his material:29 
1. Is the object or piece of writing what it purports 
to be? 
2. Is its message trustworthy? 
3. How do I know the answer to the first two questions? 
The answer to question 3 leads to another series of questions: 
1. Who is the author or m ker? 
2. What does the object or piece of writing tell me? 
3. What is the relation between the author and the 
message which is conveyed? 
4. How does the message conveyed compare with other 
statements on the same point? 
5. What do we know independently about the author and 
his credibility or the object and its authenticity? 
6. What have other competent scholars who have examined 
the material said about it? 
The answer to these questions should give us the following 
information: 
1. Whether or not the evidence was forged, -,nd if so, 
why, and whether it still has value. 
2. What the evidence tells us and wiw: t can be inferred 
from it 
29 
Ibid., pp. 135 r 
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3. The degree of value, increasing proporton6 ;.ely 
in terms oí the author's nearness in time and space to the 
event being considered, -nci ,,.,e number oi witnesses supporting 
the view; two, in this case being better than one. 
4. The author's point of view. 
In all of this ; robability is the great guide. His- 
torical truth rests not on possibility nor on plausibility, 
but on probability. At this point it would perhaps be wise 
to clarify our usage of the term "probability ". it has been 
used in at least two different ways which are generally 
referred to as the statistical and the inductive. According 
to the first, probability is a statistical concept of use 
only when there is a plurality of cases. For example, sänce 
a die has six faces, each of which is equally likely to turn 
up, the probability of throwing one particular number in any 
given throw is one in six. According to the other tyre of 
probability theory, to say that statement x is more probable 
than statement y is to say that when they are Loth considered 
in relation to a common body of prior proposa tions, it is 
more "reasonable" to believe x than y, or x is more worthy 
t i.-helief than y. It is in this latter sense that we employ 
the t erm. 3U 
The accent on probability again opens the door to pre - 
understanding. What the historian will consider probable or 
improbable in a iven interpretation, after all the evidence 
30 lohn Hick, ihilosophy of Religion, pp. 29 -30. 
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has been carefully examined, will depend to some extent on 
the assumptions he makes about the nature of ultimate reality 
and historical truth. 
To summarize, there are four statements we can make 
regarding historical epistemology. (1) The past has left 
traces of itself in the present in an infinite variety of 
forms, and this constitutes the given with which the histor- 
ian works. (2) The historian critically tests these traces 
to ascertain their message. (3) The historian's judgment 
regarding the evidence is governed by probability. (4) The 
reconstruction of an absolute past is a delusion because the 
historian has no direct access to the past, and because he 
brings to the evidence which he possesses his own preunderstanding. 
C. Historical Objectivity 
This last statement brings us to our third considera- 
tion of the historian's task, i.e. historical objectivity. 
By historical objectivity we mean that the condition must 
exist in a given historical analysis that all men thought 
competent to judge would reach approximately the same con- 
clusions. All historians would agree that there is a need 
for some sort of objectivity and impartiality in their work, 
and the very method they employ, which we have just described 
in outline, is designed to answer this need. Yet there per- 
sists in history stubborn disagreements which imply that the 
sort of objectivity and agreement which one finds in science 
does not exist in history. Why is this the case? We have 
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already alluded to what we consider to be the answer, but 
we must be more explicit. 
The answer lies in the fact that the historian brings 
to his material more and more varied types of preunderstanding 
than the scientist. The subjective element is always present 
no matter what precautions he may use to control it. All 
historical judgments are a complex mixture of interpretation 
and fact, and "there can be no interpretation of history 
without specific presuppositions. "31 Carl Decker, perhaps 
with. tongue in cheek, describes historians as 
that ancient and honor.Lle company of wise 
men of the trii:e, of bards and sort'- tellers 
and minstrels, of soothsayers and priests, 
to whom in successive ages has been entrust- 
ed the keeping of the useful myths.32 
Lest he be taken at face value, he quickly adds that "to 
establish the facts is always in order, and is indeed the 
first duty of the historian",33 but his skepticism about 
historical objectivity nevertheless comes through. He goes 
on: ",eing neither omniscient nor omnipresent, the histor- 
ian is not the same always and evrywhere; and for him.... 
the form and significance of remembered events, like the 
extension and velocity of physical objects, will vary with 
the time and place of the observer. "34 Even the most scrup- 
ulous historian cannot confine his material within the strait- 
ened bounds of scientific procedure because he cannot stand 
31 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 
Vol. II, p. 6. 
32 Ç. cit., p. 247. 
33 Ibid. p. 249. 
34 Ibid., pp. 251-252. 
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outside the course of time and judge the panorama of events. 
He is involved in their continual flow and movement and, 
whether he likes it or not he cannot claim to have a fixed 
and final knowledge. His preunderstanding will always in- 
fluence his views. He belongs to a particular ramily, class, 
country and culture. He speaks a given language and was 
educated in a certain way. He has come under the influence 
of some people and not others. All of this conditioning 
affects, though not in any absolutely deterministic pastern, 
the type of preunderstanding which he will possess. It will 
contribute to the prior information he has about the matter 
to be interpreted; it will suggest the ideolo«ical structure 
from which he works; it will help shape the attitudes he 
brings; and it will supply the method of approach. His pre- 
understanding will in turn influence his interpretation. 
I r may e, r or example, tnat a p:_: rticuiar attitude or ideo- 
logical construct will be the determining factor in his sel- 
ection of what is important and worth chronicling and his man- 
ner of colligating it, "Like any scholar, like any mind 
which perceives at ail, the historian selects and sorts"T 
35 
and this process is inevitably linked to personal convictions. 
For "facts cannot be selected without some personal convic- 
tion as to what is truth, and cannot be arranged without the 
'16 
same conviction --and this conviction is a bias."- 'l'he his- 
torian cannot escape his own historical existence. This 
35 
=loch, op. cit., p. 144. 
36 Allen Nevins, ibid., pp. D4 -5 
should not be construed as an argument for total historical 
skepticism. It is only 
the discovery of a second dimension of 
historical thought, the history of history: 
the discovery that the historian himself 
together with the here- and -now which forms 
the total body of evidence available to 
him, is part of the process he is studying, 
has his own place in that process, and 
can see it only from the point of view 
which at this present moment he occupies 
within it.37 
So, if it is true that every historical interpretation 
is guided by some prior understanding, then in what sense, 
if at all, can history be called objective? Or to word the 
question another way: Is it possible to gain objective 
historical knowledge at all? Of course it is possible to 
fix some events objectively by the documents which we possess, 
but in general these do not constitute significant history. 
The meaning and importance of the event must also be ascer- 
tained if the historián is to fulfill his responsibilities. 
Perhaps a partial solution to the demand for objectivity 
might lie in the following considerations: (1) An effort 
must be made to arrive at an objective judgment by remaining 
open to any conclusions to which the historical evidences 
may lead. The historian must have a preunderstanding which 
allows for this openness. (2) The historian moves clóser to 
objectivity insofar as he critically tests in all ways 
possible, including an examination of the scholarly opinions 
of his colleagues, his own subjective impressions, so as to 
37 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 24:_ . 
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gain a knowledge of objects. (3) An objective _;udgment is 
only realized, but nevertheless realized, from the uersiective 
of the historian. iecause each man is a complex being, and 
historically conditioned in a different way, each man will 
view historical phenomena from a diferent point of view. 
Each of these viewpoints is open to one side of the historical 
process and from each viewpoint something objectively true 
will appear.38 The picture only becomes falsified if one 
viewpoint is made: absolute. (4) There are some historical 
phenomena which require that a particular preunderstanding 
be present in order tor them to be grasped in th`ir full 
significance. The Christian affirms that God's revelation 
in jeFus Christ is such a phenomenon, and that faith is the 
necessary preunderstanding. We will consider this claim 
:in more detail in our next chapter. 
V. Conclusions 
What conclusions can we draw from this brief discussion 
of the role of prcunderstanaina: in historical interpretation? 
The first one is that historiography in its explanation and 
method is not inherently hostile to Christian faith, nor does 
it exclude a pri '.)ri the Possibility of dealing with God's 
activity in history. Historical method itself is neutral 
reg rding the nature of ultimate truth, and Christian theology 
should not allow the presuppositions of positivist historiog- 
38 Eultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 118. 
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raphy to dictate what can be treated historically.39 
Second, preunderstanding is present in all historical 
writing even though there may be an appearance of definite- 
ness and finality. The historian must be conscious of the 
relative nature of all views, and particularly of his own. 
He should not fear to expose his own viewpoint to the light 
of others, and in so doing be ready to revise his decisions. 
He should resist, on one hand, black and white thinking and, 
on the other, skepticism, for in both cases he strays from 
the responsibilities of his task.40 He must have the courage 
to make relative decisions on the basis of the evidence. 
Third, the historian should apply the historical method 
with consistency and care in order to filter out the negative 
aspects of his own subjectivity. He should learn to be 
self -aware enough to recognize his own preunderstanding, even 
acknowledge it, and rigorously judge it. For as one author 
has expressed it, "it is important...that, whatever the pre - 
suppositions of the historian may be, it should not be one 
which biases or embarrasses him in the course of his work.tt41 
Finally, it should be remembered that preunderstanding 
has a positive role to play, for without it, we could not 
even begin to interpret the given element in history. Our 
preunderstanding makes possible insights and modes of un er- 
standing -which would otherwise be out of the question. That 
faith is such a preunderstanding in relation to the Christian 
revelation is a claim that we must now examine. 
39 See T. A. Roberts, History and Christian Apologetics, 
London, 1960. 
. 
40 Hendrikus Berkhof, óÿ. cit., pp. 202 ff. 
41 J. V. Langmead Ca8serly, Toward a Theology of History, 
London, 1965, p. 89, 
Chapter Five 
History and Faith 
I. Introduction 
e are now in a position to turn our attention from a 
general discussion of the role of preunderstanding in his- 
torical study to the specific role of preunderstanding in 
the interpretation of the Christian faith. As we do, it 
should be borne in mind how the development of our theme 
has proceeded up to this point. We have seen that preunder- 
standing is an everpresent feature of all perception and 
interpretation of reality and hence will Le a factor in the 
endeavor to give a true interpretation of the Christian rev- 
elation. Particular attention was paid to the influence of 
preunderstanding in historical interpretation because of the 
contention that the arena in which God has disclosed Himself 
is history, and uniquely so in the man Jesus of Nazareth. 
In the analysis of the relationship between preunderstanding 
.,nd history, it was concluded that probability was the distinc- 
tive feature of historical interpretation. To 2ssure the 
maximum degree of truth -probability for any historical inter- 
pretation, we saw that it became necessary to recognize t >oth 
the positive and negative influence of preunderstanding, and 
to utilize a methodology which would accentuate the positive 
and put strict controls on the negative. This of course holds 
with special torce in the all important task of interpreting 
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the history which surrounds the appearance of Jesus Christ. 
e will discuss the relatinnship of preunderstanding 
to the interpretation of the Christian revelation by con- 
sidering the questions raised by the historical critical 
method as it is applied to the Christian faith, giving spec- 
ial attent=_on to the problem of the historical Jesus. From 
there we will discuss the resurrection as a historical event, 
arguing that the only appropriate preunderstanding for full 
comprehension of the resurrection is faith. 
II. Faith and the historical Critical Method 
The only really important traces which we have of Jesus 
are the documents of the New Testament. With the rise of 
historical thinking in the nineteenth century, it is not 
surprising that these documents were analyzed historically. 
Many within the church viewed this critical approach to the 
Bible with less than iavorable eyes, fearing that the results 
of such an analysis would be detrimental to faith, it is to 
the credit of Protest.nt Liberalism that its representatives 
welcomed the historical study of the Bible, it is perhaps 
to the shame of some more conservative theologians that they 
were afraid to take the risk of subjecting their understanding 
of the Bible to historical criticism, though in all fairness 
it should be acknowledged that they did have some grounds for 
anxiety, as the historical method was often bound to a closed 
naturalistic and positivistic world view. 
But after nearly two centuries of historical s tudy of 
Scripture, it has now become clear to the present generation 
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of biblical scholarship, whether liberal or conservative, 
that the Bible cannot be understood any other way. There 
can be no turning the clock back to the precritical age of 
biblical interpretation. As one conservative scholar has 
said: "These critical methods must be used because of the 
obvious fact that the Bible is not a magical book, but a 
product of history written. in the words of men.r ?1 The his- 
torical approach to the Bible has opened our eyes to its 
meaning and significance in a way which was closed to ages 
prior to the revolution in historical thinking. 
Yet when the results of the application of the histor- 
ical method to the Bible turned out to be different from the 
traditional beliefs held by the church for centuries, there 
was cause for theological concern. Three options presented 
themselves to the theologians.2 (1) The historical critical 
approach could be rejected outright as a valid method for 
interpreting the Bible. This has been the course followed 
by Fundamentalism. (2) There could be a declaration of 
peaceful co- existence, in which both history and faith were 
given their respective domains. This course has been followed 
by many theologians of the modern era, and perhaps most 
notably by Rudolf Bultmann. (3) There could be an attempt 
at integrating both the historical and theological disciplines. 
1 George E. Ladd, The New Testament and Criticism, 
Grand Rapids, Mich., 1967, p. 22. 
2 Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 36. 
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It is this latter approach which we maintain has the best 
possibility of doing justice to the Christian revelation. 
Option one, the rejection of the historical critical 
approach to the interpretation of the }able, seems an unlikely 
route for theology to pursue. Even if one maintains that 
the fdble is the infallibly written Word of God, it must be 
admitted that this Word of God is given to rien through his- 
torical events and historical personages. This very fact 
demands historical criticism. What advocates of the con- 
servative point of view often fail to realize is the theo- 
logical neutrality of the historical method. It need not 
rile out by definition the possibility of God's intervention 
in history. Historical criticism of the Bible simply means 
making intelli.ge.nt judgments about the evidence, not deciding 
a priori what can happen in history. 
The second option, the separation between history and 
faith, is epitomized by Rudolf Bultmann's call to demyth- 
ologize the New Testament by way of an existential inter- 
pretation. Bultmann's concern is to avoid the inevitable 
collision between historical tact and existential faith by 
placing faith out of reach of historical scrutiny and by 
attempting a redefinition of history. He maintains that the 
New Testament, as we possess it, is not historically accurate, 
but contains mythologic elements. It as written at a time 
far enough removed from the history it records so that it 
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has lost touch with the actual situation, and its authors 
have imposed their prescientific world view on its pages. 
A reconstruction is necessary on the basis of the critical 
principles of historical study. But faith does not need to 
wait for the answers uncovered by historical reconstruction. 
,l hat is important in the New Testament message is rants 
self -understanding. By demythologizing the New Testament, 
this essential message becomes clear. The real issue for 
faith is not what happened then but what happens now in the 
moment of existential decision. it is the Christ of faith, 
not the jcsus of history, with whom we are concerned. The 
meaning of the kerygma is not to be sought in uncovering the 
historical Jesus, which is impossible anyway, but in the 
awareness of resousibility before God. " erute facts, un- 
covered bv disinterested and objective history, are unimportant 
for faith. Bultmann does not deny that they exist, only that 
they are not essential for faith. There is a different level 
of historical knowledge which is important for faith, and that 
is ,_existential knowledge through encounter with history. 
The meaning of history is to be sought in the present because 
"every historical moment has'its own meaning in itself in that 
it implies openness to God and that it has the possibility of 
becoming the eschatological moment. 
"3 
As Bultmann himself 
exL'resses it: "The meaning of history lies always in the 
3 Heinrich Ott, "Rudolf Bultmann's Philoso by of History ", 
in Kegley, ed., op. cit., n. 59. 
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present, and when the present is conceived as the eschatolog cal 
present by Christian faith trie meaning of history is realized. "4 
Such a redefinition of history may have eased one tension, 
but it also created others. in the theology of the last 
decade there has been a gradual consensus that the chasm 
between faith and history mast somehow be scanned. Few 
theologians would deny their indebtedness to Bultmann's 
thought, [gut few also are completely at ease with his nearly 
total divorce of the kerygma from history. Gerhard Ebeling, 
though he stands squarely in the 3ultmannian tradition, 
states: "Christianity stands or falls with the tie that binds 
it to its unique historical origin. "5 5 
The theology of ;'dolzhart Pannenuerg is an expression of 
this dissatisfaction over the split between faith and history, 
and most dramatically repr seats option three, the effort to 
unite the historical and theological disciplines. Pannenberg 
Wants to emancipate historical method from its "Babylonian 
Captivity" to positivism and naturalism. He argues that to 
retreat to the security of traditional dogma (Karl Barth) 
or existential decision (Rudolf Bultmann) is to dodge the 
issue. If revelation is historical occurramce, then the 
historical method should be an anprcpriate way of uncovering 
it. H storical methodology must be freed from its anthro- 
pocentric presuppositions. The principles of research do not 
necessarily imply that man rather than God is the moving force 
4 History and Eschatology, p. 155. 
5 Op-cit., p. 264 
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behind history. Though he is careful to acknowledge that 
historical science is a human effort, and one which makes rise 
of analogy, he nevertheless argues that this does not nec- 
essarily preclude the possibility of the novel and unrepeat- 
able. The historian should not deny the possibility of an 
event simply because he has no immediate analogy to it in 
his every day exQerience of reality. Faith and history are 
brought together in Pannenberg's view by his conce :t of reve- 
lation as history.? God stands behind all hi Cory g ving it 
meaning, not just one particular segment. For "only from the 
vantage point of universal history is it possible to find the 
complete meaning of any single event. "8 Without this postu- 
late, history is a meaningless maze of occurrences. He says: 
"The unit, of history can...only be understood in a way in 
which its connection and contingency have a common root."9 
The totality of reality as history is God's world which He 
created and through which He reveals Himself. The living 
God of the Bible is Lord over all nations, not just Israel. 
Because God's revelation to mankind comes as history, the 
historical method is the only reliable way of dealing with 
the past, and faith must be content to be de1.endent on the 
results of historical research. In fact historical reason 
and faith are not inseparable acts following a chronological 
7 See Pannenberg, ed., Offenbarung als Geschichte. 
8 Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte ", Kerygma 
und Dogma, 5 (1959), 280. 
9 Ibid., p. 284. 
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or Ps7chological sequence, but co-essential dimensions of 
the total pct of the person. Pannenberg's concern is to 
reverse the subjectivist emphasis in theology which has 
existed since Schleiermacher and which derives revelation 
from the experience of faith rather than from reason's 
knowledge of history. When reason's role is removed from 
the act of t^it'h, nothing prevents faith from postulating 
whatever is emotionally satisfying. he even refuses to 
separate historical knowledge from saving faith. For 
pannenberg there can be no split between the two. 
hannen'berg's radical departure from the Neo -E ntian 
distinction between reality and value and his new emphasis 
on the historicity of the saving events are to be welcomed, 
^s is nis straightforward effort to tree historiography from 
the confines of its naturalistic presuppositions and his bold 
attempt to reunite rebson and faith. his work has opened up 
whole new vistas for theological reflection. Yet there are 
10 
points where his theology seems vulnerable to criticism. 
In the first place, he tails to do justice to the doctrine 
of the Word of God. The pl¡, ce of the kerygma as the mediator 
of the historical revelation tends to be diminished. He 
defines God's revel tion as merely a matter of historical 
facts; it is there for anyone who has eyes to see. Secondly, 
because of this position, he almost substitutes sight for 
faith. Faith for Pannenberg becomes not so much a gift of the 
10 
For r full discussion see James M. Robinson and John 
Cobb, jr., eds., New Frontiers in Theology, Vol. III, Theo- 
logy as History, New York, 1967. 
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Spirit of God as it is a product of reason. There seems 
little room left for. trust. Finally, he seems to lose the 
c- tegory of uniqueness in the redemptive events. Although 
one appreciates his effort to keep faith which is not based 
on fact from entering the picture, it does not follow that 
there can be no unique and special revelation. just L:ec use 
God is seen as the prime mover in all historical events does 
not necessarily imply that he has not revealed himself in a 
special way at particular times and places.,ut these points 
of vulnerability do not diminish the gains made in emancipat- 
ing Christian theology from the bondage of positivist assump- 
tions in historiography. 
The problem of the relationship between faith and history 
has again raised the issue of the historical Jesus. And it 
is at this point where we can best observe the role of pre - 
understanding in the interpretation of the Christian faith. 
The historical critical method, built on positivist assump- 
tions, originally met its greatest obstacle in its attempt 
to isolate the historical Jesus. The field of biblical 
scholarship is cluttered with failures to explain who Jesus 
of Nazareth was and what his meaning is for us. Our pur- 
pose is not to give a complete account of this history, but 
to mention some general trends which will help us out the 
problem in perspective.11 
With the rise of historical thinking in the nineteenth 
11 
For an interesting treatment, see Hugh Anderson, 
ed., Jesus, Englewood Cliffs, New jersey, 1967. 
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century, the traditional christological formulations were 
seriously challeiv ed. The unqualified acceptnce of the 
Cin.,:lceaonian model was undermined when it was demonstrated 
that there was dependence on Greek philosophical categories. 
It was thought that Jesus Ps he "really" was had been buried 
in a theological system of abstract concepts. The Jesus of 
the Gospels-and the Christ of the creeds appeared to be quite 
different. :Even among the laity, there was a genuine suspi- 
cion tht Jesus had been misunderstood. 
This shift from a dogmatic to a historical perspective 
culminated in an intensive effort to reconstruct an authentic 
replica of Jesus. The scholars of this era made a sincere 
effort to rid themselves of their theological presuppositions 
in order to uncover the core of historical reality about Jesus. 
Yet preunderstanding, as we have argued, is not so easily 
shed, and between the lines of the assorted biographies of 
Jesus one is able to discern the cultural and religious view- 
points of their authors. What was discovered historically 
more often than. not had a too convenient correspondence to 
what was needed theologically. 
In general, the "quest .tor the historical Jesus" was 
divided between naturalistic and supernaturalistic approaches, 
with the majority being "positive" in that they attempted 
to establish the faith on solid historical foundations. Among 
the "negative" and more radical attempts to reconstruct a 
picture of Jesus was that of David Strauss. "e argued that 
the historical life of Jesus is hidden beneath a thick layer 
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of religious mythology. F_eing a radical Hegelian, he was 
not p rticularly bothered about this reduction of historical 
content in the Gospels, but was concerned with the notion 
that the essence of Christianity is to be found in the idea 
of God- manhood which entered historical consciousness for the 
first time in Jesus. The idea, once launched, Strauss argued, 
no longer needs the undergirding of genuine evidence of 
historical event. 
Ultimately it was the rigorous application of the his- 
torical method itself which signaled the defeat of the attempt 
to reconstruct a true portrait of the historical Jesus. 
Albert Schweitzer's study of the "life of Jesus" movement 
;,nd his conclusive argument that the eschatological preaching 
of Jesus conflicts with modern notions of religion and morality 
marked tre end of the era. Schweitzer writes: "Thus each 
successive epoch of theology found its own thoughts in Jesus: 
that was, indeed, the only way in which it could make him 
live. "12 At the Leginning of the twentieth century the frss- 
trat ng pres..ence of irreconcilable viewpoints produced a gen- 
eral historical skepticism and the way was open for a new 
theological approach. 
In the later part of the nineteenth century the theo- 
logian P,íaß_tin J Uhler h maintained that the only Jesus whom 
we know is the one whom they preached as the risen Christ who 
is Lord. In his book, Der sogenannte historische Jesus and 
der geschichtliche, biblische Christus, he argued that the 
12 
Or. c ̀ t. , ;. 4. 
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real Christ is not tithe historical Jesus" but the "kervgmatic 
41 
Christ ". Kahler did not repudiate the earthly Jesus, but the 
Jesus who had been manufactured by the historiography of the 
nineteenth century. What was needed, he asserted, was the 
Christ of the Bible who lived, died and rose again from the 
dead. 
It was into this general framework which the dialectical 
theologians of the 1920's and 1930's moved. Reacting against 
the mood of historical skepticism, they attempted to free 
Christology from its dependence on the historical and psycho - 
logical pictures of the personality of Jesus. Influenced by 
Spsren Kierkegaard, who had argued that historical inquiry 
into the lire of Jesus can never produce anything certain or 
relevant for faith, men such as Barth, Brunner, Gogarten, 
Tillich and Bultmann all disclaimed the historical Jesus 
movement. 
The problem wLich this disclaimer on the quest for the 
his Lorical Jesus raised for theology was whether such a break 
between faith and historical research could be tolerated. 
The proi:lem, as we have observed, is most evident in the 
tr 
theology of Rudolf ;Bultmann. Bultmann accepted Kahler's idea 
that the Gosrels are a kerygmatic witness to Christ and not 
biographical reports. True -faith, therefore, rests on the 
kerygma, not on the shaky foundation of historical research. 
Yet Bultmann is not quite willing to go all the way with 
this assertion. he does maintain that at least the hare fact 
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of Jesus' historicity and his death on the cross are necessary 
to the kerygma.13 But if the kerygma is dependent at all on 
Jesus, then faith cannot be independent of historical inquiry. 
This inconsistency in Bultmann's theology has its root in his 
uncritical acceptance of the positivist historiography of 
the nineteenth century. His acceptance of the presuppositions 
of this view of history forces Bultmann to remove faith from 
historical inquiry and root it in existential categories. 
Yet he retains the factuality of Jesus' life and death some- 
what inconsistently in order to maintain sole connection 
between Jesus and the kerygma. 
In more recent theology there has been a gradual dis- 
enchantment with the conclusion that the historical Jesus 
bears little or no relationship to faith. Joachim ,;eremias 
writes: 
To anyone who is not aware of the contro- 
versy, the question whether the historical 
Jesus and his messages have any signifi- 
cance for the Christian faith must sound 
absurd. No one in the ancient church, 
no one in the church of the Reformation 
period and the two succeeding centuries 
thought of asking such a question.14 
There is a new openness to the possibility, even necessity, 
of uniting faith and history in sovle meaningful fashion. 
One New Testa:nent scholar summarizes the situation as follows: 
"Today, however, we can be grateful that neither the rarefied 
13 See e.g. Bultmann's article in Kegley, ed., 2E. 
cit., P. 274. 
14 The Problem of the Historical Jesus, tr. by Norman 
Perrin, Philadelph á, 1964, p.-1. 
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atmosphere of the 'theology of the Nord' and of 'existential 
theology', nor the impasse reached oy criticism, Crave stifled 
the breath of continuing empirical Concern to investigate 
and shed light on the concrete historical character of the 
revelation in the man Jesus of Nazareth."15 There is the 
growing conviction that "to hold an historical faith is to 
have a faith which stands or falls with the records. "16 
Stephen Neill remarks: "It seems to be the case that the 
faith of the Church stands or falls with the general re- 
-liability of the historical evidence for the life and death 
of Jesus Christ. "17 The Dutch theologian, Hendrikus Berkhof, 
concludes that "what we believe and confess concerning Christ 
as the meaning of history is related to the reality with 
which our history books are concerned." 
18 
This new concern to explore the relationship between 
the historical Jesus and the kerygma has been labeled "the 
new quest of the historical Jesus ".19 The common concern 
of the "new questers" is to establish the correspondence 
between history and proclamation. In calling for a new 
quest, there is no devaluation of the enormity of the problems. 
There is a general recognition that the same difficulties and 
15 Hugh Anderson, Jesus and Christian Origins, New York, 
1964, p. 96. 
16 McIntyre, The Shape of Christology, n. 40. 
17 The Interpretation of the New Testament, London, 
1964, p. 22.1.. 
18 Op. cit., pp. 197 f. 
19 See James M. Robinson, A Nev,' Quest Of the i- iistor cal 
Jesus, Naperville, Ill., 1959. 
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limitations in Jesus research obtain now as obtained in the 
earlier efforts. The historian is still subject to tiie 
negative influences of his presuppositions, and there is no 
documentary evidence from Jesus' contemporaries of such an 
objective character as to build up a neutral portrait of Jesus. 
There is also the general acknowledgerient, to which Pannenberg 
is an exception, that historical research cannot go from 
facts, even interpreted facts, t. tell us about the reve- 
latory and redemptive action of God.20 
anther Eornkamm is representative of the new quest. In 
his study of Jesus he writes: "No one is any longer in a 
position to write a life of Jesust' because "we possess no 
single word of Jesus and no single story of Jesus, no matter 
how incontestably genuine they may be, which do not embody at 
the same time the confession of the believing congregation, 
or at least are embedded therein. This makes the search after 
the bare facts of history difficult and to a large extent 
futile." 
21 
Yet a few pages later he justifies his own effort 
when he says: "Although the gospels do not speak of the 
history of Jesus in the sense of reproducing the course of 
his career in all its happenings and stages, in its inner and 
outer development, nevertheless they do speak of history as 
occurrence and event. " ?`" 
20 Anderson, Jesus and Christian Origins, pp. 97 ff. 
21 Op. bit., pp. 13 -14. 
22 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling24 have turned their 
inquiry int a specific theological program. Working closely 
together they have developed a hermeneutical theory which 
rests upon the relationship of language and faith. The 
historical Jesus and the kerygmatic Christ are linked together 
in the concept of word- event. These men are not specifically 
interested in a biographical account of Jesus, but what 
uniquely came to expression in him, namely faith. To believe 
in Jesus means to re -enact the decision of faith which Jesus 
originally made. Jesus is more the witness to faith than he 
is the object of faith. But his historicity is nevertheless 
important for, as Ebeling puts it, "faith is manifestly not 
Christian faith if it does not have a basis in the historical 
Jesus himself. "25 He further argues that "if the quest of 
the historical Jesus were in fact to prove that faith in Jesus 
has no basis in Jesus himself, then that would be the end of 
Christology." 
26 
Other theologians, less influenced by Bultmann, have 
welcomed the new quest as a justification of their original 
pOsitinns that interest in the historical Jesus was a. legitimate 
theological concern. Theologians like Joachim Jeremias, 
Otto Michel, Oscar Cullmann and Ethelbert Stauffer have really 
never bowed to îultmannian prohibitions on searching beyond 
23 See his Studies in the Historical Jesus, tr. by 
Andrew Scbie, London, 1964. 
24 Op. cit., pp. 200 ff. 
25 
Ibid., b. 204. 
26 Ibid., P. 205. 
(130) 
the kerygma for historical fact in order to more firmly root 
faith. 
It is beyond the scope of our studs; to discuss the new 
quest in its many forms. Our purpose is rather to establish 
the general consensus, even among the Bultmann theologians, 
that there is a continuit between Jesus and the kerygma. 
There must to at least a minimum core of factuality27 regarding 
Jesus if the kerygma is to present us with a way of life that 
is realistic and not culled from a dream world. This factual 
element can and should be treated by the historical critical 
method for, as Alan Richardson reminds us, "The affirmations 
of the Christian creeds are historical, not metaphysical, in 
character, and Christian theology itself is a matter of the 
interpretation of history." 
23 
III. Faith and the Resurrection of Christ 
For two reasons the particular affirmation of the 
Christian creeds around which the Jesus of history /Christ of 
faith debate should center is the resurrection. In the first 
place, if there is one issue on which the form- critics are 
agreed in their study et the earliest Christian traditions, 
it is that faith in the risen Christ forms an indispensable 
part of the kerygma. A second reason is that one of the mist 
important developments in recent biblical studies is the 
27 John Aacquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, 
P. 148. 
28 History Sacred and 'Profane, p. 13. 
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disc ̂ very that the resurrection has a high degree of resist- 
ibility to all hypotheses which fail to reckon with its 
historicity.29 
The ironic element in the form -critical consensus that 
the resurrection forms an essential part of the kerygma is 
that many scholars, despite their differences, are agreed in 
their view that the resurrection is not a historical event. 
They may look for the continuity in Jesus' faith, in his 
preaching, his idea of grace, his attitudes and actions, or 
his self -understanding, hut not in his resurrection. 
Why is there such a wide acceptance of Bultmann's 
remark that "an historical event which involves a. resur.ection 
from the dead is utterly inconceivable " ?30 Why do positions 
both to the right and left of Bultmann share the view that the 
event of the resurrection forms no part of the historical 
problem of the life of Jesus? The answer lies in the acceptance 
of a. naturalistic view of history, a position which involves 
these theologians in affirming the centrality of the resur- 
rection in the faith of the primitive church while denying the 
resurrection as an event of past history. So in the attempt 
to maintain the continuity with the kerygma of the early 
church, they are forced to maintain its meaning while denying 
its historical reality, a point of view which seems less than 
convincing. As for example in the case of Bultmann, this 
29 Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 77. 
30 Kerygma and Myth, p. 39. 
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positioa is sustained in This familiar existential inter- 
pretation. Because the resurrection accounts are not state- 
ments about what really happened, but expressions of faith in 
the New Testament community, they may be retained in the 
symbolic language of faith as the expression of self -under- 
standing. Lut can a historical approach to the resurrection 
he ignored in the consideration of the life of Jesus question? 
is it possible to really understand Jesus apart from the 
resurrection? 
In the 1950's there began to alp :ear a series of studies 
31 
which urged that theology move toward the acceptance of the 
historicity of the Lnrd's resurrection. In 1952 Hans F. von 
Campenhausen analyzed the traditions of the Easter events and 
the empty tomb in Der Ablauf der Osterereignisse und das 
leere Grab in an effort to show that the resurrection accounts 
have an early place in the development of the tradition, and 
hence are acceptable as authentic historical reports. Fol- 
lowing von Campenhausen, a séries of full scale studies, of 
the resurrection appeared: Karl Hei'ich Rangstorf's Die 
Auferstehung Jesus (1952), Richard R. Niebuhr's Resurrection 
and Historical Reason (1957), and Gerhard loch's Die Aufer- 
stehung Jesu Christi (1959). Recently in Wolfhart Pannenberg's 
Grundzü e des Christologie (1964) and Jurgen íìíoltmann's 
Theologie der Hoffnung (1964) there is a scholarly effort 
31 See the list in Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, 
L. 92. 
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to place the historical resurrection of Jesus at the center 
of the theology of the church. All of these scholars describe 
the resurrection as a historical event while not denying its 
existential meaning. For them there is an indispensable 
unity of event and meaning. 
For both Pannenberg and Moltmann the issue hinges on the 
preunderstanding which one brings to the historical task. It 
all depends on what one means by the concept of history. For 
pannenberg, *tit is the close examination of the reports of 
the resurrection that. detetmine its historicity, and not the 
prior judgment that all events in history must be more or 
less the same. "32 Moltmann has concentrated on showing how 
the modern preunderstanding of what is historically possible 
stands in direct conflict with the biblical view of what is 
historically possible.33 The Bible understands historical 
possibility in terms of the activity of God, and it is an 
openness to the passibility of God's intervention tor which 
we have peen arguing. For, as one scholar concludes, "nothing 
is to be gained by coming to the New Testament already strongly 
prejudiced against any possib lity that God could have raised 
Jesus from the dead, as an event in our world and in our 
time." 34 It is not necessary to maintain with Bornkamm that 
"the event of Christ's resurrection...is...removed from 
32 Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte ", p. 266. 
33 Jurgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, Munich, 
1965, p. 157. 
34 Anderson, Jesus and Christian Origins, p. 189. 
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historical scholarship.'135 In order to do justice to the 
resurrection there must be a rejection of all ready made 
answers. Whether an event happened or not cannot be settled 
beforehand. Whether Christ rose from the dead is an exceed- 
ingly difficult problem. One must ask all sorts of theological 
questionsincluding the meaning of the resurrection and whether 
there is a resurrection apart from faith. But the resurrection 
also raises the historical question and this question must be 
answered by interrreting the evidence. 
While it is not our purpose to go into the nature of the 
evidence for Christ's resurrection, we must still comment on 
the issues involved in judging it. There are two basic 
criteria for evaluating and interpreting historical evidence: 
(1) the rigorous application of the historical method itself, 
which inures as far as possible the objectivity of the facts; 
and (2) the preunderstandin <. of the historian. Applying 
these two criteria to the resurrection involves then an 
examination of the attestations on the part of the witnesses 
to see if what they record as happening could be more rationally 
accounted for by some alternative hypothesis, and the 
maintenance of a preunderstanding which, checked by the 
historical critical method, remains open and sympathetic to 
accepting the message of the evidence.36 
ïhe evidences available to us concerning Christ's 
35 Op. cit., p. 180. 
36 Richardson, History Sacred and profane, D. 195. 
(135) 
resurrection are the Easter traditions handed down by the 
early church. These resurrection narratives, arising from the 
community which came into being for the exrress purpose of 
being a witness to the resurrection, constitute the primary 
evidence for it. What is needed is a careful analysis of the 
two strands of the tradition, one dealing with the appearances 
of the risen Lord, and the other with the phenomenon of the 
empty tomb.37 AfterT such an analysis it is safe to conclude 
that today there is a great deal more openness to the his- 
torical reliability of the resurrection testimonies. Even 
the tradition. of the empty tomb is not easily dismissed as 
having no authentic historical content. 
While the results of biblical scholarship may not lead us 
to faith in the risen Lord, they at least clear the way for 
it by removing false hindrances. As we have argued, the 
historian-'s ability to believe the resurrection will ultimately 
depend on the preunderstanding which he brings to the evidence. 
We agree with Alan Richardson who maintains that tithe his- 
torian's final judgment of the evidence will, then, in the 
last resort,. and after as vigorous a critical appraisal as he 
can make, be determined by the man he is. "33 The gulf of 
time between the historian and his object must be bridged 
from both ends. The evidence must be carefully analyzed, 
37 Anderson, Jesus and Christian Origins, pp. 185 ff. 
38 History Sacred and profane, p. 203. 
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and the historian's mind must be open to receive the truth of 
the event in question. 
i-Vhat conclusions then can we draw concerninc: the resur- 
rection of Christ as a historical event? In the first place, 
there is a good deal o evidence to support the fact that the 
resurrection occurred as an event in history. While this 
question is far from settled, and probably never will be, 
the recent trends in biblical scholarship give encouraging 
support to the resurrection's historicity. It is a historical 
probability. Secondly, in order to fairly treat this con- 
clusion, the historian must rid himself of preconceived ideas 
which compel him to believe that it could not have happened. 
Finally, and positively, for the resurrection to be believed, 
the historian will have to have a preunderstanding which is 
open to accepting the implications of the evidence. He will 
have to know in his own life something of the experience of 
the church as it worships Jesus as the living Lord. In short, 
he will have to have faith as a rational motive for affirming 
that Jesus is the risen Lord. 
Faith, then, is the necessary preunderstanding for the 
interpretation of the resurrection. In that we have main- 
tained that the resurrection is historical, we have also 
committed ourselves to the historical method as a second 
necessary ingredient for an adequate preunderstanding. And 
if the resurrection is foundational, which we believe it is, 
then it would foll^w that faith linked to the historical method 
is also the appropriate preunderstanding for the more general 
interr retation of the Christian faith. The faith of which 
(13%) 
we speak is firmly rooted in historical probability, though 
it is not born of historical knowledge, but of God. His- 
torical evidence may suggest that God is Present and acting 
in the event of the resurrection, but it cannot supply the 
personal experience of trust in and commitment to the risen 
Lord. Yet it will prevent faith from postulating anything 
which it wishes. Thus faith and historical study are not 
basically opposed to each other, but necessarily intersect 
in Jesus Christ, and constitute the minimum requirements 
for a hermeneutical approach to the Christian revelation. 
We now turn our attention to an examination of the role 
played by preunderstanding in representative historical and 
biblicEl interpretations of the Christian faith as they have 
appeared in and during the life of the church. 
S ECTI''N II 
PREUND.%ZSTAiNDING IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 
Chapter Six 
The Theology of History: Augustine 
I. The Formation of Augustine's preunderstanding 
In Section i we attempted to analyze the nature of 
preunderstanding and to asess its place in the historical 
end biblical interpretation of the Christian faith. We 
argued specific,lly that faith is the necessary preunderstand- 
ing for an adec.-auate interpretation of God's self- disclosure 
in Jesus Christ. We further maintained that since the Bible 
understands revelation as occurring in history, any inter- 
pretive approach must necessarily be rooted in the histor- 
ical method. We concluded that faith and historical study 
constitute the minimum requirements of an adequate hermen- 
eutic for the Christian faith. 
In this present section we will attempt to describe 
and evaluate, in light of the criteria established in Sec- 
tion I, the role which preunderstanding has played in selected 
and representative historical interpretations of the Christian 
faith as they have appeared throughout the lite of the 
church. Generally our analysis will consist of four _;arts: 
(1) An isolation of those factors which contri jute to the 
interpreter's preunderstanding, and particularly that aspect 
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of his preunderstanding which is directly related to his 
view of history; (2) A description of this preunderstanding 
in terms of its type and function; (3) A tracing of the in- 
fluence of his preunderstanding on his historical interpre- 
tation of the Christian faith; and (4) An evaluation of the 
interpreter's view in light of the two categories of faith 
,nd history. 
By "historical interpretations" we have in mind those 
positions which attempt to ascertain the place of Christianity 
in history. This will involve us in at least three consid- 
erations: (1) the interpreter's understanding of history; 
(2) the place he gives to Christianity in history; and (3) 
the way the interpreter -,ctually does history. It is im- 
!;ortant to keep in mind as we go along in this section that 
i our concern is with the way the interpreter's preunderstand- 
ing influences his historical interpretation of the Christian 
faith, not his total view of reality or even his uroader 
understanding of Christianity. t'e will therefore center our 
attention on the presuppositions of historical understanding. 
The obvious and logical place to start in assessing the 
influence of preunderstanding on historical interpretations 
of the Christian faith is with Augustine whose City of God, 
a "monumental theology of history "1, was to exercise such a 
profound influence on sulsequent generations of interpreters 
of history. In order to Bain an appreciation of the preunder- 
standing from within which Augustine attempts a historical 
1 Thomas Merton, "Introduction," in St. Augustine, 
The City of God, tr. 4 Marcus Dods, New York, 1950, p. 14. 
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interpretation of the Christian faith, it is necessary to 
look briefly at his life and times, out of which his preunder- 
standing was sh -,ped. 
The world into which Augustine was born in Tagaste in 
the province of Numidia in North Africa in 354 A.D. was 
exceedingly complex. It was, as one author stated it in 1940, 
"a world the perplexities of which have probably never been 
exceeded by any period, before or since. "2 behind Augustine 
was more than a míllenium of sustained effort to realize a 
stable society based on the classical idea of the common - 
wealth. _:.ut for over a century prior to his birth, the Roman 
Expire had begun to decline. No political or military effort 
seemed capable of restoring its original strength. Military 
disasters and internal decay pointed to the fact that Rome 
was collapsing. In this atmosphere the intellectually curious 
Augustine was bound to reflect on the nature of history. 
3 
The more immediate influences on the development of 
Augusti.ne's preunrierstandi_ng were his parents and his educa- 
tion. His father, Patricius, was a pagan and his mother, 
Monica, as is well -known, was a devout Christian. It was 
Monica who was the dominant force in the household, and 
Augustine was brought up as a Christian.4 both parents 
were determined to provide a proper education for heir 
2 Charles N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Cul- 
ture, Lyndon, 1940, p. 380. 
3 Ibid., up. 381 ff. 
4 
See Augustine's remark in his Confessions, Cambridge, 
1908, T, x, 17. 
(141) 
son. Augustine learned Latin and arithmetic from a school- 
master in Tagaste and then, in 365, he went to Madaura where 
the foundations of his knowledge of Latin literature and 
grammar were laid. Thd actual content of his education in 
Madaura was meager, concentrating almost exclusively on the 
literary; and ignoring philosophy, science and history. In 
371 Augustine moved on to Carthage to complete his education. 
The combined influence of the city and his pagan teachers 
caused him to break morally and intellectually from his 
Christian faith.5 
At the age of 19, in 373, a significant change took 
place in Augustine's J i_fe. He describes the precipitating 
incident as follows: 
In the usual course of the syllabus, 
I had reached a book by Cicero: Its 
style was admired by almost all, though 
its message was ignored. The book, 
however, contains an exhortation to 
Philosophy: it is called "The Hortensius". 
This book, indeed, changed all my way 
of feeling. It changed my prayers to 
Thee, 0 Lord; it gave me entirely 
different plans and aspirations. 
Suddenly, all empty hope for my career 
lost its appeal; and I was left with an 
unbelievable fire in my heart, desiring 
the deathless qualities of wisdom, and 
I made a start to rise up and return to 
Thee....I was on fire, my God, on fire 
to fly away from earthly things to Thee.' 
It was wisdom which Augustine sought after as Cicero 
5 Ibid., III, i, 1. 
6 Ibid., III, iv, 7. 
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had urged. He turned first to the Bible but was not impressed 
with it because it did not measure up to his refined exiecta- 
tions and tastes.? His attention then moved toward an active 
group of Manicheans in Carthage whose views appeared to 
Augustine to be more acceptable and to provide a more profit- 
able direction in which to pursue wisdom. The Manicheans, as 
Augustine saw them and as they saw themselves, taught a rational 
presentation of truth in distinction from the "barbaric and 
illogical ideas of Christianity". Of particular attraction 
to Augustine was their solution to the problem of evil. The 
Manichean saw the answer to this puzzling question in a 
dualism of two ultimate principles: a gond principle, light, 
God or Ormuzd; and an evil principle, darkness, Ahriman. 
These two principles are eternal and their strife is eternal. 
Man reflects these principle s_ and their eternal conflict in 
his dual nature, his soul being good and his body evil. 
8 
Attracted by this solution and other features of the system, 
Augustine became a "Hearer" among the Manicheans and remained 
so for some nine years. 
In .374 Augustine travelled back to Tagaste and taught 
grammar and Latin literature; returning after one year to 
Carthage to establish a school of rhetoric. In Carthage he 
achieved some professional success and continued his search 
7 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo, London, 1967, p. 42. 
This work, in addition to being a recent and scholarly 
biography, contains a thorough and up -to -date bibliography 
of the voluminous literature on Augustine. 
8 
Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, 
London, 1959, Vol. II, p. 41. 
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for wisdom. By 382 he had become partially disillusioned 
with the Manicheans and frustrated in his teaching. Rome 
seemed to offer more promise for advancement in his career 
and, after reckoning with the disapproval of Monica,9 he 
set sail for ''ome. Rome, however, proved to be a disappoint- 
ment and after a year he was able to procure an appointment as 
professor of rhetoric for the city of Milan. For Augustine, 
Milan meant new interests, new possibilities for achievement 
and a new field in which to pursue his quest for wisdom. 
perhaps the most significant force on Augustine during 
his ''ears in Milan came from the highly cultured Catholic 
bishop, Amy. rose. It was largely through sermons rather than 
personal contact that Augustine felt the impact of Ambrose. 
As a teacher of rhetoric, Augustine was eager to hear the 
distinctive oratory of Ambrose and, after his arrival in Milan, 
Augustine quickly made his way to the church where the bishop 
preached. He fond the style of preaching impressive, but 
he was even more taken by the content. Catholic Christianity, 
represented by Ambrose, with its strong other -worldly note, 
appeared to Augustine as quite revolutionary and was to he a 
strong influence in his understanding of the Christian faith.10 
While in Milan Augustine also came into contact with a 
group of men who thought of themselves as taking part in a 
Renaissance of platonic philosophy. They were heavily in- 
fluenced by plotinus, an Egyptian Greek who had taught in Rome, 
9 Confessions, V, viii, 15. 
10 Brown, 2E. cit., p. 85. 
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dying there in 270. His work, The Enneads, had been put in 
more readable form by pQizphyry and sut,sequently translated 
into Latin by Victorinus. The central concern of this group 
was to reconcile Platonic teaching and Christian theology. 
In the summer of 386 Augustine was introduced to these new 
ideas and this exposure helped him to :olve some of his 
intellectual Objections to Christianity. After several 
months of intellectual and moral struggle, during which he 
read harts of the New Testament as well as the neo- Platonic 
literature, he was converted to Christian faith. He says: 
I seized it (Paul's Epistle and opened 
it, and in silence I read the first pas- 
, sage on which my eyes fell: "not in 
revelling and drunkenness, not in lust 
and wantonness, not in quarrels and 
rivalries. Rather, yourselves with 
the Lord Jesus Christ, spend no more 
thought on nature and nature's appetites." 
I had no wish to read more and no need to 
do so. For in an instant, as I came to 
the end of the sentence, it was as though 
the light of confidence flooded into my 
heart and all the darkness of doubt was 
dispelled....You converted me to yourself, 
so that I no longer desired a wife or 
placed any hope in this world, but stood 
firmly upon the rule of faith....11 
Augustine's career as a teacher of rhetoric had come 
to an end. He left his professorship and retired to Cassi- 
ciacum to integrate his new -found faith with his philsophical 
interests. His writing during this period shows a strong 
classical and neo- platonic influence, though the epistles of 
Paul urovi_de the essential foundation of his thought. 
11 Confessions, VIII, xii, 29 -30. 
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Augustine was baptized in 387 by St. Ambrose and returned to 
Africa in 388. From 388 -391 he continued his writing in a 
small monastic community near his original home. In 391 
he moved to Hippo and became a priest, and in 396 he was 
made bishop, a position which he held until his death in 430. 
While it would be pretentious to "sum up" so brilliant 
and many -sided a man as Augustine, it might be helpiul to at 
least attempt, from this brief account of his life, to re- 
construct the central influences in the formation of the 
nreunderstanding which he brings to his historical interpre- 
tation of the Christian faith. 
Perhaps most important was his exposure to the Bible. 
Augustine was firmly committed to biblical religion and 
consciously adopted what he believed to be the biblical view 
of history. He accepted the biblical affirmation that there 
is a sovereign God who is the moving force in the affairs of 
men, and it is this biblical theme which became the basic 
ideological framework out of which he worked. It functions 
as a major, positive influence on his interpretation. It 
tends to be comprehensive in its scope, going beyond its 
immediate application to his.view of history, and blossoms 
into a full -fledged world view. It is consciously developed 
by Augustine in a consistent and rational way. 
But Augustine's understanding of biblical teaching, 
like that of all Christians in any era, was formed in a 
specific historical context. The contours of Augustine's 
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belief are given shape by his envirónment and culture. The 
biblical categories are foundational, but the way he under- 
stands them and applies them is influenced by other assumptions 
which function le'-s consistently and consciously in his 
thought. The assumption that God is sovereignly at work 
in history, for example, does not function inde endently 
of other ideological assumptions. There is of course his 
thorough exposure to classical culture with its presuppositions 
regarding man and his history. While the classical world 
view does not escape Augustine's critical scrutiny, its 
presence is still ver much in evidence throughout his work.12 
It is perhaps most evident in his early writings, but can also 
be observed in his apologetic thrusts in The City of God 
which were designed for the sophisticated gan reader of 
his time. 
Not to be treated lightly either are his many years as 
a "Hearer" among the Manicheans. It is of particular im- 
portance to note the attraction which he had for the dualism 
of the Manichean system, especially 'as it provided a way in 
which to approach the problem of evil. Peter Brown remarks: 
"Yet just this Manichaeism had been Augustine's religion as 
a growin<f man. It has provided hire with an extreme and 
distinctive mould for his feelings." 
13 
12 Brown, op. Cit., u. 113. 
13 Ibid., p. 53. 
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Moreover his serious reading of the neo- Platonic lit- 
erature, especially at such a critical point in his life, 
inevitably left its mark. After his conversion, in an effort 
to obtain a better understanding of the Christian religion, he 
used "concel-ts and themes taken from ne.ó- Platonic philosophy, 
his idea of Christianity being still very incomplete and 
tinctured, more than it was to be inter, by neo- Platonism." 
14 
The main attitudinal aspects of Augustine's preunder- 
standing grew out of his varied exposure to Catholic Chris - 
tianity through his mother, Ambrose and the Christian church 
of his time with its unique problems in a crumbling empire. 
The foundational attitude in Augustine's t? reunderstanding was 
most obviously faith- -faith in the God who is sovereignly 
in control of history and the destinies of men. Almost in 
defiance of the chaos in the Empire, Augustine confidently 
believed in. the One who stands behind history and who promises 
eternal felicity to all who out their faith in Jesus Christ. 
.dhile this attitude does not operate independently of other 
attitudes, it is certainly central and functions as a major 
influence on his interpretation of history. 
Augustine's methodological assumptions are largely 
gleaned from the accepted approaches of scholarship in his 
time. In terms of historical study, he deviates very little 
from the standard practices of the classical historians. 
14 Copleston, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
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His evaluation of historical evidence, his use of sources and 
his understanding of historical causality all leave something 
to be desired. but these methodological assumptions do not 
constitute a major factor in his work. 
Let us now move to consider how these ideological, 
attitudinal and methodological aspects of Augustine's pre - 
understanding help shape the specific presuppositions whic_: 
undergird his understanding of history. 
H. Augustine's Theology of .History 
Augustine's historical interpretation of the Christian 
faith, which "weighed with an almost physical pressure on the 
mind of Europe for a thousand years... "15, is not based on 
inductions from allegedly observable trends in history nor 
on some philosophical discovery of an inner logic to the course 
of human affairs. It is more accurately described as a theo- 
logy of history, based on the biblical revelation, which 
attempts to place the whole of universal history in a coherent 
pattern.l6 
The insights gained from the Bible caused Augustine to be 
critical of the classical view of history. In the develop- 
ment of his theology of history, Augustine jettisoned the 
central historical concepts of the Greco -Roman view.17 
13 G.P. Gooch, History and the Historians in the Nine- 
teenth Century, London, 1913, p. I. 
16 Etienne Gilson, Introduction à L'Étude De Saint 
Augustin, Paris, 1943, p. 230. M. Gilson writes: "Pour la 
première fois, peut -être, dans cette oeuvre (De Civitate DeD 
grace à la lumière de la révélation qui lui dévoile l'origine 
et la fin cachées de l'universel une raison humanine ose 
tenter la synthèse de l'histoire universelle." 
17 Cochrane, off.. cit., p. 384. 
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In the first place, because of his understanding of the 
biblical doctrine of sin, Augustine rejected the optimistic 
idea of the perfection of human nature and the possibility 
of establishing a reign of peace and happiness by the efforts 
of men. Secondly, on the basis of his understanding of the 
biblical teaching on creation and redemption, he could not 
accert the Greek idea of history as being an eternally re- 
current cycle.18 His idea of time having a beginning at the 
point of creation, of a divine purpose in history being 
worked out through the - Hebrew nation in successive stages and 
the Christian experience of redemption thraigh the unique 
events of Christ's death and resurrection all made it impossible 
for him to assent to the notion of cyclical patterns which 
characterized Greco- Roman historiography. 
Augustiners rejection of the classical understanding of 
history resulted in the ascendancy of certain biblical themes 
in his own development of a doctrine of history.19 He viewed 
the historical process as the working out not of man's purposes 
but of God's purposes. God, not man, was the moving force 
behind history. Hence the actions of historical agents, 
indeed, even their very nature and existence, are a product 
of the unfolding of a providential plan and are therefore 
historically important. In addition, Augustine's theology 
of history, because of his understanding of the equality 
18 See Collingwood, op. pp. 46-48. 
19 Ibid. 
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of all men before God, was universal in scope. It overcame 
the particularism characteristic of the classical view. 
Collingwood's summary of Christian historiography into 
four categories provides a good summary of the central 
presuppositions guiding Augustine's view :20 (1) it will 
be a universal history, or a history of the world, going 
back to man's origin. (2) It will understand events not as 
the working of human agents, but as the working of providence. 
(3) Lc will attemv't to detect an intelligible pattern in the 
general flow of events, and in particular it will assign 
primary significance in this pattern to Christ whose life, 
death and resurrection give it all meaning. (4) It will 
subdivide history into periods, seeing the progressive develop- 
ment of the divine plan in the course of human affairs. 
Augustine's analysis of history shares all these characteristics. 
It would not be accurate to imply that Augustine's 
rejection of the classical view of history was total. While 
it is true that he rejected its basic features in light of 
his formulation of the biblical doctrines of creation, sin 
and redemption, he did maintain in some measure the sub - 
stantialistic idea of eternal entities underlying the process 
of historical change. But this presupposition of historical 
understanding was retained with an important difference, 
namely that a personal God was the source of the eternal 
entities. Nevertheless the purpose and plan of God for 
20 Ii.d., pp. 49-50. 
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history as revealed in the Bible is shown to fulfill itself 
within a Platonic universe. While not wanting to overstress 
this influence, it is still fair to say that for Augustine, 
Trbiblical history is platonic Idealism in time."21 
Still another basic presupposition of Augustine's 
historical understanding is a dualism of two ages, or as he 
expresses it, of two cities. This dualism in Augustine's 
thought can be traced to a. number of sources including the 
Bible, the other- worldly Christianit,/ of his tires and his 
exposure to Manicheanism. 
It is now necessary to examine how these basic presup- 
positions, rooted in biblical, classical and dualistic 
thought, express themselves in The City of God in which 
Augustine explicitly sets forth his view of history. 
Two years after the sack of Rome by Alaric the Goth 
in 410 A.D., Augustine began to write The City of God and 
would not complete it until 426. The initial occasion for 
its writing was to reply to the accusation that the Eternal 
City had fallen because the worship of the Roman gods had 
been abandoned in favor of an oriental superstition. Chris- 
tianity had been blamed as the cause of the destruction by 
those who still took the pagan gods seriously. They argued 
that after the sack by Alaric, the pagan gods had deserted 
Rome due to the intrusion of those "atheists" called Chris- 
tians who had suppressed and abolished the cults of the 
21 john H.S. Durleigh, The City of God, London, 1949, 
P. 190. 
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Roman gods.22 Augustine's reply was that long before the rise 
of Christianity Rome had suffered similar disasters, and that 
polytheistic worship does not assure world prosperity. For 
Augustine, tige real significance of Rome was to preserve 
earthly peace as the condition for sue>ading the gospel. 
23 
The empires and states have been constituted because of man's 
sin, and their value consists in the preservation of peace 
and justice. 
But the scone of Augustine's work went far beyond the 
apologetic impulse to defend the Christian fait.. against 
these accusations. IÍe simply used this as an occasion for 
developing a'"vast synthesis which embraces the history 
of the whole human race at its destinies in time and eternity.,,24 
The real issue was the way in which God intervened in human 
history to accomplish his divine purpose. It is God who has 
made all things and who administers the course of historical 
events. To know his will is to understand history, and that 
will revealed in the divine acts, judgments and promises 
recorded in Scrirture.25 Fence The City of God is a definitive 
rejection of the paganism of an aristocracy which had claimed 
to dominate the intellectual life of Augustine's age and a 
projection of a totally new world view based on the Bible. 
22 Karl Lbwith, Meaning in I- Iistory, Chicago, 1955, p. 163. 
23 The City of God, XVI I I, 46. 
24 Christoher Dawson, A Monument to Saint Augustine, 
comp iled by T.B.-Burns, London, 1945, p. 43. 
25 Burleigh, op. cit., p. 195. 
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As a result 
The City of God is the most self - conscious 
book that he ever wrote. It was planned 
ahead on a massive scale: five books 
dealt with those who worshipped the gods 
for felicity on earth; five, with those 
who worshipped them for eternal felicity; 
the remaining twelve would elaborate 
Augustine's great theme; four would deal 
with the origin of "Two cities, one of 
God, the other of the world "; four with 
their "unfolding course" in the past; 
four with their ulti:ate destinies.2 
Augustine, then, builds his theology of history on a 
rejection of the classical view of the world, a reliance on 
the biblical record and a confidence in God who was dis- 
playiñg his purposes in the history of Augustine's own 
time and who would ultimately move history to its consum- 
mati on.27 The grand theme which holds these motifs together is 
a dualistic relationship between two cities as it is expressed 
in their origins, causes and ends. Augustine writes: "two 
cities have -been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love 
of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the 
love of God, even to the contempt of self. "28 In the earthly 
city there has been conflict and hate throuh ali history 
from the fall of Adam and will he to the end of time. The 
heavenly city is, planned by God to repair the damage of sin, 
and the whole of history since the ascension of Jesus into 
26 Brown, 22.. cit., pp. 303 -304. 
27 R.L.P. Milburn, Early Christian Interpretations 
of History, London, 1954, p. 74. 
28 The City of God, XIV, 28. 
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heaven is concerned with one work only: the building and 
29 
perfecting of the city, of God. 
The first two sections of The City of God contain his 
refutation of the classical view of the world and its belief 
in and reliance upon the pagan gods. These ten gooks can:- 
statute a detailed argument against all those who would main- 
tain that the pagan gods can bring man. temporal or eternal 
felicity. The unhappiness caused by the calamities of Rome's 
recent past are not the result of the departure of the pagan 
gods due to the presence of the Christian religion. Rather the 
calamities are directly related to the behavior of the Roman 
citizens who have brought disaster upon themselves by the 
corruptions of their souls and their pagan worship. These 
disasters happened to the before the dawn of the Christian 
religion which means that no blame can be placed on its 
introduction into the Empire. If the Empire is lost, it is 
the judgment of God who rules the course of history implementing 
His purposes. Nor can one place blame on blind fate. What 
the pagans call Fortuna, chance or luck, is only what is 
hidden from us, not from God. There is no such thing as 
accident or uncaused occurrence in the universe. All history 
is controlled by the rational purpose of God.30 í'rue happiness 
for man then can only come from the sovereign God who, out of 
29 Merton, on. cit., p. xii. 
30 The City of God, V, 9. 
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his infinite love, has redeemed man by sending a mediator, 
«the man Christ .íesus. 
"31 
Because Augustine views history as standing under the 
authority of God, he is able to offer a critique of the 
prevailing political institutions. Rome has prospered in the 
past because she has been just, but now, in her failure to 
fulfill her divinely appointed function, she faces the 
judgment of God who has the power to create and dispose of 
the Kingdoms of earth. Augustine writes that 
therefore God, the author and giver of 
felicity, because He alone is the true 
God, Himself gives earthly Kingdoms both 
to good and bad. Neither does He do this 
rashly, and, as it were, fortuitously- - 
because He is God, not fortune- -but 
according to the order of things and times 
which is hidden from us, but thoroughly 
known to Himself; which same order of 
times, however, He does not serve as 
subject to it, but Himself rules as 
Lord and appoints as governor. Felicity 
He gives only to the good.32 
In the next section, Books XI -XIV, he -deals with the 
origin of the two cities. The story is well known and we 
need only repeat it here in outline form. Originally the 
City of God was designed as an angelic comunity to which 
innocent men like Adam before the Fall would be admitted. 
These angels were created by God with freewill, i.e. they, 
were "able not to sin ". Lucifer, one of the angels, led a 
revolt in heaven against God and he and his cohorts were 
31 Ibid., IX, 17. 
32 Ibid., IV, 33. 
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cast into Hell, Lucifer becoming Satan in the process. Man 
too was created with free will ( "able not to sin "), but 
after AamTs sin, he and his race became corrupt and were 
subject to death 7nd the influence of the wicked angels, 
now devils. The good angels, remain in the City of God and 
the reLellious ones in the City of Satan, both cities trans- 
cending the boundaries of this world, yet using man's his- 
tory as their battleground. On earth the inhabitants of 
the two cities live intermingled in body, though separated 
in will bec use of their difierent natures.33 Thus, says 
Augustine, ''two cities, one of sinners and one of saints, 
are to be found throughout history from the creation of man- 
kind until the end of the world: at the present day they 
are mingled together in body, but separate and distinct in 
will; in the day of judgment they will be separated bodily." 
Woven into this cosmology are the basic presuppositions 
which hold Augustine's theology of history together. In a 
harmonious combination of Platonic thought (via Neoplatonism) 
and biblical categories, Augustine sees God as omniscient, the 
knower of all that was, is and will be. He knew from all 
eternity the events which would occur in the created world, 
good 2s .ell s evil. Nevertheless God created the world .,nd 
time (simultaneously) and man and saw that it was good. It 
is good bec.,use all is in the '?ternal now for God; with God 
there is no beginning and end, and He sees in the present 
34 
33 
i rank E. Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical f:is'cory, 
London, 1965, p. 27. 
34 
De catechizancios rudikus, London, 1896, i.. 31. 
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His final triumph. Of God Augustine says: 
For he does not pass from this to that by 
transition of thought cut beholds all 
things with absolute unchangeableness: 
so that of those things that emerge in 
time, the future are indeed not yet, 
the present are now, and the past no 
longer are: but all these are by Him 
comprehended in His stable and eternal 
presence. 5 
Ïut, it might be asked, does this kind of omniscience 
in God make Him the only one responsible in history? Augus- 
tine replies in the negative as he gives what he considers 
to be a Christian answer to the problem of evil which he 
first understood in the categories of Manichean dualism. 
Man has free will to love God and be saved or to love self 
and be lost. God has foreseen that the archetypal first 
man, Adam, would sin and that a means of redemption would be 
necessary which has been provided through Christ. i3ut why 
does God allow it all to happen? He allows it "to show what 
evil could be wrought by their pride, and what good by his 
grace. "36 Thus the purpose of human history is the denouement 
of the cosmic dram-., the theme of which is the struggle be- 
tween the two cities. All subsequent history is for the 
pur»ose of fulfilling God's plan which involves the conquest 
of Satan and his followers and victory and blessedness for 
the redeemed of the City of God.37 
In Books XV -XVIII Augustine describes in this dualistic 
35 
The City of God, XI, 2. 
36 
_-
Ibid. , XIV, 27. 
37 Grace Cairns, philosophies of History, London, 1962, 
pp. 252 -254. 
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framework the course of the two cities which provides the 
substance of his understanding of the history of man. The 
history of man, ,s Auustine describes it, is the conflict 
between Civitas Dei and Civitas Terrena, each of which has 
a particular species of man 'represented by Cain and Abel. 
Augustine explains that "of these two first parents of the 
human race, then, Cain was the first -born and he belonged 
to the city of men; after him was born Abel, who belonged 
to the city of God." 
38 
Between the two cities and their 
races there is the age -long conflict of unbelief and faith, 
of love of self and the contempt of God, of the contempt of 
self and loge of God, men of strife and men of peace. The 
men of the earthly city are enslaved by their concupiscence 
and are unable to see further than their own desires. They 
lead turbulent lives the e:l'fort to appease their lusts. 
The erthly city has its 
good in this world, ailu rejoices in it 
with such joy as such things can af- 
ford. But as this is not a good which 
can discharge its devotees of all dis- 
tresses, this city is often divided a- 
gainst itself by litigations, wars, 
quarrels, and such victories as are 3G 
either life- destroying or short lived. 
The men of the 'City of God, on the other. hand, even during 
their sojourn on earth, are already possessed by the divine 
spirit of peace as they look beyond this world to everlast- 
ing life in heaven. This age long} struggle between the 
38 
Che City of God, XV, 4. 
39 
I ;id. , XV, 4. 
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children of the flesh and the children of the promise serves 
the overall purpose of vindicating God in history. 
The salvation of those destined for the City of God is 
brought about by God's chosen people, the Hebrews. Therefore 
Augustine divides human history into periods in accordance 
with the epochal events of Hebrew history as recorded in 
Scripture. Augustine's division consists of six epochs: 
(1) from Adam to Noah and the Flood; (2) from Noah to Abraham; 
(3) from Abraham to David; (4) from David to the Exile; (5) 
from the Exile to the -birth of Christ; and (6) the present 
epoch, the age of the church. The pivotal event, the climax 
of history according to Augustine, is the advent of Christ 
through whom God redeems fallen man. 
In his description of history Augustine is not primarily 
interested in secular history. For "Gentile" history, he 
contents himself with a two- monarchies theory, the reigns of 
Babylon and Rome covering the whole span of time. The his- 
tory of the Gentiles is merely tributary to the history of 
Israel and the church. It is important "only insofar as it 
affects them either as a scourge of God for sin or as an 
agent helping in the attainment of necessary ends among the 
chosen people, "40 Augustine's central concern is with the 
eschatological history of faith, which is, 
as it were, a. secret history within 
secular history, subterranean and in- 
visible to those who have not the eves 
40 b1 uel, op. cit., p. 30. 
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of faith. The whole course of history 
becomes progressive, meaningful, and 
intelligible only by the expectation of 
a final triumph, beyond historical time, 
of the City of God over the city of 
sinful men.41 
Because of his view of 'secular history, Augustine re- 
jects the notion of progress in history toward an earthly 
paradise. He argues against the milienarians that the 
eternal sabbath which was to follow the end of the sixth period 
will not be of this earth. Whatever perfectibility there is 
in this world is the individual spiritual perfection of the 
elect of the City of God. There is no conception of the 
perfection of mankind in its totality through time.42 What 
really matters is not the transitory greatness of empires, 
but salvation or damnation in a world to come. The earthly 
state has the to :k of ordering human affairs on the basis 'of 
law so that in peace and freedom men may learn to be disciples 
and receive' the privilege of membership in the City of God. 
Augustine rejects any concert which would suggest divinity 
of the state and provides a critique of all idolatrous 
pretensions of political religion. The state is not the 
goal of history; it exists only for the well being of its 
subjects. 
In his final section, Books XIX -XXII, Augustine dis- 
cusses the ultimate destinies of the two cities. In Book 
41 
Löwith, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
42 
Manuel, op. cit., p. 31. 
:. 
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,XIX he sets the stage for describing their final end by arguing 
against the opinions of the philosophers who maintained that 
it is possible to make for themselves a happiness in this 
life. He refutes this view by asserting that true peace and 
happiness belong only to the heavenly city and the people of 
Christ. True happiness will never be found by attempts to 
con='truct an ideal future on this earth; eternal felicity is 
reserved for the saints of God.43 
At the end of history when Christ shall return there 
will be a final judgment. The City of God will pass into 
eternity in the presence of God and the City of Satan will be 
a city of eternal torture tor the fallen angels and the great 
numbers of fallen men. At the final resurrection the redeemed 
will receive incorruptible bodies and live in eternal hap- 
piness with God. "There we shall rest and see, see and love, 
love and ;raise. This is what shall be in the end without 
end."44 The damned will receive bodies also in order that 
they might feel mire intensely their eternal tortures.45 
Thus are the destinies of the two cities decided. 
IT:. Summa.' and Evaluation 
It is nearly impossible to lull together in summary 
form aií_ that Augustine puts forward in his theology of 
history. Yet some attempt to list -che important themes and 
43 The City of God, XIX, 11. 
44 Ibid., XXII, 30. 
45 Hid. , XXI, 10. 
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their relationship to his preunderstanding may be helpful.46 
In the first place, Augustine s city of God may be seen as 
a polemic against the Greco -Roman world view. It is .a 
careful criticism of the prevailing preunderstanding of his 
time. Augustine argues against the classical notion of time 
as an eternal cycle, as an endless process of destruction and 
regeneration of the cosmos. He rejects all theories of 
chance and fate and refutes the notion that Christianity was 
in some way responsible for the downfall of the Roman Empire. 
His understanding of the nature of human sin does not allow 
him to be optimistic about the possibilities of a stable and 
lasting peace, for men in Civitas Terrena. Successive empires 
have failed to provide it; their only value is -to impose 
justice, check human sinfulness and make possible partial 
peace between the two cities so that men and women may be 
recruited for the Heavenly City. When the state claims a 
loyalty which is due only to God, then it will stand under 
the judgment of God. 
Secondly, Augustine's theology of history may ;e viewed 
as a vindication of God's purpose in and for the world, Be- 
cause history is providentially directed, it has a goal, an 
'end which is realized not by progressive perfection in time, 
but by the process of God's activity in the affairs of men as 
recorded in the Bible. By itself, temporal history is a 
narrative of miseries and yet, viewed from the perspective of 
46 See Burleigh, 22. cit., !pp. 203 -216. 
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the providential design, it conspires for the good as willed 
by God for His creation. The ordering of events in history 
is fair and reasonable if due consideration be given to the 
ends for which God created the world. There is a trans - 
historical meaning to the sequence of the development of 
events in time.47 History, apart from the data of revelation, 
is shorn of any significance. 
Thirdly, Augustine's view may be understood as the 
dialectic between the two cities stretched across the epochs 
of biblical history. In the development of this theme 
Augustine attempts to adapt Manichean and platonic dualism 
to fit a Christian frame of reference. Augustine selects 
this element in the life story of mankind because he believes 
it to be central and to contain the clue to its meaning. 
History is the place where the two cities intermingle and run 
their respective courses concurrently. 
Finally, Augustine's understanding of historical processes 
is never completely free from the influence of his classical 
training. History, for Augustine, remains the arena in which 
the eternal entities are expressed in time. The overarching 
purpose of God for history fulfills itself within a platonic 
universe. History is meaningful because by its processes God 
is fitting His people in all generations for fellowship and 
citizenship in the eternal city. 
47 Jacques Iiaritain, on the philosophy of History, London, 
1959, p. 2. 
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If this is the way his preunderstanding ex-:resses it- 
self in the central themes of The City of God, then how are 
we to evaluate it as a theology of history? is it an ad- 
equate historical interpretation of the Christian faith? 
On the positive side, so much has been written that we 
hardly need add to it. We will be content with a few summary 
remarks. First, Augustine's City of God has great stylistic 
merit and imaginative power. It rises above the literature 
of his tirrle because Augustine was both a master of the 
written word and a creative and original thinker. Second, 
it provides us with a cogent critique of classical culture 
by one who was immersed in it. In reading The City of God 
we are treated to a "bird's eye" view of the impotence of 
classical culture in the face of social and political dis- 
integration. Third, in its rejection of all utopian schemes 
of perfection in history and its attack on all idolatrous 
political institutions, The City of God offers universal 
insights valid for all time, not just for the declining 
years of the Roman Empire. Finally, in its affirmation of 
God's sovereignty, it directs us to look beyond the course 
of human events to lind an anchor for our hope. 
'ihile Augustine's positive contribution to historical 
understanding makes whatever negative comment we may have 
seen small indeed, we would still be amiss not to suggest 
some reservations about his views. There are four in number 
and can be statal briefly: (1) Only in theory does he do 
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justice to secular history. In actual practice he devotes 
little attention to it, and it is the least carefully 'finished 
and worst proportioned of hir work. He does not deny that 
God's sovereignty extends over the whole of human history, 
but he so emphasizes the events of redemptive history that 
world history is nearly ignored. (2) Though his preunder- 
standing is essentially opposed to the classical view of 
history, Augustine's historiographical method remains largely 
unchanged from it He still depends heavily upon tradition 
for his facts and has no effective historical weapons to 
use in sorting out fact from fancy. Augustine can hardly 
be 'flamed for this weakness in that the discipline of history 
was as yet undeveloped. but it does nevertheless mean that 
he fails to do justice to the distinctly historical problems 
which his view raises. (3) He nearly falls into the trap of 
identifying the earthly church with the Cit of God. We say 
"nearly" because he makes no s_mple one to one identification. 
";=,ut ", says Reinhold Niebuhr, "on the whole he iden ui fies 
the Civitas Dei with the hisuor.ical church.... IIe does 
surround this identification with all kinds of qualifications.... 
Nevertheless the church is, despite these qualifications, 
in some sense the K -ingdom of God on earth. "48 This means 
that at no point does he conceive of the church as standing 
under the judgment of God. (4) Lastly, his emphasis on human 
sinfulness does not allow him to ?lace value at the points 
48 Thd Natur :. and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, p. 138. 
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in human history where -there has been genuine achievement. 




understandin for one final comment. While Augustine's work 
reflects a historical approach subject to the influence and 
limitations of his place and time in history, his unshakable 
faith in the providence of God (his basic rreunderstanding) 
raises his theolo^v of history above the level of a mere 
curiosity of an ancient culture and gives it lasting value. 
Chapter Seven 
Historical Interpretation During the Enlightenment 
Edward Gibbon 
I. From Augustine to the Enlightenment 
We began our assessment of the influence .of preunder- 
standing on selected historical interpretations of the 
Christian faith by.examining Augustine's theology of history 
as it is put forward in The City of God. We saw that the 
primary factor in Augustine's preunderstanding which affected 
his interpretation was that he viewed the historical dimension 
of Christianity from within Christian faith and more particu- 
larly as the product of God's sovereign control over history. 
By way of contrast we turn now to consider a historian, . 
Edward Gibbon, who understands the historical aspect of 
Christianity from an entirely dissimilar preunderstanding, a 
preunderstanding molded by a different nurpose,1 another era 
of history and by a contrasting world view. But before we 
can deal directly and adequately with Gibbon, we must first 
sketch in general terms the presuppositions which guided 
the development of historical. interpretation from Augustine 
1 We acknowledge that Gibbon's purpose was not primarily 
to give a historical interpretation of the Christian faith, 
but to discuss the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. 
Nevertheless we include Gibbon in our discussion for three 
reasons: (1) His work illustrates that purpose itself is a 
presuppositional factor to be accounted for in analyzing 
a particular historical interpretation. (2) Though it is 
not his central concern, he does give us a historical treat- 
ment of Christianity. (3) He is an excellent example of 
one who operates outside of faith in his discussion of the 
Christian religion. 
(168) 
to the Enlightenment. 
With Augustine the idea of universal history was born. 
He saw the fall of Rome as one episode in the unfolding 
plan and purpose of God for human history. For Augustine 
the world, not merely the Roman world, had a single history 
directed by divine providence. This preunderstanding of 
Augustine's, that history is both universal and providentially 
directed, greatly influenced medieval historiography. In the 
Middle Ages history was seen as r *the realization of the eternal, 
transtemporal divine plan. It was a plan in which all 
temporal, worldly events not only had their unity but also 
were grounded in the divine reality. "2 This was the guiding 
preunderstanding of medieval historiography. The essential 
theme of history so conceived was the salvation of men, a 
cosmic drama which began in heaven and would end there. 
Because medieval man was primarily interested in the history 
of salvation, he had tittle appreciation for "secular" history 
and historical research. History was more something to be 
received from the Bible than it was something to be inves- 
tigated. Even in biblical history the medievalist saw no 
patterns pointing to a progressive and unfolding revelation. 
The plan of salvation was as well -known to Abraham as it 
was to Paul. What was spelled out clearly in the New. Testament 
was latent in the Old Testament and could be discovered 
2 Friedrich Gogarten, The Reality of Faith, tr. by Carl 
MLichaison and others, Philadelphia, 1959, p, 22. 
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by allegorical interpretation.3 Medieval historiography had 
no way of studying the.gr_owth of the various traditions 
which had come down to their tirle or analyzing them into their 
component parts. The great task of the historian was not 
analysis or encounter with history but discovering, system- 
atizing and expoü ding the universal divine plan given in 
the propositional truths of Scripture.4 
As the Middle Ages passed into the Renaissance several 
important presuppositional changes were beginning to take 
place in historical writing. First, there was a return to 
a hur,ianiFtic view of history based on the historiography 
of the classical writers. Whereas the medieval historian 
was concerned to describe human history as the unfolding 
of a divine plan with God as the chief actor, the Renaissance 
historian elevated man to the center of historical thought. 
One positive result which came from Renaissance man- centered- 
ness was a clearing away of much that had been fanciful and 
ill - founded in medieval historiography. Yet in the process 
they began the trend In historical thinking of excluding the 
notion that God can be judged to be an agent in human history, 
a trend wh ch continues to our day. A second change, arising 
in part from the elevation of man to the place of central 
importance in hist -rical inquiry, was an increasingly, but 
by no means modern, critical attitude toward historical 
3 Richardson, History Sacred and Profane, p. 66. 
4 Collingwood, 22. cit pp. 52 -53. 
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sources, and in particular those sources which emphasized the 
intervention of supernatural beings or God. This new critical 
attitude led to a third basic shift in the historical thought 
of the Renaissance, namely a general skepticism about historical 
knowledge. Montaigne, writing about 1572, voices the opinion 
of his age: 
I sometimes wonder whether it can be 
right for a prudent theologian, philosopher 
or other such person of precise and 
delicate conscience to write history. 
How can they pledge their word on a 
popular belief? How can they answer 
for the thoughts of unknown persons, and 
advance their own conjectures as valid 
coin ?5 
The general view was that historical facts were too frag- 
mentary and uncertain to provide a genuine knowledge of 
the past. Still another way in which Renaissance historical 
writing differed at .least in emphasis from medieval his- 
toriography was the manner in which history was to be used. 
The basic purpose of history in the Middle Ages was, upon 
the discovery of providential activity in human affairs, 
to praise God for this intervention. The study of history 
was for the glory of God. In short it was God- centered. 
But in the Renaissance the primary value of history, in 
that it does not give any sure and final knowledge, resided 
in the moral and political lessons which could be drawn 
from it. It is true that moral lessons were drawn by the 
5 Michael de Montaigne, Essays, tr. by J.M. Cohen, 
London, 1958, p. 47. 
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medieval historians, but this was a secondary function and 
their nature was largely pious. However in the Renaissance 
the lessons drawn from history were humanistic and pr.gm.,tic. 
The beh vier and fate of those who have gone before, whose 
record has been preservP'd bÿ the historian, provided personal 
instruction and political wisdom. Montaigne writes: 
Let a tutor remember the purpose of his 
duties, and impress upon his pupil the 
qualities of Hannibal and Scipio rather. 
than the date of the fall of Carthage, 
and not so much where Marcellus died as 
why it was inconsistent with his duty 
that he should die there. 
One final difference between medieval and Renaissance 
historiography was their subject matter. The medievalist 
was primarily concerned with. sacred history, with those 
events where God was active in bringing about the salvation 
of man. Renaissance historiography, on the other hand, was 
concerned with secular history, and particularly the history 
of Greece pn d Rome, the two civilizations which were seen 
s the high point of human existence. 
These presuppositional changes in historiography which 
came about in the.Renaissance were continued and developed 
in the Age of Natural Science (1600- 1690). Generally in 
this era men looked to the new science with its empirical 
methodology and the new philosophy with its rational systems 
rather than to history for knowledge. The philosopher 
Descartes 
- (1596- 1650), whose thought emphasized doubting all 
6 Ibid., p. 62. 
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but the absolutely clear idea of intuition, helped set the 
tone for the age and for the devaluation of historical writing 
which followed.7 
In the era of the Enlightenment, a period usually dated 
from the a,pearance of Lockers Essay on Human Understanding 
in 1690 and terminating with the publication of Kant's Criticiue 
of Pure Reason in 1781, historiography continued to follow 
the lead of the philosophers, who, as they had in Descartes' 
time, largely determined the intellectual climate of their 
day. In fct the best historians of the period were generally 
philosophers first and historians second. It was these men 
who defined the scope and purpose of historical writing. If 
we are to understand Edward GibLon's historical treatment of 
the Christian religion and the preunderstanding which guided 
it, it is necessary to know the distinctive features of the 
:e of which he is a part. 
Perhaps the essential characteristic of the period was 
man's confidence in his own ability to understand and order 
his environment by his reason so that he might achieve ful- 
fillment. The earlier work of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton 
in science, and of Descartes,. Spinoza and Leibniz in philo- 
sophy gave to the men of the Enlightenment the courage to 
make use of their understanding without feeling dependent 
upon an authority outside of themselves. Baron d'Holbach 
(1723 -1789) summed up the mood of the era as an attempt 
7 See below in Chapter 14 for an analysis of S:inoza's 
historical approach to Scripture which reflects the influ- 
ence of Descartes. 
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"to inspire man with a respect for his own reason so that 
he may no longer be duped by an imagination that has been 
led astray by authority, by the prejudices of his child- 
hood, and thus may learn to base his morals on his own 
n- tune, on his own wants, on the real advantage of society 
so that he my become a virtuous end rational ;einf_-, who 
cannot fail to become ha ppY. rr 
8 
This confidence in science and reason produced 
finitely anti -historical mentality. History could not claim 
to be an exact science and must inevitably falsify the per- 
spective of the past. The accumulation of historical infor- 
mation for its own sake was considered a waste of time and 
intellect; history was useful only insofar as it correctly 
illustrated the essential principles of moral philosophy. 
Coupled with man's confidence in his own ability to 
control his environment was the conscious attempt to secularize 
every department of human life and thought. One direction 
which this impulse took was toward an effort to emancipate 
man from the tutelage of institutional religion and from 
religion itself. There was a general revolt against the 
power of religion in the minds of men and an attempt to in- 
augurate a non - religious rational era. Frequently this 
polemical attitude toward religion with its concomitant 
emphasis on man's reason was excessive and one -sided. The 
man of the Enlightenment was often not sufficiently interested 
8 Quoted by Waller I. Wallbank & Alastair M. Taylor, 
Civilization Past and present, Chicago, 1960, Vol. II, p. 39. 
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in history for its own sake. Because of his anti- religious 
bias and his narrow understanding of reason he had no appre- 
ciation for, and therefore little insight into, whit from 
his vantage point were non -rational periods of human history. 
Usually he bec2me interested in history only at the point 
where it began to be the history of the modern spirit which 
was not unlike his own. As a result he had little concep- 
tion of historical movements and institutions as being created 
by the spirit of a people and no grasp of the gradual his- 
torical development of events in their constellation of 
causes. All too frequently he based his historical inter- 
pretation on the notion that human activity prior to his own 
time was a blind, irrational business, but which now bad 
the potential of being changed into something rational by 
man's effort. 
Two of the best minds and most able representatives of 
the Enlightenment, Voltaire (1694 -1778) and Hume (1711- 1776), 
took pen in hand to write history. Both men used a technique 
for historical investigation which was ,,dvanced for their 
day. Voltaire's particular contributions to historiography 
were his displacement of :,úestcrn Europe as the center of the 
globe and his appreciation of the arts, sciences and social 
institutions as important historical factors.10 Hume's con- 
tribution was his insistence on the necessity of the histori an's 
9 Collingwood, ótß. Cit., D. 78. 
10 
J. H. -:rumfitt, Voltaire: Historian, London, 1958, 
p. 165. 
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impartiality. "The first quality of an historian ", said 
Hume in a letter, "is to be impartial."11 Yet, capable as 
these men were, they nevertheless shared in two major weak- 
nesses characteristic of the historiography of the era. In 
the first place, they failed to grasp the importance and 
need of objective research in historical writing. iihile 
they did not consciously distort facts, neither were they 
researchers, and they had little respect for facts as sacred 
in their own right. Hume's "impartial history" seldom con- 
sisted of letting the facts speak their own truth; more 
often he gave them a philosophical interpretation according 
to the dictates of his philosophy. Both used history as a 
means to warn man about his refusal to live according to 
reason and to illustrate the follies of religion. Secondly, 
neither man effectively solved the problems of historical 
causation. Economic factors were ignored, and there was a 
general reliance on mechanical explanations rather than 
truly historical ones. Voltire in particular saw history 
as the story of the decline and fall from a golden ale of 
reason, nobility and simplicity, an altogether too simple 
scheme for historical explanation. Hume failed because of 
his static view of human nature. He believed he could apply 
the methodology science to history as a means of uncovering 
unaveïsaï laws of human behavior.12 Once discovered, these 
laws would make the task of historical causation a simple 
11 Quoted by 
1926 
Quoted B. Black, The Art of History, London, 
p. 91. 
12 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. 
A. Selby- Bigge, London, 1960, passim. 
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affair. But the complexity of human nature frustrates 
simple schemes, and Hume's generalizations are not 
convincing. 
II. A Life Sketch of Edward Gibbon 
It was into this milieu of the Enlightenment that 
Edward Gibbon was born on Avril 27, 1737, in Putney near 
London, the eldest of seven children.13 The Gibbons were 
a good English family living in circumstances of comfort, 
though not wealth. Gibbon's childhood years were plagued 
by poor health and as a result his education was hindered, 
being largely limited to infrequent attendance in the school 
at Westminster and the guidance of an aunt, Mrs. Catherine 
Porten. It was Mrs. Porten who introduced Gibbon to Pope's 
translations of the Iliad and the Odyssey and the Arabian 
Night's Entertainment, end generally encouraged him in his 
other reading. Later in life Gibbon was to think of his 
aunt as the true mother of my mind as well as my health} 
,nd write somewhat sentimentally: "But the maternal office 
was supplied by my aunt, Mrs. Catherine Porten, st whose 
name I feel a tear of gratitude trickling down my cheek." 
14 
As a boy Gibbon was a voracious reader of classic and 
historical literature. His imagination was stirred by the 
"barbaric splendor" of Oriental history and he was fascinated 
by the Persians, Moslems and Byzantines. He read the Universal 
13 A recent biography of Gibbon is Sir Gvin E 
Gibbon and His World, London, 1967. 
14 Autobiography, ed. by Oliphant Smeaton, London, 
(no date given), p. 23. 
;_seer's 
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History, translations of Heroditus, Tacitus, Machiavelli and 
Fra Paolo, descriptions of China, Mexico and Peru and was 
particularly delighted with Roman history.15 But because 
of this somewhat indiscriminate reading he was not an ex- 
cellent student 71nd learned only adequately Greek and Latin 
pnd studied no German which he considered to be uncivilized. 
At sixteen his f-3ther enrolled him as a gentleman 
commoner at Magdalen College, Oxford. Gibbon was not Pre- 
pared for such an educational experience and idled away the 
time, leaving after fourteen months. Fie writes concerning 
his experience at Oxford: "To the university of Oxford, I 
acknowledge no oLligation; and she will cheerfully renounce 
me for a son as I am willing to disclaim her for a mother. 
I s ent fourteen months at Magdalen College; they proved the 
fourteen months the most idle and unprofitable of my whole 
life. t' 
16 
While at Oxford Gibbon kept alive an interest in 
religious argument17 and began reading some Roman Catholic 
literature which included Bossuet's Exposition of the Cath- 
olic Doctrine and the History of the Protestant Variations. 
Under the spell of this literature and with a deep respect 
for the church of the F.,thers and the majestic unity and 
18 
antiquity of Rome, Gibbon became a Roman Catholic. 
When he left Oxford he was sent abroad by his father 
1 
M. Young, Gibbon, London, 1932, p. 8. 
16 Quoted by James Westfall Thompson, A History 
Historical Writing, New York, 1942, Vol. II, p. 76. 
17 Gibbon, Autobiography, p. 50. "From my childhood 
I had been fond of religious disputation...." 
18 Young, 2L. cit., p. 8. 
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to Lausanne where he was tutored by a M. Pavilliard, p Cal- 
vinist minister, whose task it was to continue the young 
Gibbon's education and to bring him back to the Protestant 
faith. The religious episode was liquidated in eighteen 
months of earnest but polite debate with his Swiss tutor. 
One of his biographers writes that "the only permanent con- 
sequence of his lapse and recovery was a delight in the re- 
finements of theological debate, and a profound conviction 
of the worthlessness of religious emotion." 
19 
Later Gibbon 
was to reflect on 'ba yle's similar course, from Protestantism 
to Rome and from Rome to a universal Protestantism of his 
own making, and Lavle's remark that "je suis protestant, car 
je proteste contre toutes les religions." 
At Lausanne Gibbon learned F rench, studied the classics 
and French thought, overcame some of his Greek and Latin 
deficiencies, was exposed to mathematics, logic and inter - 
national law and had the opportunity to meet and converse 
with his neighbor Voltaire. in his reading he was especially 
impressed with Pascal's style and the works of Montesquieu. 
He later wrote concerning Montesquieu: "My delight was in 
the frequent perusal of ,Montesquieu, whose energy of style, 
and boldness of hypothesis, were powerful to awaken and stim- 
ulate the genius of the age. "20 it was Montesquieu who first 
clearly apprehended the importance of impersonal causes in 
history, an insight of which Gibbon was later to avail himself. 
19 
luid., p. 13. 
20 Autobiography, p. 72. 
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Gibbon also read Grannone's History of Naples and, as he 
remarked in his Autobiography, "observed with a critical eye 
the progress and abuse of sacerdotal power.... "21 In gen- 
eral, Gibbon's five year stay in L ?usanne had two important 
affects: (1) It laid the foundation of his historical 
knowledge, and (2) it gave a genuinely European mold to his 
thought.22 
Mien Gibbon returned to England he took up residence 
in London with the thought of launching a career as an author 
and produced as a first.effort the Essay on the Study of 
Literature. Shortly pftr the publication of this essay he 
joined the military which occupied him for two and one -half 
years. After his release from the service he returned to 
Europe, stopping first in Paris where he met the foremost 
philosophers, d'Alembert, Diderot, Raynal, Helvetius and 
d'Holbach. This exposure to skeptical French thought plus 
his earlier training in Lausanne gave his preunderstanding 
its permanent mold. 
After Paris and a brief stay in L- usanne he traveled 
south to Rome where he made the decision of his life's work. 
I -Ie had considered being an historian for a number of years 
and even developed in outline form several historical pro- 
jects, but the arrival in Rome settled his mind. i-ie later 
recorded his impressions of seeing Rome for the first time: 
21 
Ibid., p. 73. 
22 
James C. Morison, Gibbon, London, 1878, pp. 21 -22. 
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My temper is not very susceptible of en- 
thusiasms, and the enthusiasm I do not 
feel I have ever scorned to affect. But 
at the distance of twenty -five years I 
can neither forget nor express the strong 
emotions which agitated my mind as I first 
approached and entered the Eternal City. 
After a sleepless night, I trod with a 
lofty step the ruins of the Forum. Each 
memorable spot where Romulus stood, or 
Tully spoke, or Caesar fell, was at once 
present to my eye, and several days of in- 
toxication were lost and enjoyed before I 
could descend to a cool and minute 
examination.23 
It was here, while his classically trained mind was under 
the intoxicating grip ofRome, that Gibbon decided to write 
The Decline and Fail. He leaves us p record of his decision: 
"It was at Rome on the 15th day of Octoper_, 1764, as I sat 
musing amid the ruins of the -Capitol, while bare- footed 
fryars sic] were singing vespers in the Temple of Jupiter, 
that the idea of writing the decline and fall of the city 
first started in my mind." 
24 
His original design was to limit the subject to the 
decay of the city of Rome, but gradually he began to see the 
whole grand scheme. At twenty -eight he returned to London 
and, telling no one, set about writing The Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire. His father's death had left him in- 
dependent means and he was able to pursue his project without 
interruption. The first volume appeared in 1776 and at once 
established Gibbon as a success, though the controversial 
ch;,pters fifteen and sixteen gave rise to a storm of criticism. 
23 
Autobiography, p. 122. 
24 
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Volumes Ii and III appeared in 1781. He finished Volume 
IV in France and the final volume was completed and publish- 
ed in 173. Gibbon died at fifty -seven in 1794. 
This summary of the life and environment of Gibbon gives 
us some clue to the preunderstanding which influenced Gib- 
bon's historical writing and which informs his interpre- 
tation of the Christian religion. Most obviously Gibbon 
is a man of his .age. His preunderstanding is shaped by the 
main intellectual currents of the Lnlightenment. His educa- 
tion and culture were chiefly French and his opinions were 
influenced by the leading French philosophes of the last 
half of the eighteenth century whose outlooks were essen- 
tially rationalistic and anti- religious. This basic En- 
lightenment world view suggested the specific preunder- 
standing with which Gibbon interprets the Christian faith. 
:ßäe might summarize its essential characteristics as follows: 
1. The informational element of course can be traced 
to the influence of his family, his education while'at Ox- 
ford and at Lausanne, and generally his line -long interest 
in, if not commitment to, Christian thought. Though it is 
obvious, we should perhaps remind ourselves that the source, 
the kind, and the amount of information one possesses about 
any given subject is the most basic form of preunderstanding, 
How Gibbon interpreted the Christian faith depended in some 
measure on what he knew about it. 
2. Ideologically, Gibbon is a rationalist. Reason itself, 
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Gibbon believed, is the source of knowledge and hence the 
best guide to historical understanding. It alone is able 
to judge historical evidences. This rationalistic note, 
functioning as a comprehensive world view, becomes perhaps 
the major influence on his interpretation. It operates 
consistently and consciously, though perhaps g mewhat closed - 
mindedly throughout his work. It has a negative affect on 
his views at the point where it becomes closed- minded, i.e. 
where Gibbon is intolerant of historical eras with value 
systems at variance with his own. 
3. Attitudinally, Gibbon is both anti -religious and 
romantic. These two attitudes tend to be dependent upon 
each other in an interesting way. In the first place, he 
stands antagonistically outside of faith as he interprets 
the Christian religion. Gibbon ,greed with his contempor- 
aries, Voltaire, Helvetius and d'Holbach, that the past 
was one long nightmare of crime and folly instigated by 
the selfish motives of the church and its priests. In the 
second place we notice that Gibbon had read and been fas- 
cinated by the classics and the culture which produced them, 
As a result he nursed romantic illusions about the glory 
that was Rome. He conceived of one certain period (e.g. 
the Age of the Antonines) as the pristine age of nobility, 
justice and simplicity. In old Rome lay his values, and 
anything which contributed to its decline and fall was con- 
sidered an enemy. It is at this point that the two attitudes 
become complementary. Already feeling hostile towards 
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religion, Gibbon is easily able to supply the villain in 
Rome's decline and fall -- Christianity. These two attitudes 
are major influences in his historical writing and function 
consistently and consciously throughout it. At the point 
where he deals specifically with Christianity, thy 
iiration -:1 band have a detrimental influence on his 
interpretation. 
4. the historical methoc which Gibbon employs is, like 
his attitudes, not dissimilar to the t of his immediate pre- 
decessors and contemporaries. His understanding of histor- 
ical causation and his evaluation óf,.sóurces lacks the soph- 
istication of modern historical scholarship, but for this he 
can hardly be blamed. More important for our purpose is his 
methodological presupposition of golden age and corruption. 
This scheme is not integrated into the total structure of 
The Decline and Fall but does operate unconsciously at certain 
Points along the way. Where it is present (e.g. Antonines 
vs. Christianity) it diminishes the value of his interpretation. 
must now turn to examine in more detail how his 
ess'ntial].y Enlightenment preunderstanding manifests itself 
in his work: Our primary concern will ue to evaluate the 
influence of his preunderstanding on his interpretation of 
Christianity, and only secondarily to consider its role in 
his treatment of the other aspects of the decline and fall 
of the Roman Emrire. 
III. Gibbon the Historian 
(1S4) 
Gibbon as a historian must be measured, as we have 
stressed, in relation to the age in which he lived. Not 
even 'enius transcends the conditions of its time and it is 
obvious that Gibbon did not do so. He was a historian of 
the eighteenth century, a century which placed its faith in 
reason and viewed the past as one long exhibition of the 
play ofirrational forces. He had read the historians of 
his time-- Montfaricon, lillemont, Robertson, Hume and 
Montesquieu- -and brings to a logical conclusion the "new 
history" which they had begun. What sets Gibbon off from 
his contemporaries is not his point of view, but the disci- 
plined research and massive scope of his work. No histor- 
ian before Gibbon had paid such attention to details or 
had such a concept of the continuity of history.25 
Characteristically, Gibbon conceives of history as 
anything but an example of human ability and wisdom. The 
clue to his understanding of history is given by Gibbon him- 
self when he defines it as "little more than the register 
of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind."26 The 
moving force behind history is human irrationality, and 
his narrative displays what he calls the "triumph of bar - 
irism and religion. "27 But in order for barbarism and re- 
ligion to triumph there must be something for them to triumph 
over. For GiL.:.on it is the golden age of the Antonine period 
25 
Thompson, op. cit., p. 75. 
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The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. by 
J. B. Bury, London, 19ÚO, Vol. I, p. 81. 
27 
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which he conceives to be the age in which reason ruled over 
a happy world. 
28 
Thus Gibbon begins his narrative: 
In the second century of the Christian era, 
the empire of Rome comprehended the fair- 
est part of the earth, and the most civilized 
portion of mankind The frontiers of the 
extensive monarchy were guarded by ancient 
renown and disciplined valour. The gentle, 
but powerful influence of laws and man- 
ners had gradually cemented the unión of 
the provinces. Their peaceful inhabi- 
tants enjoyed and abuwl the advantages 
of wealth and luxury. 
The succeeding volumes are designed to trace the most 
import2nt circumstances of the Empire's decline and iall 
from this golden era. 
According to Gibbon, one of the chief causes for the 
decline and fall of Rome was the growth and progress of the 
Christian religion; and it is in this context that we may 
observe his analysis of Christianity. In chapters XV and XVI 
we find his now famous and still controversial interpreta- 
tion. he wri tes : 
While the great body was invaded by open 
violence, or undermined by slow decay, a 
pure and humble r eligion,gently insinu- 
ated itself into the minds of men, grew 
up in silence and obscurity, derived new 
rigour from opposition, and finally erec- 
ted the triumphant banner of3Ahe cross 
on the ruins of the capitol. 
To the tremendous growth of the Christian church and 
its detrimental effect on Rome Gibbon attributes five causes, 
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to his task. The first cause is tithe inflexi ole, and, if we 
may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Christians, 
derived, it is true, from the Jewish religion, but purified 
from the narrow and unsocial spirit which, instead of inviting, 
had deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses.,t31 
This intolerant zeal expressed itself in zealous opposition, 
"a holy war" against the pagan gods and religious rites of the 
Empire, gradually undermining this aspect of Roman life. The 
second cause for the growth of Christianity was "the doctrine 
of a future life; improved by every additional circumstance 
which would give weight and efficacy to that important truth."32 
The early Christians, Gibbon argues, were animated by a con - 
tempt for their present life and by a desire for a future one. 
Using this promise as bait and threatening eternal punishment 
to any rejecting it, converts were not difficult to procure. 
The careless polytheist, [writes Gibbon], 
assailed by new and unexpected terrors, 
against which neither his priests nor his 
philosophers could afford himany certain 
protection, was very frequently terrified 
and subdued by the menace of eternal 
tortures. His fears might assist the 
progress of his faith and reason; and if 
he could once persuade himself to suspect 
that the Christian religion might possibly 
be true, it became an easy task to convince 
him that it was the safest and most prudent 
party that he could possibly embrace.33 
A third cause for Christianity's growth was "the miracu- 
lous powers ascribed to the primitive church. "34 Gibbon 
31 Ibid., p. 2. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., pr. 27-2`. 
34 IITid., p. 2 
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himself of course rejects the notion of the miraculous, l.ut 
acknowledges the susceptibility of people in an earlier and 
more primitive age to such accounts. He sures up his own 
position when he writes: ",Accustomed long since to observe 
and to respect the invariable order of nature, our reason, 
or at least our imagination, is not sufficiently prepared 
to sustain the visible action of the Deity."35 Cause number 
four consisted of "the pure and austere morals of the Chris - 
tiañs. "36 According to Gibbon the controlling passion of the 
ancient Christians was to achieve a certain type of ascetic 
perfection. They rejected knowledge which was not useiul to 
salvation, showed disdain for any levity of discourse, rejected 
bodily pleasures, censured all luxury, elevated to an ideal 
the state, of celibacy and expressed an aversion to business, 
war and government. This pure and austere ideal of the 
1 
Christian appealed to their pagan and degenerate contemporaries. 
The final cause for the growth of 'the Christian church was 
"the union and discipline of the Christian republic, which 
gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the 
heart of the Roman Empire.tt37 The primitive Christians, be- 
cause of their new faith,' were at first dead to the business 
and pleasures of the world. But it was not long before their 
inherent desire for action revived, and its new channel was 
35 Ibid., n. 28. 
36 Ibid., p. 2. 
37 Ibid. 
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the government of the church. Church offices, ecclesiastical 
councils, the collection of revenue, the maintenance of church 
order and the propagation of the faith soon demanded all the 
energy of the Christians. Their efficiency and their failure 
to participate in civil affairs inevitably damaged the welfare 
of the Empire. Gibbon concludes this section with a descrip- 
tive summary of the inner dynamic of the five causes. Be says: 
To the first of these the Christians 
were indebted for their invincible valour, 
which disdained to capitulate with the 
enemy whom they were resolved to vanquish. 
The three succeeding causes supplied 
their valour with the most formidable 
arms. The last of these causes united 
their courage, directed their arms, and 
gave their efforts that irresistible 
weight which even a small band of well - 
trained and intrepid volunteers has so 
often possessed over an undisciplined 
multitude, ignorant of the subject, and 
careless of the event of war.38 
In chanter XVI Gibbon discusses the conduct of the 
Roman government towards the Christians in the period stretch- 
ing from Nero to Constantine. The primary reason for the 
policy of persecution by the Roman government of the Christians 
in this era was due to the failure of the Christians to honor 
the basic values of Rome. It existed because "they [the 
Christian *dissolved the sacred. ties of custom and education, 
violated the religious institutions of their country, and 
presumptuously desl.-.ised whatever their fathers had believed 
as true, or had reverenced as sacred. "39 The Christians were 
seen as atheists and their assemblies :.ere considered a 
dangerous conspiracy. The policy of persecution was a simple 
38 Ibid., 1?. 54. 
39 
ibid., t. . 75. 
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matter of self -protection. Gibbon summarizes the policy in 
four categories which he hopes will be a corrective to exaggerated 
accounts given in the ecclesiastical histories: (1) A con- 
siderable amount of time elapsed before the Roman government 
perceived the new sect as an object deserving attention. 
(2) The Roman officials, in light of the seriousness of the 
Christian's offense, proceeded for the most part with caution 
and reluctance. (3) They were moderate in the use of punish- 
ments. (4) The afflicted church enjoyed many intervals of 
peace and tranquility.40 In general Gibbon is concerned to 
vindicate the Roman policy, correct the int recise versions 
of the extent of Christian persecution and cast dispersions 
on the nobility of the Christians. On this latter point 
,Gibbon allows his prejudice to show through. He wants no 
undue credit to go to the martyrs, and observed that more 
often than not "the soldiers of Christ, instead of distinguish- 
ing themselves by voluntary deeds of heroism, frequently 
deserted their posts and fled in confusion before the enemy 
whom it was their duty to resist. ,,41 He closes the charter 
with one final broadside on Christian virtue: 
We conclude this chapter by a melancholy 
truth which obtrudes itself on the re- 
luctant mind; that even admitting, without 
hesitation or inquiry, all that history 
has recorded, or devotion has feigned, 
on the subject of martyrdoms, it must 
still be acknowledged that the Christians, 
in the course of their intestine dis- 
40 Ibid., p. 82. 
41 Ibid., p. 106. 
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sensions, have inflicted far greater 
severities on each other than they had 
experienced from the zeal of the in- 
fidels.42 
One wonders if Gibbon's mind was all that reluctant to 
receive this truth. 
We might now ask more precisely why, according to Gibbon, 
the rise of Christianity and the decline of Rome paralleled. 
:shy did he believe that an inseparable connection existed 
between the decline of the Empire and the growth and triumph 
oi the church? In what ways ',,as the church responsible? 
The tirst answer which Gibbon gives is that with all the 
other decaying- forces in the Empire, the strength of the 
Christian world view simply undermined all the values which 
had made Rome great and strong. Roman religion collapsed, 
men profaned their intellects b7 believing in miracles and 
i,!mortallty and as a result the traditional Roman virtues 
'disintegrated. Secondly, the Christian church and its ad- 
ministrative l::ork robbed Rome of its leadership. "Armies" 
of men became monks and others isolated themselves from the 
mainstream of Roman culture, refusing to participate in the 
government and military service. Thirdly and finally, 
Christianity created dissension throughout the Empire, throw- 
ing province against province and class against class through 
controversies and persecutions which disgraced its devotees.43 
Gibbon writes: 
42 Ibid., p. 138. 
43 Shelby T. McCloy, Gibbon 's Antagonism to Chris- 
tianity, London, 1933, p. 15. 
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From the Council of Nicea to. the end of 
the seventh century, the peace and unity 
of the church was invaded by those 
spiritual wars; and so deeply did they 
affect the decline and fall of the empire 
that the historian has too often been 
compelled to attend the synods, to explore 
the creeds, and to enumerate the 'sects, 
of this busy period of ecclesiastical 
annals.44 
Our purpose is not primarily to weigh the -validity of his 
argument, though one must admit there is some cogency in what 
he contends, but to see how he views Christianity in li °ht of 
his preunderstanding which is shaped by rationalistic pre- 
.. 
supnositions and reverence for the glory of Rome. Caught 
between these two features of Gibbon's preunderstanding, 
the Christianity which he describes conies out looking like 
the enemy of mankind. He has several specific axes to grind 
against Christianity in addition to the major one of its 
contributing to the fall of Rome. We will list just a few 
of them in order to catch the tone of Gibbon's. attitude. He 
is against: 
1. Enthusiasm, which expressed itself in intolerance 
of all other, religions as well as for other Christians who 
maintained a different doctrinal position;45 
2. The priests and monks who are fanatical and super - 
stitious;46 
3. The church, which is the enemy of reason;47 
44 Decl-ne and Fall, Vol. VI, p. 115. 
45 ibid., Vol. II, p. 3. 
46 Ibid., 339. . 
47 
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4. The early Christian martyrs whose nu' bers and spirit 
have been falsified;48 
5. Miracles, whose authenticity cannot be accepted;49 
6. Belief in immortality which is the result of "the 
influence of an established priesthood, which employed the 
motives -f virtue and the instrument of ambition;,,50 
7. Christian theology which is a syäcretism of Jewish 
thought and other obscure faiths and which leads men into 
intellectual bondage.51 
He does have sonie respect tor: 
8. Jesus because he "lived and died for the service 
of mankind. "52 Yet he is in no way superior to Socrates. 
In conclusion it would not. be _i.naccurate or too strongly 
worded to state that toward religion in general he is skep- 
tical, and toward Christianity' in particular he is both 
hostile and prejudiced. He regards the Christian church 
as a disastrous episode in the history of mankind. G.M. 
Young describes Gibbon as 
before all things a humanist, and to a 
humanist any religion with an apparatus 
of sacred books and beliefs deduced from 
them, with an organized hierarchy diverting 
wealth from productive expenditures, and 
theological schools seducing intellect 
from more fruitful exercise, must appear, 
except so far as it satisfies certain 
irrational impulses which culture has not 
eradicated, a mischievous folly.53 
48 Decline and Fall, Vol, II, p. 114. 
49 Ibid., p. 32. 
50 Ibid., p. 23. 
51 Ibid., p. 326. 
52 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 105. 
53 n... cit., p. 95. 
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IV. Concluding Observations 
As historical writing in the eighteenth century, Gibbon's 
work, considered in the whole, is without equal. In both 
style and content he outdistances his nearest competitors. 
Of particular value in terms of our study is his attempt to 
bring Christianity within the framework of historical causation 
and to correct misconceptions, half pious and half conventional, 
which had gathered around the history of the early church. 
This attempt in itself is an admirable endeavor and a necessary 
advance. Also his conscientious concern for detail, his 
intuitive grasp of evaluating sources and his awareness of 
continuity in history reflect his natural genius as a- 
historian. 
Yet Gibbon had his weaknesss as a historian. He really 
advances little farther than:his contemporaries in under- 
standing historical causation. He altogether ignores economic 
factors, and not infrequently falls back upon accident as 
a means of explanation. In addition, Gibbon's critical 
method of evaluating other research rarely goes beyond the 
elementary device of sorting his authorities into primary 
and secondary, well- informed and ill- informed and then 
striking a balance which satisfied his personal sense of 
probability. Where his results are accurate- -and they often 
are --it is more the triumph of genius than method. Still 
another weakness is his historical scheme of golden age 
and corruption, a scheme to which he is not rigidly bound, 
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but which clouds his judgments about the excesses of both 
periods. Perhaps it should also be noted that The Decline 
and Nall lacks proportion, giving far more emphasis to the 
Roman period than the Byzantine. 
But of crucial importance for us is how his preunder- 
standing influenced his view of the Christian religion. 
His purpose, to trace the decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire, suggested the direction which his interpretation 
was to take. Christianity, for Gibbon, is a major factor 
in the collapse of the empire. This impulse is given con- 
tent and definition by his ideological and attitudinal pre- 
suppositions. As a rationalist, he treats certain Christian 
tenets and claims as superstition. As an admirer of Rome, 
he laments the detrimental effect of Christianity on the 
empire. .Hostile to religion, he makes the Christian religion 
appear to be the enemy of goodness, truth and justice. At 
times he is clearly closed -minded and unconsciously irration- 
al in his hostility. Fair and objective at many points, 
even most points,` Gibbon's unchecked preunderst,.nding allows 
him in his tre turent of the Christian. faith to degenerate 
from an able historian into a propagandist. 
Chapter Eight 
History and Idealism: Hegel 
I. The Formation of Hegel's Preunderstanding 
We are endeavoring in this section to understand the 
role of preunderstanding in historical interpret2tions of 
Christianity by selecting representative figures from var- 
ious eras during the life of the church. We first focused 
our attention on Augustine's theology of history and dis- 
covered that he viewed his subject from within faith in 
the God of the biblical record whose providential activity 
in the affairs of men gave meaning to human history. But 
we noted also in Augustine an inadequate historical method 
with which to approach the evidence of such activity. In 
Edward Gibbon, perhaps the best representative historian of 
the Enlightenment, we observed the reverse. His rationalis- 
tic presuppositions precluded from the start the considera- 
tion of the possibility of God's revelatory intervention 
in the events surrounding the appearanceof Christ, yet, in 
historical method, he was better able to see their true his- 
torical dimension. We move now to a third historical inter- 
pretation of the Christian faith to see if it can do justice 
to the need for an appropriate preunderstanding for the 
Christ-event without sacrificing the concern for the historical. 
We turn to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Philosophy of 
his íórß which appeared in lecture form toward the end of 
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Hegel's life and which was designed as his crowning philo- 
sophical work. 
1 
In order to gain an insight into the pre- 
understanding which guides this work, it is necessary to 
look briefly at his life and environment. 
Hegel was born in Stuttgart in the state of Würtemberg 
in 1770 to a quiet middle class family. His father was a 
subordinate official in the department of finances for the 
state, and his mother contented herself with the tasks of 
the home and the education of her three children. Hegel 
was a more diligent than brilliant pupil in school but was 
always teachable and ready to acquire knowledge of any kind. 
He was patient and methodical in his habits and wrote full 
analyses of all the important books which he read, copying 
out long passages in his notebook. He was especially gripped 
by Attic culture and read Greek literature (e.g. the trage- 
dies of Sophocles) and saw in Greek art the "vision of a 
realized harmony of existence. "2 `' In addition to his note- 
book of extracts he also kept a diary in which he recorded 
certain life values which were beginning to forni. The values 
reflect the "enlightened" views of the era: he condemns 
the evils of intolerance, sees the necessity of thinking in- 
dependently, denounces the superstitions of the vulgar, 
notices the similarities of the miracles of all ages and 
1 Two relatively recent treatments of Hegel's thought, 
though not specifically concerned with his philosophy of his- 
tory, are J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re- examination, London, 
1958, & Walter Kaufmann, FI egel: Reinterpretation, Texts and 
Commentary, New York, 1965. 
¿ Edward Caird, Hegel, London, 1886, p. 7. 
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nations and suggests that there is little difference between 
the ;_purchase of heaven's favor by direct offerings to the 
gods and the modern substitute of the gifts to the church.3 
rt 
At eighteen Hegel went to Tubingen to study. There 
theology had first place in the curriculum, though the course 
was divided into philosophy and theology sections, the former 
being two years and the latter three years. There he met 
Schelling and joined him in defending the ideas of the French 
Revolution, became friends with the poet Hölderlin with whom 
he studied Plato and Sophocles, and g:_:nerally gave himself 
with vigor to the Romantic current in which all Europe was 
engulfed. The faculty at Tübingen seems to have left little 
impression on Hegel who utilized the time more in pursuing 
his own philosophical interests of modifying and transforming 
Kantian principles than in attending lectures. The only com- 
ment from his tutors when he graduated in 1793 was that he 
was a man of good character, able in theology and philology, 
but with little aptitude in philosophy (a point which his 
biographers gleefully record). 
The next six years of hegel's life (his chrysalis years) 
were spent tutoring, three in 1erne and three in Frankfurt 
on the Mnin. During this period he attempted to piece to- 
gether the various fragments of his background and knowledge 
into a philosophical system. The two main strands of his 
intellectual heritage were his exposure to Greek culture and 
3 
Ibid. , p, 6. 
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the thought of the Enlightenment. These influences are 
in evidence in the various subjects on which he was working 
during this six year period. rie was especially p. eoccupied 
with religious questions- -she history and origin of Chris- 
tianity, its connection with Greek and Jewish religion, 
the life of Christ and rational religion. Gradually his 
minci turned to ethics, political life and ultimately to 
the physical and natural sciences. In all of these areas 
he was concerned on one hand with man's freedom or self- 
determination and on the other with man's life in its 
natural and spiritual unity. The former was the great con - 
cern of the Enlightenment, and the latter he saw to be the 
central issue of Greek thought. Gradually his philosophical 
system Legan to take shape and within a few years would 
appear in printed form. 
In 1799 Hegel's f -ther died leaving him with sufficient 
funds tò support himself. He settled in Jena in 1801 and 
became an instructor in the university. There he renewed 
his contact with Schelling with whom he collaborated in sup- 
port of the latter's philosophical position. Both men were 
a7reed that there was a unity above all differences which 
maintains itself through all differences and in reference 
to which all differences must be explained. Though both 
were willing to call this unifying force spiritual, they 
disagreed on its exact interpretation. After Schelling went 
to Arzberg in 1803, Hegel remained in Jena, and finally ob- 
tained a professorship in 1805. he was now ready to break 
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with Schelling whom he ridiculed when he gave his own views 
to the world in the Phenomenology of Mind which appeared 
in 1806. 
After the battle of Jena in 1806, which was disastrous 
to the Germans, the university became disorganized. Hegel 
lost his professorship and was forced to support himself as 
best he could. he served for two years as editor of a news- 
paper and for six years as headmaster of a Gymnasium. He 
continued to write and, between 1812 -1816, produced his most 
elaborate treatise, the Science of Logic. In 1816 he accep- 
ted a professorship at Heidelberg where he published a com- 
prehensive statement of his system, the Encyclopedia. In 
1818 he was called to ii:erlin to the chair of philosophy va- 
cated by Fichte. While at Berlin he published his Philosophy 
of Right, and delivered several extended series of lectures, 
published posthumously, in which he applied his method to the 
interpretation of history, the fine arts and religion. By 
the time Hegel came to Berlin he had achieved the leadership 
of philosophical thought in Germany, a position which he held 
as indisputably as Goethe in the world of literature and 
Beethoven in the realm of music. Hegel died in a cholera 
epidemic in 1831. 
This brief biographical sketch gives us some indication 
of the factors that went into forming Hegel's preunderstanding 
-,nd which in turn helped to shape his historical interpretation 
of the Christian faith. Among the important influences on 
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Hegel was his diligent study of Greek thought and culture. 
One of Hegel's expositors, R. Mackintosh, describes Plato 
and Aristotle as his "remote antecedents ".4 It was Plato 
who attempted to give rational order to all the world around 
him. Things, according to Plato, are nothing in themselves 
if they do not embody thoughts or ideas. The only way to 
escape from error to truth, from non -being to reality, was 
to grasp the idea behind the phenomenon. Aristotle, on the 
other hand, conceived of reality as matter becoming real by 
acquiring or passing into form. This "evolutionary" type of 
philosophy finds the real in the process of things. If one 
adds Aristotle's conception of movement to Plato's concept 
of ideas as constituting reality, one discovers something 
very similar to íiegel's logic. It is for this reason that 
Reinhold Niebuhr describes hegel's thought as reinterpreting 
"Platonism to conform to the historical consciousness of 
mod erni t y. "5 
Another element in the formation of Hegel's preunder- 
standing is Christian theology. Hegel regarded his attempt 
at universal history as a rationalized version of the biblical 
idea of historical unity through divine providence.6 Hegel 
writes that his "mode of treating the subject is a theodicy, 
a justification of the ways of God to man...so that the ills 
which may he found in the world may be comprehended and the 





Hegelianism, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 33. 
History, p. 3. 
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thinking spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence 
of evil. "7 Hegel saw himself as a true son of the faith 
and indeed as an apologist for it. 
Still another ingredient which contributed to the develop- 
ment of Hegel's preunderstanding is the thought of the En- 
lightenment, including the rationalism of Descartes and 
Spinoza. To the Enlightenment Hegel owes his self- confidence 
in the all sufficiency of reason. 
8 
He never doubted that 
the "real was the rational" and "the rational the real ", 
and that his own mind was rational. With such a doctrine, 
man has implicit knowledge of everything, and Hegel believed, 
without arrogance, that he had come a long way in making 
explicit what was implicit. Even God, as his critics are 
fond of saying, was not permitted by Hegel to have any secrets. 
But IIegel's rationalism was not a simple transplant of the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment. His thought was also 
influenced by Romantic strains. It is significant that in 
the small town Of Jena where Hegel lived for a number of 
years Goethe had been minister of education, Fichte had 
lectured, Novalis and Schiller had regularly visited and 
friendships had been established with Hhderlin and Schelling. 
Hegel could not have resisted tree influence of such a constel- 
lation of men who passed through Jena.9 Romanticism had 
7 Lectures on the philosophy of History, tr. by J. 
Sibree, London, 1890, p. 16. 
8 Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, London, 1959, 
P. 275. 
9 Jacob Bronowski & Bruce 1Th zlich, The Western Intellec- 
tual Tradition, London, 1960, ,p. 479 -480. 
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expressed the confidence, like the Rationalism of the Enlight- 
enment, that man had powers within his grasp which, if 
properly employed, would enable him to find truth and personal 
'fulfillment as one who was essentially in harmony with God. 
But it revolted against the uniformity that Rationalism 
tended to impose on man. If man was essentially in harmony 
with God, could not this harmony lie within the realm of a 
person's own individuality, his desire to be unique, to be 
free, to create something in particular? Why should these 
inner surgings be repressed and sacrificed on the altar of 
reason ?10 Hegel hears this plea of Romanticism and makes room 
for individuality and creativity --for diversity. But he does 
so without sacrificing rational unity to a mere appeal for 
poetry, creative experience and to individual genius.11 
In that our concern is primarily for Hegel's view of 
history, and particularly his historical interpretation of 
Christianity, we must also examine the historical writing 
which ,,receded his and weigh its influence on the formation 
of his preunderstanding. In chapter seven we discussed in 
outline form the development of historiography from the 
Augustinian influenced medieval period, through the Renaissance 
and new science eras up td the Enlightenment with its cul- 
mination in the historical writing of Edward Gibbon. Now it 
is necessary to outline the presuppositions in historical 
10 Fuller, o p. cit., pp. 39-40. 
11 ar_th, From Rousseau to Ritschl, p. 276. 
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understanding in the intervening years between the Enlighten- 
ment and Hegel's writing and, as we do so, we will discover 
that much of what appears new and original in Hegel had 
already been said, but in amore fragmentary form. 
Before genuine progress could be made in historiography 
beyond the Enlightenment, three fundamental shifts had to 
tae r. -lace; 
12 
(1) The epistemological foundation of history 
had to be established, making history a legitimate form of 
knowledge; (2) The perspective of history had to be exranded 
by a more sympathetic study of those previous eras which the 
Enlightenment had written off as uncivilized and hence ignored; 
(3) The understanding of human nature as being universally the 
same in all ages and races had to be refuted. 
The first of these conditions was met by the Italian, 
Vico, who chronologically belongs more to the age of rationalism, 
but whose development of the idea of history was far ahead of 
his time. As he set about formulating the principles of the 
historical method as :Bacon had formulated those of the 
scientific, he found himself confronted by Cartesian philosophy 
with its tendency to devalue historical knowledge. What he 
objected to in Descartes' theory: of knowledge was not math- 
ematical knowledge but thé implication that the only criterion 
of truth is the clear and distinct idea which precluded from 
the start the legitimacy of historical knowledge. According 
12 Collingwood, op. cit., p. 82. Collingwood here 
suggests only the latter two. 
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to Vico, this Cartesian criterion does not prove an idea 
true, only that the holder of the idea thinks it is true 
because it appears self - evident to him. What is needed, 
he contends, is a different,epistemological principle. He 
finds this principle in the doctrine that verum et factum 
convertuntur: that is, that the condition of being able to 
know anything completely is that the knower himself should 
have made it.13 It follows from this principle that history 
which is a human product can be an object of human knowledge. 
And once it is established how historical knowledge is genuine 
knowledge, it is not difficult to work out a historical 
method which Viço proceeded to do. An important related point 
about Vico is the place which he assigns to man in historical 
processes. Man is a genuine creator in history. But he is 
also that which providence makes use of in "benevolent 
cunning" in order to accomplish a spiritual purpose as history 
moves along its spiraling course.14 This idea we will see 
repeated in Hegel. 
The remaining two conditions were met in the writing of 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744- 1803). Herder, under the 
influence of Rousseau, viewed human history as a growing 
organism and thus could be sympathetic with bast ages in fiat 
they were'necessary steps of development. Hence he saw value 
in civilizations very different from his own. In his Ideen 
1.3 I id. 
, p. 64. 
14 G.B. Vico, The New Science, tr. by T.13. Bernin 8_ 
AMI-). Fisch, New YorkT961, pp. 75 ff. 
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zur philosophic der Menschengeschichte, published in four 
volumes between 1784 and 1791, we find his description of 
the historical progress of mankind. Mankind, according to 
Herder, is an organism gradually developing higher organisms 
within itself. Each stage in the evolutionary process 
necessarily leads on to the next, culminating in man (humanity) 
who is an end in himself. Man's rational and moral life 
vindicates his existence. Herder also meets the second 
condition in his analysis of the various civilizations. As 
he studied them he believed he could observe that each race 
had its own characteristics and that human nature was diver- 
sified and variable. 
Immanuel Kant (1724 -1804) in his Idee zu einer allgemeinen 
Geschichte weltbUrgerlicher Absicht published in 1784 con- 
tinued the development of historiography beyond the Enlighten- 
ment conception. Collingwood summarizes Kantts view in four 
categories: (1) Universal history is a feasibleeideal, but 
demands the union of historical and philosophical thought; 
(2) The notion of universal history presupposes the progressive 
development of a plan coming into existence; (3) That which 
is coming into existence is human rationality; (4) The means 
by which this is taking place is human irrationality.15 
In a lecture delivered in Jena in 1789 entitled "Was 
heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte ?" 
the poet Schiller followed Kant's analysis, but whereas Kant 
15 Ibid., i>. 103. 
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placed the goal of history in the future, Schiller asserted 
that the aim of universal history was to show how the present 
came to be what it is. 
Another follower of Kant was the philosopher Fichte who 
published his views of history in an essay entitled Grundzüge 
des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters in 1806. Fichte also viewed the 
present as being of prime importance to the historian. The 
historian's task is to uncover the unique character of his 
own age and discern the single concept which characterizes 
each age in the past. By such an analysis the historian 
will be able to discern the sequence of concepts which 
constitutes the logical structure of history. The inner 
dynamic or the unifying concept characteristic of each age is 
the dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The 
concept first appears in its pure and abstract form (thesis), 
then it generates its own opposite (antithesis) with the 
resulting synthesis, and so the process goes on through 
history. The fundamental concept uniting the total process 
of history, according to Fichte, is rational freedom 
which also dances to the triple beat of the dialectic. In 
stage one, the primitive society, freedom operates without 
opposition on blind instinct. In stage two, freedom limits 
itself by the creation of authoritarian rulers and laws. 
Finally in stage three, civil freedom, men govern themselves.ló 
In the thought of Schelling we discover one more important 
concept in this development of historical thought which began 
16 Ibid., pp. 106 ff. 
(207) 
with Herder. Schelling understood history as the process in 
which the absolute itself comes into full and complete 
existence and self- awareness as Spirit. 
In Hegel we see the culmination of this historical 
movement. His interpretation of history owes something 
to each of the writers mentioned. He believes that providence 
stands behind history, cunningly using men to accomplish 
spiritual ends (Vico). Moreover, Hegel's history is a 
universal history of mankind (Herder) whose. plot is the 
development of freedom which is identical with moral reason 
(Kant) and culminates in the present (Schiller). In addition, 
history is the development of freedom by the dialectic of 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis (Fichte) and a cosmic process 
by which the world comes to realize itself in self-conscious- 
ness as Spirit (Schelling). 
Out of all these contributing elements --his exposure to 
Greek thought, rationalism, romanticism, and the new develop- 
ments in historical thinking --Hegel constructs a massive 
philosophical systems This philosophical system becomes the 
ideological framework out of which he interprets the Christian 
faith. It is comprehensive in its scope and functions as the 
major influence on Hegel's view. It operates consistently, 
consciously and rationally throughout his interpretation. 
Bdcause of its breadth, it is inclined to function as a closed 
system, and as such, has a negative affect on his analysis of 
Christianity. The ideological assumptions of Hegel's 
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philosophical syst::m tend to overshadow the attitudinal and 
methodological aspects of his preunderstanding. We will 
therefore focus our attention on how these ideological 
assumptions exrress themselves in his historical interpretation. 
II. Hegel's Philosophy of History 
As we have suggested, Hegel's philosophy of history, 
and hence his interpretation of the Christian faith, is so 
intimately connected with his total philosophical system 
(and is the logical outgrowth of it) that it is necessary to 
look at some aspects of that system in order to appreciate its 
role as a preunderstanding. We are keenly aware as we do so 
of the complexity and universality of his philosophical 
system and of ot!r inability to do justice to it in a few 
short paragraphs. And of course this is not our purpose. 
There are, however, some basic underlying concepts which 
function as presuppositions in his analysis of history and 
the place of Christianity in that analysis. We must have 
these well in mind as we attempt to weave our way through 
the labyrinth of his views. 
Perhaps the most basic concept, and here Hegel agrees 
with Fichte and Schelling, is that ultimate reality is 
absolute mind or Spirit (Geist) which passes through various 
stages of development in time and becomes conscious of itself 
in human reason. It is the self- expression of absolute mind 
which gives meaning and unity to all reality and hence to 
history.17 
17 Findlay, op. cit., i,p. 34 ff. 
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A second concept central to Hegel's thought is the notion 
of relation. For Hegel, every idea is a group of relations; 
we can think of something'only by relating it to something 
else, and perceiving its similarities and differences. An 
idea without relations of any kind is empty and meaningless. 
By means of his dialectical logic, Hegel attempts to show how 
everything is connected in principle with everything else 
and helps to constitute the whole. Another way to state this 
essential element in Hegel's system is by the concept of 
implication. Each phase of reality is shown by Hegel to 
imply all'the rest. There is a mutual interdependence of 
all that exists, a relation of the whole to the parts and of 
any part to the whole.18 
of all the relations, and this is a third fundamental 
concept, the "most universal is that of contrast or oppositiofl. 
Hegel makes use of Spinoza's dictum that ''all determination 
is negation ". Every condition of thought or of things leads 
of necessity to its opposite and then unites (Aufgehoben) 
with it to form a higher and more complex whole. With 
Schelling, Hegel posits the underlying identity of all 
opposites and with Fichte he argues that the inner logic 
of this identity is the dialectic of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis. 
a 
Fourthly and finally, Hegel sees mind as the indispenscble 
18 Ibid., pu. 58 ff. 
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organ for the perception of ultimate reality. It is mind 
which discovers the unity in diversity of all thought and 
being. 
Hegel's Philosophy of History incorporates all of these 
basic concepts. He does so by dividing his lectures into 
three main sections each of which has subsections. In Section 
One, the Introduction, Hegel sets forth his pivotal themes, 
methodology and approach. In Section Two he analyzes the 
geographical basis of history and divides the globe accordingly. 
In his final section Hegel traces the development of human 
history through its four important stages: the Oriental, the 
Greek, the Roman and the Germanic. We will follow Hegel's 
pattern in our discussion. This will enable us to see the 
specific place he assigns to Christianity within the whole. 
Hegel begins by defining his effort as philosophical 
history, in distinction from original or reflective history, 
which has as its goal the apprehension of the reasons why 
events happened as they did. The reasons behind the events 
are discovered by Reason. As he says, "The only thought 
which philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of 
history is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is 
the sovereign of the world; that the history of the world, 
therefore, presents us with a rational 
19 process." The 
nature of tiffe reasons discovered by Reason belong to the realm 
19 np. cit., p. 9. 
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of Spirit. History, is the gradual development of the self - 
consciousness of the eternal Spirit or God. For Hegel, 
Infinite or Pure Being is its own negation or Nothing. To 
be real, the Infinite must be concrete, and therefore manifests 
itself in the myriad forms of the existing world with the goal 
of returning to itself as the One Real'Individual, the 
Absolute Idea. In this dialectical process täe goal is 
realized in and constitutes the substance of history. ?0 
The essence of the Spirit's self -manifestation is freedom. 
Hence "the History of the world is none other than the 
progress of the consciousness of Freedom...." 
21 
What are the various means which the principle of freedom 
(used synonomously by Hegel with the progressive self -con- 
sciousness of the Spirit) employs for its realization? Hegel 
mentions three in particular. The first is his famous 
"cunning of reason" (List der Vernunft).22 In order to be 
free the absolute Spirit avails itself of the passions, 
appetites, private interests and opinions of individuals and 
peoples to secure its own end. "The cunning of reason...sets 
the passions to work for itself."23 Reason works in and 
behind the passions and selfish interests of man and uses 
them as agents. uence it is not by chance, but of the very 
essence of history, that the ultimate outcome of great 
20 Grace Cairns, op. cit., p. 282. 
21 Hegel, op. cit., pp. 19 -20. 
22 See Löwith, op. cit., pry. 52 -59, for an essay on 
this concel)t. 
23 Hegel, op. cit p. 34. 
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historical actions is always something which was not intended 
by men. 
The second means utilized by the Spirit or God to achieve 
self -conscious freedom is great men called by Hegel "world 
historical individuals ".24 individuals such as Caesar or 
Napoleon had no consciousness of the general idea which they 
were unfolding while seeking their own political ends, yet 
they were thinking men who had insights into the requirements 
of their time and ushered in the necessary changes for progress. 
In the accomplishment of their goals, though they may have 
trampled innocent flowers along the way, they were the agents 
of the World- Spirit and an indispensable part of its progressive 
self -awareness. This emphasis on the Dart played by great 
men in history may have been partly stimulated by Hegelts 
personal obervation of Napoleon who marched with his vic- 
torious army through Jena in 1306. Hegel recorded in his 
diary that he "saw the Emperor, the world -soul,- riding 
through the city to reconnoitre. It is in truth a strange 
feeling to see such an individual before irle, who here, from 
one point, as he rides on his horse, is reaching over the 
world, and remouldi n ií."25 
A third means used by the Spirit for its ends is the 
state. For Hegel, the state was the highest expression of 
human reason; in fact the state was reason and therefore 
could do no wrong.26 The essence of the state was freedom, 
24 Ibid., p. 30. 
25 Quoted by Caird, a. cit., p. 66. 
26 J.W. . Thompson, a. cit. , u. 205. 
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freedom manifested and organized. The succession of the 
various states in history is the pathway of the Spirit's 
gradual self -realization. Hence for Hegel there is no history 
prior to the state, only inchoate barbarism and decay. 
In the next major section Hegel discusses the geographical 
basis of history. What is important to notice in this section 
is his refusal to approach history by way of nature.27 
Nature and history are essentially two different things. They 
intersect only at the point of geography, and here Hegel is 
careful to strike a balance in describing this mutual depen- 
deuce. He writes: "Die Natur darf nicht zu hoch und nicht zu 
niedrig angcschlegen werden." 28 A fe examples from this 
section will illustrate Hegel's point. The extremes of heat 
and cold may exert a power which prevents the self -development 
of Spirit. The temperate zone is the theater of history. 
Australia and the pacific Islands are physically immature. 
America is but the echo of the Old World, and Africa displays 
its bondage to the powers of nature. Only Asia and Europe 
are historical. In addition, nature provides the symbol for 
the development of world history. As the sun rises in the 
East and travels to the West, so goes the course of civil- 
ization. 
So it is, in his third section, that he traces the 
27 Collingwood, QL. cit., p. 114. 
28 Quoted by Robert Flint, The Philosophy of Hist-ry in 
Europe, Edinburgh, 1874, p. 514. 
(214) 
Spirit's progress across the cultures of Asia, Greece, Rome 
and the Germanic world. "The history of the world travels 
from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of I- fistory, 
Asia the begi.nning." 
29 
In the East to West movement the 
Spirit has been educated to the reality and consciousness 
of its freedom and is "coming home" after the alienation 
with itself. 
Asian history (China, India and Persia) represents the 
childhood of the Spirit's development toward consciousness 
of its freedom. In China the society was organized in a way 
which excluded individual reflection and creativity in every 
sphere of life. There was no scientific research, art, 
service or initiative, no real morality of the heart and con- 
science and no sense of spiritual life. All human freedom 
was absorbed into the emperor. He is that One who owns all 
things. Therefore, "no other individual has a separate 
existence." 30 India too suffered with no freedom or inward 
morality. In Persia the Spirit first begins to waken from 
its slumber and is recognized as light. 
But the veil is lifted to the freshness and fulness of 
youthful life by the Greek Apollo who exhorts, "Man, know 
thyself." In Greece man first felt himself as truly man. 
Here the Spirit emancipated itself and attained free individ- 
uality. Socrates, in particular, represents for Hegel the 
29 Hegel, op cit., p. 109. 
30 Ibid., p. 105. 
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beginning of the realization of reflective inwardness. But 
only some are free; slavery still exists and morality has not 
yet become fully self- conscious because "the individual will 
of the subject adopts unreflectingly the conduct and habits 
prescribed by justice and the laws.tt31 
Stage three, the Roman world, represents the manhood of 
Spirit, a time of obedience to the positive law of the state. 
In Rome the individual sacrifices himself for the national 
interest, yet without loss of personality. But gradually 
as the individual despot takes over the state and is accepted 
because of the need for order, the Spirit cannot accept this 
tyranny and is driven back into the depths of its own inner 
being to seek a spiritual empire. Such an empire is revealed 
and founded by Christ. 
With the decline of Rome and under the inspiration of 
Christianitv the Germanic world developed. It represents 
the old age of Spirit, not in the sense of weakness, but in 
maturity, strength and the fulfillment of time. In the 
Germanic world there is the recognition that all men are free. 
In modern Germany the antithesis between church and state 
which existed in the Middle Ages has vanished and the spiritual 
becomes reconnected with the secular. "Freedom has found 
the means of realizing its Ideal- -its true existence.t,32 
It is in this general framework that Hegel gives us 
31 Ibid., p. 106. 
32 Ibid., p. 116. 
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his historical interpretation of Christianity. The Christian 
religion made its appearance at a time when the Roman world 
was in a "desperate condition and the sain of abandonment 
by God --came to an open rupture with reality, and made prom- 
inent the general desire for satisfaction such as can only 
be attained in 'the inner man,' the Soul,--thus preparing 
the ground for a higher spiritual world. "33 The situation 
of mankind was therefore "analogous to a place of birth, 
and its pain was like the travail- throes of another and 
higher spirit, which. manifested itself in connection with 
the Christian Religion. "34 With the dawn of Christianity, 
Spirit is self- harmonized and man, recognizing God as Spirit, 
finds his own essential being. God, conceived of as Spirit, 
is the new principle on which the history of the world turns. 
It is Jesus who recognized the nature of God as pure 
Spirit and therefore he becomes the supreme organizing force 
of the modern world. Though hewás clothed in the historical 
appearances of finitude his true substance, i.e. his essen- 
tial nature, was absolute and perfect spirituality which 
is true infinitude. In him time was fulfilled; he is the 
goal of all previous history and the starting point for all 
history to come because he saw the principle that God and man 
are one by virtue of their sharing a spiritual nature.35 
A great mistake is made, Hegel believes, when Christ is 
33 lbid. , p. 330. 
34 Ibid. 
35 George S. Morris, Hegel's Philosophy of the State 
and History, Chicago, 1887, p. 227. 
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regarded as only a bygone i ersonaïit . If one takes this 
"unspiritual" point of view, then it leads to such irrelevant 
questions as his birth, his father and mother, his early domes- 
tic relations and his miracles. Considered in respect to 
his talents, character and morality he can only ce placed 
in the same category as Socrates and other great men. "But" 
says Hegel, "if Christ is to be looked upon only as an excel- 
lent, even impeccable individual, and nothing more, the con- 
cention of the Speculative idea, of Absolute Truth is ignored. ."36 
The real issue concerning Christ is not his person but the 
revelation which was made in him. All that has been made of 
Christ in the doctrines and councils of the church is the 
symbolic expression in pictorial language of what philosophy 
can state more accurately. It is not the uniqueness of the 
historical Christ or the once- for -all character of his media- 
tion which is important, but the ultimate truth that Divinity 
and humanity are one in essence, that the life of man is the 
life of God in temporal torm.37 In the grand progressive 
sairal of history, individual events are but transient in- 
dividualizations of an eternal and unchanging content. The 
importance of Jesus, as a '4orld- historical figure, is that 
he says for the first time that God and man are one and at- 
tained in his death freedom and infinity of spirit. All men 
now are to appropriate this idea and to accomplish Jesus' own 
history. 
p . cit., p. 337. 
37 
H. R. Mackintosh, n. cit., p. 108. 
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Thus in Christ a new epoch is launched. Mnn is liber- 
ated in principle from foreign authority and is able to achieve 
authentic selfhood in relation to the absolute. With Christ, 
time is fulfilled and the historical world becomes, in prin- 
ciple, perfect. But at the beginning of the epoch, the prin- 
ciple which Christ enunciated is still abstract and acknow- 
ledged only in the inner shrine of the heart. It has not 
yet penetrated into secular existence. The idea, because 
it too is a part of history, must go through the dialectic 
of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The Spirit of Christ 
which embodied the early church faced the antithetical chal- 
lenge of the barbnrism that swept over the Roman Empire and 
resulted in the synthesis of the Roman church. With the rise 
of the church, a new antithesis takes shape in the secular 
state which .renders its allegiance to Rome not by freedom 
but by compulsion. As the battle rages between the secular 
states and the ecclesiastical church, the essential unity 
of the divine and human is violated and the Spirit is no 
longer able to find its expression in the ecclesiastical 
church. The synthesis which arises is the modern German 
world. In this new expression the Spirit becomes conscious 
of its freedom,' and the antithesis of Church and state begins 
to vanish. Man begins to realize that the spiritual can 
only be realized through the secular and that the secular 
must be developed out of the spiritual. The church becomes 
an integral part of the state. The states and laws are merely 
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the manifestation of religion in the relations of the actual 
world. The truth which has been proclaimed must now be con- 
verted into fact, and it is this task which the various na- 
tions of Europe have before them and which each of them is 
accomplishing with more or less success in its own way. 
Thus, as the realization of the Spirit of Christianity, 
the history of the world is a true theodicy. Speaking phil- 
osophically, history is the self -realization of absolute 
Spirit, "whose reality is the consciousness of Freedom and 
nothing short of it. "38 But speaking theologically, history 
is God's justification and the assurance "that what has hap- 
pened, and is happening everyday, is not only not 'without 
God, ' cut is essentially His work. 
"39 
III. Evaluation 
we began our discussion of Hegel wondering if his analy- 
sis of the Christian religion would meet the two conditions 
which we have established as necessary in order for any his- 
torical interpretation to do justice to Christian faith, 
namely an appropriate preunderstanding (faith) and an ade- 
quate historical methodology. At first glance it might ap- 
pear that Hegel has met these requirements, but on closer 
scrutiny it becomes questionable whether he has really met 
either one. 
But let us first look at the reasons for affirming that 
38 




he has met these two conditions, i.e. at the positive con- 
tribution which he makes to our historical understanding of 
the Christian faith. It should be acknowledged from the be- 
ginning that his intention has been both to write from with- 
in faith and to play fair with historical fact. If we are 
merely to judge intention, then credit must be given to Hegel 
for meeting the conditions. He does see God as the author 
of the historical drama of mankind. God governs the world, 
and history is the carrying out of His plan.40 Je also learn 
from Hegel that our knowledge of God is historical, particu- 
lar and event- oriented. What happens in history is the revel- 
ation of God. And of course, as these two concepts are 
brought together, they imply others as well. It follows 
that history is a meaningful and rational process, that God 
and reason are not in conflict, hut one, and that Christian 
faith so interpreted is not repugnant to modern culture. All 
this is to HegelTs credit. just where then does he fail? Why 
has not his massive system won our day as it did his? There 
are fundamental reasons, and we might summarize them as a 
failing to do justice to the two requirements which have been 
laid down as necessary features for an adequate interpretation 
of the Christian faith. 
In the first place, Hegel does not have an adequate his- 
torical methodology. He makes no serious scientific inquiry 
into the evidence. At certain points he is ignorant of his- 
torical facts; at other times he either ignores them or twists 
40 
ibid., p. 38. 
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them to suit his purpose. de forces onto history an unreal 
unity by either ignoring or falsifying historical details.41 
In addition, as Croce has observed,42 Hegel often confuses 
opposition and distinction. History is not necessarily a 
dialectical process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. His- 
torical institutions may originate and develop side by side, 
but not be or only partly be in conflict. It is artificial 
to force dialectical logic onto history. jiegel also fails 
as a historian in limiting history-to political history. He 
does so because of his understanding: of absolute Spirit and 
its relation to the state, but this is certainly not suffi-z, 
cient grounds for ignoring a multitude of other human acti- 
vities which constitute the stuff of history just as much 
as political activity. We cannot resist mentioning one final 
negative point, which it seems, all who discuss Hegel are 
fond of mentioning, namely that he sees history as being ful- 
filled in the Prussian state of his time. This sanctification 
of the secular state, a sort of secular realized eschatology,43 
assigns virtue at precisely the roint where it is most dub- 
ious, that is in the corporate will. The irony of such an 
"easy conscience" which deifies the state is that it makes 
possible the unleashing of the whole daemonic fury of the col- 
lective expression of man.44 In short, Hegel fails in histor- 
ical methodology because he makes it a slave of his system, a 
system which is a monument to his creative ability and imag- 
ination but .a tombstone for scientific historiography. 
42 
R. iebuhr, Faz h and History, p. 122. 
Benedetto Croce, What is Living and What is Dead in 
the Philosophy of Hegel, tr. by Douglas Ainslie, London, 1T5, passim. 
43 See Bultmann, , History and Eschatology, p. 68. 
See R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, 
PP. 80, 93, 118. 
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Secondly, Hegel comes to the historical dimension of 
Christianity with an inadequate preunderstanding. It is not 
essentially that of faith but of idealistic philosophy. Even 
when it is acknowledged, as we have done, that there is no 
such thing as "pure faith",' i.e. faith which functions in- 
dependently of cultural and historical influences, it is 
still difficult to call Hegel's philosophical system, which 
we have described as one massive complex preunderstanding, 
the expression of_faith. It really has very little to do 
with what the church has traditionally recognized as faith. 
As a result fundamental tenets of Christian belief are dis- 
torted. Christianity is forced to pit his philosophical system 
and becomes nearly unrecognizable in the process. The funda- 
mental idea of God, for example, is that of an impersonal and 
abstract being. He is not the God of the Bible, of Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob but the God of the philosophers. lle is Abso- 
lute Spirit, Idea, Reason, It. He does not stand sovereignly 
above history, but is himself, in his self- manifestation, the 
process of history. Moreover, evil is not something for which 
atonement must be made but an- essential part of the whole 
dialectical process of history. As Barth remarks: "Hegel 
could even speak of the Devil in tones of unfeigned admiration."45 
Further, the Christian faith is conceived of by Hegel as being 
realized in the secular state, as if the Christian faith could 
45 
Fr_nm Rousseau to Ritschl, p. 286. 
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ever be "realized" in the secular state, let alone anywhere 
46 
else. And finally, in the last resort, Jesus himself is 
irrelevant; a bearer of an important idea, yes, but not the 
Word made flesh nor the unique once- for -all redeemer of ma.n- 
kind.47 
For these reasons we must look beyond Hegel for an 
adequate historical interpretation of the Christian faith. 
ztt 
ö r., i. t h, op. c i. ï; ., p. 58. 
47 1_; `. mack+. n t -) s h , op. cit. , p. 109. 
Chapter Nine 
History and Nineteenth Century Liberalism 
Adolph von Harnack 
I. Harnack's Frame nf. Reference 
In our attempt to ascertain the influence of preunder- 
standing on representative historical interpretations of 
Christian faith we have considered three quite different 
approaches. In Augustine we found a theologian at work, 
writing from within faith, attempting to organize the par- 
ticularities of history into a theological framework. In 
Eduard Gibbon we observed the historian whose understanding 
of Christianity was largely determined by his rationalistic 
presuppositions and by his placing of the Christian faith 
within the larger context of the decline and fall of the 
Roman Empire. In Hegel we saw the philosopher whose !meta- 
physical system gave form to the historical dimension of the 
Christian religion. In our analysis we have argued that all 
three men failed at certain points to do full justice to the 
demands placed upon any interpreter who would seek to render 
an account of the Christian faith. Augustine, because the 
historical method was as yet undeveloped, was unable to deal 
competently with the historical questions surrounding the 
appearance of Christ. Gibbon, who saw more clearly than 
Augustine the historical issues, was prohibited from treating 
them adequately by his uncritical acceptance of the Enlightenment-. 
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world view. Hegel, due to his preoccupation with creating an 
all- embracing view of the unity of history, was unable to give 
proper attention to the importance of historical details 
and particular events. 
We turn now to Adolph von Harnack who, like Gibbon, 
was a professional historian and one incidently whose quality 
of workmanship was second to -that of no German historian of 
his day. But unlike Gibbon, Harnack was also a Christian 
theologian who understood and interpreted Christianity from 
within faith. Faith is the broad horizon of understanding 
out of which he works. However the specific form that his 
faith takes is related to his life situation and the pre- 
dominant thought patterns of his culture, both of which we 
must examine if we are to appreciate the role which his 
preunderstanding assumes in his historical interpretation 
of the Christian faith. 
Harnack was born in Dorpat on the Baltic in 1851 to a 
reasonably well -to -do and cultured bourgeois family. 
1 
He 
was educated at the local university and displayed Loth 
diligence and brilliance. His own ability, and the fact that 
his brother -in -law, Hans Debrück, was the imperial tutor and 
adviser, brought him into contact with two of the great 
1 For a full account of Harnack's life, see Agnes von 
Zahn- Ilarnack, Adolph von Harnack, Berlin, 1936. See also E. 
Schmidt and E. Seeberg, "Adolph von Harnack" in Sammlung 
gemeinverständlicher Vortrage und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der 
Theologie und Religiongeschichte, Heft 150 1930) and F.B. 
Clogg, "Adolph von Harnack ", London Quarterly Review, CLIV, 
241 -246. For a careful treatment of his theological views, 
see Wilhelm Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, New York, 1968. 
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historical minds of his time, Mommsen (whose daughter he 
later married) and Dilthey. 
He began his academic career as a Lecturer in church 
history at Leipzig (1874) and soon established a national 
reputation. by his sound textual work in a collection of writings 
by the early Christian fathers. From Leipzig Harnack moved 
on to Giessen (1879), then to Marburg (1886) and finally to 
Berlin (1388). By the outbreak of the First World War he 
was one of the most famous scholarshin Germany. He wrote 
voluminously and with uniform quality, publishing over 1800 
titles of books and articles. His best known works are 
The History of Dogma (1886 ff.), What is Christianity? (1901) 
and perhaps his greatest work, The Expansion of Christianity 
(1902). 
In addition to his scholarly work, Harnack took an 
active part in public affairs and wa. especially influential 
in the educational policy of the nation. Active in the Berlin 
Academy of Science, he prepared its official history in 1900. 
From 1905 -1921 he was the general director of the preussiche 
Staatsbibliothek at Berlin. From 1910 he was president of 
the Kaiser- Wilhelm -Gesellschaft zur Förderung der. Wissenschaften 
which was founded at his suggestion on the centenary of 
Berlin University. In th- post -war republic he was a rallying 
point for German scholarship and aided the revival of research 
and publication.2 What is important to notice about the 
2 For a brief account of iris activities see J.W. 
Thompson, op. pit., pp. 566 -568. See also Felix E. Hirsch, 
"The Scholar a s Librarian: To the Memory of Adolph von Harnack", 
The Library Quarterly, IX (1939), 299 -320. 
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course of Harnack's life is his thorough identification 
with and acceptance of nineteenth century liberal culture. 
But in order to better understand the factors which 
went into the formation of Harnack's preunderstanding it is 
necessary to go beyond this simple biographical sketch and to 
examine the intellectual currents of the age in which he 
lived and worked. The nineteenth century was an age of great 
intellectual ferment, and a man as sensitive to his time as 
Harnack could not help but be influenced by the dominant 
thought patterns of his era. Because Harnack was both a 
theologian and a historian, it is in the development of 
theology and historiography that we find the main influences 
which shaped his preunderstanding. 
What is of lasting importance in nineteenth century 
theology is not so much the final conclusions which were 
established but rather the development of a new theological 
method.3 This new theological method in large measure grew 
out of the fundamental changes which were taking place in 
historical thinking. Confronted with the rise of new his- 
torical knowledge, the theologian found it increasingly 
difficult to employ the traditional method of systematizing 
inerrant propositional statements from Scripture. This 
sharpened sense of historical consciousness took mane forms, 
one of which was the development of biblical criticism. The 
"lower" critics turned their attention to the individual 
3 Richardson, History Sacred and profane,- p. 78. 
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problems of the text and weighed the merits of each of the 
manuscripts. The "higher" critic was interested in the 
accuracy of the text and the meaning of the words. His 
task was to get behind the text to the events as they really 
happened. In order to do so it was necessary for him to 
find out when each passage of Scripture was written, wto 
wrote it and to whom and why it was written. 
One of the important theological movement's growing out 
4 
of higher criticism was the search for the historical Jesus.5 
Such a search implied that Jesus, as he lived in history, was 
different from the Jesus whom we find pictured in the Gospels. 
The effort of the historical critic to get behind the Gospel 
accounts to find out what Jesus had really been like was 
built on the assumption that the early church and the Gospel 
writers had added their own interpretation to the actual 
events. The problem left to the critic was to sift the 
authentic sayings and doings of Jesus from the later additions. 
Karl Barth lists five features of this movement which he 
believes unite the many divergent attempts to reconstruct 
the historical Jesus: (1) The authors of the movement be- 
lieved they could understand Christ in the same way as they 
did other historical persons; (2) They could understand him 
as a person of a distant bygone time insofar as they have 
sources of his life, i.e. the Gospels; (3) They sought the 
4 See George E. Ladd, op. cit., for an excellent survey. 
5 See above, ch. 5. 
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historical Jesus who can be distinguished from the sources, 
i.e. the true historical core which becomes visible behind 
the sources; (4) They believed that Jesus was a human personage 
who is in principle accessible to historical knowledge in 
exactly the way as Tiberius was accessible to them; (5) 
As a personage who is comprehensible historically they 
believed that Jesus was of supreme value.6 
perhaps the most impor-tant single theologian of the 
nineteenth century was Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768- 1834). 
7 
His work is important for a number of reasons, not the least 
of which was the formulation of this new theological method. 
It had two foundational postulates.8 The first was the 
affirmation that Christianity was a positive historical 
religion. In this affirmation Schleiermacher parts company 
with both. the prevailing rationalism of the eighteenth century 
whicn sought the universal religion of reason and Hegel's 
idealism which posited the metaphysic of the Absolute Spirit. 
Christianity, according to Schleiermacher, is a particular 
religion which Legan at a certain moment of history, developed 
as a historical movement and consists today in a particular 
form. The second postulate of 36hleiermacher'.s theological 
method was the concept of the religious- consciousness. 
Schleiermacher maintained that dogmas were a secondary and 
6 From Rousseau to Ritschl, p. 378. 
7 See ch. 2 for an account of his views on hermeneutics 
and ch. 3 on revelation. 
8 Richardson, The Bible in the Age of Science, pp. 81 -82. 
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derivative element in religion. What is essential is the 
revelation of the Infinite within the sanctuary of the 
individual soul. Responsive to the Romanticism of his time, 
he insisted that the heart of religion was feeling, and in 
particular the feeling of absolute dependence upon God. The 
uniquenes of Jesus is not to be found in Fome metaphysical 
doctrine about his person nor in a miraculous account of his 
birth, but in the fact that he possessed a God -consciousness 
to a supre e degree. Within these two principles much of 
Liberal theology of the nineteenth century found its perimeters. 
The framework allowed sufficient 'room for the developing 
science of biblical criticism and its various products 
(e.g. the search for the historical Jesus) because it did 
not restrict free inquiry with a priori dogmatic propositions. 
The theology of Albrecht Ritschl (1822- l8c.9) rested 
easily within the two postulates of Schleiermacher's theo- 
logical method and represents the most significant development 
of the method in the latter half of the nineteenth century.9 
For Ritschl, religion must be practical, not theoretical; 
it must begin with the questions of the here and now. Like 
Scalei ermacher, he had little patience with metaphysics or 
with theological discussions which did not appear to have 
practical consequences. To be practical, Christianit must 
be built on fact. The ground of truth for Christianity was 
the one certain historical fact which could be empirically 
9 H.R. A1ac'.dntosh, op. cit., pp. 136-174. 
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investigated, namely the impact which Jesus made upon the 
soul confronted by him. God, for Ritschl, was not to be 
found in nature, hut in history where a movement has arisen 
dedicated to the values articulated by Jesus. Religion, then, 
is based on value judgments, and the importance of Jesus 
rests solely on the fact that he led men to find the God who 
stands behind the values. Jesus is divine in the sense that 
he makes us conscious of the highest in life. From his 
influence comes the church, the value- creating community, 
which is the spearhead of building a society inspired by 
love and dedicated to the establishment of the Kingdom of 
God on earth. 
Harnack's theological position, while he brings to it 
his own originality, essentially combines the central features 
of nineteenth century theological thought. He is sensitive 
to the advance of biblical criticism and interested in getting 
behind the sources to the real Jesus of history. Christianity 
is a positive historical religion dev: loping and adat ting in 
response to its environment as any other historical institution. 
The essence of religion is the soul's relationship to God and 
its chief expression is the effort to realize the values 
enunciated by Jesus, namely the recognition of the Fatherhood 
of God and the establishment of the brotherhood of man. Thus 
in Iarnack we see the final working out of the presuppositions 
of nineteenth century theology. These presuppositions con- 
stitute the main ideological assumptions in Harnack's pre- 
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understanding. They of course are a major influence on his 
interpretation and function consistently, consciously and 
rationally throughout it. 
These ideological assumptions also suggest the attitudinal 
component of Harnack's nreu.nderstanc'ing. He is a Chri stian 
theologian operating from within faith and is th(_refore 
sympathetic in his treatment of the Christian revelation. 
But this attitude of sympathetic rapport does not mean that 
Harnack sets aside that complex of attitudes which are 
essential to the historian, i.e. fairness, objectivity, 
honesty, thoroughness, open -mindedness, etc. Both sets of 
attitudes, that of the theologian and that of the historian, 
are operative in his interpretation. 
The methodological strand of Harnack's preunderstanding 
can be traced to the increasingly sophisticated science of 
historiography. It is in this area that we discover the 
sources of his iethodological presuppositions. The new 
history which began to be written in the nineteenth century, 
especially in Germany, was no longer content with mere erudition 
but attempted to discover the significance and continuity of 
events, i .e. to perceive and to understand the development of 
history.10 Gradually, as the study of history progressed, 
the emphases of the Romantic movement gave way to the rigorous 
treatment of data. With the decline of Hegel's influence 
l-0 J.W. Thomason, oo. cit., P. 149. 
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there was a general suspicion of all philosophies of history 
and a tendency toward positivism, i.e. the effort to analyze 
historical data in a way similar to that employed by the 
natural sciences. This involved the historian in the two- 
fold task of ascertaining facts and then framing laws by 
generalizing from the facts (induction).-- The nineteenth 
century historians pursued the job of collecting facts with 
vigor and skill. There was a vast increase of detailed 
historical information based on an accurate and critical exam- 
ination of evidence. In fact the best historian became the 
greatest m=aster of detail. The ideal of constructi?.g a 
universal history was replaced by concentration on a much 
narrower area. 
In the endeavor to ascertain the facts, the historians 
worked out a new method of handling sources which centered in 
philoloical criticism. Each source was divided into its 
component parts by distinguishing its earlier and later 
elements, thus enabling the historian to discriminate between 
the more and less trustworthy portions. Even the more trust- 
worthy portions were then analyzed, attempting to show how 
the author's point of vii 41+ influenced his statement of the 
facts and allowing the historian to rectify any distortions.12 
In most cases the historian never got to the second 
stage of positivist principles, yet continued to be iní luenced 








by the first stage. He regarded each historical fact as 
something capable of being isolated by the processes of 
research. This resulted in the total field of history being 
sliced up into an infinite number of parts, each capable 
of being separately considered. In addition, each fact was 
considered to be knowable in an objectively empirical wad-. 
Thus the so- called subjective elements of the historian's 
preunderstanding could be eliminated. The ideal of the 
historian was to ascertain the fa.cLs in cool detachment, 
and say what they were without passing judgment on them. 
As a result, history became largely the history of external 
events, not the history of thought out of which the events 
grew. 
13 
The great Renaissance of German historical scholarship, 
of which Harnack was a product, began with the founding of 
the University of Berlin in 1810. To this intellectual 
center came a whole succession of learned historians and 
finally Harnack himself in 1388. One of the early leaders 
of the German historiography was Barthoïd Georg Niebuhr 
(1776 -1831) whose lectures on Roman history drew large 
crowds of students and townspeople. Niebuhr reconstructed 
Roman history on a "positive" factual basis, cutting away 
all the excesses of superstition and legend. He was especially 
critical of Livy, whose accounts he described as so much 
13 Ibid., p_. 132. Coilingwood here, with his idealist 
understanding of history, wishes to make a stronger point 
than I do. 
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patriotic fiction. The real force behind the progress of 
the study of history in Germany was Leopold Rance (1795 -1835) 
who came to Berlin in 1825. At twenty -nine he had written and 
published his Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen 
Völker which contained the famous description of history, 
lfwie es eigentlich gewesen ist." This work attempted to 
show the essential unity of the Romano- Germanic world and 
contained a penetrating criticism of historical sources. 
It immediately established Ranke's reputation and secured 
for him the-leadership of German historical thought. It was 
not long before a whole school grew up around him, with over 
thirty of his students achieving a high reputatiot, as his - 
torians and filling the important chairs of history in the 
various German universi ti es.14 
It was in this tradition of historiography that Harnack 
wrote his historical works. In many ways, as he did with the 
theology of the nineteenth century-, he brings the historiography 
of the same tine t a magnificent climax. His work as a 
scholar is above reproach, though not criticism, and he was 
indeed the peer of any of the great German historians of 
his time.15 Harnack's chief concern was to establish, on 
the basis of a critical study of history, a reconciliation 
between Christianity and mddern culture. His method was 
14 J..V. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 189-192. 
15 Ibid,,., p. 567. 
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the same as that of the secular historian, to ascertain facts 
objectively and to employ a scientific methodology in their 
interpretation. His work is the embodiment of his own contention 
that church history and secular history are one.16 
Thus nineteenth century bourge6is culture, the prevailing 
theological traditions of his time, the attitudes of both the 
theologian and the historian, and the presuppositions of 
positivist historiography supply the main ingredients in 
Harnack's preunderstanding. All of these elements converge 
on what might be described as Christian liberal humanism 
which becomes the anstruct out of which Harnack proceeds to 
the task of interpretation. Let us now see how this pre - 
understanding manifests itself in his historical interpretation 
of the Christian faith. 
II. Harnackts Interpretation 
Like his immediate theological predecessor, Albrecht 
Ritschl, Harnack stressed the ethical side of Christianity. 
He rejected all metaphysical formulations and reduced Christian 
doctrine to a bare minimum. He is thus a typical exponent 
of liberal Protestantism. For Harnack, as with Ritschl, 
religion is a practical affair concerned with the power to 
live a blessed and holy life. In Christianity this power 
stems from the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ 
who lived and taught true religion. Among the motives which 
induced Harnack to reduce Christianity to this essential 
16 Adolph von Harnack, "The Relation Between Ecclesiastical 
and General History", Contemporary Review, LXXXVI (1904), 
346_59. 
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minimum was the desire to make Christian faith acceptable to 
bourgeois cult1Yre.'7 Harnack was convinced that all the 
trappings of organized religion stood in the way of the 
liberty of the Christian, a, concept articulated by Luther 
and the Reformation. Harnack could see no need for mediation 
between God and man in the form of priests, Bible, church, 
sacraments or metaphysical christology. All this he perceived 
to be a stumbling block for modern man which had to be over- 
come. According to Harnack, the way to overcome the objection 
was to accept it as valid. Religion consists entirely on the 
soul's relation to God and the practice of the ethic of love 
and not in the external formalities concocted by church 
officials across the centuries. Hence Harnack advocated the 
need to jettison christology and ecclesiastical dogma. and 
restore the historical Jesus and his religion to their 
rightful place, to once again lo "lc to that personality whose 
power and influence set the whole Christian enterprise in 
motion. 
Although the original religion of Jesus was ethical 
and practical, it was not long before the church felt the 
need to make some beliefs about God and the world more ex- 
plicit. This tendency.- to formulate religious beliefs led 
the church to articulate dogmas, i.e. propositions which were 
supposed to express the contents of the faith and the acknow- 
ledgement of which was necessary for church membership and its 
promised blessings. In 1536 Harnack began to publish in 
17 See Thomas Nicol, "Harnack Among the Apologists", 
London Quarterly Review, CVii (1907), 23 -29.. 
(238) 
E';) 
several volumes his In Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte which 
had for its subject this development of dogma. The theme of 
these volumes is the gradual perversion of the original 
gospel by the imposition of,Hellenistic conceptions upon it. 
Dogma arose as an apologetic effort to place the Christian 
tradition within the framework of Greek philosophy. As a 
result, true religion was choked by theological and meta- 
physical doctrines, and the history of the church's thinking 
has for the most part been the story of the obscuration and 
deterioration of Christian truth rather than of its positive 
development. Harnack clarifies his purpose and scheme when 
he writes that 
The History of Dogma is a discipline of 
general Church History, which has for its 
object the dogmas of the Church. These 
dogmas are the doctrines of the Christian 
faith logically formulated and expressed 
for scientific and apologetic purposes, 
the contents of which are a knowledge of 
God, of the world, and of the provisions 
made by God for man's salvation. The 
Christian Churches teach them as truths 
revealed in Holy Scripture, the acknow- 
ledgment of which is the condition of the 
salvation which religion promises. But 
as the adherents of the Christian religion 
had not these dogmas from the beginning, 
so far, at least, as they form a connected 
system, the business of the history of 
dogma is, in the first place, to ascertain 
the origin of the Dogmas (of Dogma) and 
then secondly to describe their development 
(their variations) .18 
In pursuing this two -fold task, Harnack was dedicated to 
the historical positivists' ideal of objectivity and believed 
18 Histor' of Doy°ma, tr. by Neil Buchanan, New York, 
1961, Vol. I, p. 1. 
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that his responsibility: -was "simply to recognize this state of 
things and to represent it exactly: as it lies before us in 
the documents." 
19 For Harnack, there was no room for an 
inquiry into the author's point of view. In a historical 
work such an inquiry need not be made, for what matters is 
"whether the author is in sympathy with the subject about 
which he writes, whether he can distinguish original elements 
from those that are derived, whether he has a thorough 
acquaintance with his material, whether he is conscious of 
the limits of historical knowledge and whether he is truthful."20 
The perversion of the original gospel began in apostolic 
times when the early preachers began to preach about the 
significance of Christ's person rather than repeating his 
teaching and reporting the historical events of his life. 
This led to the emergence of a new stage in the history of 
the church, Dogmatic Christianity, which "stands between 
Christianity as the religion of the Gospel, presupposing a 
personal experience and dealing with disposition and conduct, 
and Christianity as a religion of culeus, sacraments, ceremonial 
and obedience, in short of superstition.... "21 The process 
was accentuated by the spread of Christianity into the 
Hellenistic world and its absorption of Greek ideas. Not 
the least influential in this development was the Apostle 
Paul who "dethroned the ¡people and the religion of Israel" and 
19 Ibid., p. 3. 
20 Ii:id. , p. vii. 
21 Ibid., .r? . 16. 
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"tore the Gospel from its Jewish soil....,,22 Hence "dogma 
in its conception and development is a work of the Greek 
Spirit on the soil of Gospel" whereas "the Gospel itself is 
not dogma, for belief in the Gospel provides room for know- 
ledge only so far as it is a state of feeling and course of 
action, that is, a definite form of life."23 
Harnack views the original gospel as presenting itself 
"as an apocalyptic message on the soil of the Old Testament, 
and as the fulfillment of the law and the prophets, and yet 
it is a new thing, the creation of a universal religion on 
the basis of that of the Old Testament. "24 Jesus himself 
brought no new doctrine, but simply lived a holy life with 
God and before God and gave himself to the service of mankind 
in order to win them for the Kingdom of God. As a result of 
his example and teaching, many Jews left the Jewish church 
to form a new community, and it was this community which was 
gradually changed by the intrusion of foreign elements. 
Harnack asks in lament 
how and by what influence was the living 
faith transformed into the creed to be 
believed, the surrender to Christ into a 
philosophical Christology, the Holy Church 
into. the corpus permixtum, the glowing 
hope of the Kingdom of heaven into a 
doctrine of immortality and deification, 
prophecy into learned exegesis and 
theological science, the bearers of the 
Spirit into clerics, the brethren into 
laity, held in tutelage, miracles and 
healing into nothing or into priestcraft 
22 Harnacic, The Expansion of the Christian Church in 
the First Three Centuries, tr. and ed. by James n -fiat, London, 
1904, pp. 64 -65. 
23 History of Dogma, Vol. I, pp. 17 -1S. 
24 p. 41 
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the fervant prayers incoa solemn ritual, 
renunciation of the worl! into a jealous 
dominion over the world, the "spirit" 
into constraint and law ?25 
For Harnack there can be no doubt about the answer. This 
development was the product of the detachment of the gospel 
from the Jewish Church, an inevitable, but unfortunate pro- 
cess. As the gospel entered the Roman world and encountered 
Greek culture and opposing ideologies, it was forced to 
organize and to formulate its beliefs. The second century 
of the church was characterized by its victorious conflict 
with gnosticism and the Marcionite church, by the gradual 
development of ecclesiastical doctrine and institutionalism, 
and by the decay of early Christian enthusiasm.26 In the 
remaining volumes Harnack describes the formation and var- 
iations of dogma through the story of the Catholic church, 
noting in particul< r the contribution of Augustine. At the 
time of the Reformation Harnack believes that Luther made 
some attempt to return to primitive Christianity and to eman- 
cipate religion from dogmas, Lut it was only a beginning 
and the task must again be taken up. 
Harnack himself takes up the task of uncovering the 
essence of Christianity smothered beneath the corruption of 
dogma. He believes that although the rise and development 
of dogmatic formulation have obscured the message of Jesus 
it is still possible, by historical investigation, to find 
25 
Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
26 Ibid., Vol. iI, p. 1. 
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the kernel of truth in the husk of ecclesiastical doctrine. 
This essence alone will satisfy modern men who are baffled 
by the unintelligibility and the incredibility of the church's 
belief system. By a careful penetration 'lack to the Jesus of 
the Galilean hills and his gospel it is possible to lay bare 
the essence of true religion. 
In 1900 Harnack delivered a series of lectures which 
were published with the English title of What is Christianity? 
in which he attempted to state what he believed to be the 
central teachings of Jesus' gospel. His approach was to 
be historical. "':'that is Christianity ?" asks Harnack. "It 
is solely in its historical sense that we shall try to answer 
this question here; that is to say, we shall employ the methods 
of historical science, and the experience of life gained 
by studying the actual course of history. "27 The materials 
in such an historical inquiry, Harnack explains, are three- 
fold: the Gospel records (Synoptics), the influence of Jesus 
on his contemporaries and the influence of Jesus through 
his disciples on subsequent history. Harnack lays the stress 
on history because, as he says, "the whole substance and 
meaning of religion- -life in God, the forgiveness of sins, 
consolation in suffering- -she [_the Church) couples with 
Christ's rerson; and in so doing she associates everything 
that gives lite its meaning and its permanence, nay the 
Eternal itself, with an historical fact; maintaining the 
27 What is Christianity?,-cr. i. 
London, 1901, p. 6. 
Thomas Bailey Saunders, 
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indissoluble unity of both. "28 
At the outset of his investigation Harnack reveals 
his debt to the presuppositions of positivist- historiography 
by insisting on the exclusion of the miraculous. "We are 
firmly convinced ", he says, "that what hat_Ïpens in space and 
time is subject to the general laws of motion, and that in 
this sense, as an interruption of the order of nature, tsere 
can be no such thing as 'miracles'."29 Even by limiting the 
sources of the inquiry to the Synoptic Gospels and by deny- 
ing the possibility of the miraculous, it is still not an 
easy task to distinguish "between what is traditional and 
what is peculiar, between kernel and husk in Jesus' message...." 
30 
As a further guide Harnack appears to employ one more rule, 
though he might have objected to having it stated this way, 
and that is to define the essence of true religion before 
the investigation begins. True religion, and hence the re- 
ligion of Jesus, "is not a question of angels and devils, 
thrones and principalities, but of God and the soul, the 
soul and its God"31 or, as he says elsewhere, "religion is 
a relation of the soul to God, and nothing more.32 
With these guidelines Narnack determines. that the 
message of Jesus can be summarized under three main headings: 
(1) the Kingdom of God <;nd its coming; (2) God the Father 
216 
Christianity and History, tr. by Thomas Bailey 
Saunders, London, 1896, pp. 17 -18. 
29 What is Christianity ?, p. 26. 
30 
31 
, p. 55. 
Ibid., p. 56. 
32 Christianity and History, p. 41. 
(244) 
and the infinite value of the human soul; and (3) the higher 
righteousness and the commandment of love.33 These three 
propositions are fairly obvious in their meaning but a few 
comments to clarify the exact way in which Harnack understood 
them may be helpful. 
Let us look first at his understanding of the Kingdom 
of God. Harnack was aware that Christ's teaching concerning 
the Kingdom of God had been interpreted by J. Weiss and others 
as having a distinctly Jewish futuristic and apocolyptic ref- 
erence, but he preferred to interpret it as the present rule 
of God the Father in an individual life. He writes: 
On the lips of Jesus the phrase, the 'Kingdom 
of heaven' or the 'Kingdom of God' means 
the sum total of all those great and holy 
influences which, feeding and nourishing 
the life of the soul, will gradually take 
shape and form within humanity, so that 
finally the whole human race shall be 
welded into a Urotherho'd, as inclusive 
as the whole of human life, and as 
profound as human need.34 
Secondly, we should not miss the import of Harnack's 
teaching on the relationship between God the Father and 
Jesus the Son. Harnack is insistent that the gospel as 
Jesus proclaimed it had to do with the Father only and not 
the Son. Harnack felt it was necessary to return to the 
religion of Jesus, not the religion about Jesus. Jesus him- 
self is brother to man, the only difference being that he 
possessed a perfect consciousness that God is Father and 
33 
What is Christianity ?, p. 51. 
34 
A Scholar's Testament, tr. by Olive Wyon, London, 
1933, p. 1. 
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conceived of his mission as communicating this message to 
others. .Jesus is not to be explained in terms of Greek 
metaphysics, but in terms of the life he lived. To under- 
stand what it means to assert that Jesus is the Christ as 
Peter did at C2esar &a Phii ipfi 
we must 4I2rnack writesi free our minds 
from all later false interpretation, a- 
bove all we must leave ecclesiastical ex- 
planations alone, and think nothing 'meta- 
physical' or 'Trinitarian'. Rather we may 
paraphrase Peter's confession like this: 
'You are the Promised One, promised to our 
forefathers, and the One for whom they 
waited, the One who will usher in the era 
of the holy rule of God over us; One who 
knows that God is his Father, and who pos- 
sesses the power of implanting this know- 
ledge .,s a vital energy within the hearts 
of men - -not only in my heart but in the 
heart of mankind as a whole.5 
The death of Jesus is the supreme example of the principle 
of vicarious suffering and indeed the death knell to the 
need for sacrificial systems. Harnack rejects Christ's 
bodily resurrection and distinguishes between the Easter 
faith which he accepts and the Easter message which he re- 
jects. Thus the importance of Jesus is found in the mes- 
sage he proclaims, that Almighty God is the ruler of the 
world and of every individual soul. Jesus is the religious 
genius of the human race who enjoyed a unique filial rela- 
tionship to God. His teaching and his life fulfill the 
highest aspirations of our moral consciousness, and so we 
are convinced of the truth of his message. The fact "that 
3-5 
A Scholar's Testament, p. 28. 
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the whole of Jesus' message may be reduced to these two 
heads-God as Father, and the human soul so ennobled that it 
can and does unite with him- -shows us tha t the Gospel _ s in 
nowise a positive religion like the rest; that it contains 
no statutory or particularistic elements; that it is, therefore, 
religion itself." 
36 
Jesus' message had the great influence it did because 
his life and personality inspired men, and the flame he 
kindled had the power of continually re- kindling fresh 
flames of the same kind it the hearts of men of countless 
types. The nian in the pr! sent feels the impact of Jesus' 
message because one loving spirit set another on fire, creating 
a chain right down to the present and because, with a certain 
amount of sensitivity, modern man is able to receive the flame 
of Christ's inspiration directly into his own soul so that 
"the sense of separation due to tine and space vanishes into 
thin air. "37 "it was testified of Christ ", Harnack explains, 
"that he was the Way, the Truth, and the Lite; as such he is 
still revealed to our inmost £e ling, and therein consists 
his presence to us. "38 
Thirdly and finally, we should note the application which 
Harnack gives to the message of Jesus. Our responsibility, 
as those who know God as Father, is to confront men with the 
message which ,Jesus lived and taught. With love as the 
36 What is Christianity ?, p. 63. 
37 A Scholar's Testament, p. 30. 
38 Christianity and History, p. 49. 
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foundational principle of our lives, we are to work to bring 
about the reign of God the Father in the hearts and affairs of 
men and thereby establish the Kingdom of God on earth. 
TIT. Concluding Observations 
Although Adolph von Harnack's particular theological 
point of view lias passed from the scene for many reasons, 
some of which we shall mention, there is still much that is 
positive in his work.39 In the first place, one cannot help 
but be impressed with the si ncerity, dedication, skill and 
scholarship which he brought to his work. His many scholarly 
volumes, and particularly his History of Dogma and Expansion 
of Christianity are and will be in the future necessary 
reading for the conscientious student of these subjects. 
And of course his '.hat is Christianity? remains a monument 
to the era of classical liberal theology. The great ethical 
ideas which it enunciates still stir the sincere Christian 
to be a "man for others" even as the Jesus of the Galilean 
hills was such a man. 
Secondly, we would call attention to the value of 
IIarnack's emphasis on rediscovering the real and human Jesus. 
His general point that traditional theological formulations 
in their description of Jesus are more Greek than gospel 
is well taken. Whether his image of Jesus is the "real" 
Jesus is another question, but what is of importance is the 
39 Among Harnack's defenders when his theology was at 
the center of the theological debate was his translator, 
Thomas Bailey Saunders, who wrote professor ,'-í rnack and His 
Oxford Critics, London, 1902. 
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conviction that the Jesus of history is the clue to the 
whole Christian theological endeavor. 
Of positive note also is his concern to make the Christian 
message speak with relevancy and force to his generation. 
This is the perennial responsibility of theology, and indeed 
it has little value if it does not fulfill this function. 
Because Harnack did not take this responsibility lightly, he 
attempted to meet what he considered to be the objections of 
his generation to Christian faith by side -stepping traditional 
theological approaches to Christ and by returning to the Jesus 
of history. In itself such an effort is worthy of commendation, 
but whether he succeeded in establishing the validity of his 
method and conclusions is what we must now determine. It is 
our contention that Harnack did not wholly succeed because he 
allowed both his method and his conclusions to be too greatly 
controlled by the ideals of his culture.40 
Specifically, Harnack failed at the very point where he 
should have been the strongest, namely in .historical method. 
His failure was that he allowed his theological presuppositions 
to damage his historical objectivity. The Jesus whom he 
discovers is but a pale reflection of the liberal ideal 
rather than the Jesus about whom the New Testament speaks. 
Harnack's method of analyzing the Gospel records with the 
scheme of kernel and husk too easily opened up the possibility 
40 Iarnack's critics were numerous in his own time. See 
e.g. W. Sanday, "An Examination of Harnack's What is Chris- 
tianity?,'} London, 1901; A.J. Mason, Christianity: ;chat is it ?, 
London, 1902; and Herman Cremer, A Reply to Harnack on the 
Essence of Christianity, tr. by Bernhard Pick, New York, 1903. 
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of setting aside material wh-ich did not fit in with his 
preconceived image of Jesus. Yet this material cannot be so 
easily laid aside in the effort to find the real Jesus. As 
a result, the Jesus whom he...produces is a product of his 
liberal imagination, not the Jewish Rabbi from Nazareth. 
Harnack's Jesus is lifted out of his Sitz im Leben. With a 
somewhat Marcionite attitude toward the Old Testament, Harnack 
moralizes the Old Testament character of Jesus' teaching, 
especially in reference to the Kingdom of God. In Harnack's 
formulation it has lost its apocalyptic and eschatological 
reference and leas been reduced to the present reign of the 
Father in individual lives. 
In fact Harnack's whole effort to sustain the Christian 
faith by a simple appeal to what he considers to be the 
teachings and personality of Jesus is questionable on his- 
torical grounds and was challenged in his own time. In 
reply he wrote: "but they the teachings of Jesus; lose no 
particle of their Dower and validity, unless it can be shown 
that the main lineament of the personalit of Christ, and the 
sense and true ;,_pint of his sayings, have been altered. I 
cannot discover that historical criticism has effected any 
such change. "41 Yet time and again in his own historical 
criticism he has done just this. Because of his positiviytic 
and liberal humanistic presuppositions, he has rejected much 
41 Christianity and History, p. 56. 
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of the historicl record. Most of the New Testament, with 
the exception of the Synoptics, has been set aside as of no 
historical value. Even the apocalyptic and eschatological 
elements have been purged from the Synoptics. In reference 
to the futuristic note in Jesus' teaching Harnack writes: 
"I admit if historical research had proved that he was an 
apocalyptic enthusiast...it would be another matter." 
But has not this element in Jesus' teaching been established 
beyond all doubt now, and was it not always there for any 
who had eyes to see it? Harnack, sensing the problem and 
valiantly trying to overcome it, continues: "Woe to us...if 
our faith rested on a number of details to be demonstrated 
and established by the historian....Testimonies, documents, 
assertions- -when all is said, to what do they amount ?" 
"But", he goes on to write, "the spiritual purport of a whole 
life, of a personality, is also an historical fact; it has its 
reality in the eff,ct which it produces; and it is here that 
we find the link that binds us to Jesus Christ. "43 But how 
42 
can we know the personality without the details? And it is 
certainly very tricky business to attempt to reconstruct 
from the effects in people's lives the personalit; which 
is their cause. 
As a result of such a historical method the New Testament 
teaching about the gospel is greatly reduced. Perhaps the 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
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real issue is whether the Christ of the apostolic witness 
can be rejected and replaced by a Jesus of modern reflection. 
Evidently this is what Harnack does and concludes that a 
person like the Christ of the New Testament preaching is an 
impossibility. So instead of building a theology on the 
biblical Christ he maintains that the essence of religion 
consists in the ideas of Jesus' message rather than in his 
person. Jesus, in the end of the day, is separable from the 
unusual truths he taught. Ultimately, history and idea can 
be separated. Because "we know that there are few among us 
who hear and understand the voice of God, in the secret 
sphere of their inner personal life, without human help and 
intervention..." 
44 
we can see the importance but not the 
necessity of Jésus. Though Jesus was the first to think 
these thoughts and proclaim them with clarity, it could have 
been someone else. As Emil Brunner says in respect to Harnack's 
view: "The Gospel itself and the faith which corresponds to 
it have nothing whatever to do with the historical fact."45 
According to Harnack, we know that Jesus' message is true, 
not because he proclaimed it as the Son of God, but because 
our moral experience senses that it is so. The idea of the 
"inestimable inherent value of every human soul ", the idea 
of God as Father and the message of the communion of brethren 
realizing itself in love are universal truths of religion46 
44 Christianity and History, p. 43. 
45 The Mediator, p. 67. 
46 History of Dogma, Vol. I, p. 70. 
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which may be separated from the particularities of history. 
Our Kantian moral sense judges them valid and German liberal 
culture finds them ennobling. The extraneous features of 
theology, ecclesiastical structure and worship are unnecessary. 
It was the dialectical theoloCians of the early twentieth 
century who saw cle rl- the limitati :-ins of this liberal approach 
ey- itomi zed in Harnac . We now proceed to their criticisms 
and reformulations as they take form in the thought of Emil 
ßrunner. 
Chapter Ten 
History and the Dialectical Theology of the 
Twentieth Century: Emil Brunner 
I. Brunner in Context 
we have been attempting to show the importance of pre - 
understanding in representative historical interpretations of 
the Christian faith. We have argued that the interpreter can 
do justice to the given in Christianity only when he stands 
within faith and when he employs an adequate historical 
methodology. Both are necessary for either one without the 
other inevitably leads to a distortion. The affirmation of 
faith without the historical check can l'=ad to the postulation 
of any religious belief which is emotionally satisfying, and 
the historical methodology without the oreunderstanding of 
faith means the imposition of a point of vie: which, because 
it is not in sympathy with the nature of the given, twists 
the Christian message to fit its own yerspective. We have 
maintained that all of the interpretations which have ,een 
examined so far, though valuable and impressive to be sure, 
have nevertheless failed in various ways to meet the demands 
of these two criteria. 
In the Swiss theologian, Emil Brunner, we find a man 
whose understanding of the Christian faith comes very close 
to meeting the requirements of both faith and history.1 If 
1 good introduction to Brunner's thought which also 
contains a bibliography of his writing is The Theology of 
Emil Brunner, ed. by Charles W. Kegley, New York, 19G2. 
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he fails at all, and we will argue that he partially does, it 
is in his insistence that faith must necessarily be removed 
from the relativities of history. But before we can justify 
such a statement we must lo,k closely at the factors malting 
up his preunderstanding and their influence on his historical 
interpretation of the Christian faith. 
Because a. man's thought is seldom removed from the 
circumstances of his life, it would be wise in our desire 
to understand Brunner's thought to sketch a few biographical 
facts.2 He was born on December 23, 1889, in the Canton of 
Zurich, the cradle of the Swiss Reformation. From childhood 
he was surrounded by mementos of a glorious theological past 
including the cathedral where Zwingli had preached. The 
influence of the history and thought of the Reformation would 
be hard to escape in such an environment. After his training 
at the Gymnasium, he turned to the study of theoloy at the 
universities of Zurich and Berlin. He then went to Union 
Theological Seminary in New York which was a center for 
religious liberalism, then at its peak of influence in the 
United States. On returning to Switzerland in 1912, Brunner 
became a minister of a Swiss Reformed church. After a year 
of serving as a pastor, he went to England to teach high 
school in Leeds. He returned to Switzerland in 1916 to become 
pastor of a church in the Canton of Glarus. 
2 I am indebted to Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner, 
Chicago, 1961, for this outline of Brunner's life. 
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Brunner had been trained in his theological studies as 
a liberal. His first book, which was a study of symbolism in 
religious knowledge and an effort to T'get beyond Schleier- 
macher", reflects this orientation. Gradually, however, 
a profound change began to take place in his viewpoint while 
7ui%si<7i 
he pastored the church in Glarus.due in large measure to his 
conviction that the theology in which he had been trained was 
not able to speak relevantly to his people and to the con - 
djtions of a world lost in war. When Karl Barth's revo- 
lutionary RUmerbrief appeared in 1919, Brunner immediately 
declared himself to be of this new theological persuasion 
in a review of Barth's book, and he soon became one of the 
leading exponents of Barth's theological position. It was 
not long before he was appointed a Privatdozent on the theo- 
logical faculty of the University of Zurich, and later, on 
the basis of the publication of his penetrating critique 
of Schleiermacher's theology in Die Mystik und.das Wort, 
he was promoted to professor of Theology at the same university, 
a position whin he actively held until 1953. 
Among the important incidents in Brunner's life and one 
of the more lively theological debates of our century occurred 
in the 1930's when he and Barth came to a parting of the ways 
over the question of natural theology.3 Brunner insisted 
that there is a "broken natural revelation" of God in the 
3 See Natural Theology, Comprising "Nature and Grace" 
by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No" by Dr. Karl 
Barth, London,, 1946. 
(256) 
human heart, i.e. even though men have been corrupted by sin 
they still retain a minimum of knowledge about God and some 
capacity to hear and understand the gospel. Brunner argued 
that if it were not for this point of contact (a sort of built - 
in preunderstanding) preaching would be useless. Barth 
countered with his now famous ttneintt and maintained that the 
Holy Spirit does not need any point of contact but creates 
His own. 
In addition to his teaching, writing and the demands 
of theological debate, Brunner also found time to be interested 
in the Oxford Group movement and took part in the effort of 
this group to meet the needs of lay Christians which he felt 
were not being met by the established churches. This activity 
is significant because it points to Brunnerts own sense of 
mission and his conviction that relationship with God is 
preeminently a personal affair. 
As Brunner's importance as a theologian became recognized 
he received and accepted the invitation to become a visiting 
lecturer at Princeton Seminary in New Jersey and at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York. The stimulation of this 
year for all concerned was heightened by the fact that the 
theological right joined the theological left to challenge 
his position. In addition to this lectureship he delivered 
addresses in many of the leading theological centers in 
both Europe and America. 
In 1949 he travelled to various parts of Asia and the 
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Far East and was especially impressed with Japan. To the 
surprise of the theological world he returned to Japan in 
1953 and, at the the age of sixty- three, accepted the chair 
of Christian philosophy at the International Christian 
University. He went, as he said, "to spend a few of the 
last years God will give me on the missionary ba ttle- front. " 
4 
Because of his wife's failing health he was forced to cut 
short his stay and return to Switzerland in 1955. On the 
way home he suffered a stroke which handicapped him for the 
rest of his life. He died in 1967. 
It is impossible with a man of Brunner's stature to 
isolate all of the factors which went into forming his pre- 
understanding. Yet not to make some effort to at least 
estimate the impact of certain men and events would be to 
ignore what Brunner himself. acknowledged.5 In that our 
concern is primarily with Oefining the presuppositions which 
guide his understanding and interpretation of history, we 
will foots our attention on the factors which contributed to 
their development. 
Not at all unimportant in the formation of the ideological 
asie ct of the preunderstanding which undergirds Brunner's 
historical interpretation of the Christian faith was his 
exposure to the thought of Sren Kierkegaard whom Brunner 
calls "incomparably the greatest apologist or 'er'istic' 
4 Quoted by Elmer G. Homrighausen, "Brunner Goes to 
Japan", Theology Today (January, 1954), 537. 
5 See "Intellectual Autobiography", in Kegley, ed., 
The Theology of Emil Brunner, pp. 3 -20. 
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thinker of the Christian faith within the sphere of protes- 
tantism."6 Kierkegaard (113-1855) anticipated in a remarkable 
way the reaction of many twentieth century theologians, 
including ;runner, to the characteristic nineteenth century 
solutions of the problems which the rise of positivistic 
historiography had created for theology.? Faith, Kierkegaard 
argued, waF not to be founded upon historical research which 
can neither verify it nor refute it. Faith is rather the 
acceptance of the "Absolute paradox", that the Eternal God 
has entered history, was born an infant and grew to manhood 
as other men do. Even the contemporaries of Jesus were in 
no better position to understand the paradox than those who 
lived eighteen centuries afterward, for it can be known only 
subjectively, not historically. Those who accent the paradox 
are "contemporary" with Jesus just as surely as the apostles 
themselves. All scholarly effort to reconstruct the life of 
Jesus, while not to be scoffed at, is really irrelevant to 
faith. Even the most brilliant reconstruction would yield 
only approximate results and would therefore provide an 
inadequate basis for man's eternal happiness. The absolute 
paradox can be known only by being believed on the attestation 
of the apostles. This assertion of Kierkegaard's is a 
fundamental presupposition of Brunner's understanding of 
history. It is a ma for influence on his views and functions 
6 The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics, Vol. 1 
tr. by Olive 'iyon, Landon, 1960, p. 100. 
7 See his philosophical Fragments. 
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consistently and consciously throughout his interpretation. 
Also influential on the development of the ideological 
as!ect of Brunner's preunderstanding was the personalist 
philosophy of Ferdinand Ebner." It was Ebner who first intro- 
duced Brunner to the concept of I -Thou, not Martin Buber 
whose development of I -Thou philosophy appeared independently 
of Bbner's.9 The centrality of the I -Thou concept in Brunner's 
thought is demonstrated in his book Wahrheit als Begegnung10 
in which he argues that our knowledge of God is to be con- 
trasted sharply from "objective" knowledge. The true al- 
ternative is not subjective knowledge, as one would expect, 
esuecially in light of his high opinion of Kierkegaard, 
but personal relatioship. God is truly known only in an 
I -Thou relation rather than by historical investigation. 
We will discover when we look m ire closely at Brunner's 
view of history that this too is one of his basic presup- 
positions. 
Equally important in the formation of Brunner's pre - 
understanding was his Reformation heritage. To the great 
reformers, Luther and Calvin, with their em basis on the 
g See Paul K. Jewett, "Ebnerian Personalism and Its 
Influence on Brunner's Theology ", The Westminster Theological 
Journal (May, 1952). 
9 "Comments by Brunner ", The Reformed Review (January, 
1956), 33. Brunner writes: "Please note that I was never 
conscious of being strictly influenced by Martin Buber. I 
read I -Thou many years after my Man in Revolt....My eyes were 
opened by Ferdinand Ebner. 
10 Pu lished in English first as The Divine -Human 
Encounter, London, 1943, and later revised as Truth as 
Encounter, London, 1964. 
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centrality of the Word of God, Brunner owes his theological 
orientation.11 That God has spoken His Word to men in Jesus 
Christ is, for Brunner, the key which unlocks the meaning 
of history. 
Coupled with his rootage in Reformation theology is 
another source of his preunderstanding, namely the new 
theological movement in which he played such an active role, 
variously called New Reformation theology, the Theology of 
the Word, Neo- orthodoxy, Crisis theology and Dialectical 
theology. 12 Here we must look in some detail at what motivated 
this new movement. 
On the negative side, it was motivated by its reaction 
to a liberal theology which had failed to sneak an authori- 
tative word to a generation shaken by the First World War 
and the ominous decline of Western Europe. In the first 
two decades of she twentieth century the theology of Ritschl 
expressed in the liberal Protestantism of the Harnack t,,_e 
was paramount. There was confidence in the ability of 
historical resc:arch to get behind the Gospels to the real 
Jesus of history and to measure the influence of his powerful 
personality on his contemporaries which was the source of 
genuine religious experience.13 Also shaping the theological 
scene of these decades was the practice of the religions- 
geschichtliche Schule of W. Bousset, R. Reitzenstein, W. 
11 John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, 
London, 1964, p. 318. 
12 Ibid., p. 319. 
13 See above, cia. 9. 
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Heitmüller, E. Troeltsch and others to regard the particular 
events of the Gospel history such as the Virgin Birth, the 
miracles, the Resurrection and Ascension "as instances of the 
general tendency of all religion to proliferate legendary 
]4 
and miraculous occurrences for the edification of the faithful." 
Behind this tendency was the positivist presupposition that 
particular historical instances lead to general laws just as 
n natural science. The events of biblical history could be 
explained according to the laws of the development of religion 
in general and could be articulated by the science of comparative 
religion. It goes without saying that Lnere was no room 
in this view for God as a category for historical ext lana-tion. 
Brunner writes in 1929 of this theological climate: "From 
1700 A.D. to 1900 A.D. Christian theology chances its dis- 
tinctively Christian bearings and drifts with an idealistic 
immanence -faith into theological liberalism. The year 1900 
marks the approximate date when it began to sink into a 
sea of relativistic skeeticism."15 
Equally unacceetable to this new school of theology was 
protestant Orthodoxy which, it was maintained, blindly ignored 
the historical problems raised by the science of biblical 
criticism and whose view of propositional revelation corrupted 
faith by making it intellectual assent rather than personal 
commitment. "Orthodoxy errs ", Brunner writes, "in its 
14 Richardson, History Sacred and profane, p. 128. 
15 The Theology of Crisis, New York, 1929. 
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insistence on the rigidity and finality of its form, which, 
because of its lack of critical insight, it assumes to be 
essential to its existence.i"16 
The alternative to the devitalizing historical skepticism 
of liberalism and the anachronistic verbal inerrancy of 
Orthodoxy was the "Theology of the Word" with its primary 
çmphasis on allowing men to hear what GdId has to say to them. 
This neW theological."- orientation denied that there was any way 
Trom man to God. Rather God has come to man and spoken His 
Word in Jesus Christ, The knowledge of God, inaccessible 
from man's side because of his finitude and sinfulness, is 
made available to faith by God's free act of grace. God's 
Nord is known in Jesus Christ to whom the Bible bears witness 
and whom the church proclaims in her preaching. 
The other labels of this movement also dépict something 
of its character. It has been called Neo- orthodoxy because 
of its desire to recapture the spirit of the Reformation as 
the classical period of protestant thought. The title 
"Theology of Crisis" is not a reference to the crisis of the 
First World War but a reference to the crisis which is the 
judgment of the divine Word upon the world and man's critical 
position of having to decide when personally confronted with 
the Word of judgment and grace.17 We have chosen the label 
"Dialectical theology" because of its emphasis on the para- 
16 Ibid., p. 
17 Brunner, The Word and the World, London, 1931, n. 7. 
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doxical nature of truth. The whole movement has been char- 
acterized by its insistence that God cannot be spoken of in 
some simple formula, but must be spoken of --aradoxically, 
balancing each affirmation with a corresponding negation in 
order to do justice to the God who infinitely transcends our 
finite creaturely being. Brunner in 1931 was willing to 
describe his theology in this way. He wrote: 
It is only by means of the contradiction 
between two ideas- -God and man, grace and 
responsi ility, holiness and love- -that 
we can apprehend the contradictory truth 
that the eternal God enters time, or that 
sinful man is declared just. Dialectical 
theology is the mode of thinking which de- 
fends this paradoxical character, belonging 
to faith -knowledge, from the non -para- 
doxical speculation of reason, an vin- 
dicates it as against the other.l 
All of these ideological concepts -- Kiekegaard's "Ab- 
solute Paradox ", I -Thou personalism, the Reformation emphasis 
on the Word of God and the central themes of the New Reformation 
theology - -we will find present in Brunner's interpretation of 
history. 
The central attitude (or complex of attitudes) operative 
in Brunner's interpretation is his own personal faith in the 
God who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. Brunner inter- 
prets the historical dimension of the Christian revelation 
19 
from within faith. This attitude, given a specific direction 
toward historical understanding by the ideological presup- 
positions that we have ennumerated, is of course a major 
18 Tbid., pp. 6-7. 
19 A4acquarrie, op: cit., p. 325. 
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influence on his views. It is comprehensive in scope and 
functions consistently and consciously throughout his inter- 
pretation. Other attitudes such as honesty, fairness, ob- 
jectivity and open -mindedness are also in evidence in Brunner's 
treatment. 
His methodological assumptions are essentially those of 
the historical critical method. He accepts the method (and 
conclusions) of higher criticism and does not allow his faith 
to dull his sensitivity to historical evidence. 
We must now examine how Brunner's preunderstanding 
with its ideological, attitudinal and methodological com- 
ponents manifests itself in his historical interpretation 
of the Christian faith. 
II. Brunner's Concept of History 
The role which Brunner's preunderstanding has in his 
view can best be understood if we turn first to his theology.20 
He shares with Karl Barth the conviction that the theme of 
history is the history of the covenant of grace, that God's 
acts in the affairs of men (Heilsgeschichte) are the true 
history by which all other history is determined.21 Because 
his understanding of history is entwined with his theology, 
it shares with his theology a dialectical dimension and, 
as a result, tends to be difficult to describe in a straight- 
20 See Kegley, ed., The Theology of Emil Brunner, 
PD. 157 -174. 
21 See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. III /I, 
PP. 59 ff. 
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forward way. Frustrated by this aspect of Brunner's thought, 
John Hesselink remarks: "I have been reading Brunner's works 
since college days in 1948 and have read intensively 
almost everything of Brunner's in English this past two 
years, yet I would be the first to confess that just about 
the time I think I understand how Brunner stands --for example 
on the crucial problem of history --I am unsettled by finding 
a new problem on rereading an old passage. "22 To this remark 
Brunner replied: "If you are baffled by my conception of 
history- -this is just one case where I differ from everybody, 
as far as I know. "23 These comments give some indication of 
the complexity of Brunner's view. 
The theological problem which Brunner attempts to solve 
and which forces him to articulate his view of history is 
this: How does one ground Christian faith in a historical 
revelation in such a way as to avoid the relativities of 
history? protestant Liberalism with its history of religion 
and psychology of religion schools had taught that there is 
no absolute truth. Brunner calls this "historicism" and 
rejects it. Faith, he asserts, can never embrace the relative 
but only that which is true for all men in whatever period of 
history they live. Brunner also rejects any forni of idealism 
which, in its effort to escape the uncertainty of historical 
22 "Encounter in Japan: Emil Brunner, An Interpretation ", 
The Reformed Review (January, 1956), 22. 
23 Ibid., p. 33. 
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truth, refines Christianity into a set of eternal ideas. 
And the return to orthodoxy according to Brunner is scion - 
tifically hopeless in the light of modern criticism. To 
accept the biblical narrative as a completely roliable record 
is possible only for one who ignores th_ results of biblical 
criticism. 
The clue to 3runner'.s way out of the either /or of 
liberalism and orthodoxy is found it his definition of 
revelation.24 God Himself enters into history in the person 
of Jesus Christ to perform once and for all the decisive act 
of history. In Jesus Christ the impossible ha pens: the 
Infinite becomes finite, the Eternal becomes temporal and the 
Divine becomes human, Revelation is the coming of God ", a 
wonder that breaks into the world from beyond the world, and 
hence is neither idea nor history. Revelation is an event, 
yet it is not in the same category as other historical 
events. The revelation of God in the person of Jesus Christ 
is a point in time which is tangent to eternity, a qualification 
of the stream of time from the perspective of eternity. This 
intervention from beyond in Jesus Christ is the center of 
God's revelatory acts in the affairs of men. 
The center of the BiLle and of the his- 
tory of revelation is the revelation in 
the Incarnation of the Word, Jesus Christ. 
From Him as the Center we see the primal 
revelation in the Creation as the reve- 
lation of the eternal Word; from Him 
24 See Paul K. Jewett, Emil ?runner's Concept of 
Revelation, London, 1954. 
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as the Center, although only in a mirror 
darkly, we know a final, fulfilling 
revelation, where we shall not 'believe', 
but we shall see Him 'face to face'. 
Therefore He,is the unity of all the 
revelations.`5 
Brunner's doctrine of Scripture is closely tied to his 
view of revelation. Two points regarding his treatment of 
this doctrine are germane to our discussion. First, the 
Scriptures are the human testimonies which give us the 
primary witness to the objective and historical revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ, and therefore they have the authority 
of a norm. Secondly, we are not required to believe the 
Scriptures because they are the Scriptures but because 
Christ meets us in them.26 The Word of Scripture is truth 
in a subjective and personal sense.27 Thus the Bible according 
to Brunner is the witness to the "revealing action of God in 
a twofold stooping to man; historically objective, in the 
Incarnation of the Son, and inwardly subjective, in the 
witness borne to the Son through the Spirit in the heart 
of man.... "28 This twofold structuring is characteristic 
of Brunner and supplies a key to the understanding of his view 
of history. 
The response of man to God's self- revelation in Jesus 
25 Brunner, Revelation and Reason, tr. Uy Clive Wyon, 
London, 1947, p. 198. 
26 The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 110. 
27 ;runner, Lternal Hope, tra by Olive vtiyon, London, 
1954, p. 184. 
28 The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 29. 
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Christ is faith. It is in faith, :runner writes, that 
"God's self- communication finds its com)letion. For here and 
here only...does God's self manifestation, self -revelation and 
self -communication reach its goal. "29 Faith is the point in 
man's consciousness where he [rasps what God has done in 
revelation. Faith is man's appropriate relation to the 
historical appearance of Jesus Christ. 1-tit note that faith is 
not intellectual certainty about historical fact, but the 
acceptance of a communication, for in faith "Another com- 
municates to me the mystery that only He knows -- namely that 
He lover me." 
30 
Thus Brunner can say that "the certainty of 
faith lies in another plane than the secular certainty of 
historical facts. "31 
Brunner's understanding of faith leads us to the con- 
sideration of one final s;;ecifically theological point before 
we examine, in light of his theology, his direct statements 
about history. This final point is his assertion that primary 
truth is essentially personal. Brunner reasons that "if 
God is the primary reality, then the Word of God is the 
primary truth. Thus truth is not to be found either in the 
object or the subject, but beyond both, Truth then, is God 
Himself in His self -communication. "32 The truth which is 
29 The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the 
Consummatión, Dogmatics, Vol. III, tr. by David Cairns, 
London, 1964, p. 171. 
30 Ibid., p. 259. 
31 Brunner, The Scandal of Christianity, London, 1951, p. 25. 
, Christianity and Civilization: First Part: Foundations, 
p. 40. 
(269) 
revealed to faith "is not truth in the sense of knowing 
something, but in the sense of a divine- human, personal 
encounter. God does not reveal this or that; He does not 
reveal a number of truths. ,He reveals Himself by communicating 
Himself. "33 Knowledge of God comes in personal address, in 
an 1 -Thou encounter in contrast to objective knowledge which 
seeks to get power over that which is known and to learn how 
to manipulate it. In objective knowledge the knower is detached 
and has no vital concern or communion with the object. God, 
however, is not another object who is subject to o:r control, 
but a Person to whom we relate in trustful obedience. But 
this does not mean that the historical is unimportant. Brunner 
is careful to point out that "the first and decisive element 
is the historical, the truth that is not in us but comes to 
us."34 Yet we perceive this truth in encounter as we hear 
the Word of the Thou. Thus the historical and personal 
character of truth are necessarily linked together. Is the 
truth of God's revelation then historical truth? Brunner 
answers in his typically dialectical and somewhat ambiguous 
fashion when he says "Yes and no. Yes, for it is in history 
that this revealed secret encounters me as truth. No, f -r it 
is the Eternal God who now speaks to me in this historical 
revelation. Thereby the historical event ceases to be 
historical and becomes living presence."35 
33 Ibid., p. 37. 
34 Truth as Encounter, p. 21. 
35 Christianity and Civilization: First Part. p. 40. 
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For Brunner, then, the Christian revelation belongs to a 
decisive once- for -all act of God in history. This revelation 
is attested to in the ;words of Scripture and grasped b 
personal faith in a divine -human encounter where God in 
Christ meets man. This construction involves Brunner in the 
delicate balancing act of preserving both the historical 
foundation and net the non- historical nature of revelation. 
He will not give up either and insists on preserving the 
paradox. just how he sustains this dialectical formulation 
of the doctrine of revelation leads us to consider in m're 
detail his statements regarding history. 
The way in which Brunner hangs on to the historical 
aspect of revelation is by positing a different realm of 
history than that which concerns the secular historian. He 
shares with Barth, Cullmann and others the contention that the 
miraculous revelation of the Word Of God to ,_es place in the 
realm of surer -history. Brunner writes: "What we believe as 
Christians, we believe because something particular has 
taken place in history. This particular thing that has 
happened in history we call saving history (Heilsgeschichte), 
or the history of salvation, or the history, of revelation, 
or the historical revelation."36 The central fact of saving 
history is the event of Jesus Christ. This fact of the Word 
becoming flesh is the center of the divine manifestation and 
36 The Christian Doctrine of Creation and RedemDtion, 
Dogmat_cs, Vol. II, tr. by Olive Wyon, London, 1964, D. 193. 
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is a unique event. God is intensely concerned with human 
history, and in the fullness of time, he intervened in it. 
Even more, at a certain 1oint in this time process, God 
Himself enters the scenery,- of temporal life. The Eternal 
appears in the shape of a historical person and as such 
performs once and for all the decisive act of all history. 
The personal God enters into the strearJ of time in a his- 
torical personality, Jesus of Nazareth, "crucified under 
Pontius Pilate." 
ut God's entrance into history in the person of Jesus 
Christ is on a different plane of history from that which the 
secular historical method can investigate. The aim of his- 
torical science, according to Brunner, "is primarily to fill 
in the spatio- temporal continuum to the analogous continuum; 
that is, t that which we call the sum total of all the 
possibilities of nature and history. "37 What Brunner seems to 
be saying in this definition is that the historical method is 
limited in its understanding of historical causality and 
explanation to the natural world. Therefore, in this sense 
of the word, the Christian faith is not co11cernied with 
history: at all. It is related to history in that the unique 
event of Christ's appearance took place in history, but it 
does not gain its essential character from its historical 
connection. Precisely because something super -historical 
37 The Mediator, p. 160. 
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and decisive has entered into human history, to faith history 
means something entirely different from its meaning in all 
other forms of thought. Jesus Christ is truly historical, 
vet he transcends all historical barriers. As Brunner explains: 
"The fact that Christ was 'sent' is not a movement within 
history; it is the entrance of the non -historical element 
into the world of history. 38 
Brunner is careful at this point not to speak about the 
entrance of idea or eternal truth into history via a human 
personality. Any slip into "universal religion or ontology 
would be for Brunner to lose everything. All depends on the 
fact that the Word became flesh and that the Eternal has 
entered into the sphere of external historical fact. Jesus 
Christ can only be our Redeemer if he was crucified in time and 
space upon the hill of Calvary. The divine self- manifestation 
is enclosed within a real historical human life. But "this 
does not mean that this life, in its historical extension and 
its visible character, as such constitutes the revelation."39 
If this were so, argues Brunner, the extent of our knowledge 
of this history would constitute the extent of our faith. 
There is no direct identity between the life of Jesus and 
revelation. Brunner insists that the "flesh" is not the 
"Word", though the two are nearly impossible to separate. 
The identity which exists between the two is not direct but 
38 Ibid., p. 311. 
39 Ibid., p. 355. 
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indirect. The historical extension and visible character of 
Jesus' life do not in themselves constitute the event of 
revelation, but without this visible history there would have 
been no event at all. Brunner continues: "The central element 
in this life, which makes it absolutely decisive for us, is 
the 'word' which this event contains. But this 'word' is 
not an idea, truth, a thought, but a personal reality." 
40 
To tie revelation to historical event would be to subordinate 
it to the universal order of history whereas in reality it 
is a category by itself, i.e. it is unique (einmalige) and 
hence not a part of history. 
The basic reason why Brunner does not want to link 
revelation to history in what he considers to be the ordinary 
meaning of the word is because history of necessity deals in 
probabilities and hence cannot provide security for faith. 
"Dependence on history as a science ", he vrites, "leads to a 
state of hopeless uncertainty. Therefore, when a thoughtful 
person refuses to build his relation to the eternal on anything 
so unsafe as historical science, he is acting rightly; for 
such building is indeed a glaring example of building one's 
house upon the sand. "41 The reconstruction of the past 
belongs to the realm of empirical knowledge which can never 
arrive at absolute certainty but only probability. If faith 
were founded on history then it would find itself involved 
40 Ibid., p. 356. 
41 Ibid., p. 156. 
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in the intolerable self- contradiction of assuming the un- 
conditional certainty of what was only provisionally and 
relatively certain.42 The brute facts of history are a 
necessary presupposition but never an adequate ground for the 
knowledge of Christ. 
Where then does the Christian find certainty for his 
faith if not through historical science? In short he finds 
it in faith itself. Brunner maintains that the manner of 
verifying historical facts which are important for faith such 
as the crucifixion differs for faith and for historical 
science. Faith is sure on the basis of the witness to Christ 
of the apostles whereas the historian seeks verification 
through critical and rational processes.43 The trouble with 
such an approach on the part of the historian is that he 
explains the revelatory events from a point of view which is 
alien to their meaning. But it is only faith which is able 
to rightly perceive these events. As Brunner puts it: 
"the meaning of that history in which Christ manifested him- 
self is only revealed to faith. "44 It is the presupposition 
of faith that the one whom faith calls Christ can only be 
known as Christ through faith, whereas he must be regarded 
as mere man, though a remarkable one, from any other point of 
view. A uniform interpretation of the life and character of 
Jesus is an impossible task for scientific study because the 
42 Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 160. 
43 The Mediator, p. 165. 
44 Ibid., p. 161. 
(275) 
hidden unity of this life, which is the key to understanding 
it, the Person of the God -man, is not human and historical 
at all. Only he who brings the presupposition of faith can 
understand this life. 
45 
Faith in Jesus as the Christ is 
identical with the true perception of the historical reality 
of Jesus. Thus through faith the historical fact of Jesus 
Christ becomes a certainty to the believer whereas the same 
historical fact is distorted by inadequate preunderstanding 
and given only probability in the continuum of history by 
the historian. 
As a consequence of this position the activities of Jesus 
during his earthly life have less than central bearing upon 
the faith of Christians. In that the validity of the Christian 
faith does not rest upon historical science, there can be no 
conflict between criticism and faith. In fairness to ?'runner 
it should be mentioned that because of the criticism of 
Paul Althaus he has affirmed the importance and reliability 
of the story of Jesus in the Gospels for faith, a position 
which he did not maintain forcefully in Der Mittler.46 
Neve.rthE.less i_runner sees no need to be worried about the 
negative results of biblical criticism as long as the central 
affirmations are not disproved, for "faith...knows, for reasons 
which are not accessible to the historian as such, that this 
inquiry cannot yield a negative result."47 
45 Ibid., p. 360. 
46 see Revelation and Reason, p. 24n. 
47 The Mediator, p. 166. 
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But fnr academic thoroughness, Brunner does ask the question 
whether there is an insurmounta le conflict between historical 
research and the Jesus Christ known by faith. After a 
thorough study of all aspects of the problem ?;runner concludes 
that "In spite of all sceptical suggestions, there is a 
hard core of tradition, which cannot be eliminated, and which 
emerges intact from every critical examination, however 
48 
searching and meticulous it rnav be." Even the most in- 
tensive historical criticism (e.g. 6ultmann's Jesus) leaves 
more than enough of the Gospel "portraits' and its picture of 
the central person to inspire and support faith. This his- 
torical account of Jesus agrees on the main points with the 
apostolic witness to Christ. The refusal to acknowledge this 
cannot be sustained by an appeal to historical reason. Such 
a rejection can only be eased on a philosophy of life which by 
inner necessity is forced to arbitrarily manipulate and 
transform the facts.49 
In summary, Brunner, to escape the relativities and 
inadequacies of historical science as a means of establishing 
faith, posits the ream of -Ieilsgeschich-e where God breaks 
into human history from outside to reveal Himself in Jesus 
Christ. Faith makes this revelatory act certain for the 
believer whereas the secular historian confined to the natural 
order for historic ̂:l explanation is unatle to grasp its full meaning. 
48 The Christian Doctrine of Creation and !edem>tion, p. 243. 
49 Ibid., p. 327. 
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Iii. Evaluation 
There is much that we agree with in Brunner's inter- 
pretation of the historical dimension of the Christian faith. 
The general structure of his interpretation comes close to 
meeting the twin demands which we have previously established, 
i..e, the recognition of faith as the necessary preunclerstanding 
to correctly :per.ceiving and interpreting the Christ -event and 
the application of a scientific historical methodology to the 
historical material. On the first point Brunner could not 
be more explicit. He insists that it is faith alone which 
is able to grasp God's self -revelation in Jesus Christ. The 
detached and non- sympathetic historian will never be able 
to understand in depth the person and work of Jesus Christ 
because he lacks a proper preunderstanding. He does not 
come with the personal relationship of faith ithout which it 
would be unlikely for him to assert that Jesus is the Christ, 
and not do so would be to miss the essential point for 
proper comprehension. 
Neither do we find failure on Brunner's part at the level 
of historical methodology. He roams skillfully through the 
maze of biblical -historical scholarship, keenly aware of the 
issues and problems. It is not Brunner's inadequacy as a 
historical scholar that is questionable. But where we do have 
reservations is how Brunner employs (or does not employ) 
historical knowledge in his theology. Khat we have in mind 
specific =111v is the use made of the rconcept of Heilsgeschichte. 
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We do not question that God has. been and is at work in history 
nor that I -Ie has acted specifically and dramatically in the 
history of Israel and centrally and definitively in Jesus 
Christ. What makes us uneasy is the tendency to assume that 
because there is a Heilsgeschichte one need not be concerned 
with the problems of history in the establishment of an 
adequate foundation for faith. It is altogether too easy to 
say that the secular historian has no access to the redemptive 
events and therefore our faith is secure from his critical 
investigations. To assert that Jesus rose from the dead and 
then argue that this fact cannot be touched by the historical 
method is to be driven into a realm of super- history where 
the critics cease from troubling and the faithful are at rest. 
We would agree with Brunner that faith is a necessary pre- 
understanding to apprehending the full efficacios meaning 
of the resurrection yet is it not still necessary for the 
historian qua historian, even though he is a believer, to 
subject the resurrection to an examination of the evidence? 
Is it legitimate to sever faith from history in this way? 
Unfortunately it appears that this is what Brunner appears to 
do when he writes that "the assertions of faith, even where 
they include an historical fact, are emphatically statements 
of faith, that is, they are real assertions which are attained 
in connection with faith, and not in connection with historical 
reasearch."50 As John McIntyre points out, there seems to be 
50 The Mediator, pp. 164 -65. 
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"a fear that if historical knowledge were to turn out to be 
genuine knowledge, then faith would rest on something less 
than Christ himself.ttol Would it not be better to say that 
faith rests on the Christ who is accessible to historical 
verification? 
Ultimately this disengagement of faith from history 
leads to a kind of dialectical double -talk because those who 
make the separation really cannot reconcile themselves to its 
implications. In this Brunner seems to be no exception. He 
vehemently maintains our .redemtion rests on real historical 
facts, e.g. without Passion history there can be no message 
of the cross,: but also speaks of the non- historical nature 
of revelation. But if revelation must have a historical 
foundation, i.e. if it occurs in history,: is it not then 
really historical? And does not the position seem to lead 
to a logical contradiction? For as long as Brunner holds to 
the Kiekegaardian tune /eternity dialectic, history would of 
necessity be in the sphere of the relative. But since 
revelation is the communication of absolute truth in which 
the eternal becomes historical, we have the impossible situation 
of the absolutizing of the relative. Pleas for preserving 
the paradoxical nature of truth at this point sound a little 
bit like an easy way out. It is not the paradox of the 
Eternal becoming temporal that we are objecting to here, but 
the failure of Brunner to accept its consequences, namely 
51 The Shape of Christology, p. 121. 
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that revelation is truly historical in nature. 
One wonders also if Brunner's fear of resting faith on 
historical probability is justified. Does not the concept 
of faith inherently contain a measure of uncertainty? Does 
not faith cease to be faith when everything is crystal clear? 
And is it not possible to smugle in a note of anti-intel- 
lectualism when we are afraid to take our chances on the plane 
of plain history. Further, does Brunner not make a false 
enemy out of the so called secular historian? If that which 
we put our faith in will not stand up under historical 
scrutiny, then maybe we had better let it go. It is true of 
course that there is nothing which resembles anti- intel- 
lectualism in Brunner. Yet the question still remains: Is 
he justified in his insistence of the non- historical nature 
of revelation? 
The fundamental issue at stake in our criticism of 
Brunner's interpretation of history is whether there is one 
history or two. We would argue that the distinction between 
secular history and super- history creates more problems than 
it solves. If one begins with an understanding of history 
where no distinction is made between events and their meaning, 
and where everything that happens does so within thé providence 
of God, then most of the difficulties of Brunner's formulation 
disappear. If all action is seen as a unity because God is 
the true subject of history, of all history, then faith need 
not be separated from history. Where Brunner fails is in his 
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uncritical acceptance of the presuppositions of positivist 
historiography. It is his acceptance of the positivist 
defi r.ition of history which forces him into the realm of 
super- history. If he were more willing to define history in 
biblical categories (which he clearly understands) and less 
willing to allow the secular historian to dictate what can and 
cannot happen in history, then it would be unnecessary for 
him to try to maintain some semblance of historical revelation 
opt? re:-.71,e; 
t-y a clever dialectical maneuver. He would be able to accept 
at face value that the "Word was made flesh ". Such a view 
of history would also be better suited to giving meanin - to 
the vast range and complexity of world history. Surely the 
God who is Creator and who became incarnate in Jesus Christ 
is concerned about the t ̂ tal'ty of history and not just one 
isolated segment. Nor would such a concept of history necessarily 
lead to the objectivization of faith or have to deny that 
faith is essentially personal relationship with God. Faith 
could be firmly tied to historical revelation while at the 
same time maintaining the contemporaniety of the I -Thou 
relation. The church has always taught that what happened 
in history nearly two thousand years ago is made a present 
reality b the presence of the Holy Spirit in the believer's 
life. In a word, Brunner ultimately fails to do justice 
to the historical nature of revelation. 
Chapter Eleven 
Faith and History: Reinhold Niebuhr 
I. The Roots of Niebuhr's.Thought 
In our analysis of the role of preunderstanding in 
historical interpretations of the Christian faith we have 
been conscious of both the negative and positive contri- 
butions which preunderstanding may make to the interpretation. 
We have observed the positive factor at work in ternes of the 
place which the preunderstanding of faith has in the inter- 
pretation of the Christian revelation,l We have also been 
concerned to show the negative influence of preunderstanding 
in those cases where it has obviously distorted the inter- 
pretation. In reference to the negative influence, we have 
maintained that the best corrective to such distortion is 
an adequate historical methodology. Historical methodology 
serves the vital twofold function of filtering out the 
negative features of the interpreter's preunderstanding while 
at the same time supplying him with the tools to "get at" 
the evidence of historical revelation. We have noted that the 
historical methrd is necessary, even when faith is present, to 
prevent distortion of the distinctly historical dimension of 
God's self -disclosure in Christ. Thus we have stressed with 
equal emphasis the necessity of the posture of faith and an 
See above, ch. 5. 
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adequate historical method. For without faith the inter- 
preter will inevitably impose a world view onto the Christ - 
event which by its very nature cannot do justice to it. On 
the other hand, without the employment of the historical method, 
there is no factual check on faith. Both are necessary and 
constitute the minimum requirements in an interpretive approach 
to the Christian faith. 
Another aspect of our argument has been that the given 
to be interpreted prescribes in large measure the preunder- 
standing with which it can be properly apprehended. With the 
Christ -event we have maintained that the necessary informational, 
attitudinal and ideological elements for the required preunder- 
standing are supplied by faith and that the necessary method- 
ological element, in that the appearance of Jesus Christ is 
an event in time, is historical. We have used these two 
criteria,. faith and history, in judging the adequacy of the 
various interpretations which have been considered. Our 
present concern is tc discuss one final historical inter- 
pretation of the Christian faith in light of these two 
criteria, after which we will turn our attention to selected 
and representative interpretations of the biblical data.2 
2 In the various historical interpretations which have 
been treated, an attempt has been made to be representative, 
choosing men whose time in history, whose point of view and 
whose reason for writing have differed widely, and who speak 
for a large segment of opinion in their historical era. Some 
of the more obvious omissions from the main stream of Western 
thought we will include in Section III. 
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In Reinhold Niebuhr we find a thinker who unites faith 
and history in a persuasive way, and who combines many of the 
test insights of the men who have been examined so tar. He 
is concerned, as was Augustine, to find the answer to the 
riddles of history in the 'biblical historical events with 
their culmination in Christ. He shares with Gibbon the desire 
to treat all history, including so-called sacred history, by 
the historical method. He is sympathetic to Hegel's objective 
to find meaning for the whole of world history. He would 
agree with Harnack that the Christian message must seak 
with relevancy and force to each generation and therefore 
needs interpretation in light of the modern mood. And he 
unites with Brunner in an enlightened approach to biblical 
theology which gives him the categork s for understanding the 
historical dimension of the Christian faith. 
of course as a Christian theologian, Niebuhr writes from 
within faith. Faith is both the ideological and attitudinal 
framework out of which he interprets history. But, as we 
have maintained, a man's faith is given specific content and 
direction by the context in which he finds himself. Therefore, 
if we are to understand Nie uhr's preunders-tanding and its 
influence on his interpretation of the Christian faith, we 
must look at those factors which supply his faith with its 
dominant motifs. A trief account of his life and activities 
will give us some indication of what those factors are. 
Niebuhr was born in Wright City, Missouri in 1892, the 
(2 5) 
eldest of three children.- 
3 
His father was a pastor with 
Harnackian sympathies in an Evangelical Church (later the 
Evangelical and Reformed), a small denomination which traces 
its ancestry back to the German Prussian Union which was made 
up of Lutheran and Reformed groups. Niebuhr speaks warmly of 
both his parents but attributes to his father in particular 
a formative influence and describes him as one "who combined 
a vital personal piety with a complete freedom in his theo- 
4 
logical studies." 
Nietuhr attended the educational institutions of his 
denomination, Elmhurst College and Eden Theoln'ical Seminary 
in St. Louis. He then went on to Yale Divinity School where 
he received his J3.D. degree in 1914 and an M.A. degree in 
1915. Yale Divinity School at that time was characterized by 
theological liberalism and social optimism, and Niebuhr left 
seminary filled with the convictions of a liberal theolty 
which believed in the goodness of God a:id man, the desirability 
of applying the Sermon on the Mount to the whole of life and 
the optimistic hope that the Kingdom of God could he built 
on earth in the not too distant futures 
Family nedsresulting from his father's death and 
"boredom with epistemology"5 prompted him to leave graduate 
3 A good biography of Nietuhr is June Bingham, The 
Courage to Change, New York, 1961; see also D.R. Davies, 
Reinhold Hiebuhr: The pr_ophat from America, New York, 1943. 
For his theology see Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold 
Nie_uhr, tr. by Louise p.. ttibone Sm ti h, New York, 1956. --___ 
Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds., Reinhold 
Niebuhr; His Religious, Social and Political Thought, New 
York, 1956, p. 3. 
5 Ibid., p. 4. 
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study and the academic career to whicj it pointed and assume 
the responsibility for a small parish in Detroit. There 
cLt 
Niebuhr was able to observefirsthand the problems of the 
worker in the automobile industry, something of the tactics 
used to suppress union organization and the tragic cost in 
human values which America was paying for its rapid indus- 
trialization. During the thirteen years of Niebuhr's pastorate, 
Detroit crew from a city of 500,000 to 1,500,000 and a good 
part of this growth can be attributed to the expansion of 
industry. The resulting social problems, Niebuhr began to 
realize, could not be as easily solved as his theology had 
led him to believe. He began to re- evaluate his liberal and 
moralistic creed which he had accented as tantamount to the 
Christian faith. In a diary which ue kept during these 
years he recorded some of his impressions: 
We went through one of the automobile 
factories today. So artificial is life 
that these factories are like a strange 
world to me though I have lived close to 
them for many years. The foundry interested 
me particularly. The heat was terrific. 
The men seemed weary. Here manual labor 
is a drudgery and toil is slavery. The 
men cannot possibly find any satisfaction 
in their work. They simply work to make 
a living. .Their sweat and their dull 
pain are part of the price paid for the 
fine cars we all run. And most of us 
run the cars without knowing the price 
that is being paid for them.6 
The experiences of the Detroit years, he remarks, "determined 
my development more than any books I may have read. "7 In 
6 Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed C'nc, New York, 
1960, p. 99. 
7 Kegley, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 5. 
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an article _ch ea.re.d in 1939, looking back on his time 
as a pastor in Detroit, he wrote "that such theological 
convictions '.A.hich I hold today began to dawn upon me during 
the end of a pastorate in a great industrial city. They 
dawned upon me because the simple little homilies which 
were preached in that as in other cities...seemed completely 
irrelevant to the brutal facts of life in a great industrial 
center...." 
8 
In a 'dition to the disillusionment created by his 
observation of the impotency of his theology to meet the 
needs of an expanding industrial community, Niebuhr al-:o saw 
his liberal optimism fail to supply satisfying explanations for 
a tragic world war. A trip to Europe during the war's latter 
stages gave him an opportunity to view its harsh realities. 
This perspective helped to free him from a too easy acceptance 
of the naive slogan that the war was fought "to make the world 
safe for democracy." Later (1923) he wrote: "Gradually the 
whole horrible truth about the war is being revealed. Every 
new book destroys some further illusion." He laments that "all 
human sin seems so much worse in its conseiuences than in its 
intentions. "9 
The parish ministry also made its contribution to the 
break up of Niebuhr's literal point of view. He was impressed 
with the inadequacy of the "simple idealism into which the 
8 "Ten Years That Shook. My World ", The Christian 
Century, Vol. LVI /1, No. 17 (April 26, 1939), 545. 
9 Leaves, pp. 61 -62. 
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classical faith had evaporated" to aid in the crises of 
personal life. Commenting on his pastoral experience of 
observing the gradual death of a Christian woman with cancer 
he says: "1 relearned the essentials of the Christian faith 
at the bedside of that nice old soul. "10 
Niebuhr left Detroit in 1928 to become Professor of 
Chr: stian Ethics and Philosophy of Religion at Union Theo- 
logical Seminary in New York, a. position which he held until 
his health forced him into semi- retirement in the late 1950's. 
ìhiro/veci 
In addition to his teaching at Union, he was -active in an 
incredible number of activities. In his earlier years he 
was involved in a pacifist organization, the Fellowship of 
Reco,ciliati on, but later gave up his pacifist convictions. 
His work as a leader in th:e ecumenical movement is well 
known. IIe has also found time to run for public office on 
the Socialist ticket, participate in the policy making and 
running of the New York Liberal party and serve as an adviser 
to President Roosevelt during the New Deal years. He helped 
found Americans for Democratic Action and worked faithfully 
in the Zionist cause. Besides the writing of his many books 
and articles11 he has edited two religious journals, served 
on the editorial staff of many magazines and lectured tirelessly 
in many universities and theological seminaries. 
10 Kegley, ed., 7,einhold Niebuhr, p. 6. 
11 For a bibliography of Niebuhr's writing through 1955 
see D.B. Robertson, Reinhold Niebuhr's Works: A Bibliography, 
Berea, k:entucky, 1955. 
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Essentially Niebuhr's preunders Landing grew out of the 
turbulent life which he lived and his efforts to app y 
Christianity to the social, economic and political s :heres. 
He has on several occasions rejected the appellation of 
theologian and has maintained "that the gradual unfolding of 
my theological ideas has come not so much through study, as 
12 through the pressure of world events." Niebuhr, as we have 
seen, first began to structure his thought in reaction to the 
nineteenth century liberal world view which had informed 
American Christianity.13 By degrees it became clear to him 
that the foundations of economic and theological liberalism 
were extremely weak. The "social gopel" was of more concern 
to the theologian than to the worker. Much was discussed, 
but little was accomplished in concrete action. He ï:erceived 
the cause of the failure of liberal theology to lie in its 
anthropology whi ch lacked understanding of the egotistic 
character of human existence.14 The social gospel's faith 
in human perfectibility did not take into account the deeply 
rooted power of sin in human nature. Liberalism, according 
to Niebuhr, as superficial and sentimental. 
In addition to his campaign against liberalism, Niebuhr 
conducted a second front against orthodoxy, though his 
thinking has gradually moved toward some of its emphases. 
The basic fault of liberalism was its naive optimism and 
12 "Ten Years That Shook My World ", p. 545. 
13 D.R. Davies, op. cit p. 7. 
14 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, n. 178. 
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sentimentality; the lack of power in orthodoxy was due to its 
Pessimism, its theological rigidity and its ethical moralism. 
Niebuhr writes that "Orthodox Christianity, with insic-hts 
and perspectives in many ways superior to those of liberalism, 
cannot come to the aid of modern man, partly because its 
religious truths are still imbedded in an outmoded science and 
partly because its morality is expressed in dogmatic and 
authoritarian moral codes. "15 
Finally, Niebuhr's thought grew in response to his 
contact with MIarxism. One of his earliest books published in 
1932, Moral r.ian and Immoral Society, reflects this Marxian 
influence. In it Niebuhr shows an appreciation for Marx's 
ideal of equality and his honest disclosure of social injustice. 
Eut Marxism also failed to provide Niebuhr with a framework 
for his thought because of its unjustified cynicism, doctrinaire 
economic determinism and naturalism. In reference to this 
latter point he describes Marxism as "naturalistic as modern 
liberalism. It is therefore deficient in an ulti late perspective 
upon historic and relative moral achievements."6 
The product of his contact viitii theological liberalism, 
orthodoxy and Marxism was a "realistic" theology, a position 
which attempted to preserve the concern for social justice 
as contained in liberalism and the realism of orthodoxy and 
Marxism while rejecting naive optimism, pessimism and cynicism.17 
15 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, New York, 1959, 
D. 14. 
16 Ibid., p. 25. 
17 For an examination of these three movements on 
Niebuhr's thought see G. Briílenburg Niebuhr, tr. 1:y 
David Freeman, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1960. 
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But before consideration can be given to his theology and its 
implications for his view of history, we must first lock at 
some of the specifically intellectual roots of Niebuhr's 
thought, for they too, in addition to his.more immediate 
circ:_mstances, contribute to the preunderstanding which he 
brings to his historical interpretation of the Christian faith. 
The historical roots of Niebuhr's preunderstanding are 
widespr ad; indeed they include the whole tradition of Western 
civilization. Yet there are some more sr;ecific roots which 
may be isolated.18 Perhaps the supreme influence on Niebuhr's 
preunderstanding comes from the Bible. In ¡,articular, his 
understanding of history is built on the biblical affirmation 
that God has disclosed Himself in His mighty acts and centrally 
n His Son Jesus Christ. It is the Bible which supplies the 
content and categories for Niebuhr's thought and guides him 
in its application to modern life. 
A second force in the formation of Niebuhr's preunderstanding 
is the American tradition of pragmatism, individualism and 
freedom.19 He is the grateful heir of William James and John 
Dewey. Niebuhr takes the fundamental concepts of pragmatism 
and gives them depth by placing them within the framework of 
Christian faith. ',Mile rejecting James' idolatry of the 
human will and Dewey's idolatry of human intelligence, Niebuhr 
18 I have been helped at this point by Richard Kroner's 
article, "The Historical Roots of Niebuhr's Thought" in 
Kegley, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 178 -191. 
19 kegley, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 30,E -9. Kroner 
strangely omits this factor in his article. 
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asserts that Christian faith must work in practice and meet 
the needs of contemporary society. Niebuhr also reflects the 
heritage of pragmatism in his non -theological writing. He 
shares with other pragmatists such as H.L. Mencken, Walter 
Lippmann and Lewis Mumford the role of the prophet i -_ the 
critical interpretation of his age and the debunking of 
artificial. sentimentalities. 
A third influence on Niebuiir's nreunderstanding is the 
theological tradition which has given primacy to personal, 
existential and subjective categories. He finds common ground 
with Plaise Pascal who stressed the contradictory nature of 
human selfhood and who laid bare the limits of human know- 
ledge. He is indebted to Seren Kierkegaard who, Niebuhr 
thinks, interpreted the human self "more accurately than any 
modern, and possibly than any previous, Christian theologian."20 
From Kierkegaard Niebuhr learned how to avoid a speculative 
rationalism without being trapped by an obscurantist fundamentalism, 
and borrowed the concert of the dialectical relationship be- 
tween time and eternity. In the work of the Spanish Catholic 
existentialist, Unamuno, Niebuhr discovered the sense of the 
tragic in human history and in Nicholas Berdyaev, the Russian 
philosopher, he uncovered justification for an emphasis on 
the mysterious and dramatic in human existence. In the 
thought of Martin Buber he came upon the personal dimension 
20 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, p. iii. 
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of reality, and in the writings of Emil Brunner he was made 
aware of a doctrine of man which did justice to both human 
experience and biblical teaching. Influenced as he was by 
this tradition, Niebuhr's own theological categories tend to 
be biblical, personal, dramatic and historical. 
Finally, Niebuhr is influenced by the church's great 
theologians. In Augustine Niebuhr finds a doctrine of roan, 
a philosophy of state and theology of history which are as 
relevant to his generation as they were to the tasks and 
neces.ities arising out of Augustine's situation.21 s In 
reference to Augustine Niebuhr says that "the thought of this 
theologian was to answer so many of my questions and to 
emancipate me finally from the notion that the Christian 
faith was in some way identical with the moral idealism of 
the past century. "Z2 Niebuhr is also a student of the 
Reformation. Concerning this point Richard Kroner writes: 
"Trie dependence upon Reformation theology is evident in 
every book and every line Niebuhr has written. "23 Niebuhr 
identifies with that element in Luther which is mystical and 
dialectical and which challenges the easy answers of rationalism. 
From Calvin Niebuhr senses both the necessity and the in- 
herent dangers of applying Christian principles to political 
and social contexts. 
21 See Niebuhr's Christian Realism and Political Prob- 
lems, London, 1954, pp. 114 -139. 
22 Kegley, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 9. 
23 Ibid., p. 186. 
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Thus we find Niebuhr's preunderstanding being formed by 
his education and pastoral experience, his reflective reactions 
and criticisms of current ideological options and his wide 
reading in the thought of Western civilization and Christian 
theology. This wide range of influencing factors on Niebuhr's 
preunderstanding does not easily fit any simple scheme of 
classification. Ideological, attitudinal and methodological 
elements are difficult to separate. However we would suggest 
the following scheme as a working hypothesis. 
Ideologically, Niel)uhr is indebted to two quite distinct 
grour,s of influence, secular social theorists and Christian 
thought. On the one hand are the dominant notes of Marxism 
and pragmatism and on the other the obvious influence of such 
thinkers as Augustine, Calvin and Kierkegaard. Niebuhr 
borrows ideological assumptions freely from both groups, and 
manages to hold them in balance, i.e. in a dependency relation- 
ship. These assumptions do not always function consciously in 
his views, but there i:-, an overall consistency and rationality 
about them. Because they do not really converge into a 
systematically formulated world view they are less than 
comprehensive in scope and allow Niebuhr to be open to new 
ideas and evidence. 
The main attitudinal components of Niebuhr's preunder- 
standing stem primarily from his active involvement as a 
Christian in his social milieu. There is for example a 
strong element of reaction in his attitude; (to "sentimental" 
liberalism, "cold" orthodoxy etc.). There is compassion 
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in his reading of history stemming no doubt from his experience 
in Detroit. There is a general openness to any and all 
strands of thought which shed light on man's social condition. 
This complex of attitudes is a major positive influence on 
his interpretation. 
Niebuhr has fey consciously formulated methodological 
assumptions. He accepts the historical critical method in 
reference to the biblical documents but has no clearly 
defined theological approach in the sense of many of his 
contemporaries. 
There is more that could be done by way of defining and 
categorizing Niebuhr's preunderstanding, but perhaps the best 
way to see the influence of his preunderstanding on his 
historical interpretation of the Christian faith is to turn 
to his interpretation itself. This will enable us to illustrate 
09y-way-4-44-specific the role which his preunderstanding does 
play in his view. . 
II. Niebuhr's View of History 
Niebuhr's understanding of history (i.e. the presup- 
positions with which he interprets history) grew in response 
to his conviction that nineteenth century liberal views of 
the inevitability of progress in history failed to do justice 
to the realities of modern life. He addressed himself to what 
he considered to be the arrogant presumption of nineteenth 
century system -makers. that there can be a worldly resolution 
to the problems of human history. Niebuhr asserts in contrast 
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that the goal and purpose of history lies beyond our terres- 
trial sphere, and that the clue to the enigma of man's his- 
torical existence is to be found in the self-disclosure of 
God in Jesus Christ. 
Niebuhr's views are set down in systematic forni in his 
chief work The Nature and Destiny of Man (1946) and Faith and 
History (1949). An elaboration of the essential themes con- 
tained in these volumes is to be found in Beyond Tragedy (1937) 
a nd Discerning the Signs of the Times (1946). Many of his 
other volumes, particularly Reflections on the End of an Ira 
(1934), The Irony of American History (1952) and The Self and 
and the Dramas of History (1956) include applications and in- 
24 
direct references to his central theme. Our discussion of 
Niebuhr's interpretation of history will include a brief 
state Rent of the ideologies over against which Niebuhr sets 
his thought, an examination of the focus point (the revelatory 
event) and the propositions which support it, and finally an 
explanation of sore of the categories Niebuhr employs in his 
description of the historical process. 
To begin with, Niebuhr places his view in reference to 
the three major formulations of the nature of history which 
have occurred in Western thought.- 
25 First, he distinguishes 
the approach of Greek classicism which tended to identify 
24 ?bid., p. 292. The article "Reinhold Niebuhr's 
Philosophy of History ", pp. 292 -310, written by Robert E. 
Fitch, is excellently done and I make use of some of his 
material. 
25 Faith and History, pp. 15 -16. 
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history with the world of nature and which sought the emancipation 
of man's reason from the world of flux. This approach Niebuhr 
criticizes as being essentially a- historical. It is altogether 
too dependent upon the natural order and explains historical 
causation in terms of the occurrences in nature or of tragic 
fate. 
A more formidable opponent is the modern view of history 
which regards the historical development of man's power and 
freedom as the solution for every human perplexity and evil. 
Modern man, Niebuhr argues, believes that historical develop- 
ment is a redemptive process. He writes that "the dominant 
note in modern culture is not so much confidence in reason 
as faith in "26 Modern man holds the that 
historical progress can gradually change the human situation. 
Such a conviction, Niebuhr believes, contains two very dubious 
propositions which are responsible for the errors and illusions 
in the modern view: (1) the idea of the perfectibility of 
man and (2) the idea of progress.27 The modern approach to 
the understanding of history fails, according to Niebuhr, be- 
cause neither of these two articles can be justified. The 
first proposition does not sufficiently take into account the 
complexity of man's nature, and ascribes to him a t'-pe of 
freedom which he does not _:ossess. To Niebuhr, man is and 
does participate by virtue of his self- transcendence in the 
26 Ibid. , p. 3. 
27 Christian. Realism and political problems, t-. 13. 
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creation of histr>ry, tut he is also limited .Ly the temp -oral 
process and tainted by sin which makes his perfectibility 
impossible. Niebuhr refutes the second proposition in a 
manner similar to Johnson's rebuttal of Berkeley. The modern 
view stubs its toe on the rock of the brutal facts of history. 
' +Since 1914 ", writes Niebuhr, "one tragic experience has 
followed another, as if history had been designed to refute 
the vain delusion of modern man. "28 And, unfortunately, 
modern man's explanations of the catastrophes of our time 
are derived from principles of interpretation which were 
responsiLle for his inabilitY to anticipate the experiences 
which he now seeks to comprehend. 
A more adequate understanding of the nature of historÿ, 
Niebuhr believes, is to be found in the biblical -Christian 
approach which understands man's historic existence as both 
meaningful and mysterious, and which regards the freedom of 
man, which distinguishes history from nature, as the source 
of evil as well as good. In the revelation of God in Christ, 
faite, discerns God's redemptive purpose as both the fulfillment 
and negation of all partial meanings in history as they are 
"embodied" in national, imperial and world -wide cultural 
destinies.29 
The validation of the Christian view of history, according 
to Niebuhr, is ultimately by faith and not by rational 
28 Faith and History, p. 7. 
29 
Ibid., p. 120. 
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anal =sis; yet there is a limite.-i validation which can be 
demonstrated. 
30 
This apologetic task Niebuhr conceives as 
having both a negative and positive side. The negative side, 
as we have already implied; consists in demonstrating that all 
worldly wisdom, whether optimistic or pessimistic, emphasizing 
either the dignity or the misery of man, gives an inadequate 
view of the total human situation. The positive aspect of 
the demonstration consists in correlating the truth appre- 
hended by faith to the truths gained about life in human 
experience and through scientific and philosophical disciplines. 
The focus point of history, that which gives the whole 
stream of events coherence and meaning, is the revelatory 
event of Jesus Christ. "The Christian faith begins with, 
and is founded upon, the affirmation that the life, death, 
and resurrection of Christ represent an event in history, in 
and through which a disclosure of the whole meaning of his- 
tory occurs.... "31 The true meaning of history can never be 
discerned inside the flux of time for plan will inevitably 
construct a realm of meaning from a particular standpoint 
within that flux.32 He will impose upon history a meaning 
which is itself historically conditioned. God reveals the 
purpose of history from beyond by dramatically breaking into 
time in the central and culminating act in Heilsgeschichte.33 
30 Ibid., p. 171. 
31 Ibid., p. 29. 
32 Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 1F?7. 
33 Ibid. 
, 1p. 188. 
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The meaning supplied by God in the revelatory event is 
twofold. positively, it is an assertion that God has taken 
action to overcome the variance which exists between man and 
God.34 It is the demonstration of God's wisdom and truth, and 
grace and power which can overcome sin, complete what man 
cannot of himself complete and provide new resources for 
human life. God Himself in His Son has become a historical 
person to rescue men. God has broken into our finiteness 
from His eternity and sought us out. In Christ, the meaning 
of man's historic existence is fulfilled. In Christ, the divine 
sovereignty is "revealed to have an ultimate resource of 
mercy and forgiveness, beyond judgment, which completes history 
despite the continued fragmentary and contradictory character 
of all historic reality. "35 Niebuhr writes: 
Christian faith regards the revelation in 
Christ as final because the ultimate prob- 
lem [sin) is solved by the assurance that 
God takes man's sin upon Himself and into 
Himself and that without this divine ini- 
tiative and this divine sacrifice there 
could be no reconciliation and no easing 
of man's uneasy conscience. This reve- 
lation is final not only as a category of 
interpreting the total meaning of history 
but also as a solution for the problem of 
the uneasy conscience in each individual.36 
On the negative side, this revelatory event stands as a 
judgment upon all the idolatrous centers of meaning before 
34 Kegley, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 19. 
35 Faith and History, p. 157. 
36 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1, p. 143. 
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which we worship.' It functions as a perspective from which 
to view the pretensions of man's pride as he constructs 
absolutes out of the relativities of his cu]ture. In short, 
from the standpoint of Christian faith, the life and death 
of Christ become the revelation of God's character as Loth 
`edeemer and Judge whose mercy and forgiveness triumph over 
the vicissitudes and ambiguities of man's historical existence. 
Niebuhr employs three major propositions in building 
a structure around his foundational point that the meaning of 
-. n 
history has been disclosed in the Christ- even.t.J6 The first 
proposition is that the unity of history is perceived by faith 
in the sovereignty of God and not by "sight" of historical 
processes. Here the influence of Augustine is clearly in 
evidence. Niebuhr does not attempt to build an over -all 
structure to history as has been done for example by Hegel, 
Marx, Spengler and Toynbee. Such inner unity cann"t be elab- 
orated by reason because history displays chaos as well as 
order. Faith alone is able to perceive coherence in the flux 
of events as it grasps the meaning of tta suffering divine 
love." In the revelatory event "faith discerns the self- 
disclosure of God. 1140 Niebuhr is careful to acknowledge that 
"the dramas of history contain many facts and sequences which 
must be rationally correlated. But the frame of meaning in 
37 Faith and History, ch. VII. 
38 Kegley, ed. , Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 293 -4. 
39 Christian Realism and Political Problems, n. 1L4. 
40 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, p. 136. 
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which these facts and. sequences are discerned must be appre- 
hended by faith because it touches the realm of mystery beyond 
rational comprehension." 
41 
That realm of mystery which faith  
discerns via the revelatory event and places its confidence 
in is the sovereignty of God. God is the actuating force 
in history, and "history is conceived as unity because all 
historical destinies are under the dominion of a single divine 
soverei?nt -." 42 Niebuhr justifies this claim to find meaning 
by faith in God's sovereignty over history by pointing out 
that any attempts to ascertain the meaning of history are . 
introduced 'by faith, and that the only legitimate resting 
place for faith is the Eternal God who supplies history's 
meaning from beyond history rather than in the midst of its 
rela .ivities.43 
A second supporting proposition of Niebuhr's central 
thesis is his affirmation of the permanent character o sin 
and evil in history.44 Again Augustine's influence is present. 
History itself is not redemptive; it cannot be its own Christ. 
No amount of progress will be able to squeeze out sin, nor 
can man ever be master of his own historical destiny. The 
reason standing behind this assertion of Niebuhr's is to be 
found in his understanding of the nature of man. Man is a 
41 The Self and the Dramas of History, London, 156, 
p. 260. 
42 Faith and History, p. 120. 
43 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, o. 151. 
44 Faith and History, ch. VIII. 
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free being able to participate creatively in the making of 
history. The self's memory of the past and its capacities to 
project goals transcending the necessities of nature enable it 
to create the level of reality which we know as human history.45 
Therefore a radical distinction must be made between the 
natural world and the world of human history. The justification 
for such a distinction lies in the unique character of human 
freedom. Yet man with all his freedom is still imprisoned by 
sin and finitude. In fact it is the misuse of this very 
freedom which causes man to sin. Niebuhr describes the 
process in the following way: 
Moral or historical evil is the conse- 
quence of man's abortive effort to over- 
come his insecurity by his own power, to 
hide the.finiteness of his intelligence by 
pretensions of omniscience and to seek for 
emancipation from his ambiguous position 
by his own resources. Sin is, in short, 
the 'consequences of man's inclination to 
usurp the prerogatives of God, to think 
more highly of himself than he ought to 
think, thus making destructive use of his 
freedom by not observing the limits to 
which a creaturely freedom is bound.46 
The sin of pride causes man to attribute to himself and his 
institutions an importance and permanence which is not justi- 
fied. God's revelation in Christ offering grace and mercy 
supplies both the vantage point from which to judge such 
arrogance on the part of man and the resources of love to 
overcome man's rebellion and his evil inclination of self- 
45 The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 53. 
46 Faith and History, p. 137. 
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worship.47 "Ultimately, therefore," writes Niebuhr, "only the 
divine forgiveness toward all men can overcome the confusion 
of human history and make this whole drama meaningful. "48 
A- third and final proposition which expands Niebuhr's 
conviction that the Christ -event is that event which gives 
meaning to all events is that history provides a disclosure 
of meaning but not a fulfillment of meaning. Niebuhr seeks a 
mediating point between the classical view which denies all 
meaning to the temporal and desires to esca»e to the eternal 
and the modern view which expects total fulfillment in history:. 
In one of Niebuhr's favorite expressions, "Man is a Moses" 
who has glimpsed the promised land from afar, but cannot enter 
3.n.49 There is nothing inherent in history which will com- 
plete it Man may make some progress in his culture and 
institutions, but in them he finds no telos or true end. Mather 
he finds finis, i.e. an abrupt termination of his career in 
this world. The eschatological symbols of the New Testament, 
the return of Christ, the Last Judgment and the resurrection, 
give man the assurance of a telos beyond history.50 
The mention of symbol moves the discussion to a consid- 
eration of some of the categories which Niebuhr uses in his 
description of history. Following Robert Fitchwe will limit 
47 Ibid., p. 142. 
48 Ibid., p. 31. 
49 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, p. 308. 
50 Faith and History, p. 269. 
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our inquiry to four: (1) symbol and myth, (2) paradox, 
(3) the Marxian dialectic and (4) irony.51 
Niebuhr employs the concepts of symbol and myth partly 
because of his desire to be true to both the message of the 
Bible and the facts of history, but more importantly because 
of his belief in the I;ierkegaardian dictum that there is 
Ttan infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity." 
Eternity is the realm of the absolute and history is the 
realm of the relative. Therefore anything in history is by defini- 
Lion relative and can be no more than a pointer to the eternal. 
It is both foolish and dangerous to identify anything in history 
with the eternal. The symbol, then, is a link between time 
and eternity and cannot be identified with either.52 Care 
should be taken neither to inter:ret the symbol literally nor 
to treat it as unimportant for "if the symbol is taken literally 
the dialectical conception of time and eternity is falsified 
and the ultimate vindication of God over history is reduced to 
a point in history.... On the other hand, if the symbol is dis- 
Hissed as unimportant, as merely a picturesque or primitive way 
of apprehending the relation of the historical to the eternal, 
the Biblical dialectic is obscured in another direction. "53 
Symbols are the rallying points for religious myths 
which are attemits to discover depth in history and to exrlain 
51 Kegley, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 292 ff. 
52 Edward J. Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Ni ei:uhr, 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1960, p. 111. 
53 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, i,. 289. 
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the collective insights of man's interaction with eternity. 
The religious myth deals with the mystery and depth of life 
which elude all efforts to catch them in neat rational 
descriptions. Inevitably .,there is a note of deception, a 
necessity of picturing things as they seem rather than as 
they are, in order to record on one dimension what exists 
in two dimensions.54 The biblical doctrines of the Creation, 
the Fall, the Incarnation, the Atonement and the Consummation 
all have an element of the mythological in them. 
Niebuhr is also fond of speaking of the nature of history 
and historical events in terms of paradox. Two examples from 
the heart of his theology will illustrate this point. First, 
man is limited Ly sin and finitude and yet is a self-trans- 
cendent being. As a result he is at the same time both a 
product and a creator of history. A second illustration is 
Nieùuhr's. time /eternity dialectic which is central to his 
description of the Incarnation. The idea of eternity entering 
time, Niebuhr affirms, is intellectually absurd; "that the Word 
was made flesh outrages all the cantons by which truth is 
Yet The whole character usually u 5. dged. it is the truth. 
of the Christian religion is involved in the affirmation of 
this paradox. 
A third category which Niebuhr utilizes in his description 
of history, particularly in his earlier writings, is the 
54 Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, New York, 1937, p. 5. 
55 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Marxian dialectic. He never accepts the Marxian position 
without qualification, but does explore in Moral Man and 
Immoral Society (1932) and Reflections on the End of An Era 
(1934) the influence of class conflict and the inevitable use 
of force and power in all collective institutions. In these 
volumes he apriies Marxist insights to the rapidly expanding 
American industrial society. He was especially conscious of 
the fact that the American cai;italistic system was completely 
filled with social injustice and largely accepted a Marxian 
analysis of it. His primary concern was with social justice, 
and while he rejected the more radical Marxian solutions, he 
saw no way to escal_ -e class conflicts i;; the achievement of 
a just society. 
A final category which Niebuhr employs in analyzing 
history is irony. He sees in man's situation a continual 
eruptionof the ironic, by which he means that often the 
intention of an action is far different from the outcome. It 
is ironic that the instruments which men use to destroy 
particular vices ultimately take on the nature of the vice. 
It is ironic that human sin springs from the misuse of --tri i 
capacities of Hower, wisdom and virtue.56 The ultimate irony 
is in the biblical history, that Christ is crucified by the 
priests of the purest religion of his day and by the most 
sophisticated legal code, the Roman; and Lhat his crucifixion 
which ap: ears to i.e a tragic defeat is in fact a final victory. 
56 Niebuhr, The irony of American History, New York, 
1952, pp. 151 ff. 
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Iii. An Appraisal 
As with other men we have considered, so with Niebuhr 
there is much that is positive in his understanding of the 
historical dimension of the Christian faith. What is particu- 
larly important for our theme is the place which Niebuhr gives 
to the necessity of the preunderstanding of faith for an 
adequate comprehension of the Christ- event. Niebuhr explicitly 
states that it is faith alone which is able to discern the 
transcendent and redemptive meaning in the revelatory event 
of the Incarnation. Niebuhr writes that "God does disclose 
his purposes. The disclosure takes place in significant 
events of history. The revelatory power of these events 
57 
must be apprehended by faith." Equally important, as this 
quote,/,indicates, is Niei:uhr's insistence on the historical 
del. 
nature of revelation, that God in Christ has redeemed man and 
revealed.the meaning of all history. Niebuhr rejects all 
ontological s eculation and affirms that the ";fiord was made 
flesh's and tha t "God was in Christ reconciling the world to 
Himself." And, unlike Brunner, he does not remove the reve- 
látory events from historical examination. He erects no 
false dichotomy between Faith and historical science. In 
discussing this issue he praises the old liberal tradition 
which maintained that honesty involved not only loyalty to 
Christian truth "but also fidelity to the standards of the 
57 Faith and history, P. 119. 
(309) 
whole modern world of culture. This tradition rightly insisted 
that no facts of history could be exempted from historical 
scrutiny in the name of faith. Christianity was a historical 
religion. It rested upon the facts of history as interpreted 
by faith. 
"58 
While we are in basic agreement with Niebuhr, there are 
still some aspects of his thought which appear to be overly 
influenced by certain aspects of his preunderstanding. This 
is not so much a question of negative criticism as it is a 
matter of emphasis. In the first place, does Niebuir ovr- 
stress the Augustinian note of human sinfulness? Does the 
emphasis on the fragmentary and destructive aspect of history 
(which certainly exists) allow enough room for an appreciation 
of the positive achievements of human culture? Given world 
wars, atomic bombs and all the rest, mankind has nevertheless 
made progress in an amazing number of directions. Niebuhr's 
"realism" which comes close to being overly negative has 
caused one author to write: "Niebuhr seems so overwhelmed by 
the evil imbedded in any manifestation of rower, in its 
idolatrous self -esteem, that he appears to strip the culture 
itself of all w 'rth. "59 Does not the Christ-event, while 
revealing the ultimate character oí sin, also reveal the 
ultimate good and supply power for pursuing it? Should not 
more emphasis be given to the place of God's activity,- in 
58 Essays in A,, lied Christianity, ed. by D.B. Robertson, 
New York, 1960, r. 1 5. 
59 Manuel, or. cit., p. 143. 
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the lives and affairs of men? Surely faith teaches that God 
has not forsaken us. 
Another question of emphasis and not of basic disagreement 
which rises to the surface in a close scrutiny of Niebuhr's 
interpretation of historical revelation is his adherence to 
the Kierkegaardian dialectic of time and eternity. Because 
of his acceptance of this principle, Niebuhr necessarily sees 
the meaning of history as being supplied from "beynnd". But 
many of the valuable insights and principles which Niebuhr 
allegedly gets from.beyond. history seem to have really been 
found in history. Though the Christian revelation may have 
come from beyond history, it nevertheless occurred in history 
and is connected with precedent and subsequent history, and 
functions as a power in history.60 Maybe history has more 
meaning and structure than we suppose, especially if we view 
God as the moving force behind it rather than its occasional 
visi tor. 
A final question regarding Niebuhr's formulation is his 
use of the concept of myth, especially as it relates to the 
redemptive events. It may have its place as a means of 
describing the early chapters of Genesis, but seems less 
appropriate in describing the Incarnation, Atonement and 
Resurrection. Granted these events point beyond themselves 
to eternity, but they also have a reference point in history 
which most "myths ", as the word is ordinarily used, do not 
60 Kegley, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 306. 
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have. Even symbol, which has a less unfortunate connotation 
than myth, is problematic. One always wonders if events really 
happened if they are described in terms of myth or symbol. 
And of course if the redemptive events lose their facticity, 
which Niebuhr does not want them to do, the historic revelation 
is exchanged for theistic philosophy. 
SECTION III 
P REUNDERSTANDI.NG AND BIBLICAL INTERPRETATIONS 
Chapter £welve 
The Allegorical Method: Origen 
I. Preliminary Considerations 
Our concern in Section I was to define End analyze 
preunderstanding and to consider its relationship to the 
general task of interpreting the Christian revelation. In 
Section II the discussion moved to a consideration of the 
role of preunderstanding in representative historical inter- 
pretations of the Christian faith. Our attention now shifts 
to an assessment of the role of preunderstanding in rep- 
resentative interpretations of the Bible. 
Our emphasis in Section III will be slightly different 
than in Sect -ion II, though inevitably, in our treatment of 
the various historical interpretations of the Christian 
faith, some attention was paid to the way in which the six 
representative authors male use of the biblical record. 
Yet in general the views discussed dealt primarily with the 
broad scope of history and the place which Christianity has 
in it, or the meaning which the Christian revelation gives 
to it. But in this section the emphasis will be placed on 
the bi'lical documents themselves and how they have been 
interpreted and should be interpreted in light of the ever 
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present factor of preunderstanding. So our specific purpose 
in this section is to analyze the. function of preunderstanding 
in biblical interpretation. To remind ourselves again of the 
inevitability of preunderstanding having an influence on the 
interpreter of the Bible we would do well to quote Karl 
Barth. He says: 
No one is in a position, objectively or 
abstractly, merely to observe and present 
what is there. For how can he do so 
without at the same time reflecting 
upon and interpreting what is there? No 
one copies without making this transition. 
In affirming and representing what is 
written, and what is because of what is 
written, we accompany what is written, 
and what is because of what is written, 
with our own thinking.' 
Our approach in evaluating the role of preunderstanding 
in biblical interpretation will be similar to that for his- 
torical interpretation. iVe ß.i11. begin by looking briefly at 
each interpreter's historical situation in an effort to un- 
cover the factors which contribute to the formation and content 
of his preunderstanding. Next we will analyze his preunder- 
standing in terms of its type and function. We will then be 
in a position to explore how the interpreter's preunderstanding 
influences his view and interpretation of the Bible. Finally, 
we will utilize both the concepts of history and faith as we 
have defined and developed them as a means of judging the 
adequacy of the six hermeneutical positions which will be 
discussed. 
1 Church Dogmatics, Vol. I /2, p. 727. 
2 See above, chs. 1 & 4. 
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It should be remembered that our emphasis will be upon 
that aspect of the interpreter's preunderstanding which 
influences his interpretation of the Bible, not the totality 
of his preunderstanding. In general our pattern will be first 
to state the broad assumptions which provide the foundation 
for the hermeneutical system and then to examine how these 
assumptions become manifest in the sr,ecific presuppostions 
of the interpretive method. The first biblical interpreter 
to be considered is the brilliant Alexandrian teacher of the 
third century, Origen, whose genius was devoted primarily 
to the development of an adequate view of biblical hermen- 
eutics for his time. 
II. The Formation of Origen's Preunderstanding 
Origen's preunderstanding was shaped in the first tifty 
years of the third century, an era in which there was a potent 
ferment of ideas and a bitter contest between opposing 
ideologies. Assorted syncretistic religious cults which had 
their origins in Egypt, Babylon, Persia, Syria and Asia Minor 
were blossoming throughout the Roman Empire. For the sophis- 
ticated, philosophy was readily available. The Stoics were 
actively philosophizing, as were Plutarch and his followers, 
each spreading the influence and popularity of philosophical 
thought. of special significance was the rise of the various 
gnostic sects under the leadership of such men as Basilides and 
his son Isidorus,, and Valentinus and his disciples Ptolemaeus 
and Heracleon. The gnostics dealt with the religious subjects 
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of God and providence, man and his nature, the origin and des- 
tiny of the cosmos, Christology and redemption. As the gnostic 
sects seceded from the church, their exegesis became more 
speculative and thdy incorporated various expiatory rites, 
recipes for salvation and some asceticism from the syncretistic 
religions. The church too had its spokesmen who were brimming 
over with ideas. Apologists such as Aristides, Justin, Tatian 
and others vigorously defended the faith. Intellectually this 
era was far from dull as these four streams of thought- - 
syncretistic religion, philosophy, gnosticism and Christianity- - 
sought to win the day for their cause. 
The pro1;l em with which the era was ¡preoccupied and with 
which These various groups were all dealing in their own way 
was essentially a religious one. Yet the framework in which a 
solution was being sought was classical culture. The result 
was often a strange merging of new beliefs and religious 
mysticism with classical values and philosop hy. 3 As we will 
observe, Origenfs thought was no exception to this general 
pattern. 
The city, of Alexandria was in many ways the center of 
this ideological ferment. Nearly all of the main currents 
of thought met and mingled in this cosmopolitan and learned 
city where schools, libraries and museums were common features 
of the landscape. There were numerous professorships of 
Eugène De Faye, Origen asid His Work, tr. by Fred 
Rothwell, London, 1926, po. 13 -17. 
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philosophy, rhetoric and literature; the Ptolemies organized 
regular scientific expeditions; and courses were offered in 
mathematics, astronomy and geography. In such an intellectual 
atmosphere there was a large degree of toleration. Adherents 
of different cults and creeds lived side by side in mutual 
good will and inevitably absorbed some of each other's points 
of view. As a consequence, a mutual dependence of Christian 
and pagan speculation was one of the most pronounced features 
of the age.4 In this environment Origen was able to gain an 
encyclopedic knowledge, but he, like others of his time, 
assimilated more than one strand of thought into his pre- 
understanding. 
It was in or near Alexandria that Origen was born about 
185 A.D. 
5 
His parents, if not Christian at the time of Origen's 
birth, were soon afterwards converted and Origen grew ue in a 
Christian family. - His father, Leonides, was a man of means 
and culture and personally supervised Origen's early ed- 
ucation which included nearly every branch of Greek learning 
as well as moral and spiritual subjects and the study of 
the Bible. Later Origen became a pupil of Clement at the 
catechetical school of the church of Alexandria. 
When he was seventeen his fathe- was arrested and ul- 
timately martyred in the persecution of Severus (A.D. 202). 
4 William Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic 
Theology, Edinburgh, 1901, p. 2. 
5 Probably the best introduction to Origen's life and 
thought is jean Daniélou's Origen, tr. by W. Mitchell, New 
York, 1955. 
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Origen felt the impact of this very keenly6 and wished to 
follow his father in martyrdom. Fortunately he was prevented 
from doing so by his mother. 
One of the results of the persecution in which Origen's 
father was martyred was the flight of Clement from Alexandria 
and the consequent break up of the catechetical school which 
was under his direction. In a surprised move the bishop, 
Demetrius, put Origen, who was still a youth of eighteen, in 
charge. The decision proved a wise one and Origen's course 
of life as an educator was set. He soon attracted many 
students not only by his teaching7 but also by the quality 
of his life.8 
Origen's life as an educator may be conveniently divided 
into two separate parts. The first part, from 203 -231, 
centered in Alexandria where he was an increasing success 
as a teacher and won pupils from varying persuasions and 
backgrounds. In the early years Origen himself taught the 
preparatory courses of dialectics, physics, mathematics, 
geometry, and astronomy as well as the more advanced courses 
in Greek philosophy and speculative theology. Later the 
teaching of the preparatory courses became too heavy a burden 
and he assigned them to his pupil Heracles. Origen also 
6 Eusebius writes that "when...the flame of persecution 
was kindled to a fierce blaze, and countless numbers were 
being wreathed with the crowns of martyrdom, Origen's soul 
was possessed with such a passion for martyrdom...tht he was 
all eagerness to come to close quarters with danger, and to 
leap forward and rush into the conflict. "Ecclesiastical 
History, tr. by H.J. Lawlor & J.E.L. Oulton, London, 1927, 
Vol. I, vi 2.2. 
7 Ibid., vi 3.12. 
8 Ibid., vi 3.7. 
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found time, in addition to his teaching, to attend the 
lectures of Ammonius Saccas, the famous founder of Neo- 
platonism, and was influenced in his cosmology and psychology 
as well as in his theological method.9 
The second part of Origen's teaching career began in 
232. After a controversy which resulted in his excommunication 
by the bishop of Alexandria., Origen was invited to found a 
ne', school of theology in Caesarea. This school, over which 
Origen presided for twenty years, was nearly as successful 
as the one in Alexandria.. The courses of instruction were 
similar. After a brief philosophical orientation the students 
proceeded to study logic, natural science, geometry and 
astronomy, and then for the more advanced, there were courses 
in ethics and theology. At the outbreak of the Decian perse- 
cution (249 -251) Origen was arrested and severely tortured. 
As a result of these tortures, his health was broken arid' he 
died in Tyre in 253 A.D. 
Throughout his life Origen was a disciplined. scholar. 
In both the qualit and quantity of his output he has. few 
peers in the history of the church. Many of his writings 
have been lost or destroyed due to later controversies which 
raged'over his teaching, but more than enough has been 
preserved to appreciate the scope and depth of Origen's 
contribution. Martin Marty writes that "Origen...inspires 
a gasp of awe for his breadth and depth of thought; he was 
9 Johannes Quasten, patrology, Vol. II, The Anti - 
Ni.c' ne Literature after Irenaeus, Utrecht, 1953, p. 38. 
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a universal genius, a theological Leonardo da Vinci --at home 
in philosophy, dogma, apology, polemics, exegesis. Though 
he was later repudiated by some in the East, he is the eastern 
church's greatest teacher and, more than others, formed the 
idea patterns in which Christian creedalism grew. "10 with 
Origen, the church's intellectual life comes of age. 
Now, before turning to Origen's hermeneutical position, 
it is necessary, on the basis of this brief introduction to 
Origen's life setting, to state explicitly the essential 
features of his preunderstanding, and particularly that 
aspect of his preunderstanding which plays a prominent part 
in his interpretation of Scripture. 
At the center of Origen's preunderstanding was his 
deeply rooted Christian faith. Faith in the God of the 
biblical witness was the comprehensive world view with which 
he approached the Bible. But Origen's faith, like that of 
must Christians in nearly every era of history, was given 
its specific content by the environment of which he was a 
part. It is this specific content as it informs his inter- 
pretive method with which we are primarily concerned. It 
contains ideological, attitudinal and methodological com- 
ponents. 
part of the ideological element in Origen's preunder- 
standing in regard to the Bible was supplied by the tradition 
10 A Short History of Christianity, New York, 1965, p. '-'7. 
(320) 
of the church. Implicit for the man of faith in Origen's 
time was the acceptance of certain beliefs about the nature of 
the Bible. These beliefs--that Scripture is inspired, that 
it is a unity, that it was given for a definite purpose and 
that it should be interpreted allegorically -- which Origen 
accepted as essential in the unified web of belief for the 
Christian, were not to be questioned because they were handed 
down from the apostles themselves.11 Origen, as a loyal 
churchman, assumes them as part of his hernleneutical s' stem. 
Thus much of what Origen says about the Bible may be understood 
as an attempt to produce a more coherent and self- consistent 
version of the teaching put forward by Christian writers of 
an earlier generation.12 Origen is particularly indebted 
to the Greek apologist, Ireneaus, and his catechetical teacher, 
Clement. From these two men Origen borrows these fundamental 
ideological assumptions about the Bible. And it is this 
set of assumptions, which we will discuss in a moment, that 
constitutes the major influence on his interpretation of 
the Bible and functions consistently and consciously through- 
out it. 
Yet these assumptions do not function in a vacuum in 
Origen's thought. They are rather dependent upon a wider 
philosophical idiom, that of later Platonism, which is 
also an intenral part of the ideological composition of 
J1 Origen, On First principles, tr. by G.W. Lutterworth, 
London, 1936, PreT ce, 2 
12 Richard A. Morris, God and World in Early Christian 
Theology, New York, 1965, p. 13. 
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Origen's preunderstanding.13 Origen was an excellent student 
of Greek philosophy and he is indebted to it for his under= 
standing oi the nature of the religious question.14 The 
fundamental problem was the soul's attainment of a certain 
level of knowledge which transforms it into the likeness of 
God. Origen accepts this emphasis but recasts the logic of 
Platonism (which saw the soul's ultimate return to its divine 
source as dependent upon its own discovery of God) by pos- 
tulating that the soul's spiritual progress depends upon God's 
revelation of Himself,15 a revelation which is, contained in 
Scripture. This position determines Origen's estimate of 
Greek thought for which he had great respect as a tool to L e 
used for the explication of the Christian revelation, but 
towards which he was not uncritical since it had failed to 
make the knowledge of God available to ordinary people. 
Greek philosophical thought, he believed, was guilty of 
tolerating heathenism, had no pot'er to convert souls and had 
little meaning for any except the intellectually elite. Yet 
this basic platonic assumption, while functioning somewhat 
less consistently and consciously in his interpretation of 
the Bible than the assumptions which he accepted from his 
ecclesiastical forebears, nevertheless consti tutes a major 
13 Adolph Har.nack, History or Dogma, Vol. IA, p. 338. 
14 See Charles Bigg, The Christian platonists of 
Alexandria, London, 191.3, pp. 321 -352. 
15 Norris, op. cit., np. 132 ff. 
r 
inï:uen.ce on it. 
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In fact no other Christian before him, not 
even Justin Martyr, had been in so close a brush with the 
philosophical schools as Origen was with the Platonists of 
Alexandria. 
The attitudes which Origen brings to his interpretation 
of Scripture are essentially what one would expect of a 
Christian theologian of his stature. As one who stands 
within faith, he is open and receptive to the Bible's message 
concerning God's self -disclosure in Christ. As a scholar, 
he is creful, thorough and honestly critical of that which 
does not seem convincing. As a loyal churchman, he is 
respectful of the trad..tions of biblical interpretation 
which were commonly accepted by the church of his time. 
All of these attitudes are operative in Origen's interpretation 
of Scripture_. 
The main methodological ingredient in Origen's ereunder- 
standing as it relates to his interpretation of the Bible is 
provided, as we have suggested, by the tradition of biblical 
interpretation which preceeded him in its origin, but which 
was still current in its most salient feathres in his time. 
16 
In the earliest decades of the church the only written authority 
which could be called Scripture was the Old Testament. But 
the Christians had inherited from Judaism the concept that 
God's will is expressed in a written word, and soon the documents 
describing the sayings and deeds of Jesus (the Gospels) began 
to carry the weight of authoritatjve Scripture. This inevitably 
16 Robert M. Grant, A Short History of the Interpré- 
tation of the Bible, London, 1965, pp. 42 TT. 
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raised the question of the relationship between the Old 
Testament and these new documents. By the second century 
the church was full of a variety of ideas in regard to this 
relationship. Barnabas believed that the Old Testament had 
meaning as it was understood in terms of the Gospels, and his 
exegetical method was characterized by typology designed to 
extrap-late from the Old Testament the essential truth of the 
gospel. For him, history had little meaning: God's covenant 
had always been made with the Christians and thus there could 
be no analysis of the relation between old and new covenents. 
Marcion took the extreme view of rejecting the Old Testament 
completely. His view was justifiable only if viewed from 
within his own distinctive theology which posited the existence 
of two Gods, the j.:st God of the Jews and the benevolent God 
of the New Testament (or parts of it) who is the Father of 
Jesus Christ. Arguing against Marcion was Justin Martyr who 
held that all of God's witness can be included in the Christ an 
faith and that the only real difference between God's reve- 
lation in the Old Testament, Greek philosophy and that in 
Christ is one of degree. His exegesis of the Old Testament is 
at once christocentric and historical, allowing the historical 
fi 
reality of God's relationship to. Israel, yet insisting that 
this earlier covenant looks forward to being superseded in 
Christ. Irenaeus defined even more precisely the relation of 
the testaments and asserted, also against Marcion, that the 
same God reveals Himself in both Old and New. The revelation 
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of God in the law of the Old Testament was real and valid for 
its day but now God reveals Himself in a new way in Jesus 
Christ. Both Justin and Irenaeus were able to take biblical 
forth seriously and to set tire permanent value of 
the Old Testament. Yet more definitive formulation was needed, 
and it was to be found in the allegorical tradition of 
Alexandria. 
In biblical studies the father of allegorical method was 
philo, an Alexandrian Jew of the first century who desired to 
reconcile the Bile (the Septuagint version of the Old 
Testament) with Greek thought. Philo was convinced that the 
best way to accomplish this goal was to interpret the Bible 
aller_orically. Allegory, sometimes called a prolonged 
metaphor, is a rhetorical device which represents a sense 
higher than the literal. It differs from a metaphor in 
being a veiled presentation, in a figurative story, of a 
meaning implied but not expressly stated. Philo had two 
classes of allegorization, the physical and the ethical. 
The former referred to God and the nature of the world, the 
latter to the duties of man. Behind the historical or literal 
sense was a hidden meaning fitting into one of these two 
classifications. Every.word and letter of Scripture had its 
meaning. The gnostic sects, which flourished in Alexandria, 
also were great allegorizers and found esoteric meanings 
behind the obvious sense of the biblical literature. Clement, 
Origents teacher, was the first among the Christians to 
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justify and explain the meaning of the allegorical method. 
Believing that all Scripture speaks in the mysterious language 
of symbols he was able to find biblical support for his already 
formed thought. Yet his method was checked by his insistence 
that faith in Christ, his person and his work, was the key 
to understanding Scripture. The Logos which spoke in the 
Old Testament can bé understood in light of the knowledge 
which Christ has given. The methodological assumptions of 
allegorical interpretation Origen takes over and advances in 
his own distinctive way. 
III. Origen's Hermeneutical System 
We must now consider how these strands of Origen's 
preundersta.nding come to expression in his hermeneutical 
system. We will do so by examining the four fundamental 
presuppositions of the system. They are: (1) that the Bible 
is inspired; (2) that it is a unity; (3) that it was given 
for a definite purpose; and (4) that it is best interi-?reted 
allegorically. 
First, loyal to the ecclesiastical tradition of which 
he was a part, Origen asserts the Bible to be the inspired 
Word of God and not merely the composition of men. Though 
Origen has questions about the canonicity of certain New 
Testament books and attributes to some books (e.g. the Gospel 
of John) more value than others, generally he extends the 
concept of inspiration to cover all the biblical books and 
to every word of each book so that errors are impossible. 
He writes: 
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We believe that there is no possible way... 
of bringing to man's knowledge the higher 
and diviner teaching about the Son of 
God, except by means of those scriptures 
which were inspired by the Holy Spirit, 
namely, the Gospels, and the writings 
of the apostles, to which we add, according 
to the declaration of Christ himself, 
the law and the prophets.17 
Apna.r.ent errors he explains by assuming that two separate 
events are recorded or by resorting to the allegorical 
method. In the case of solecisms and grammatical defects he 
distinguishes between the external word about which the 
biblical authors were conscious of their liability to err and 
its contents which are uniformly and absolutely without 
error. The medium of inspiration is the Holy Spirit who 
communicates the revelatory message to the author and super- 
intends his writing without nullifying his own choice of words. 
The evidence for the inspiration of Scripture consists of its 
acceptance on the part of large groups of peole and its 
consequent power in their lives, fulfilled prophecy, the 
apostolic activities which bear the authenticating stamp of 
God's presence and the inner conviction of the reader as he 
exposes himself to the truth of Scripture. 
A second presupposition of Origen's view of the Bible, 
following logically from the first, is its unity. Over 
against Marcion and the gnostics, who depreciated the value of 
the Old Testament and the Jews who argued that the Christians 
had no title to the Old Testament, Origen asserts with 
17 On First Principles, 1.3.1. 
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Irenaeus the harmony of both Testaments, of law, prophecy, 
gospel and epistle. In the Old Testament the truth is hidden, 
but in the New it comes to light. The Old Testament is 
illuminated by the New, just as the New only discloses its 
profunditY once it is illuminated by the Old. The bond 
between the two is determined and maintained by the allegorical 
method. 
Origen, then, accepting the basic assumptions of his 
theological forebears, understands the Bible as given and 
inspired by God and as a unified whole. From these two 
principles it follows that the Scripture contains nothing that 
is unworthy of God, and that its whole message mu;-.t therefore 
be accepted. This leads to a consideration of a third 
presupposition of Origen's hermeneutic, namely that the 
purpose of Scripture is the communication of divine truth. 
According to Origen the primary objective of God in giving 
men the Scriptures is positive and didactic, i.e. to transmit 
ineffable mysteries about man, God, the nature of the world, 
sin and redemption. The Bible is essentially a mine of 
speculative truth rather than a record of God's redemptive 
activity in history. In a kind of refocusing of the Platonic 
ideal of the lover of wisdom, Origen believes that the soul 
makes progress through rational activity to fellowship with 
God. The product of such study is theology which is an interior 
grasp of the divine mysteries and communion with God Himself.18 
18 L.U. Patterson, God and History in Early Christian 
Thought, London, 1967, p. 48. See also On First Principles, 
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The obvious implication is that Scripture must be studied as 
well as read and that the meaning, though plain enough at one 
level, is in other respects obscure and hidden. Origen stresses 
the "mysteries" which the ,inspired books contain but which are 
not always explicit. Therefore it is necessary to make 
comparisons of different passages and to use techniques of 
logical analysis in order to draw out the hidden and spiritual 
truths. And if the interpreter fails to grasp the full import 
of a ?passage he should put the blame on himself. Origen 
explains that "if sometimes, as you read the Scripture, you 
stumble over a thought, good in reality yet a stone of 
stumbling and a rock of offence, la, the blame on yourself." 
For, he goes on, "there is not one jot or tittle written in 
Scripture which, for those who know how to use the power of 
the Scriptures, does not effect its proper work." 
19 
There is a secondary objective on God's part in giving 
us the Scripture in the form IIe has which is negative in 
nature. ;t serves the purpose of concealing the higher truths, 
under the cover of some narrative of visible things or human 
deeds or written legislation, from those who are not fit to 
receive them. The form in which Scripture comes to us 
protects against the mocking of the heathen from whom the 
mystery of the King should be veiled. That which is sacred 
should not be given to the dogs. Moreover the literal sense of 
19 Origen, Selections from the Commentaries and Homilies, 
ed. & tr. by R.B. Tollinton, London, 1929, pp. 49 -50. 
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Scripture is sufficient for the salvation and edification 
of the multitudes who would only be confused with the com- 
plexity of the deeper mysteries. For them pistil is enough 
and gnosis is unnecessary. The highest truth of the inspired 
text can only be apnropsia.ted by one who goes beyond the letter 
of Scripture to the symbolic meaning. Origen writes that 
since "the Scriptures were composed through the Spirit of God... 
they have not only that meaning which is obvious, but also 
another which is hidden from the majority of readers. For 
the contents of Scripture are the outward forms of certain 
mysteries and the images of divine thins. "20 An acquisition 
of the deeper knowledge of Scripture goes beyond the salvation 
which is available to all men to perfection which is available 
to only the few.21 
Thus, according to Origen, the Bible is meaningful in 
two ways in its plain sense and as a symbol of higher truths. 
It is in this way that Origen's Platonism extends to 
conception of the character of the Scriptures themselves. 
The Biblé has an inner meaning which is only partially 
reflected in its outward and literal sense. As Plato had 
seen in the harmonious motions of the visible world evidence 
of an intelligible order which was their counterpart, so 
Origen sees in the explicit teaching of Bible hidden re- 
flections of higher truths. 
22, 
20 On First principles, preface, 8. 
21 Arthur C. McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, 
Vol. I, Early and Eastern, NewYork, 1932, p. 212. 
22 Norris, op. cit., i- . 139. 
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But even though Origen firmly believes ih the inspiration 
and unity of Scripture and conceives of the whole of its 
message as having relevance for the present, he is not blind 
to the difficulties inherent in such a view, especially those 
which the text itself supplies. Because by definition there 
can be nothing in Scripture which is unworthy of God, Origen 
the apologist is forced to find a higher meaning for certain 
Passages which he views as unacceptable. He is aware, for 
example, of the anthropomorphic references to God, and prophecy 
which has not yet been fulfilled. He finds much in both 
Testaments which is immoral and unbecoming, and refers to 
certain Old Testament laws as being worse than those of the 
heathen. Some commands, e.g. those enunciated by Christ in 
the Gospels, are impossible to obey. There are accounts of 
events in Scripture which, if taken literally, are absurd 
such as references to night and day before the sun was created 
or jess seeing all the Kingdoms of earth from a high mountain. 
Even the Gosr.els contain passages which contradict each 
other.23 Why then, if the Bible is the inspired Word of God, 
are there these apparent discrepancies? They are put there, 
reasons Origen, to act as signposts to the fact that everything 
in the Bible has a spiritual meaning. They are providentially 
placed to warn us that we are not on the right track if we 
pursue the literal_ sense, and to remind us that we must 
23 For a list of the difficulties which Origen discovers 
in the see Frederic W. Farrar, History of Interpretation, 
London, 1886, p. 191. 
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leap over the literal to the spiritual it we would truly 
understand the Scriptures.24 
The solution for Origen to problems raised by the 
apparent conflict between ,his vies 
-. of Scripture and the 
difficulties which, he discovers in the text brings us to the 
fourth presupposition of Origen's view, viz. that the Bible 
should be interpreted by the allegorical method. By this 
hermeneutical approach he is able to reconciAe the concepts 
of the inspiration and the unity of Scripture, and its purpose, 
with textual discrepancies and embarrassing passages. Stated 
baldly, for Origen the Bible says one thing and means another. 
Every injunction and every narrative is really a mystery 
shrouding a secret sense which alone is of real value. This 
does not mean that in Ori gen's view none of the Bible is 
history, that no laws are understood literally or that no 
records of the life of Christ are to be taken as history.25 
There are only a few passages which have no literal meaning at 
all. By this qualification Origen shows himself aware of some 
of the dangers in an allegorical method which would dissolve 
redemptive history into timeless myth. He had before him the 
example of gnostic exegesis, presupposing a radical discon- 
tinuity between the plane of history and the divine realm so 
that there could be no contact. Origen stops short of this 
24 For a discussion of this point, see Henry Chadwick, 
Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, London, 
1966, p. 112. 
25 
On First principles, IV. 3.4. 
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position and complains that the "heretics" go beyond Scripture. 
But Origen does believe that all Scripture has'more than 
a literal meaning. It has in addition a moral and a spiritual 
meaning which can be discerned by the allegorical method.` 
6 
Origen is not content like Clement to accept the allegorical 
method merely because it is the traditional way of inter- 
preting the Bible. In typical thoroughness he builds a 
rational argument for its use. He starts with the notion 
that earthly things in general and sacred history and law in 
particular are the shadows of things heavei_y and invisible. 
If God made man in his own image, He may have made other 
earthly things after the image of the heavenly things. Thus 
by means of the world that is seen the soul is led upwards 
to the unseen and the eternal. This general principle is 
applied to Scripture in terms of the Platonic doctrine of the 
constitution of man. As man consists of body, soul and spirit, 
so the Scripture correspondingly has a literal (historical), 
moral and snirifral meaning.27 Though he is not always clear 
on the difference between the moral and spiritual and often 
fuses them into one, in general he ascribes to t?-e moral the 
passage's interior, practical and individual mewing and to 
the spiritual its collective, universal and 11mysterious" 
meaning. In the parable of the mustard seed, for. example, 
there is the seed itself (literal), the faith of the individual 
26 Perhaps the best treatment of Origen's allegorical 
methodology is R.C.P. Hanson., Allegory and Event, London, 1959. 
27 On First Principles, IV. ii.4. 
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believer which the seed denotes (moral), and the Kingdom of 
God which the seed represents (spiritual). In this example 
there is no literal meaning which illustrates Origen's dictum 
that "all has a spiritual meaning but not all has a literal 
meaning. "2" Another example of Origen's exegesis which 
aptly illustrates his method of interpretation is his handling 
of the Song of Songs. It can be taken in its literal sense 
as a love poem. However, according to Origen, there are 
deeper meanings. At the moral level, the Canticles can be 
read as the soul's desire to be joined in fellowship with 
the Word of. God. At the sriritual level, the love Song 
depicts the church's longing for union with Christ.29 
Agai ~:st his critics, Origen defends his use of the 
allegorical method in two ways: by an argument and an appeal 
to authority. His argument begins with the premise ghat the 
Bible is inspired and intended to instruct each generation 
in timeless truths. Therefore it cannot be what it arì .ars 
to be, viz. ancient history or geography or ceremonial 
legislation for a bygone age. It follows that the only inter- 
pretive method which gives all parts of the Bible a con - 
temporary existential relevance is allegory. The appeal to 
authority is essentially an appeal to Paul in whose writing 
Origen finds instances of the allegorical method. Origen 
refers specifically to Paul's use of the crossing of the 
28 Ibid., TV. 3.5. 
29 Tollinton, ed., op. cit., >>p. 79 ff. 
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Israelites through the Red Sea as an analogy of baptism, and 
his giving an allegorical twist to the story of Sarah and 
Hagar. From these instances Origen draws the sweeping 
conclusion that a mystical meaning must have been _nteuded 
throughout the whole of Scripture. 
Leaving the four fundamental presuppositions of Origen's 
approach to the Bible, we find that there are three additional 
matters which have been hinted at but need further elucidation 
in our analysis of Origen's method of biblical interpretation. 
First, in order to guide the interpreter who employs the 
allegorical method, Origen lists some objective rules. Not 
all the rules he frames are impressive to our modern ears, 
but the fact that he makes an attempt is significant. Those 
which are least impressive are his instructions concerning how 
t^ find clues to the hidden meaning of Scripture by studying 
the symbolism of numbers, Hebrew proper names of persons and 
places and grammatical oddities in the text. More acceptable 
are his rules on how to avoid private, unrestricted fantasy 
in one's interpretation. One does so (1) by taking Scripture 
not piecemeal, but as a whole; (2) by interpreting the obscure 
passages on the basis of the plain, comparing text with text; 
(3) by checking with teaching of other expositors; (4) by 
insisting on a christocentric interpretation; and (5) by 
hard work and prayer.30 Secondly, even the utilization of 
these rules does not insure a correct interpretation. The 
''O Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical 
Tradition, p. 157. 
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interpreter also needs the grace of God. Origen explains that 
there is the doctrine that the Scriptures 
were composed through the Spirit of God 
and that they have not only that meaning 
which is obvious, but also another which 
is hidden from the majority of readers. 
For the contents of Scripture are the out- 
ward forms of certain mysteries and the 
images of divine things. On this point 
the entire church is unanimous, that 
while the whole law is spiritual, the 
inspired meaning is not recognized by 
all, but only by those who are gifted 
with the grace of the Holy Spirit in the 
word of wisdom and knowledge.31 
The understanding of Scripture then is a grace. 
Thirdly, Origen distinguishes between levels of inspir- 
ation in the biblical literature. It is true that in most 
passages Origen presupposed the similarity and e,jual value 
of all parts of the Scriptures, but in some instances he 
divides Scripture into stages and grades of inspiration 
depending on the worthiness of each author. In Christ the 
full revelation of the Logos was expressed. The apostles, 
however, while inspired, did not possess the same degree of 
inspiration as Christ. Further, Origen differentiates among 
the prophets and apostles, attributing various levels of 
inspiration to each one.32 
IV. An Evaluation 
The influence of Origen on his own time and subsequent 
generations was profound. While his views on biblical 
31 On First principles, Preface, 8. See Henri Crowzel, 
Origene etla Connaissance Mystique, Toulouse, 1961, r.p. 
400- 409,Tor an examination of this issue. 
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interpretation were seldom accepted without the creation of 
they were nevertheless accepted, and were controversy,33 
gradually absorbed into the main dream of the church's thought. 
In Origen's own time there is little question but that 
his hermeneutical system did have a positive role to play. 
In the first place, the allegorical method served the practical 
function of making it possible for an ancient text to be 
contemporary and relevant in the life of the church. No doubt 
this led to some errors in exegesis, b more importantly it 
gave the homiletician a tool that opened up biblical material 
which would have otherwise been closed to him. It freed him 
from the confines of a rigid authoritarianism, and he was able 
to draw a life- changing message from the pages of Scripture. 
Kept in bounds, such is the preacher's task in any age. In 
fact this may be the one justification for using the allegorical 
method in biblical interretation. If the interpreter finds 
in a passage another level of meaning than the historical, he 
may, if he does not ignore or distort the historical sense, 
affirm that meaning.34 Secondly, Origen's hermeneutics served 
the apologetic function of elevating the value of the Bible 
in an age when it was under attack. By use of allegory he 
was able to uphold the rationality of the bible and its message 
against gnostic and pagan critics. Finally, it should not be 
33 Both Augustine and Jerome were critical of Origen's 
views, and his teachings were officially condemned by the 
church in the sixth century. 
34 See St. Paul's use of allegory in Gal. 4:24, and a 
discussion of allegory in its relationship to theological 
interpretation in James Barr, Old and New in Interpretation, 
pp. 103 -148. 
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forgotten that Origen was the father of grammatical as well 
as allegorical exegesis. Critics are fond of pointing to 
his fanciful allegory, but far less frequently give Origen 
credit as being the first,great biblical scholar of the church. 
But a. lack of appreciation for Origen's gifts and scholar- 
ship on the part of many critics does not make their criticisms 
of his pork any the less cogent. To the modern historically 
and critically minded scholar, Origen's allegorical method is 
simply inadequate. While Harnack's reference to Origen's 
exegesis as "biblical alchemy" may be a little unfair, it is 
nevertheless true that Origen's imagination did work overtime 
on etymological, cosmological and arithmetical speculation of 
obscure passages.35 This unbridled subjectivism, to which the 
allegorical method lends itself, allowed Origen to find 
whatever suited his purpose or need within the pages of 
Scripture. Even a close adherence to the guiding rules which 
Origen suggests did not prevent him from forcing Scripture to 
yield up whatever wr'uld support his own viewpoint. There is 
little in his system to check the negative influence of 
preunderstanding. And of course there are few who would 
want to vindicate Origen's disregard of the biblical author's 
obvious purpose in his.writi.ng. To squeeze a spiritual 
meaning which the author did not intend out of every passage 
and to find symbols where there are none is indefensible. 
35 See Tollinton, op. cit., pp. xxvii ff. for a list 
of examples. 
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Certainly no appeal to Paul's rare use of allegory can justify 
such activity. 
To sum up, Origen's allegorical interpretation of 
Scripture is basically a failure to be truly historical. This 
is the case in two vital ways: (1) Under the influence of 
later Platonism, Origen did not see the Bible as a product of 
historical development but as an intellectual source book 
for speculative ideas. Even where he was inclined to be 
critical of its contents, his use of allegory made it possible 
for him to evade the historical problem. (2) As a result, 
he did not fully grasp the historical nature of its message. 
He failed to see that the self- revelation of God has occurred 
in history rather than in the realm of rationally conceived 
timeless truths. Origen's allegorical method of biblical 
interpretation is inadequate, then, because he did not allow 
"history" to check, define and give content to his faith. 
Chapter Thirteen 
Biblical Interpretation During the Reformation 
Martin Luther 
I. Luther in Context 
The method of allegorical interpretation, most clearly 
articulated in the church by OriL,en, continued to influence 
biblical exegesis up to the close of the Middle Ages. Al- 
though this interpretive method was challenged at one time or 
another, it was not until the Reformation that a major shift 
in biblical hermeneutics took place. The chief figure in 
bringing about the change was of course Martin Luther. It 
is the profound influence of Luther's life and writings 
that justifies his inclusion in this study, not the fact that 
he has been neglected by historical scholarship. In fact, so 
much has been written about Luther that one hesitates to add 
to the collection. 1 But no account of the role of preunder- 
standing in biblical interpretation would be complete without 
mentioning him. His life and views not only illustrate and 
underline our central themes, but they provide the framework 
out of which so many subsequent interpreters of the Bible work. 
l One biographer of Luther, Ewald M. Plass, in his 
This is Luther, St. Louis, 1948, p. 4, claims that more has 
been written concerning Luther than any other historical 
figure except Jesus of Nazareth. In addition to the various 
editions of Luther's works which have appeared, there are also 
excellent bibliographies available, many in the back of the 
better biographies. See also the annual bibliography in 
Luther- Jahrbuch; H.S. Grimm, "Luther Research Since 1920", 
The Journal of Modern History, XXXII (1960), 105 -118; Josef 
corner, Bibliógrap ishish ches Handbuch des deutschen Schrifttums, 
Bern, 1949; and K. Aland, Hilfsbuch zum Lutherstudium, 1958. 
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Before moving directly to Luther, it is necessary to 
cast a backward glance and pick up the main presuppositions 
which guided biblical interpretation between Origen and the 
Reformation.2 This will enable us to appreciate the historical 
roots of Luther's thought and the significance of the change 
which he brought about. It was not long after the allegorical 
method of the Alexandrian school had been developed by Origen 
that it encountered opposition within the church. Jerome, 
who had at first been an advocate of the method, later re- 
jected it and began increasingly to respect the literal 
meaning of Scripture, a shift of position influenced by his 
contact with Jewish teachers. In fact, wherever the influence 
of the syngogue was felt by the church, scriptural inter- 
pretation moved in the direction of literalism. 
Such was the case at Antioch where the Jewish community 
had been prominent for a number of centuries. The Christians 
at Antioch, respecting the views of the Jewish leaders, 
critic'_zed Origen's allegorization and rejected his appeal 
to Paul in Galations, chapter four. The Antiochenes maizta_.ncd 
that Paul believed in the reality of the events which he 
described whereas the Alexandrians deprive biblical history 
of its reality. Theodore of Mopsuestia, in his Concerning 
Allegory and History Against Origen, argued that since in the 
allegorists' view there are no real events, then Adam was not 
2 I am following the account given by Robert M. Grant, 
0e cit., pp. 69 -101. 
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really disobedient. How then, he asks, did death enter the 
world and what meaning does our salvation' have? For the 
school of Antioch, the historical reality of the biblical 
revelation was essential., Though they did not deny the 
possibility of a higher or dee er meaning than the literal, 
they insisted that such meaning must he based upon history. 
The Antiochene tradition, with its insistence on the his- 
torical nature of revelation, was c' veloped further in the 
writing and preaching of both Chrvsostom and Jerome, and 
would continue to be one of the main; forces in the church's 
understanding of the Bible, balancing the allegorical tradition. 
Still another strand in the church's approach to biblical 
interpretation grew out of the uneasiness which was still felt 
by many Christian exegetes in their conflicts with 1v'arcion and 
the gnostics. These minority groups and the later ones which 
followed.them could also appeal to the authority of Scripture 
and did so convincingly. Interpreters within the main stream 
of the church's tradition often accused those outside of dis- 
torting the obvious meaning of the text. But as allegorization 
came to be accepted by the orthodox theologians, this charge 
lost much of its force. Church officials soon began to sense 
the need fer an external authority which would permanently fix 
the meaning of Scripture. They found this authority in the 
Catholic Church itself. In the church, it was argued, Scripture 
had been preserved by those who stood in the apostolic succession. 
T.rtul7.ia_ of Carthage early in the third century was one of 
the first to state the argument, piecing it together from the 
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writing of ireneaus to whom he owed much of -his understanding L 
of the Christian faith. In De praescriptione, written in 
about 200 A.D., Tertullian makes his case from a legal point 
of view, asserting that the Scriptures are the property of 
the church. His argument runs as follows: (1) Jesus Christ 
came to preach the truth of revelation; (2) He entrusted this 
truth to the apostles; (3) The apostles transmitted it to the 
apostolic churches which they founded; (4) Therefore, only 
those churches which stand in the succession of the apostles 
possess the teaching. This authoritative tradition was 
refined by Augustine in his De doctrina christiana written 
in 397 A.D. Augustine was no mere traditionalist, and insisted 
that a good exegete must be philologically trained, but field 
that the interpreter, in difficult and troublesome passages, 
should be guided by the tradition of the church. 
There is little that is novel in biblical interpretation 
during the Middle Ages. Essentially it is a period of 
transition from the old patristic exegetical theology to the 
divorce between the Bible and theology which is found in the 
writing of Thomas Aquinas, a divorce which Luther did not 
accept. The materials of biblical study remain largely the 
same. There is a dependence upon a chain of interpretations 
pieced together from the commentaries of the fathers and a 
reliance on marginal or interlinear notes called a "gloss" 
which had been adc'ed to the text across the 5 -ears of inter- 
pretation. The primary method of interpretation is the 
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allegorical with its postulate of a four -fold meaning to 
every text of Scripture.3 
Toward the end of the medieval period Aquinas reasserted 
the importance of the literal sense of Scripture. He did not 
reject Origen's contention that Scripture contains a deeper 
"spiritual meaning ", but emphasized in agreement with the 
Antiochene exegetes that such a meaning must be built on the 
literal. He further contended that exegesis is an objective 
study, not one which is guided by some inner grace. Here 
Aquinas interjects the modern note that reason is an autonomous 
agent and can make judgments on the meaning of Scripture. 
This note, present in the biblical humanists (e.g. Erasmus) 
and later rationalists (e.g. Spinoza), is also rejected by 
Luther. 
Where Luther and all the reformers from John Wyclif on 
did agree with Aquinas was on the necessity of the literal and 
grammatical interpretation of Scripture. However, here again 
there is a difference. The reformers insisted on the right 
of the text, as literally interpreted, to stand alone. There 
are not several authorities in the church, but one which 
stands over against, if necessary, the fathers and the councils 
3 Occasionally the number of meanings in a given text 
varied anywhere between two and seven, four being by far the 
most common; (a) historical or literal which related the things 
said and done in the biblical record; (b) allegorical which 
deduced doctrine from the narratives; (c) anagogical which 
derived heavenly meanings from spiritual facts; and (d) 
tropological or moral which extracted lessons for life and 
conduct. 
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of the church. The church is not to be the arbiter of the 
meaning of Scripture, for Scripture, the Word of God, is the 
judge of the church. But the crucial question for Luther and 
the other reformers, as they placed the Bible in a position 
of authority in opposition to the church, v:°aç interpretation. 
How is the i3ible to be interpreted correctly? In accordance 
with the purpose of our study, we will analyze the answer 
which Luther gives to this question in reference to his 
preunderstanding. 
In a quite dramatic way Luther's preunderstanding in 
regard to the Bible was shaped by his life situation. The 
general course of Luther's life is well known and we need 
not go into it in detail. However, because certain events 
of his life had such an immediate influence on his under- 
standing of the Bible, it might be helpful to remind our - 
seves of some of these events. 
Luther was born in 1483 to a lower -middle class- miner's 
family in Eislelen.4 His parents were able to provide him 
with a reasonably adequate elementary education. At fourteen 
he was sent to school at Magsburg and later to Eisenach. 
Ther:- is little in these early years to suggest the tumultuous 
career which he was to have. 
4 There are over 200 biographies of Luther, many of 
them excellent. I have been helped by Roland i3aiiiton, Tiere 
I Stand, New York, 1950, and Robert H. Fife, The Revolt of 
Ttartin Luther, New York, 1957. The debates over thi? and 
that in Luther's life are endless. E.G. Rupp in ch. 1 of 
his The Righteousness of God, London, 1953, traces the his- 
toriography of Luther. 
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In 1501 he enrolled at the University of Erfurt with 
the intention of pursuing a legal career ;which his father 
had strongly enco raged. At Erfurt Luther was exposed by 
the progressive faculty to the nominalist .?hilosphy of the 
via moderna which included a study of the teachings of Scotus, 
Occam and 3iel. This new school of Catholic theology laid 
increasing emphasis on God as personal will, and on in as 
the expression and result of the rebellious will of man. 
There was a definite Lreak with the medieval notion that 
there is in the human soul a fragment of the eternal SuLstance, 
and that it is possible for man to bring his divine endowment 
into union, fusion and oneness with the eternal Godhead by 
means of a technique of exercitia sbiritualia. To this new 
school of thought, God was in no sense "Substance" Lut 
personal will. ';etween this holy will and the rebellious 
will of fallen and sinful man there does not and cannot exist 
a natural relationship or substantial kinship. From man's 
side there is an insuperable gulf which separates him from 
God. What is alone possible is a communion or fellowship 
betwen Person and person, the gracious initiative for it 
being and remaining ever With God, never v ith man --whose 
very response to it by faith is itself God's act and gift.5 
This exposure to the teachings of the via moderna should 
not he underestimated as a factor in the formation of Luther's 
preunderstanding. 
5 J.S. Whale, The Protestant Tradition, Cambrid ̂e, 1960, 
pp. 29 -30. 
(346) 
Equally significant in the formation of Luther's pre - 
understanding was the sudden change which took place in his 
life on July 2, 1505, when the wind and the lightning of a 
thunder storm aided him in facing an inner crisis ' :. i.ch had 
been building up for a number of months. He knelt before a 
statue of St. Anne and promised to enter a monastery. In the 
face of his father's anger, he entered a rather strict order 
of Augustinian Eremites at Erfurt.6 
But Luther found little comfort under the authorit \.' of 
tile Roman system and continued to be filled with fear and 
doubt. Continually haunted by the question of how to be 
righteous before a holy God, he threw himself into the 
discil-line of the monastery. He writes: 
Being a monk, I wished to omit nothing 
of the prayers and often overtaxed myself 
with my courses and written %cork. I 
assembled my hours for an entire week and 
sometimes even two or three. Sometimes 
I would lock myself up for two or three 
entire days at a time, with neither food 
nor drink, until I had completed my 
breviary. My head became so heavy that 
I could not close my eyes for five 
nights. I was in agony and all confused.? 
Luther was helped some-by an evangelical counselor, Vicar 
General Staupitz, who urged him to study the Bible and to 
teach at the new university at Wittenberg. After a brief 
stay at iittenberg, he returned to Erfurt and assumed the 
6 See Heinrich ,oehmer, Der Junge Luther, Stuttgart, 
1951, pp. 41 ff. 
7 Quoted b,, L.G. Sci,wiebert, Luther and His Times, 
St. Louis, 1950, . p. 150. 
(347) 
responsibility of lecturing on Peter Lombard's Sentences. 
Still without peace of mind, Luther made a pilgrimage to 
Rome in 1510, a trip which did little but create a negative 
impression about the papacy. Returning to Germany, Luther 
resumed his study and teaching. Between 1513 and 1517 he 
threw himself into the serious study of Scripture, doing 
expositions of the Psalms, Genesis, Galations and Romans. 
By the time he was working out his commentary on Galati, 
he was making use of many of the tools and methods of the 
biblical humanists, and particularly Erasmus' translation 
of the New Testament.8 
In another dramatic crisis, the Fo- called "tower experience", 
a further important change took place in Luther's outlook. 
Believing that he had come face to face vdth God without 
being annihilated, he suddenly grasped the saving insight 
recorded. by Paul in Romans 1:1.7 that "the righteous shall 
live by faith." Luther for the first time saw clearly that 
righteousness had to be a gift of God, not a demand. of God 
in the law. For Luther this was good news and ultimately his 
apprehension of this biblical theme proved to be the turning 
point in his life. This message he came to believe was the 
true treasure of the church, though presently obscured by the 
misunderstanding of grace. Grace was not infused into the 
soul as a supernatural oualitY, with án admixture of works 
and merits, but a divine miracle which made possible trust 
8 ILid., pp. 275 ff. 
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in and co_nmunion with God. Luther became convinced that such 
a message must be preached. 
At first he saw no need for the repudiation of the past. 
But gradually the practices in the church around him forced 
him to ask why what he had discovered was not at the center 
of the church's message and ministry. Finally he was led to 
question the whole medieval ecclesiastical and sacramental 
system. In October of 1517 the issue came to a focus in 
Wittenberg over the matter of indulgences. An indulgence 
was a remission granted by the church for the temporal punish- 
ment due to Bins already forgiven. It was dependent on the 
merits of Jesus Christ and the saints and implied a. "treasury 
of merits" which had already been piled up of which the head 
of the church on earth was custodian and dispenser. In the 
late Middle Ages this practice had become vulgarized and 
commercialized by professional pardon -peddlers. In Luther's 
time Pope Julius II had established a jubilee indulgence 
to gain funds for St. Peter's in Rome. This offended German 
sensitivities, and the Way the scheme was carried out violated 
the idea of free grace which Luther had discovered. A Dominican 
agent, Johannes Tetzel, was the huckster of indulgences in 
the Wittenberg area and provoked Luther's rage when he offered, 
upon payment for a certificate of indulgence, full remission of 
penalty in purgatory and a share in the merits of the saints 
without confession. 
On October 31st Luther used the door of the castle church 
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as a bulletin board on which to nail his ninety -five theses. 
His objective wa- not to pose questions regarding the validity 
of the pope, purgatory or even the indulgences, but simply to 
call attention to corrupt practices. "Whomever speaks against 
the truth of apostolic indulgence, let him be accursed and 
damned." (Thesis 71) r3ut unintentionally Luther had "introduced 
a world- historical revolution" because of the distinction 
which he made between the Catholic sacrament of penance and 
Christ's words on penitence.9 
Rome at first acted with semi -detachment. Leo X could 
not see that a theological dispute between monks could have 
much significance. But the matter sonn took on larger 
proportions and Luther became involved in a defense of his 
thesis in the Heidelberg Disputation. There he encountered 
Tetzel, and later he met the papal emissary, Cajetan, at 
Augsburg. When he was labelled a. heretic by John Eck the 
debate became even more heated. In 1519 at Leipzig Luther 
moved to the logical conclusions of his indulgence thesis, 
namely that the Facramental system with its emphasis on 
works and merits was wrong; that the Pone could err and in 
fact was the anti -Christ prefigured in certain New Testament 
writings; and that monasticism, mass, penance and merits 
were not the way to a better life, but perversions of the 
free grace of God in Christ. Rome countered with a denunciation 
and called on God to rise up and purge His vine and of the rude 
9 Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther's World of Thought, tr. by 
Martin H. Bertram, St. Louis, 1958, p. 45. 
(350) 
German wild boar. Sensing that a denunciation was not enough 
and that he had miscalculated Luther's power and popularity, 
the Dope later issued the bull Exsurge Domine which Luther and 
his colleagues burned on December 10, 1520, along with a copy 
of the canon law. 
I:uther continued to publish his views in a series of 
tracts and was called upon to defend them at the Imperial 
Diet of Worms. On this occasions he pushed aside his last 
opportunity to recant, justifying his stance by reference to 
his reliance on the apostolic witness and the voice of con- 
science. On leaving Worms, he was taken into protective 
custody at the Wartburg castle and proceeded to consolidate 
his view of Scripture. The remaining years of Luther's life 
were with preaching, teaching, writing and guiding 
the movement which he had begun. He died in 1541. 
On the basis of this biographical sketch, let us attempt 
to piece together in summary form the main features of his 
preunderstanding which undergird the specific presuppositions 
of his hermeneutical system.1° 
In the first place, we would note that Luther's encounter 
with Rome forced him to face the question of conflicting 
ideologies regarding authority. Step by step, each new 
circumstance demanded that he clarify his own position. Did 
final authority on religious questions reside in the eccles- 
iastical institution with its power to dispense grace? Or 
did it reside in the individual conscience which seeks to 
10 Several recent volumes have explored the background 
of Luther's thought. See e.g. H. Bórnkamm, op. cit.; 
Schwiebert, op. cit. ; A alter G. Tillmann, The World and Men 
Around Martiñ Luther, Minneapolis, 1959; and V.H.H. Green, 
Luther and the Reformation, London, 1904. 
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know God's will as it is expressed in Scripture? Ultimately 
Luther had no choice but to question the whole basis of the 
medieval Catholic system and frame a new theological structure 
on the basis of biblical authority. This new structuring 
becomes for Luther the ideological foundation of his pre - 
understanding. It moves toward being comprehensive in its 
scope and ober_ates as a major influence on his interpretation. 
It functi-ns consistently, consciously and rationally through - 
out it. 
Secondly, his own personal religious experiences, 
especially hi internal sense of being accepted and forgiven 
by God in Christ, and his exposure to the teachings of the 
via moderna with its emphasis on God as personal will helped 
to mold his convictions concerning the central message of 
the Bible. This message he believed revolved around the 
matter of God's grace and man's faith over against law and 
works. By faith man apprehends God's gracious activity in 
Christ and is freed from the agonizing strictures of the 
law. In this conviction Luther elevates the attitude of 
faith to the central place in his preunderstanding. Faith 
becomes that attitude which is able to insightfully grasp 
the Word of God contained in Scripture. And it is this 
attitude of faith in Luther, as we will observe shortly, 
which is operative throughout his interpretation of Scripture. 
Finally, we should give due consideration to the influence 
of Luther's education and study, both in kind and amount, on 
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forming his view that the Bible must be understood historically. 
His training in the via moderna at Erfurt, his reading of 
Augustine, his years of biblical study and exposition and 
finally his study and acceptance of the critical and exegetical 
work of the biblical humanists all contributed to the form- 
ulation of the methodology with which he approached the Bible. 
That Scripture cannot be understood apart from a study of the 
grammar of the text and an examination of the historical 
context in which it was written becomes the fundamental 
methodological assumption of Luther's approach to the Bible. 
It is now necessary to see how these strands of Luther's 
preunderstanding- -the ideological, the attitudinal and the 
methodological- -come to expression in the specific presup- 
positions of his hermeneutical system. 
II. Luther's Approach to the Bible!' 
We. will examine Luther's approach to Scripture from three 
angles: (1) the assumptions he makes regarding the nature of 
the Bible; (2) the presuppositions Waich guide his inter- 
pretation of the Bible; and (3) his insistence on the need 
forfaith in interpreting the Bible. 
First, then, what is the Bible in Luther's eyes? What 
kind of a book is it? What does Luther assume about the 
nature of the Di le as he approaches it? Fundamentally for 
11 Books which deal specifically with Luther's inter- 
pretation of the Bible are Gerhard Ebeling, Evangelische 
Evangelienauslegung: Eine Untersuchung Luthers Hermeneuiik, 
Munich, 1942; Michael Reu, Luther and the Scriptures, 
Columbus, 1944; J.Y.S. Reid, The Authority of Scripture, 
New York, 1957; and Sydney Carter, The Reformers and Holy 
Scripture, London, 1928. 
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Luther the Bible is an authoritative book. Rome saw tradition 
and Scri.ture not as an either /or but as a both /and. In 
opposition, Luther asserted the principle of sola scrintura. 
He stressed the contradictions between the purity of the 
witness of the word of God in Scripture and the tra1itions 
of men in the church. According to Luther, ecclesiastical 
tradition had superseded Scripture, and the hierarchy of the 
church, as conservers of apostolic tradition and dispensers 
of the sacraments, had arrogated to themselves divine powers. 
As Luther viewed it, the question turned on the issue of 
authority. In the heat of the debate with Rome Luther 
proclaimed: 
Unless I am overcome with testimonies from 
Scripture or with evident reasons- -for 
I believe neither pope nor the councils, 
since they have often erred and contra- 
dicted one another --I am overcome by the 
Scripture texts which I have adduced, 
and my conscience is bound to God's 
word. I cannot and will not recant 
anything: for to act contrary to one's 
conscience is neither safe nor sincere. 
God help me: Amen.12 
In addition, Luther conceived the Bible to be an inspired 
book. Here we must be careful. Luther's view of inspiration 
was not what his followers later developed into the doctrine 
of verbal inerrancy.13 Luther never worshipped the Bible. 
12 Quoted by Plass, This is Luther, pp. 49 -50. 
13 Though Luther could say: "Not only the words which 
the Holy Spirit and Scripture use are divine, but also the 
phrasing." In BBw -,id M. Plass, ed., What Luther Says: An 
Anthology, St. Louis, 1959, Vol. I, p. 65. 
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He could treat the text freely, argue with Paul and John, and 
question the canonicity of Hebrews, James, Jude and Revelation. 
He doubted that Solomon was the author of Ecclesiastes or 
Proverbs and refers to Kings as "a hundred times better. than 
Chronicles. "14 Yet Luther could say with conviction: "We 
intend to glory in nothing but Holy Scripture, and we are 
certain that the Holy Spirit cannot oppose and contradict 
Himself. "15 Thus for Luther the Bible is not a stereotyped 
collection of supernatural syllables. It has not been dictated 
by the Holy Spirit but His illumination produced in the minds 
of the biblical authors the knowledge of divine truth which 
they expressed in human form. 
What gives the Bible its authoritative quality and 
authenticates the claim of inspiration is its message con - 
cernin Christ. The Bible for Luther is understood as a 
chr_istocentric book. What is new about Luther's position in 
this matter is the way in which the content -of the Bible 
(Christ) is linked with its authority and inspiration. In 
matters of faith and conduct the Bible is the sole norm 
and guide and it possesses this authority because of its 
divine origin. Yet the authority of the Bible is not imposed 
externally or arbitrarily but personally as we encounter 
Jesus Christ in faith on its pages. Paul Lehmann remarks 
on this point that 
14 Table Talk, tr. & ed. by William Hazlitt, London, 
1857, pp. 11 -12. 
15 Plass, ed., What Luther Says, Vol. I, p. 72. 
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the content of the Bible and the authority 
of the Bible are so interrelated as to 
derive the authority of the Bible from its 
content and to confirm the content of the 
Bible by its authority. The content of 
the Bible is its message concerning 
Jesus Christ. Consequently, it has 
divine authority. But this authority is 
not imposed from without. It is the 
authority of the Spirit of God by whose 
activity the record both came into being 
and is freely accepted by all who read 
and heed what it says.l6 
Finally we should note that Luther views the Bible as 
an understandable book. In the chief matters which pertain 
to law and gospel its message is plain. In the argument with 
Erasmus over the question of free will, Erasmus had remarked 
to Luther that much in Scripture is obscure. Luther replied 
in essence that it is our own fault if we do not understand 
Scripture. By continuous and solid study of language and 
grammar we can overcome the major difficulties, and what 
obscurities may remain only concern subordinate matters.17 
For Luther "the Holy Spirit is the plainest wr .ter and speaker 
in heaven. and on earth."18 
The implications of Luther's insistence on the pers- 
picuity of Scripture lead, us to consider, secondly, the 
foundational presuppositions of Luther's interpretation of the 
Bible. In his early exposition of the Psalms (Dictate super 
Psalterium 1513 -1515) Luther was still employin7 the allegorical 
16 Paul Lehmann, "The Reformer's Use of the Bible", 
Theology Today, Vol. III (1946 -47), 330 -334. 
17 Kurt Aland, "Luther as Exegete ", Expository Times, 
Vol. LXIX, No. 2 (Nov. 1957), 46. 
18 Plass, ed. What Luther Says, Vol. I, p. 91. 
(356) 
method of the four -fold sense of Scripture. But even in this 
he laid down the principle that notniug in Scripture is to 
be interpreted allegorical'y, tropologically or anagogically 
which is not elsewhere expressly stated historically. In 
the Seven penitential Psalms (1517) he has forsaken the four- 
fold sense completely19 and in his exposition of the Decalogue 
(1518) he has begun to mock scholastic interpreters IAho, 
according to Luther, treat scriptural inter etation as a 
game. Later he said: "The school divines with their specu- 
lations in holy writ, deal in pure vanities, in mere imaginings 
derived from human reason."20 By the time he wrote Reso- 
lutions in 1518 he was convinced that tradirional exegesis 
was wrong. It was not only wrong but evil because it was 
being used to justify practices and beliefs which Luther felt 
to be unbiblical.21 Allegory is to be rejected except in those 
few isolated cases where the biblical author gives a special 
reason for its use. By 1518 Luther was convinced that ttan 
iternreter must, as much as possible avoid allegory, that he 
may not wander into idle dreams. "22 
In place of the four -fold sense of the allegorical 
method Luther substituted the sensus literplis, grammaticus or 
historicus. There is essentially one meaning for each passage 
19 Luther's Works, ed. by j. Pelikan & D.E. Poellot, 
St. Louis, 1958, Vol. 14, pu. 137 ff. 
20 Table Talk, p. 3. 
21 B.A. Garrish, Grace and Reason, London, 1962, 
pp. 143 -144. 
22 Quoted by F. Farrar, op. cit., p. 328. 
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of Scripture and it is to be ascertained by contextual and 
grammatical study. "Each passage", he asserts, "has one 
clear, definite and true sense of its own. All othersare but 
doubtful and uncertain opinions. "23 It is the literal or 
obvious sense of Scripture which is the guide for faith and 
Christian theology. Natural speech is queen and superior 
to all subtle or clever inventions. And of course the way 
to understand the obvious intent of the language is by having 
a knowledge.of the biblical languages, making use of all the 
grammatical tools available, studying the times, circumstances 
and conditions in which the author wrote and observing the 
context of each passage to be interpreted. Luther was even 
willing to allow that if it could be shown that any of his 
interpretations of passages were grammatically untenable, 
he would not cling to them, however edifying. He refused to 
fall back on the evasion that he was offering a special, 
spiritual sense which the words concealed in addition to the 
literal sense. In accord with his insistence on the his- 
torical interpretation of Scripture was the -principle that 
Scripture is sui iusius interures. Scripture is its own best 
interpreter, "and, indeed, that is the right method. Scripture 
should be placed alongside Scripture in a right and proper 
way."24 The Bible is not obscure so that the tradition is 
required in order to understand it. Rather Scripture possesses 
23 Ibid., p. 327. 
24 glass, ed., : dhat Luther Says, Vol. I, p. 88. 
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claritas, i.e. it has illuminating power.25 The meaning of 
biblical terms is not determined on the basis of their usage 
in Aristotle, the fathers or dictionary definition, but on 
the basis of their usage in Scripture. The more obscure 
passages are made clear by the ones whose meaning is obvious. 
Says Luther: "It is indeed true that some passages of Scripture 
are dark; however, they contain nothing but precisely That 
which is found at other places in clear, open passages."26 
While Luther often applied this principle as part of his 
general historical approach to the Bible, i.e. comparing 
passage with passage in order to understand the historical 
situation and the author's intent, it is also true that he 
often used the principle in a more theological way. Each 
passage should be interpreted in light of the whole, which 
meant for Luther, in light of his understanding of the 
central message of the Bible, justification by faith. At 
this point Luther has moved beyond the historical to the 
J experiential. The tools of scholarly labors are not enough. 
This then leads us to a consideration of a third matter 
in Luther's approach to biblical interpretation, namely that 
the interpreter of Scripture in order to understand its 
meaning must be a man of faith. In Luther there is not 
only the scholar's desire to interpret the text accurately 
and faithfully by means of the best to,-4s of historical 
25 Gerhard ch_,elin, ord and Faith, pp. 306 -307. 
26 blass, ed., What Luther Says, Vol. I, p. 75. 
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science, but there is also the believer's desire to search 
the text for further illumination of his own decisive experience. 
Exegesis is never merely historical. It begins there but 
proceeds in faith under the guidance of the Spirit to discover 
the redemptive message of Christ. 
Faith is the necessary preunderstandi.ng for an adequate 
interpretation of Scripture. For Luther faith includes both 
understanding and experience. One must comprehend the message 
in its totality in order to understand its parts. "For 
although an understanding of the words is first in order, 
yet an understanding of the subject matter is of great im,.or- 
tance. "27 But such understanding is not a. mere intellectual 
grasp but an illuminating experience. The man who understands 
is the one who has encountered God in Christ and who is 
justified by His grace. The exegete who has faith under- 
stands Scripture not by the autonomous use of reason but by 
the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Luther writes: "Scripture 
is tho sort of book which calls not only for reading and 
preaching but also for the right interpretation: the reve- 
lation of the Holy Spirit. "28 It is only the man to whom the 
Spirit of God has been given who will be able to understand 
Scripture as a whole or in its separate parts. For without 
the Spirit no one will perceive anything in Scripture rightly, 
not even when he has the most intimate acquaintance with its 
27 Ibid., D. 94. 
28 Iiid., p. 76. 
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contents. But he who has the Spirit of God -- anyone, not just 
a priest - -is able to grasp the essential message. Luther did 
not always find this doctrine of the right of private judgment 
an easy one to maintain. In the controversies which surrounded 
his life, nearly all of his opponents appealed to Scripture 
to support their case. But Luther rightly preferred a storm 
of debate to the stagnation of enforced conformity. 
The man of faith directed by the Holy Spirit is guided by 
one final rule, namely "to find Christ everywhere in Scripture." 
This christocentric emphasis is perhaps the central feature of 
Luther's her_merieutical position. It is the gospel message 
which has been grasped by faith which supplied the key to the 
meaning of Scripture. The historical interpretation of 
Scripture is not an end in itself but a means of understanding 
Christ who is taught in all of the books of the Bible. In 
the f__nal analvsis Luther returns to the christocentric inter- 
pretation which is found in the New Testament. This principle 
supplies Luther with a criterion to judge Scripture.. By 
faith the exegete can determine which passages effectively 
"preach Christ" and which do not. He writes in his introduction 
to the Epistle of James: ''All the genuine sacred books agree 
in this, that all of them preach Christ and deal with Him. 
This is the true test by which to judge all books when we see 
whether they deal with Christ or not, since all the Scriptures 
show us Chri st. tí29 Luther then identifies Scrioture with the 
29 Quoted by Lehmann, ''The Reformer's Use of the Bible'', 
p. 337, 
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gospel of Jesus Christ, not with the explicit contents of a 
number of books. He insists on the primacy of those books 
which speak of Christ, for Christ, the very word of God, is 
himself the content of the word of God in the Bible. Such 
a view led him to a typological understanding of the Old 
Testament and allows a form of allegorical interpretation 
to re -enter exegesis. But he never allowed allegorical inter- 
pretation to establish proofs of the authority of the church; 
Christ remains above all merely human authority. 
Thus Luther understands the Bible as an authoritative, 
inspired, christocentric and understandable book. It is to 
be interpreted literally and historically with the lest 
philological tools available. But such study is not an end 
in itself. He who would truly understand the Scriptures must 
be a man of faith in whom the Holy Spirit is working to reveal 
the message of Christ. 
s_II. An Appraisal 
There is much that is commendable in Luther's views on 
the interpretation of the Bible, indeed far more than we have 
reason to mention for the purposes of this study. We will 
content ourselves with calling attention to the way in which 
his view relates to our theme of preunderstanding. 
In the first place, Luther recognizes the necessity 
of and rightly insists on the employment of a historical 
methodology in the study and interpretation of Scripture. 
He sees clearly that without a. historical check, interpreters 
can make the Bible say anything which suits their fancy. 
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Only a literal and grammatical approach is able to uncover 
the Bible's true meaning and protect against the negative 
influence of preunderstanding. Secondly, Luther is also 
aware of the impossibility of reason to offer a detached and 
objective analysis of the message of Scripture. It is only 
the man with the preunderstanding of faith who is able to 
discern the Bible's decisive and redemptive content, the 
Word of God. Thus for Luther it is possible to correctly 
interpret the Bible only when it is approached in fith by 
historical study. 
Hut as Luther worked out this hermeneutical theory in practice 
he revealed himself, for all his genius, to be limited, as 
all men are, by his time and place in history. He was a child 
of his times in his uncritical acceptance of the historicity 
'of the biblical narratives. The tools, methods and presuppo- 
sitions of scholarly study of the Bible which he employed, 
while advanced for his day, were nevertheless primitive by 
modern standards. He was also a child of his times in his 
use of the Bible in argument and controversy. Failing to 
appreciate fully both the-historical origins of the Bible and 
its historical development of thought, he often resorted to 
the proof-text method in arguing his case. Further, Luther 
was a child of his times, though understandably so, in setting 
the Bible so radically Over against the church. His prin- 
ciple of sola scriptura was perhaps a necessary corrective 
for his time, but one which now needs to be viewed in a 
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different light, taking cognizance of the fact that we always 
understand the Bible from within the tradition of the church. 
We have one final reservation about Luther's view, one 
in which he is not so much a child of his times, but one 
in which the necessary balance between faith and history ap- 
pears to beweighted in favor of faith. We have in mind his 
christological interpretation of the Bible, and particularly 
of the Old Testament. The objection we raise here is not so 
much one of principle as it is one of emphasis and applica- 
tion. It does not violate our understanding of history to 
maintain that Christ is prefigured in the Old Testament. But 
to find him everywhere is to contradict the literal-histori- 
cal principle of interpretation and to fail to appreciate the 
historical context and message. 
But this objection appears insignificant beside the abiding 
value of his views. His influence has been felt by nearly 
all interpreters of the Bible since his time. It is true 
that rationalists like Spinoza30, standing outside of the 
church and in an altogether different tradition, came under 
the influence of Luther very little --if at all. But biblical 
interpreters within the church, even among Roman Catholic 
exegetes (though partly in reaction) and more particularly 
among Protestant exegetes, have not escaped the impact of 
Luther's apr roach to the Bible. The Pietist tradition of 




of John Wesley31 appealed to the subjective emphases in 
Luther's teaching. Classical Orthodoxy, whose views we will 
assess in the preaching of Charles Spurgeon32, while perhaps 
more influenced by Calvin than Luther, nevertheless saw in 
Luther's insistence on the inspiration and authority of 
Scripture an anchor for their theological system. Even the 
"modern" interpreters of the Bible, whose views grew out of 
the revolution in historical thinking in the nineteenth cen- 
tury and which we will consider in the popularized form of 
Harry Emerson Fosdick33, could find in Luther's critical 
approach toward certain books of the New Testament and his 
stress on the necessity of an historical and grammatical approach 
to the text the beginning of an attitude which would charac- 
terize their method. We turn now to examine these various 
hermeneutical approaches. 
31 See ch. 15. 
32 See ch. 16. 
33 See ch. 17. 
Chapter Fourteen 
Spinoza and Rationalism 
I. Spinoza in the Age of Natural Science 
In our survey of selected interpreters of the Bible 
we have considered two thinkers whose preunderstanding was 
firmly rooted in the conviction that God is and that He has 
made Himself known in Jesus Christ. Though differing greatly 
in their hermeneutical systems, both Origen and Luther shared 
a common faith in Christ. It was their faith. which was 
foundational in t eir approach to the Bible. But in order 
to gain a more representative perspective on biblical inter- 
pretation, it is necessary to consider an interpreter of 
Scripture whose basic starting point was not gleaned from 
within the Christian community. We have chosen the philoso- 
r)her Spinoza whose preunderstanding was shaped by the revolu- 
tionary new patterns of thought which were developing in the 
late Renaissance. 
The natural science period of the Renaissance is cus- 
tomarily dated from 1600 to 1690. In this period the Counter 
Reformation checked the free flow of thought in Italy, and 
unfortunate religious wars and assorted controversies dis- 
couraged philosophical work in Germany. In England, Holland 
and France the situation was more favorable and not a few 
brilliant achievements were made. 
One great achievement of this era was the formation of 
new methods for philosophical investigation. In this period 
:oth Bacon and Descartes advanced a new method which was to 
be subsequently influential. In addition to method, there was 
a second form of achievement brought about by the work of 
Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz- -the erection of 
rational systems which gave primacy to reason as the source 
of knowledge.l Spinoza's preunderstanding, as we will attempt 
to show, combines both the method and the system character- 
istic of his age, and largely determines his approach to 
biblical interpretation. 
Baruch Spinoza (1632 -1677) came from a family of Jews 
who were driven out of Spain and Portugal by the Inquisition, 
and had taken refuge in Amsterdam. He received a good educa- 
tion for his time, studying the Bible and Talmud in "Hebrew, 
and Jewish books upon religious and philosophical subjects. 
He learned Latin in the school of Van Ende, a nominal Roman 
Catholic. There he also read the works of Descartes and 
other modern 1 _hilosophers, and studied mathematics and natural 
science.2 This kind of exposure soon made it difficult for 
him to accept all the statements of the Bible, together with 
the rabbinical interpretations, in a strictly literal manner. 
At twenty -four he was expelled from the synagogue and became 
an outcast from his own people. Some see in this expulsion 
the underlying motive of his philosophy, i.e. the attempt to 
find some lasting gpod independent of external circumstances.' 
1 William K. Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy, 
New York, 1941, pp. 38 -39. 
2 
Jantes Martineau, A Study of Spinoza, London, 1883, 
pp. 21 -26. 
3 Wright, ój?. cit., p. 93. 
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After his expulsion from the Jewish community, Spinoza 
assumed the Latin form of his first name, Benedict, and lived 
among Christians. He was able to support himself by grinding 
lenses, but devoted the major portion of his time to the pur- 
suit of philosophy. In each of the places where he stayed, 
chiefly small towns in the vicinity of Amsterdam, he found 
intellectually minded friends who encouraged him in his phil- 
osophical pursuits and studied his philosophy in manuscript 
form. In the course of time Spinoza became well enough 
known to be offered a professorship at the University of 
Heidelberg, and a pension from Louis XIV on the condition 
that Spinoza. dedicate a. book to him. Both options he refused, 
determined to lead an independent life and not risk his free- 
dom to express his convictions. Spinoza lived out the remain- 
der of his life grinding lenses, dying of consumption at 
forty -five. 
The clue to the main attitudinal component of Spinoza is 
preunderstanding can be found in his refusal to accept any 
position in life which would prevent him from honestly ex- 
pressing his views. The fundamental attitude which functions 
consciously in his approach to Scripture is one of openness 
to truth. He Was determined to come to the Bible with no pre- 
conceived ideas. How consistently this attitude was operative 
in his interpretation of Scripture is a question we will at- 
tempt to answer shortly. 
The ideological and methodological elements in St,inoza's 
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preunderstanding developed under the influence of a number 
of writers, but the really formative influences were of 
two very distinct kinds. There was of course the influence 
of Judaism on the one hand, and on the other, the New Phil - 
osophy.4 _,is Jewish upbringing was probably responsible for 
his use of the word "God" for the ultimate reality, though it 
is obvious he did not borrow the identification of God with 
nature from the Old Testament writers.5 In addition, Spinoza's 
rational criticism of the Bible no doubt had roots in the 
teaching of the medieval Jewish philosophers. 
6 
The influence of the New Philosophy is even more evi- 
dent. He was acquainted with Bruno (154`2 -1600) who taught 
that the solution to, the problem of the one and the many lay 
in the direction of nantheism. Durant describes Lruno's phil- 
osophy in the following manner: 
All reality is one substance, one in cause, 
one in origin; and God and this reality are 
one. The object of philosophy is to per- 
ceive unity in diversity, mind in matter, 
and matter in mind; to find the synthesis 
in which opposites and contradictions meet 
and merge; to rise to that highest know- 
ledge of universal unity which is the in-, 
tellectual equivalent of the love of God.' 
It is not difficult to see these ideas in Spinoza's thought. 
Descartes, too, was an important influence. What attracted 
Spinoza was Descartes' conception of one homogeneous substance 
underlying matter and another homogeneous substance underlying 
4 
J. Alexander Gunn, Benedict Spinoza, Melbourne, 1925, 
p. 35. 
5 Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, 
London, Vol. IV, p. 208. 
6 Gunn, op. cit., p. 36. 
' Will Durant, The Story of philosophy, New York, 1943, 
p. 116. 
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mind. 8 Spinoza was keen and bold enough to develop the 
implications of this Cartesian philosophy in a monistic way.9 
In addition, Spinoza's method of philosophical investigation 
was similar to that of Descartes. Clear and distinct ideas 
are true; confused ideas are inadequate and false. Reasoning 
progresses in a. series of propositions with the highest 
certainty found in intuition.10 Descartes' influence is 
obvious in both system and method. Hobbes and Bacon also left 
their mark on Spinoza. Hobbes' influence is evident in 
Spinoza's political philosophy, not our present concern, but 
Bacon's inductive methodology is especially evident in Spinoza's 
handling of Scripture. 
It should not be concluded from this list of influences 
on Spinoza that his work was of a derivative sort. He did 
his own original work and "escapes all ready made labels or 
classifications. " 
11 
Nevertheless it is possible to see the 
main currents of the thought of his age shaping his philo- 
sophical system. And it is this philosophical system, 
functioning as a comprehensive preunderstanding, that he 
brings to his interpretation of Scripture. Therefore, before 
we can deal adequately with Spinoza's hermeneutic, we must 
touch briefly on those aspects of his philosophy which are 
directly related to and form the background for his approach 
to the Bible. 
S Ibid., p. 117, 
9 Wright, op. cit., p. 90. 
10 Ibi.d., p7-95. 
il Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza, London, 1962, p. 26. 
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Ideologically, it is his epistemology and his theology 
which are central to his interpretation of Scripture. 
Sprinoza distinguishes three different kinds of knowledge: 
opinion, reason and intuition. Under opinion he puts the 
ordinary observations of the senses given in experience, 
images aroused by association of ideas, memories, words, 
symbols and information transmitted by tradition.12 These 
lack scientific exactitude, and are fragmentary and confused. 
Spinoza, on the other hand, has absolute confidence in reason 
and intuition. Reason is Possible because all men share in 
the same characteristics and give assent to patterns inherent 
in geometry and syllogism. The third kind of knowledge, 
intuition, comes if one knows anything completely, and under- 
stands it in its ultimate nature and necessity, which for 
Spinoza is some aspect of God. 
13 
His epistemology leads directly into. his theology or 
monism. Father Copleston begins his discussion of Spinoza 
with the remark that "the most conspicuous idea of S.: ino za ' s 
philosophy is th ̂ t there is only one substance, the infinite 
divine substance which is identified with nature; Deus sive 
natura, God or Nature." 4 Descûrtes had defined substance 
as "an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in 
12- 
ti Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding 
in ';arks of Spinoza, tr. by R.H.M. Elfles, London, 1884, Vol. 
11,-7775. 
13 Wright, 211. cit. , p. 96. 
14 Copleston, 22. cit., p. 206. 
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order to exist." 
15 
Spinoza accepts this definition and labels 
the substance God. God, for Spinoza, is a mathematical 
necessity and scientific law; one, infinite, complete, all - 
embracing, self- sustaining substance; the ultimate ground 
and essence of everything mental and physical and the only 
kind of God compatible, as he thought, with modern know - 
ledge.16 The highest good for man is the intellectual love 
of "God" who is the logical ground of the mechanical laws 
of nature. Both of these presuppositions, the epistemolo- 
gical and the theological, functioning dependently, have a 
major influence on his views. They operate consistently, 
consciously, rationally and, as one would expect, somewhat 
closed -mindedly throughout his interpretation. - 
The methodological center of the preunderstanding with 
which Spinoza comes to the Bible, beyond the methodology 
inherent in his philosophical system, is induction. Taking 
his cue from Bacon, Spinoza wants to make judgments about the. 
Bible by reasoning from its various parts to the nature of 
its whole. He attempts to examine it in its p ?rticulars 
before reaching any general conclusions. It is only as one 
goes from the individual to the universal that.sound judgments 
can be reached. This methodological presupposition is a 
major influence on and operates consciously in Spinoza's 
interpretation. 
H. Spinoza's Interpretation of the Bible 
15 Quoted by Wright, op. cit., p. 98. 
16 Ibid., --- p 94. 
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We turn now to see how these various strands of Spinozats 
preunderstanding come to expression in his hermeneutical 
system. Spinoza's objective as he approaches the prol;lem 
of interpreting Scripture is really twofold: (1) to inter- 
rogate the Bible in accord with the science of the clad,-; and 
(2) to preserve his notion of an immanent God discerned by 
intuition. These two objectives share the common motive of 
preserving his freedom while giving him the security of an 
unchanging good which would not be subject to the unsure 
particulars of history and fickle human nature. 
It is in-the Theologico -Political Treatise that Spinoza's 
approach to Scripture is found. He begins the treatise 
with an attempt to refute the view that the state owes its 
origin to divine institution. At this point, Spinoza's at- 
titude of being open to truth and resisting all external 
interference in the formation of his thought is clearly evident. 
There were those in his time who argued that the modern state 
was like the Jewish theocracy in the Old Testament, and that 
it was granted authority by the will of God to regulate the 
expressions of views in science, philosophy and religion. 
As a refutation of this point of view, Spinoza maintains that 
the-Hebrew political institutions were intended only for the 
Hebrews and not for the present. He further argues that the 
Scriptures are designed primarily for the particular people, 
and only secondarily for the human r:ce. On a slightly differ- 
ent tact, but with the same objective, he argues that the 
contents of the Bible are necessarily adapted to the level of 
(373) 
understanding of the popular mind. Gunn comments that 
"Spinoza insists on the essential humanism of the Bible; we 
must read it as a book written by men who were writing for 
men."17 Hence the Bible, Spinoza feels, especially as it 
was interpreted by his contemporaries who used it against 
him, is less than binding. The fundamental purpose of the 
Theologico -Political Treatise is thus a persuasive plea for 
freedom. 
In his Preface, Spinoza clarifies his method and gives 
us a revealing glimpse into the conclusions he hopes to 
reach. Regarding method, he points out that there are those 
who believe a priori that every passage of Scripture is true 
and divine. "Putt?, he goes on, "such a doctrine should be 
reached only after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension 
of the Sacred Books...and not be set up on the ttreshold, as 
it were, of inquiry. 
18 
The Bible must be interrogated and 
examined in the.same fashion as nature. Spinoza employs the 
method of induction to the contents of the Bible. He sttes 
in a straightforward manner: "3 determine to examine the 
Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and unfettered spirit, 
making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing to it 
no doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein set down. "19 
This is a very significant passage and its implications will 
be treated below, but perhaps here we should note that he is 
not wholly consistent in carrying out his objective. He does 
17 Gunn, 22. cit., p. 82. 
18 
A Theologico -Political Treatise in Works of Spinoza, 
London, 1884, Vol. I, p. 8. 
19 Ibid., p. 8. 
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make certain assumptions about the Bible (e.g. that it is a 
product of its authors' imaginations), assumptions common 
to the new philosophy of his age. But in fairness to Spinoza, 
it is important to notice that he .:ants to begin with no 
assumptions. He asserts that we cannot say a priori that 
the Bible is inspired or authoritative. Only by examining 
its particulars can we say anything about it in general. 
We must reason from the individual to the universal. 
What does Spinoza uncover in his inductive investigation? 
He breaks the suspense by hinting at the answer in advance, 
an answer which is not unexpected and which underlines the 
fact that one always approaches interpretation with some form 
of prior understanding. 
Now, as in the whole course of my investi- 
gation I found nothing taught expressly by 
Scripture, which does not agree with our 
understanding, or which is repugnant there- 
to, and as I saw that the prophets taught 
no thing, which is not very simple and 
easily grasped by all, and further, that 
they clothed their teaching in the style, 
and confirmed it with the reasons, which 
would most deeply move the mind of the 
mass to devotion towards God....2° 
Let us now look to see how Spinoza came to these 
conclusions. In chpters 1 -3 Spinoza deals with prophecy 
and the role of the prophet among the Hebrews. Prophecy 
he defines as revelation, a sure knowledge revealed by God 
to man, and a prophet as 'tone who interprets the revelations 
of God to those who are unable to attain to sure knowledge of 
the matters revealed, and therefore can only apprehend them 
20 Ibid., p. 9. 
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by simple faith. "21  The prophet, however, perceives revelation 
in parables and allegories, or in more Spinozian words, he 
grasps the revelation of God with the aid of imagination.22 
No one except Christ received the revelation of God without 
the aid of the imagination. 
23 
Nevertheless, the prophet's 
perception was partially accurate. The doctrine of the 
Spirit of God in Scripture means that the prophets were given 
a special power to perceive the mind of God. "The imagination 
of the prophets, inasmuch as through it were revealed the 
decrees of God, may equally be called the mind of God, and 
the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of God."24 
The imagination does not possess in itself any guarantee of 
truth, such as with clear and distinct ideas, but requires 
some external reason to assure certainty.25 These external 
conditions are three in number: (1) the things revealed 
must be imagined very vividly; (2) there must be the presence 
of signs; and (3) the mind of the prophet must be wholly given 
to what is right and good.Z6 Even with these extrinsic 
conditions fulfilled, the certitude afforded is not mathematical, 
only moral, because the prophet's message is colored by his own 
21 Ibid. p. 13. 
22 Ibid. p. 25.. Imagination is a technical term for 
Spinoza. It refers to mental images as opposed to the clear and 
distinct idea which is not connected in the mind with any par- 
ticular mental picture projected from our sense experience. What 
the prophet says about God he says from his imagination, but God 
is outside of sense experience. Therefore what the prophet says 
is distorted. See Hampshire, 22. cit., pp. 16 -24. 
23 Ibid., p. 19. 
24 Ibid., p. 24. 
25 Ibid., p. 28. 
26 Ibid., p. 29. 
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individual disposition and personal opinions.27 Sure know- 
ledge of God by this method remains tenuous, and is suited 
for those who can only apprehend GodTs revelation "by simple 
faith." 
Spinoza has put the question of certain knowledge about 
God to Scripture and found it wanting. The next logical step 
is to sec if there is a higher "revelation" which will provide 
secure knowledge of God. It is through the notion of Divine 
law that he approaches the problem. Law he defines as "that 
which an individual, or all things, or as many things as 
belong to a particular species, act in one and.the same 
fixed and definite manner."28 Such laws can be perceived by 
reason and intuition. Divine law, which can also be perceived 
in the same fashion, is that which is concerned with the 
highest good, the true knowledge of God and love. Certain 
knowledge which removes every doubt depends solely on man's 
capacity of intuition and reason. This apprehension of God 
comes because God is the ground and source of all things. 
It follows that "all natural phenomena involve and express 
the conception of God as far as their essence and perfection 
extend, so that we have greater and more perfect knowledge 
of God in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena: 
conversely...the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, 
the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God."29 
27 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
28 Ibid., p. 57. 
29 Ibid., p. 59. 
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He concludes that the highest blessedness is "the intellectual 
knowledge of God, the most perfect Being."30 Our knowldge of 
God, and also our love of Him, are derived from general ideas, 
in themselves certain and known, not from the unsure his- 
torical narrative contaiñed in Scripture.31 Spinoza is even 
bold enough to say that "Scripture literally approves of the 
light of natural reason and the natural divine law."32 But 
to justify this claim, he has to deal with those sections of 
Scripture which appear to contradict it 
He disposes of the binding relevance of ceremonial law 
by arguing that these observances were ordained in the Old 
Testament for the Hebrews only, and that they formed no part 
of the divine law.33 They had reference only to the government 
of the Jews, and designed to bring temporal advantages 
to the masses.34 Miracles, too, are defined to fit the 
pattern of interpretation which Spinoza has established. He 
deprecates the popular mind for thinking that "the power and 
providence of God are most clearly displayed by events that 
are extraordinary and contrary to the conception they have 
formed in nature. 
"<s 
The masses call such unusual phenomena 
miracles, but nature cannot be contravened. It has a fixed 
and immutable arder.36 A miracle is either a subjective 
imagining, or a natural phenomenon which hides its source. 
30 Ibid., p. 60. 
31 Ibid., p. 61. 
32 Ibid., p. 68. 
33 Ibid., p. 69. 
34 Ibid., p. 76. 
35 Ibid., p. 81. 
36 Ibid., p. 82. 
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Indeed, "many things are narrated in Scripture as miracles of 
which the causes could easily be explained by reference to 
ascertained workings of nature."37 There is always a "res 
mere naturalis." If it were otherwise, one could not see 
God, for what is foreign to nature is also foreign to God.38 
Having established that the revelation contained in 
Scripture has limited value, and that a better understanding 
of God can be discerned by reason, a position which Spinoza 
affirms that Scripture itself teaches, he is ready to ask 
the question which is central to our discussion. How then 
should we interpret the Scriptures? Should we interpolate, 
invent novelties, and impbse our prejudicial point of view 
so that superstition may abound? God forbid: Superstition 
"teaches men to despise reason and nature and only to admire 
and venerate that which is repugnant to both."39 We must 
escape from the crowd in order to interpret Scripture correctly. 
To be free from the danger of error, we have only to apply to 
Scripture a method similar to that used in interpreting 
nature, viz. induction. He says: 
I may sum up the matter by saying that the 
method of interpreting Scripture does not 
widely differ from the method of inter- 
preting nature --in fact, it is almost the 
same. For as the interpretation of nature 
consists in the examination of the his- 
tory of nature, and therefrom deducing 
definitions of natural phenomena on 
certain axioms, so Scriptural inter- 
pretation proceeds by the examination 
37 Ibid., p. 84. 
38 Martineau, 22. cit., p. 355. 
39 Spinoza, Theologico -Political Treatise, p. 99. 
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of Scripture, and inferring the intention 
of its authors as a legitimate conclusion 
from its fundamental principles.40 
Spinoza does not doubt the value of this method. He goes on: 
By working in this manner everyone will 
always advance without danger of error- - 
that is, if they admit no principles for 
interpreting Scripture, and discussing 
its contents save such as they find in 
Scripture itself- -and will be able with 
equal security to discuss what surpasses 
our understanding and what is known by 
the natural light of reason.41 
Because Scripture often treats matters which cannot be deduced 
from principles known to reason (e.g. narratives and reve- 
lation), and because Scripture does not give us definitions 
of things, we must seek for the principles and definitions 
from the Bible itself. The procedure then in interpreting 
Scripture is to examine its history. "The universal rule ", 
he argues, "is to accept nothing as an authoritative Scrip - 
tural statement which we do not perceive very clearly when 
we examine it in the light of its history."42 The principle 
of induction leads Spinoza to the acceptance of the historical 
method as the means of determining what Scripture says. 
Scriptural history, according to Spinoza, is comprised of 
three ingredients: (1) the nature and properties of the 
language in which the books of the Bible were written, i.e. 
Hebrew; (2) an analysis of each book and arrangement of its 
40 Ibid., p. 99. 
41 Ibid., p. 100. 
42 Ibid., p. 101. 
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contents under heads, taking special note of those passages 
which are ambiguous, obscure or seem mutually contradictory, 
and guarding against the imposition of any external principle 
of interpretation which has no foundation in Scripture; and 
(3) a study of 
the environment of all the prophetic books 
extant; that js, the life, the conduct, 
and the studies of the author of each book, 
who he was, what was the occasion, and 
the epoch of his writing, whom did he 
write for and in what language. Further, 
it should inquire into the fate of each 
book: how it was first received, into 
whose hands it fell, how many different 
versions there were of it, by whose ad- 
vice was it received into the Bible, 
and lastly, how all the books now uni- 
versally accepted as sacred, were united 
into a single whole.43 
Once this historical investigation is completed, the 
interpreter can proceed. The next step is to determine what 
is universal and common to Scripture, and then from there 
one is able to go back to what is less universal, just as 
with the history of nature. The universal element is that 
which is the basis and foundation of all Scripture and which 
is taught by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable 
for men. Whatever is obscure or ambiguous in Scripture is 
explained and defined by this universal doctrine.44 As an 
example of such a universal doctrine Spinoza cites Matthew 
6:33 which teaches that men should seek first the Kingdom 
of God and his righteousness above all else. The cassage, 
43 Ibid. 
44 
, pp 101-103. 
Ibid., p. 104. 
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"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted ", 
can be explained in light of Matthew 6 :33. It is those who 
mourn for the Kingdom of God and for righteousness who shall 
be comforted.45 
This simple rule of interpreting the incidental by the 
universal works well with the practical passages, but Tithe 
purely speculative passages "46 are more difficult. The 
method, however, does not change perceptibly. The interpreter 
of the speculative matters of Scripture must never simply 
infer the intention of one author from a clearer passage 
in the writings of another. Why is this the case? Because 
the prophets adapted their writings to the prejudices of 
their age. But how does one then arrive at the objective 
of the prophet? There is only one way, and that is to "begin 
from the most universal proposition. Then we must proceed 
to miracles, and so on to whatever is most general until we 
come to the opinions of a. particular prophet, and at last, 
to the meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, 
or miracle." 
47 
One must always be careful not to let an 
45 Ibid., p. 105. 
46 Unfortunately Spinoza gives no example of a specula- 
tive passage. His precise meaning therefore is left in doubt. 
Perhaps the clue to his meaning is to be found in his contrast 
of the speculative with the practical, the former dealing 
with abstract concepts, the latter with specific guidelines 
for daily living. 
47 Ibid., p. 106. 
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established tradition, or the meaning of a. word, which can 
easily be twisted, dictate the meaning of a particular 
passage. 
48 
Even a careful application of this principle does not 
assure accurate knowledge of the text. There are at least 
three difficulties which, Spinoza argues, are impossible to 
surmount: (1) inadequate resources make it impossible to 
gain a thorough knowledge of Hebrew; (2) lack of records 
makes knowing the history of all that has happened to every 
book of the Bible unachievable ; and (3) the books of Scrip- 
ture are no longer extant in their original language.49 He 
concludes: TTThe foregoing difficulties in this method of 
interpreting Scripture from its own history I conceive to be 
so great that I do not hesitate to say that the true meaning 
of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at best mere 
50 
subject for guesswork....'T 
But this conclusion does not mean that we cannot i:now 
what is important in Scripture. These difficulties only a- 
rise when we try to follow the meaning of the prophet in mat- 
ters which cannot be perceived by clear and distinct ideas 
that are conceivable through themselves. This is of course 
Spinoza's trump card. "Thus we conclude that we can easily 
follow the intention of Scripture on moral questions...." 
51 
The precepts of piety come across clearly in Scripture, and 
48 Ibid., p. 107. 
49 Ibid., 
50 Ibid., pp. 108-111. 
51 Ibid., D. 112, 
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of such does salvation and blessedness consist. It is not 
really necessary to be disturbed over what remains after 
reason and understanding have done their work, for such mat- 
ters are more curious than profitable. He goes on say: 
Besides, I do not doubt that everyone will 
see that such a method only requires the 
aid of natural reason. The nature and 
é'icacy of the natural reason consists 
in deducing and proving the unknown from 
the known, or in carrying premises to 
their legitimate conclusions; and these 
are the very ethods which one method 
desiderates.5. 
There are still a few more matters which remain to 
Spinoza in order to tidy up his argument. The first is to 
r 
consider the opinions of those from whom he differs. One 
group with whom Spinoza disagrees maintains that the light 
of nature has no power to interpret Scripture, but a super- 
natural faculty is required for the task. This contention, 
Spinoza thinks, is only an "obscure way of stating their com- 
plete uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture." 
53 
Such people interpret Scripture just like the rest of man - 
kin6, and with the same limited grasp of history. If a 
supernatural faculty exists at all, it is given only to a 
faithful few. 
Spinoza also has a point of contention with Maimonides 
who held that one could never be sure of a passage until it 
was obvious that the passage contained nothing contrary or 
repugnant to reason. This point of view, argues Spinoza, 
52 
Ibid., p. 113. 
53 Ibid., p. 114. 
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has a number of difficulties: (1) it leads to a twisting 
and an explaining away of the words of Scripture, because 
reason cannot infer what we find in Scripture; (2) it leads 
to an elite group of philosophers who alone can interpret 
Scripture and they would constitute a dangerous ecclesias- 
tical authority; (3) it assumes that the authors of Scripture 
are in agreement with each other and that they were superior 
philosophers and theologians which obviously they were not; 
and (4) it supposes that the sense of Scripture cannot be 
made plain from Scripture itself, a notion which he has just 
spent the last hundred pages refuting. Such a view which 
explains the words of Scripture by preconceived opinions is 
clearly useless. 
54 
Spinoza also refutes the traditions of the Pharisees 
and the Popes, arguing that on public matters they may have 
authority,, but on individual matters such as the state of 
blessedness, their authority does not apply. 
After a long section in which he deals historically with 
55 
the various books of the _able Spinoza comes to a second 
matter to be cleared up to finalize his argument. It con- 
cerns the sense in which Scripture may be called sacred. He 
defines a thing as sacred insofar as it promotes piety and is 
used religiously. It follows that nothing is intrinsically 
54 
Ibid. , pp. 116 -117. 
55 This section does not articulate any new principle 
of interpretation. It is rather an attempt to apply his prin- 
ciple of history to the books of the Bible. His conclusions 
do not sound particularly startling to us,(e.g. Moses could 
not have written the Pentateuch in its present form) but were 
very important in his day and have had a profound influence. 
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sacred, or profane for that matter. "Thus ", he concludes, 
"Scripture is sacred, and its :ord divine so long as it stirs 
mankind to devotion towards God. "56 This is of course exactly 
what Scripture does in that it teaches the very simple yet 
universal doctrine of divine justice and charity and the 
necessity of man's obedience57 to what he has grasped by 
faith.58 
Lastly, Spinoza clarifies what he considers to be the 
relationship between theology and reason. He has shown al- 
ready that Scripture does not teach philosophy, but obedience, 
and that its contents have been adapted to the understanding 
and opinions of the popular 'mind. The realm of theology is 
the "scheme and manner of obedience or the true dogmas of 
piety and faith." 
59 
Reason too has its that of truth 
and wisdom. Neither theology nor ,reason is to serve the 
60 
other, but each has its domain. It is interesting to note 
that if theology is rightly doing its task in setting down the 
precepts of life, these precepts will be in accordance with 
reason and "in nowise repugnant thereto.tt61 Although we 
cannot deduce from reason the content of Scripture, which 
makes revelation necessary (for the masses), nevertheless it 
is reason which allows unto grasp with moral certainty what 
is revealed. 
























inadequate kind of knowledge. Only by intuition's clear 
idea can we be sure of our grasp of God. The Bible is a 
human book which we understand by applying a method of inter- 
pretation similar to that applied by science to nature. 
Such an application to the contents of Scripture yields a 
moral certainty about the road to piety. Spinoza applies 
the principle of induction to Scripture and achieves moral 
truth which still has to be ratified by reason. He applies 
Descartes' rationalism and achieves a pantheistic monism 
which allows him to avoid the stubborn particularities of 
history, and gives h_m the security of what he considers 
to be absolute truth, the contemplation of which is the 
highest good of man. 
III. Critique and Influence 
This charter would not be complete without some estimate 
of Spinoza's worth and influence. There is much on the pos- 
itive side. His emphasis on the need for an approach to 
Scripture which would be free from a priori assumptions was 
a necessary and important advance. Reasoning from particulars 
to universals which we have called in Spinoza's thought "the 
principle of induction" is essential to any method of inter- 
preting the - Bible. That induction led him to study the 
Scriptures "historically" helped pave the way for modern 
ap roaches in biLlical study. 
Y(,t we also have some reservations. First, Spinoza, like' 
all men, was unable to step out of time for a perspective free 
from t; reunderstanding, though his objective was "to examine 
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the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and unfettered 
spirit, making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing 
to it no doctrines which I do not find clearly therein 
set down." 
62 But when he can exclude the possibility of 
miracle, for example, because such a notion is repugnant to 
reason, he has clearly smuggled in a presupposition which the 
biblical authors would not condone. He in fact does make 
certain assumptions about the Bible as we have seen. There is 
a second negative comment which is directly related to the 
first one and that is his belief in the all sufficiency of 
reason. IIe seems to have no doubts about reason's capacity 
to penetrate to reality if the proper method is employed. 
"By working in this manner ", he says with assurance, "every- 
one will always advance without danger of error.... "63 Here 
Spinoza seems a true man of his age, with little appreciation 
for historical and cultural conditioning, or, speaking 
theologically, sin's corrupting influence on reason, and the 
resulting elusiveness of truth. It is reason rather than 
faith guided by the Holy Spirit which leads to a correct 
interpretation of Scripture. Thirdly, his reduction of the 
teaching of Scripture to.mere piety simply fails to do justice 
to the contents of Scripture. True piety is certainly taught, 
but more is taught as well. The central theme of Scripture 
is not man's religiosity, but God's activity in the affairs 
62 Ibid., p. 8. 
63 Ibid., p. 99. 
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of man. Fourthly, the romantic strain calling the highest 
good of man the intellectual love of God appears, if not 
inconsistent, at least unnecessary to his rationalistic 
system. Fifthl%:, he falls into some of the same traps of 
which he accuses Iaimonides, namely of imposing rationalistic 
assumptions on the content of Scripture and of separating 
the initiated from the uninitiated. The masses have their 
Scripture and popular preacher, but the sacrament of truth 
is reserved for the inner circle.64 Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, he shares with his age the comparative 
65 
hhile he lack of appreciation for the idea of history. 
urges the historical study of Scripture, he does not accord 
to it a high degree of value. Ultimate truth comes by reason. 
Accordingly, he is severely in of 
Scripture which describes history as the milieu of God's 
redeeming activity. 
If Spinoza's influence was not great in his own time, 
it proved to be significant on later generations. People 
such as Lessing, Herder and Schleiermacher read their Spinoza. 
Durant remarks that "it was by combining Spinoza with Kant's 
epistemology that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel reached their 
varied pantheisms."66 These various men, end Spinoza through 
them, provide the roots of certain stra,lds in contemporary 
biblical interï- retation. But before we move to the modern 
scone, we must first fill in the steps along the way. 
64 Martineau, a.. cit., p. 369. 
65 Hampsiiire, op. cit., p. 194. 
66 Durant, op. cit., p. 150. 
Chapter Fifteen 
The Hermeneutics of Pietism: John Wesley 
I. Wesley's Preunderstanding 
In or effort to assess the role of preunderstanding in 
representative interpretations of the Bible, we have considered 
three distinct hermeneutical positions. Origen, in an attempt 
to reconcile his view of inspiration with what he felt to be 
offensive passages of Scripture, resorted to the allegorical 
method. This method, while making the Bible appear more 
acceptable to his generation, failed for two reasons: unchecked 
by the tests of the historical method, it inevitably led to 
artificial interpretations, and it did not do justice to the 
historical nature of revelation. Luther's christological 
approach came closer than Origen's allegorical method in 
meeting the twin demands which we have established as necessary 
for an adequate interpretation, i.e. the use of the historical 
method and the presence of the preunderstanding of faith. 
However it easily led back to the excesses of the allegorical 
method in its typological understanding of the Old Testament. 
In Spinoza we found the most important advocate of reason 
over Scripture and the weight of traditional interpretation. 
His rationalistic approach rejected the notion that Scripture 
has authority over the interpreter's mind. The failure of his 
position lay in its uncritical endorsement of the all suf- 
ficiency'of reason and its inability to appreciate the 
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historical dimension of God's self -disclosure. 
Not infrequently students who have studied the history 
of the interpretation of the Bible have found in Spinoza's 
insistence on the autonomy of reason a natural link with the 
modern understanding of the Bible, one which. certainly had its 
roots in the age of rationalism but which was more adequately 
developed in th,e nineteenth century v:ith the rise of scicntific 
history. Consequently, they have easily passed from rational- 
istic to critical -historical approaches, ignoring some quite 
important traditions which lie between and which also make 
their contribution to contemporary views of the Bible. Two 
of these traditions, pietism and Protestant Orthodoxy, we 
will examine in order to- illustrate our theme.' We will 
look first in the present chapter at John Wesley as a repre- 
sentative of the pietistic tradition and then turn to the 
classical orthodoxy of Charles Spurgeon in Chapter Sixteen. 
Pietism, in its post -Puritan expression, had a number of 
distinctive features. It was a quest for personal holiness and, 
conversely, a resistance to the compromise with the world on 
the part of the officially established churches. It was an 
effort to live the Christian life within the walls of new 
communities and in patterns of individual response, and thus 
a sectarian reaction to institutionalism. In part it was an 
evasion of the theological questions posed by a rationalistic 
scientific world and a flight into personal piety. But 
1 One obvious omission from our treatment is Roman 
Catholic Modernism. See Grant, op. cit., pp. 133 -140. 
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although it may have been an intellectual retreat, it was an 
evangelistic advance, and from its various expressions 
sprang a new desire and a concerted effort to win the world 
for Christ.2 
In its original form, Pietism was a Lutheran and Reformed 
movement on the continent. The term first appears in 1689 as 
a rebuke to Lutheran holiness movements.3 One of its first 
representatives 'was Philipp Jacob Spener ( -1705) of Alsace - 
Lorraine who, in his Pia Desidirea, argued for a converted 
ministry and an increase in devotional life. The movement 
grew under the leadership of the founders of "pious colleges" 
such as August Hermann Francke ( -1727) of Halle who established 
a "little church" within the larger church for those most 
eager for spiritual growth. Continually frustrated with the 
official church, harassed by the government and persecuted by 
fashionable society, Pietism emerged into a powerful force in 
eighteenth century church life in the Lutheran world. 
Reformed pietism had an easier time of it than its 
Lutheran counterpart because its moralism was somewhat more 
congenial to Calvinism and Arminianism. In a time of rational- 
istic apathy, dedicated Christians pulled together assorted 
strands of Dutch and English Puritan holiness movements and, 
combining mysticism with an appeal to the lower classes, 
developed pietism into a major movement. One of the most 
2 Marty, op. cit., pp. 291 ff. 
3 Ibid., p. 282. 
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effective efforts was that of the Moravians under Count 
Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf(- 1760). Influenced by Spener 
and Francke, wealthy and spiritual, Zinzendorf used his 
resources and his estate called Herrnhut to build an impressive 
Pietist community. 
Yet no Pietist organization ranks in scope and influence 
with English Methodism. Under the guidance of John Wesley, 
Pietism moved from Europe to the fertile soil of England. 
The prevailing features in English life in the mid- eighteenth 
century were especially conducive to the Wesleyian form of 
Pietism. Uninspiring church life, deistic and rationalistic 
theological thought and poor social and moral conditions all 
helped to make the masses receptive to Wesley's message.4 
He went to the people, not with philosophy, but with a 
religious appeal and for Wesley "religion is the most plain, 
simple thing in the world. It is only, 'we love Him, because 
He first loved us'. "5 It is this religious appeal which 
provides the foundation for Wesley's understanding and 
interpretation of the Bible. But to gain a clearer conception 
of what the "religious appeal" consisted and how it expressed 
itself in Wesley's hermeneutical system, we must look briefly 
at the formative influences in Wesley's life. 
John Wesley was born in Epworth, Lincoln hire, on June 17, 
4 For an account of conditions in Wesley's time see 
Maidwyn Edwards, John Wesley and the Eighteenth Century, 
London, 1955. 
5 John Wesley, The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., 
London, 1829 -31, Vol. TR, p. 46T 
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1703. His father Samuel was a- learned though eccentric a-ld 
impractical man who served as rector of the church at Epworth. 
Wesley's mother Susannah was both matriarch and saint and 
presided with equal grace and firmness over the affairs of 
the large impoverished family.6 
Wesley's formal education began in 1714 when he was sent 
to Charterhouse in London on a scholarship prov=ded by the 
Duke of Buckingham. Six years later he went up to Oxford and 
matriculated as a Charterhouse scholar. In spite of the 
relatively low standards which existed at Oxford at this 
time, Wesley, with the aid of a few good tutors and disciplined 
habits, acquired an adequate education. 
Up until 1725 .esley's religious interests v,ere relatively 
immature. But suddenly, under the right stimulation, his 
earlier religious training focused into faith and personal 
commitment. Wesley records his Oxford "conversion" as follows: 
In the year 1725, being in the twenty - 
third year of my age, I met with Bishop 
Taylor's Rules and Exercises of Holy Living 
and Dying. In reading severad-pa:rts of 
This book I was exceedingly affected, by 
that part in particular which related to 
'purity of intention.' Instantly I re- 
solved to dedicate all my life to God, 
all my thoughts and words and actions, 
Ting thoroughly convinced there was no 
medium, but that every part of my life 
(not some only) must either be a sacrifice 
to God, or to myself.... In the year 1726 
I met with Kempis' Christian patterns. 
The nature and extent of inward religion, 
the religion of the heart, now appeared 
6 Albert C. Outler, ed., John Wesley, New York, 1964, 
p. 5. The influence of Susannah Wesley on her son John is 
traced by G. Elsie Harrison, Son to Susanna, London, 1944. 
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to me in a stronger light than ever it 
had done before. I saw that giving 
even all my life to God...would profit 
me no king unless I gave my heart, yea, 
all my heart to him.... A year or two 
later, Mr. Law's Christian perfection and 
Serious Call were put into my hands. 
These convinced me more than ever of the 
absolute impossibility of being half a 
Christian, and I determined, through his 
grace...to be all- devoted to God: to give 
him all my soul, my body and my substance. 
By 1725 the significant influences on Wesley's life are 
evident in his new religious interests. The rich heritage of 
his home and family, the stimulation of a university environ- 
ment and religious friends, and the radical demands for utter 
seriousness in religion as they had been discovered by him in 
Taylor, Kempis and Law had all combined to teach him that 
the Christian life is devotio, the unconditional yielding of 
the whole man in love to God and neighbor. 
With this awareness Wesley decided to prepare for the 
ministry and, in anticipation of ordination, shifted his 
academic pursuits from the classics to the Bible and Theology. 
In 1726 he was elected fellow of Lincoln College which estab- 
lished his position in the university, assured him of financial 
security as long as he remained unmarried and gave him the 
freedom to Dursue his divine calling. He was ordained in 1728. 
Except for the time he served as his fatherts assistant 
at Epworth (1726 and 1729) Wesley remained at Oxford. When he 
returned to Oxford from Epworth in the latter part of 1779 
7 Works, Vol. xi, )J). 766 -67. Quoted by Cutler, ed., 
op. cit., p. 7. 
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he became involved in a semi- monastic group whichhad been 
gathered by his brother Charles for the purpose of Bible 
study, mutual discipline in devotion and frequent communion. 
To this group, called many things but most frequently "The 
Methodists ", Wesley devoted much of his time and energy. 
Also at Oxf. :rd, with the help of one of his fellow 
"Methodists ", John Clayton, who was a competent patristics 
scholar, Wesley began the study of ancient Christian literature. 
He was especially taken with "Macarius the Egyptian" and 
r -nraem Sy-rus. !hat fascinated him in these men was their 
descri¡>tion of "perfection" as the goal of the Christian 
life. This notion became central to Wesley's thinking as he 
attempted to fuse the Eastern tradition of holiness as 
disciplined love with the Anglican tradition of holiness as 
aspiring love.8 
Yet with all his fervent religious activity, Wesley 
remained discontented and unsatisfied with his religious life. 
He rejected the idea of going to Bpworth to take over for his 
father on a permanent basis. But when the opportunity to go 
to Georgia as a missionary came along, Wesley saw it as his 
opportunity to serve the Lord and to put some of his, ideas 
into practice. Unfortunately the experience proved to be a 
fiasco. He was jilted in a love affair, got intangled with 
the law and fled in two years. The time, however, was not 
8 Outler, or. cit., p. 10. 
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a total loss. He continued his studies, particularly in the 
thought of the Eastern church, and made contact with the 
Moravians who taught him by example and precept that faith 
should be fearless and piety joyful. Looking back on the 
stormy voyage across the Atlantic Aesley recorded in his 
Journal that 
In the midst of the psalm wherewith 
their service began, the sea broke over, 
split the mainsail in pieces, covered 
the ship, and poured in between the decks, 
as if the great deep had already 
swallowed us up. A terrible screaming 
began among the English. The Germans 
(Ehe Moravians) calmly sung on.9 
Such behavior made a lasting impression on Wesley. 
He was back in England in the early part of 1738, still 
unsettled but continuing to search fof a coordinating factor 
which would bring meaning to his religious feelings. The 
divergent forces at wrrk in his life -- Eastern notions of 
synelthesis (the dynamic interaction betwen God's will and 
man's), classical Protestantism with its concepts of sola 
fide and sola scriptura and the Moravian stress ùpon "inner 
feeling " --were brought into cohesion in his "Aldersgate 
experience ". The Journal recording on May 24th reads: 
In the evening I went -irery unwillingly 
to a society in Aldersgate- street, where 
one was reading Luther's preface to the 
Epistle to the Romans. About a quarter 
before nine, while he was describing the 
change which God works in the heart through 
9 John Wesley's Journal, abridged by Percy L. Parker, 
London, 1902, p. 7. 
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faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely 
warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, 
Christ alone, for salvation; and an 
assurance was given me that He had taken 
away my Fins, even mine, and saved me from 
the law of sin and dea th.10 
In the summer of 1733 Wesley visited the Moravians in their 
homeland at Herrnhut and Marianborn. On returning to England 
he began to preach, believing as Jonathan Edwards had written, 
that God honors those who preach His word. With some re- 
luctance he accepted in 1741 Whitefield's invitation to 
preach to the angry mob at Bristol and, to Wesley's surprise, 
"revival" broke out. Thesé first fruits gave him confidence, 
and his late starting though long lasting career was launched. 
The next fifty years were devoted to preaching, organizing 
the Methodist Societies, providing literature for his converts, 
debating with Anglicans, Calvinists, Roman Catholics and 
Moravians, and developing his own theological system.11 Few 
men have travelled farther, preached more and organized better 
than John Wesley. He died in 1791. 
From these few biographical notes on Wesley it is not 
difficult to reconstruct the essential features of the pre - 
understanding with which he afiproaches the Scriptures. It 
is obvious that faith is the comprehensive preunderstanding 
with which Wesley comes to the Bible. He believed in the 
God about whom the biblical authors spoke. But the crucial 
10 Ibid., p. 43. 
11 For accounts of Wesley's theology see William Cannon, 
The Theology of John Wesley, New York, 1946, and Colin 
Williams, John Wesley's Theology Today, London, 1960. 
(398) 
question is: What are the precise contours of Wesley's faith? 
What form did his faith take? We will attempt to answer this 
question by examining Wesley's preunderstanding in terms of 
its type and function. We will then be in a position to see 
how his preunderstanding works itself out in the specific 
presuppositions of his hermeneutical system. 
The attitudinal element in Wesley's preunderstanding, 
reflecting his deeply rooted piety, is an exceedingly important 
one. Its various components might best be characterized 
by the term "expectancy ". Wesley expected the Bible to si)eak 
a poignant word to his personal life and to the lives of all 
believers who would expose themselves to Scripture. The 
word which ''esley expected thé Bible to speak broke in on the 
believer in atleast three dimensions: the practical, the 
pious and the experiential. It was practical in the sense that 
he believed the Scripture gave specific guidelines for daily 
living and decision making. It was pious in that he felt 
that the precepts of the Bible could lead the pilgrim Christian 
along his way toward holiness. It was experiential in the 
sense that its proper readlng created peace and joy in the 
believer's heart. On this latter point, it is significant to 
note that Wesley's own heart had been "strangely warmed ", and 
that the pattern of his religious growth in his formative 
years jumped from experience to experience. He believed that 
God the Holy Spirit could use the pages of Scripture to speak 
directly to the believer, often in the crisis of the moment. 
This complex of dependent attitudes which we have called 
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"expectancy" is a major influence on Wesley's handling of 
Scripture. It tends to be comprehensive in its scope and to 
function as a conscious if not a wholly rational and consistent 
element in his hermeneutical system. 
The attitudinal part of Wesley's preunderstanding with 
which he comes to the Bible gives a clear hint of the main 
ideological content. He conceives the Bible to bd the book 
which leads the man of faith to Christian spirituality. The 
most important immediate source of this emphasis was the 
Anglican theological literature in which he steeped himself 
while at Oxford and in Georgia. This Caroline moral theology, 
most ably represented by Jeremy Taylor and William Law, had 
taught Wesley that faith is a serious undertaking. From the 
great scholars of the seventeenth century revival in partristic 
studies (William Beveridge and Robert Nelson), he grasped the 
intimate correlation of Christian doctrine and Christian 
spirituality. To these shaping forces he added the decisive 
r e- r/etti p,s 
influence of his continual perusal in the piiu and wisdom of 
the early Christian fathers, Ignatius, Clement, Macarius, 
Ephraem Syrus and others, and the devotional literature of 
the Middle Ages, particularly the Imitation of Christ by 
Thomas á Kempis. Incorporated into this theme of understanding 
the Bible as the Christian's guide to holy living were the 
basic presuppositions held by the Reformers regarding Scripture. 
iesley assumes that the Bible is authoritative, inspired and 
that it can be understood. These ideological assumptions 
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merge into a dependency relationship in Wesley's thought and 
determine the basic direction of his interpretation of 
Scripture. Generally they function consistently, consciously 
and rationally throughout it. 
The methodological aspect of Wesley's preunderstanding 
cannot be easily separated from the attitudinal and ideological 
aspects. As we will observe, Wesley gives a large place to 
experience as that which authenticates the interpretation. 
Yet he is aLire that experience, without careful study of the 
historical and grammatical, can mislead. He attempts, not 
always consistently, to hold these two emphases in tension, 
i.e. he tries to allow room for God the Holy Spirit to speak 
directly to the believer's experience and to faithfully study 
the Bible in its historical setting and original languages. 
What is important to note is that he did make a conscious 
and rational effort to apply a historical methodology, albeit 
a primitive one, to the study of the Scriptures, and this 
constitutes a positive influence on his interpretation. 
As a final word about Wesley's preunderstanding we would 
stress his capacity for the synoptic view. His preunder- 
standing functioned openendedly rather than closed- mindedly. 
He had an uncanny ability to glimpse the underlying unity of 
Christian truth as it was expressed in all of its varietiës 
from both the Catholic and protestant traditions. While 
assuredly a man of his age and afflicted 1 ith its assorted 
prejudices and superstitions, he Was also a man who possessed 
a universal vision. He was able to fuse "faith and good 
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works, Scripture and tradition, revelation and reason, God's 
sovereignity and human freedom, universal redemption and con- 
ditional election, Christian liberty and an ordered polity, 
the assurance of pardon and the risks of '"falling from grace", 
original sin and Christian perfection..."12 into a reason- 
ably well- ordered theological system. 
It is now necessary to examine more closely how his 
preunderstanding took form in the particular presuppositions 
of his hermeneutical system. How did Wesley's eyes of faith 
read, understand and interpret the Bible? 
II. Wesley's Interpretation of the Bible 
For purposes of clarity we will divide our analysis of 
the presuppositions undergirding Wesley's handling of the 
Bible into two sections: his view of the nature of the 
Bible and his actual interpretation of the Bible, the latter 
hinging on the former. Each section will then be further di- 
vided into five subsections. 
Following the tradition of the Reformation doctrine of 
sola scriptura Wesley viewed the Bible in the first ?lace 
as the absolute authority in matters of faith and jractice. 
This theme runs throughout all of his teaching and preaching. 
Neither the. united testimony of the ancient fathers and Re- 
formers nor religious experience, important as these are 
in Wesley's system, are sufficient to prove a doctrine which 
is not founded in Scripture.13 "For," as Wesley says, "as all 
12 Outler, op. cit., p. viii. 
13 Arthur S. Yates, The Doctrine of Assurance, London, 
1952, pp. 105 f. 
4 
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faith is founded upon divine authority, so there is now no 
divine authority but the Scriptures; and, therefore, no one 
can make that to be of divine authority which is not contained 
in them. "14 In reference to the Roman Catholics, he fur- 
ther asserts "that as lóng as we have the Scripture, the 
church is to be referred to the Scriptures, and not the 
Scriptures to the Church.... "15 The Scripture is sufficient 
in itself and "neither needs, nor is capable of, any farther 
additaon."16 
In general ::esley applied the principle of authority 
equally to 211 of Scripture and, therefore, quoted indiscrim- 
inately from the Old and New Testaments. I-ïe moves with 
freedom over all parts of the Bible in search of evidence 
to support his points. Every page of Scripture is uniform- 
ly precious. If one seems more illuminating than another, 
the explanation is to be sought in the interpreter's own 
need or present interest rather than in the Scripture it- 
self.17 For the most part he is unhindered by critical 
finds of date, occasion or authorship and - proo 
texts as easily from as from Matthew.18 
Secondly, the _- :rule derives its authority from its 
divine insniration. The biblical authors, under the guidance 
of the holy Spirit, recorded d:vine truth. Wesley explains 
14 
bvorks, Vol. X, D. 91. 
15 Ibid., p. 94. 
Ibid., p. 141. 
17 
W. E. Sangster, The Path to Perfection, London, 1943, 
16 
p. 3618 
See e.g. John 'Wesley, A Plain Account of Christian 
Perfection, Bristol, 1770, p. 40. 
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the process as follows: 
Concerning the Scriptures in general, it 
may be observed, the word of the living 
God, which directed the first Patriarchs 
also, was, in the time of Moses, commit- 
ted to writing. To this were added, in 
several succeeding generations, the in- 
spired writings of the other Prophets. 
Afterwards, what the Son of God preached, 
and the Holy Ghost spake by the Apostles, 
the Apostles and the Evangelists wrote. 
This is what we now style the Holy Scrip- 
ture: This is that 'word of God which 
remaineth for ever;' of which, though 
'heaven and earth pass away, Rne jot or 
tittle shall not pass away. '1Y 
He also gives us his interesting if not completely convinc- 
ing "short, clear, and strong argument to trove the divine 
inspiration of the holy Scriptures." The argument begins 
with the proposition that "the Bible must be the invention 
of either good or angels, or or 
God." But it could not be the work of good men or of angels 
bec use they neither would nor could write a book in which 
they would tell lies by prefacing their remarks with "Thus 
aith the Lord ". Nor could it be the invention of bad men 
or devils since they would not write a book which commands 
all duty, forbids all sin and condemns their souls to hell 
in all eternity. Therefore, Wesley concludes, the Bible 
must be given by divine inspiration.20 
It follows that if the Scriptures are divinely inspired, 
they are infallibly true. As Wesley sees it, "if there be 
any mistakes in the Bible, there may as :-yell be a thousand. 
19 Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament, London, 
1755, Preface 10. 
20 
Works, Vol. xi, p. 484. 
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If there be one falsehood in that book, it did not come from 
the God of truth."f21 Divine inspiration also insures the 
quality of the content in the Bible. It is "a most solid 
and precious system of truth"; "every part is worthy of God ";. 
it is "the fountain of heavenly wisdom "; .,nd the arguments 
are cogent, the expressions urecise and the style above 
"all the elegantes of human composition." 
22 
Thirdly, this authoritative and inspired Bible contains 
the way to holiness and heaven. From his earliest years at 
Oxford, Wesley had been preoccupied with the notion of 
Christian holiness or perfection.23 This concern blossomed 
into the full- fledged doctrine of "entire sanctification" 
in the publication of his A Plain Account of Christian Per- 
fection. Wesley believed that in an instant and by a simple 
act of faith perfection could be "wrought in the soul ". This 
was the second of two distinct stages of the Christian 
experience of salvation, the first being justification. With- 
out going deeper into this phase of Wesley's teaching, it is 
enough to point out that `esley understood the Bible in this 
context. The Bible was a practical book which led the be- 
liever down the path of holy living toward perfection. It 
was not primarily a textbook of speculative truths or the 
record of God's revelation in history, but a source book for 
the development of pious devotion and godly character. And 
21 Journal, London, 1909 -1916, Vol. VI, r. 117. 
22 Notes on the New Testament, Preface 10 -12. 
23 John M. Todd, John Wesley and the Catholic Church, 
London, 1958, p. 13. 
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ultimately, of course, it contained the directions to heaven. 
tiesley wrote: 
I want to know one thing- -the way to 
heaven; how to land safe on that happy 
shore. God Himself has condescended to 
teach the way; for this very end he came 
from Heaven. He hath written it down in 
a book. O give me that book! At any 
price, give me the book of God! I haX9 
it: here is knowledge enough for me. 
As Luther understood the central message of Scripture to be 
- 
justification by faith in Christ and interpreted the Bible 
accordingly, so Wesley perceived the primary message to be 
instructions in true piety and interpreted Scripture in light 
of this assumption. 
Closely aligned to Wesley's devotional understanding 
of the Bible is a fourth consideration, namely the relation- 
ship between religious experience and Scripture. As has 
already been mentioned Wesley would not allow religious 
experience to have authority over Scripture, but he did in- 
sist that it validated the biblical message. The truth of 
Scripture is to be verified by Christian experience. God's 
message in Christ is applied to the human personality by the 
Holy Spirit, and when this happens in the believer's life 
the message of Scripture'is confirmed. The dead written word 
has come alive by an act of faith which is more than concep- 
tualization or verbalization but an inner reality of the heart.25 
Fifthly and finally, in keeping with the Protestant 
24 Wesley's Standard Sermons, ed. by Edward H. Sugdem, 
London, 1935, p. 31. 
25 Outlet, o.. cit., p. 27. 
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principle of the perspicuity of Scripture, Wesley viewed the 
Bible as an understandable book, not one whose sacred mysteries 
could only be penetrated by ecclesiastical officials. There- 
fore it should be read by all Christians.26 But the practical 
streak in Wesley's temperament also made him aware that 
Scripture needs to be carefully taught .to the people, a task 
to which he devoted his life. Underlining this point he 
writes: "The Scriptures are clear in all necessary points, and 
yet their clearness does not prove that they need not be 
expia fined." 
h7 
It was his life -long teaching of the Bible that forced 
Wesley to ponder the question of its interpretation. Though 
he never wrote at length on the correct method, he did articu- 
late some gúidelines for himself and his followers as the 
pressures of his responsibilities demanded them. This leads 
us directly into our first observation regarding Wesley's 
method of interpretation, namely that it grew out of the 
practical demands of communicating the message of Scripture 
to masses of unlearned people, of teaching "plain truth" to 
"plain people". There was little room in Wesley's mind for 
a. complicated hermeneutical theory. The literal sense of 
Scripture was sufficient though a "spiritual" sense was 
also possible. But for the most part "the literal sense of 
every text is to be taken, if it is not contrary to some 
26 Works, Vol. x, p. 142. 
27 Quoted by Yates, op. cit., p. 107. 
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other texts; but in that case the obscure text is to be 
interpreted by those which speak more plainly. "2b In his 
instructions to his fellow Methodist preachers regarding the 
teaching of the.Bible he asks a series of rhetorical questions, 
one of which is "am I a master of the spiritual sense (as 
well as the literal) of what I read 
?"29 
Wesley does not make 
clear what is meant by "spiritual "., but it most likely is a 
reference to interpreting Scripture in terms of practical 
piety. It is certainly not a. suggestion to interpret the 
Bicle in terms of esoteric,and speculative truth. In keeping 
with his insistence on the obvious and literal sense, Wesley 
also exhorts his preachers to be acquainted with grammatical 
constructions, the biblical languages and the context and 
scope of each book. 
Another selection from Wesley's preface to his Standard 
Sermons gives us a clue to the next three principles of his 
interpretive method: 
I sit down alone: only God is here. In 
His presence I open, I read His book.... 
Is there a doubt concerning the meaning 
of what I read? Does anything appear dark 
or intricate? I lift up my heart to the 
Father of Lights: 'Lord is not Thy Word, 
"If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of 
God "? Thou "givest liberally, and up- 
braidest not "....' I then search after 
and consider parallel passages of Scrip- 
ture, "comparing spiritual things with 
spiritual ". I meditate thereon with all 
the attention and earnestness of which 
my mind is capable. If any doubt still 
28 Ibid. 
29 Works, Vol. x, p. 490.. 
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remains, I consult those who are ex- 
perienced in the things of God; and then 
the'writings whereby, being dead, yet 
they speak. And what I thus learn, 
that I ever teach.30 
The first point to note in this passage is the place Wesley 
gives to the direct guidance of God. Alone in meditation, 
the interpreter is led by the Spirit of God to the true 
meaning of the biblical passage. Not infrequently, applying 
this principle to decision making and stretching it to its 
breaking point, Wesley would seek divine guidance by a 
fortuitóus opening of thé Scriptures, taking the first 
passage he lit upon as the answer to his query. It was also 
this kind of direct divine guidance which was given the 
primacy in Wesley's interpretive method. He writes: "Man's 
human and worldly wisdom or science is not needful to the 
understanding of Scripture but the revelation of the Holy 
Spirit who inspireth the true meaning unto them that with 
humility and diligence search."31 
The second principle to glean from the long section quoted 
above is that Wesley places great confidence in the analogy 
of faith, i.e. that the central tenets of the Christian faith 
shed light on the difficult and incidental passages of Scrip- 
ture. The whole gives meaning to the parts. This involves 
letting one passage interpret another, for "Scripture is the 
best expounder of Scripture. The best way, therefore, to 
understand it, is carefully to compare Scripture with Scripture, 
3G Standard Sermons, pp. 31-32. 
31 (tltler, op. cit., p. 123. 
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and thereby learn the true meaning of it."32 Following 
Luther, Wesley maintains that those passages of Scripture 
which contain the essence of the gospel and therefore throw 
the most light on the rest are Paul's Epistles to the Romans 
and 'Galatians. 
33 
Still a third principle alluded to by Wesley in his 
summary statement of how he determines the meaning of Scripture 
is the consultation "of those experienced in the things of 
God." '.desley had great respect for the church fathers, the 
leaders of the Reformation and biblical scholars of his own 
time. I -?e did not hesitate, in difficult passages, to compare 
his own views with what others had written.. In the preface 
to his Works he pays tribute to the tradition of the church 
when he writes that "in this edition, I present to serious 
and candid men my last and maturest thoughts: agreeable, I 
hope, to Scripture, Reason, and Christian Antiquity. "34 
Bearing in mind that Scripture was his supreme authority 
and reason the authority of his age, "Christian Antiquity" 
is given a high place of authority in Wesley's system. 
There is one final matter to mention in our discussion 
of Wesley's hermeneutical method and that is his willingness 
to make use of what critical tools were available to him. He 
was a first -rate Greek scholar and was not adverse to correct- 
ing the text of the Authorized Version. He states in the 
32 Works, Vol. x, pp. 92, 142, 482. 
33 Outlet, op. cit., n. 123. 
34 Quoted by Sangster, on. cit., p. 33. 
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opening section of Explanatory Notes on the New Testament 
his procedure: 
I design, first, to set down the text 
itself, for the most part, in the common 
English translation, which is,...the best 
that I have seen. vet I do not say it is 
incapable of being brought, in several 
places, nearer to the original. Neither 
will I affirm that the Greek copies from 
which this translation was made are 
always the most correct: and therefore 
I shall take liberty...to make here 
and there a small alteration.35 
Nor was he blind to or happy with the theological and practical 
implications of some of the Psalms. In drawing up the Sunday 
services for American Methodism he omitted many of them on 
the grounds that they were "highly improper for the mouths 
of a Christian congregation.'t 
36 
How far-Wesley would have 
allowed a critical historical understanding of the Bible to 
influence his views had he lived in the modern era, one can 
only conjecture. But at least it appears that in principle 
he would not have completely rejected such an approach. 
III. An Assessment 
It would be easy to underestimate the value of the more 
distinctive features of the pietistic approach to the bible 
as we have examined them in the writings of John Wesley. 
Religious "experience", in an age where all of man's inner 
life is exposed to intense psychological scrutiny, is bound 
to be a little bit suspect. Few these days would be prerared 
35 Notes on the New Testament, Preface, 4. 
36 Works, Vol. xiv, p. 317. 
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to acce-Dt the testimony of one who claims to ['ave a direct 
"pipeline" to God. Yet perhaps there may be some truth in 
the Pietist claim that the Bible's message only has value 
when it becomes personal in the believer's life. Where this 
emphasis is balanced with a healthy respect for historical 
exegesis, it will not necessarily mean a distortion of the 
biblical message. Perhaps one avenue of true understanding 
of the Bible is an internal sensitivity and openness to its 
message. Is this not what the Pietist- influenced Schleiermacher 
emphasized a few decades after Wesley in his divinitory 
method, and what Dilthey in the late nineteenth century and 
Bultmann in our tine have stressed, though in different 
language? This is in fact what we have argued all along. 
The Bible cannot be adequately interpreted and its message 
rightly understood without the preunderstanding of faith. 
And faith is, amonff other things, an attitude of affinit - 
which is able to receive and identify with the message of 
Scripture. It is this aspect of Wesley's hermeneutical 
position which has lasting value. 
But where Wesley fails (and here we do not judge him too 
hPrshly because he lived in an age which neither understood 
the historical method nor appreciated the value of history) 
is in his non -historical understanding of the Bible. As such, 
it was only his intuitive good sense, Christian character, 
knowledge of the traditional interpretation of the church 
and scholar's desire for truth which gave hs interpretations 
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their balance. It is true that Wesley was not uncritical 
of the Bible in his own primitive and limited way, carefully 
examining the text and exhorting his co- workers to know their 
Greek and Hebrew and something of the historical context of 
th- books of the Bible. But on principle he could have been 
far wide of the mark. Believing as he did that Scripture is 
divinely inspired and uniformly authoritative and that the 
Holy Spirit guides the interpreter to the correct view, he 
might easily have imposed onto the words of Scripture almost 
any meaning that his own preunderstanding and desires dictated. 
As it was, his chief sin-was pulling verses out of context . 
either for the purpose of effective homiletics or to support 
his favorite doctrines. In so doing he may have missed the 
essential meaning of several passages, but he was neither 
the first nor the last to commit this error. Fortunately, 
.tesley's preunderstanding was working for him rather than 
against him, and flagrant interpretive violations of the 
intent of Scripture are the exception rather than the rule 
in his work. A lesser man than Wesley, however, employing 
the same hermeneutical principles, and unchecked in his 
interpretation of the Bible by the application of the his- 
torical method, might miss the meaning of Scriptpre altogether. 
Adequate biblical interpretation requires not only the pre - 
understanding of faith but also the study of history. 
Chapter Sixteen 
The Bible in Protestant Orthodoxy 
Charles H. Spurgeon 
I. Spurgeon Heritage 
Protestant Orthodoxy is a direct descendant of the 
Reformation. More than Luther or Zwingli, its patron saint 
is John Calvin. It was Calvin's theological system with its 
extremely high view of Scripture as the deposit of the 
apostolic tradition which formed the cornerstone of órthodoxy's 
understanding of the faith. Second to Luther in his depth - 
perception of the Bible, Calvin was superior in his system- 
atization of its teachings. In Calvin, theories regarding 
the inspiration of the biblical documents began to appear which 
opened the door for the static conceptions of God's reve- 
lation.which were characteristic of the protetaht scholastics 
,of the seventeenth century. These seventeenth century divines 
found in Calvin a source book for their doctrine'of verbal 
inspiration. His legal mind needed a. codebook, a document, 
a systematic statement of God's revelation to man, and he 
found it in Scripture. The writers of Scripture were "amanu- 
enses", "penmen", "clerks ". "The Holy Spirit dictated to the 
prophets and apostles ", he wrote in his commentary on Jeremiah.1 
It should be remembered in fairness to Calvin that in 
1 Quoted by Marty, or. cit., t . 225. 
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the days which preceded the historicF,1 and literary analysis 
of the Bible, such assertions did not lead to the complications 
they would today. It should also be noted that the later 
generations of theologians who hardened Calvin's views 
into dogmatic cate7ories did not do justice to the reformer's 
own witness to the human dimension of the, revelation in 
the Bible. As we observed in Luther, so there is in Calvin 
as well a responsible respect for biblical authority, hut 
this was accompanied by a freedom of interpretation which 
allowed him to question the text and to see a superior value 
in the New Testament where God's redeeming activity was more 
explicit in his once- and - for -all revelation in Jesus Christ. 
From the Old Testament to the New Testament there was an in- 
creasingly explicit view of revelation, from the hint in the 
promise to Adam to the open declaration at Calvary. 
Calvin's heirs were not as balanced in their views.2 
The sense of liberty in interpreting the text was replaced 
by a dogmatic tradition and an air -tight doctrinal system. 
The reverence for Scripture was superseded by the doctrine 
of verbal inerrancy and a rigidity in interpretation. 
Uniformitv took the place of living thought and originality. 
The arbitrary tradition which the reformers had torn away 
reappeared in a new fr,rm. Once again the Bible began to be 
read through the eyes of elaborate theological formulations. 
The "analogy of faith" was distorted into a method of proof- 
2 ` See Farrar., op. cit., Pp. 357 i
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texting, and the Spirit's guidance in the interpretive process 
was claimed in sunpor_t of one's own position. Rarely was an 
interpretation sub.;ect to the check of historical scrutiny. 
The word of God was identified with Scripture, anal few 
bothered to distinguish between Scripture and their inter- 
pretation of Scripture. 
The impulse toward the notion of verbal inerrancy was 
motivated by the need for a decisive oracle in the endless 
theological disputes which were characteristic of the era. 
The n rah. vacuum of authority which war created when papal 
infallibility was set aside was abhorred and quickly filled 
by the doctrine of an infallible Bible. The assumption 
was made that the Bible was a homogeneous, self- interpreting 
and verbally dictated whole, and that inferences drawn from 
it by dialectics and framed into theological propositions were 
as certain and sacred as the text itself. Ultimately the 
authority of Scripture was impaired by a defensive over- 
statement of its infallibility and by not allowing it to 
turn back and judge the theological structures erected from it. 
Because the Bible, bothathe Old and the New Testament, 
was seen as revelation itself, not the attestation to reve- 
lation, historical questions regarding the genuineness and 
integrity of the text were ignored. The Bible was inspired 
equally throughout. In the Formula. Consensus Helvetica of 
1675 the assertion was made that even the vowel points of the 
Hebrew text were inspired. This mechanical artificiality 
made true exegesis impossible. The text was so well defended 
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by dogma that it could not be approached and its essential 
meaning was missed. 
The English representatives of Protestant Orthodoxy 
in the seventeenth century were the Puritans whose maximum 
influence in English religious life extended from 1560 until 
1688 and reached its peak between 1640 and 1660 with their 
control of government under Oliver Cromwell. The Puritan 
movement began initially as an effort to reform the Church 
of England and check all tendencies of movement toward Rome. 
Their efforts at reform were not wholly unsuccessful, but by 
1662 their irritating pleas and programs for legislation in 
every area of life ceased to be appreciated and they were 
ejected from the State Church. As a result, the Puritans 
were classified along with the Separatist movement (Inde- 
pendents, Pres:yterians, Eaptists, etc.) as Nonconformists. 
The Puritan movement was steeped in Reform.',rtheology, 
and produced the historic Westminster Confession of Faith 
2nd innumerable volumes of dogmatics. The foundation of their 
confession and theological system was the assertion that the 
Bible was the very voice and message of God to man. It was 
the infallibly inspired work of the Holy Spirit and authori- 
tative in all matters, including not only doctrine, worship 
and church government Lut also civil and political problems, 
daily work, home life, dress, recreation and duty. The Puri- 
tans surveyed the whole gamut of life in light of the Bible 
and attempted to live accordingly. The literal word of 
Scripture was a direct message from God spoken as much in 
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the present as in the past. 
The-. eighteenth century in both England and on the Con- 
tinent brought a number of challenges to the rigidity and 
sterility within Protestant Orthodoxy. Arminius reasserted 
the importance of human freedom and responsibility and the 
iietists argued for the validity of religious experience. 
Exhausted by religious wars and disputations, the countries 
of Europe expressed a general appeal for tolerance. Ration- 
alistic philosophy turned its attack on the religious estab- 
lishment with telling force, and arising out of rationalism 
were the beginnings of biblical criticism. alt the orthodox 
tradition had commanded a strong allegiance from the people 
and would not be easily edged out. Although across the years 
it has adjusted to circumstances, retreated from critical 
problems and borrowed from the pietism of the Evangelical 
R-- vivals, its essential position remains intact, and it con- 
tinues as a major force in the life of the church today.3 
Charles Fadden Spurgeon can Lest te understood as a 
nineteenth century reprsentative of Protestant Orthodoxy, 
and more particularly of the Puritans. His most recent biog- 
rapher (who incidently thinks a great deal of the Puritans) 
writes that Spurgeon "as completely moulded and fashioned 
by those spiritual giants of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the puritans. He stood in tL:eir noble tradition, 
in the direct line of their theology and outlook, and can 
3 see Louis Gasper, The Fundamentalist Movement, 
Paris, 1963. 
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without question be called the heir of the puritans. "4 
Spurgeon himself, who had 7000 books in his liLrary by or 
about the Puritans, wrote: "We assert this day that, when 
we take down a volume of Puritan theology, we find in a 
solitary page more thinking and more learning, more Scrip- 
ture, more real teaching, than in whole folios of the ef- 
fusion of modern thought. The modern men would be rich if 
they possessed even the crumbs that fall from the table of 
the Puritans. "5 In order to better understand the influence 
of the puritan tradition on the formation of the preunder- 
standing which Spurgeon brings to his interpretation of the 
Bible, it is necessary to look briefly at the course of his 
life. 
Spurgeon was porn on June 19, 1834 in Kelvedon, Essex 
to a sturdy, lower- middle class family which had had Non- 
conformist sympathies for generations.6 When Charles was 
born his father, John Spurgeon, was a clerk in a coal yard, 
but also found time to be honorary pastor of an Independent 
(or Congregational) Church at Tolleslury. There he preached 
with conviction the Calvinistic doctrines as he understood 
them. Spurgeon's mother was a deeply religious woman who 
conscientiously guided her children in the faith. Financial 
4 Ernest W. _',acon, Spurgeon: Heir of the Puritans, 
London, 1967, p. 1.02. 
5 Ibid., p. 120. 
6 
For sympathetic treatments of Spurgeon's life in 
addition to bacon, see J. C. Carlile, C. H. Spurgeon, London, 
1933; and W. Y. Fullerton, C. H. Spurgeon, London, 1920. I 
follow Lacon's account. 
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difficulties necessitated sending Charles to live with his 
grandparents early in his life. His grandfather was a pastor 
in an Independent Chapel in Stambourne, and his grandmother 
and aunt were dedicated to caring for the spiritual welfare 
of the young boy. 
Spurgeon's early education began at a nursery school 
in Colchester where his parents had moved. Later he attended 
a day school run by a Mr. Henry Le'.:Tis. At fourteen he was 
sent to All Saints Agricultural College, not because he wanted 
to be a farmer, but because his uncle was a tutor there. 
During this time Spurgeon became an avid reader, a habit 
he was to continue throughout his life. In.addition to 
reading Shakespeare, Milton, Defoe and others he gained an 
initial acquaintance with Puritan literature. In his fifteenth 
year he read _;axter's .Call to the Unconverted, james' Anxious 
Enquirer, Foxe's Book of Martyrs, Doddridge's Rise and pro- 
gress of Religion in the Soúl and Scougal's The Life of God 
in the Soul of Ì1an. 
Toward the end of his fifteenth year Spurgeon was sent 
up to Newmarket, Cambridgeshire to become a pupil in the 
school of Ir. John Swindell. There he studied Greek, Latin 
and philosophy, assisted in the training of younger children 
and was exposed to the environment of the University. 
düile in Cambridge Spurgeon became spiritually unsettled. 
He began to question the adequacy of his own relationship 
with God, was "keenly aware of his sines and struggled with 
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doubts about the truth of many Christian affirmations. On 
January 6, 1850, unai)le to get to the church of his destin- 
ation because of heavy snow, he stumbled into a Methodist 
Chapel. There was a very small congregation and the regular 
minister was not preaching because he had been detained by 
the snowstorm. A layman in the congregation preached on 
the text "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the 
earth" (Isaiah 45:22). The message struck home and Spurgeon 
was converted. He writes concerning this incident: 
The cloud was gone, the darkness rolled 
away, and in that moment I saw the sun. 
I had been waiting to do fifty things, 
but when I heard the word LOCK, I could 
almost have looked my eyes away. I could 
have risen that instant, and sung with 
the most enthusiastic of them of the pre- 
cious blood of Christ, and the simple 
faith that looks alone to Him. I thought 
I could dance all the way home. I could 
understand what John Bunyan meant when 
he declared he wanted to tell all the 
crows of the ploughed land about his con- 
version.... Between half past ten, when 
I entered the chapel and half past twelve, 
when I returned home, what a change had 
taken place in me.7 
Soon after his conversion, Spurgeon was baptized in a Baptist 
church because of his convictions regarding believer's bap- 
tism. He began to study his Bible in earnest and felt called 
to the ministry. His first sermon was preached in Water- 
beach while he was still sixteen years old, and it was such 
a success he was invited to be their pastor. The small 
church grew under his leadership and his fame as a boy 
7 Facon, ó.2.. cit., p. 24. 
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preacher spread. In the summer of 1853 he was invited 
to speak at the annual meeting of the Cambridge Sunday School 
Union. A member of the New park Street Baptist Chapel in 
London heard him and was impressed enough to invite him to 
be a candidate for their vacant pulpit. In March of 1854 
at nineteen years of age he was called to this large and 
historic Lut failing church 
In a short time Spurgeon's preaching attracted large 
crowds of people and his preaching career was undezvay. The 
1200 seat auditorium of the New park Street Church was soon 
overflowing and a building program was launched. In March 
of 1861 the Metropolitan Tabernacle was completed with a 
seating capacity of 5000. Sunday after Sunday, year after 
year, eager worshippers crowded the auditorium to capacity. 
S 
In addition to his preaching and pastoral responsibili- 
ties Spurgeon found time for a number of other activities. 
Ile as instrumental in founding a castor's training college 
and an orphanage. Often he would lecture in the college on 
the Puritans or the Christian classics or homiletics. Always 
in demand to fill other pulipts, he preached in Scotland 
and Ireland and many parts of England. was a pr.oliiic 
writer, publishing 135 volumes and editing another 28. The 
intense pace of life which Spurgeon sustained took its toll 
on his health and he died in January of 1892 at the age of 57. 
paving briefly outlined Spurgeon's heritage and life we 
8 
; Lic7. , p. 5(). 
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must now state more precisely the main features of his pre- 
understanding in order to measure its influence upon his in- 
terpretation of the Lible. Spurgeon, like most of the thinkers 
we have already considered, the exceptions being Gibbon and 
Spinoza, stands within Christian faith. He assumes the 
truth of the biblical testimony regarding God's self -dis- 
closure in ,Jesus Christ. Faith is the ground of Spurgeon's 
preunderstanding. Again our concern is with the form which 
his faith takes. 
Of supreme importance to the ideological component of 
his preunderstanding was his adherence to the main tenets 
of the puritans. He seldom questioned the categories in the 
post- Calvinistic theology of seventeenth centurÿ protestant 
o 
The bible was insr_red and authoritative. 
God was sovereign in creation, providence and redemption. 
Christ the Son of God was sinful man's substitute in his 
atoning sacrifice at Calvary and man is justified by faith 
in this deed. The Holy Spirit is active in the lives of the 
saints guiding them i.n holy living, and ultimately they will 
Persevere until the return of Christ. These mutually de- 
pendent _u ritan assumptions which Spurgeon adopts consti- 
tute the major influence on his interpretation of Scripture. 
Taken as a whole they tend toward being a comprehensive 
world view and function consistently, consciously, rationally 
and somewhat closed- minciedly throughout his hermeneutical 
system. 
9 The one exception was his insistence on believer's 
baptism. 
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of hardly less importance than Puritan theology in the 
formaton of Sr >urgeon's i reun derstanding, especially the at- 
titudinal aspect, was the pietism of the 3vangelical Revivals 
which had been assimilated Ly the Nonconformist movement 
and accommodated by Spurgeon to the ideals of the Victorian 
era. The fusion of pietistic, Nonconformist and Victorian 
attitudes -produced a mentality that was experience- centered 
and conversionist in outlook. It was inclined toward anti - 
intellectualism and was usually at war with science and cul- 
ture. It tended to identify holiness with the avoidance of 
certain activities and the ability to sustAin intense reli- 
gious feeling. The Bible, as we shall explore shortly, was 
a magic book, a veritable object of worship, able to answer 
all questions and meet every need. The person of Jesus 
Christ was often described in heroic and romantic super- 
latives appropriate to Victorian tastes and values. On this 
point, it is important to note that Spurgeon in many ways 
epitomized the Victorian value- system, its speech and its 
manner of life. He was a romantic; he appreciated wealth 
and elegance; and he spoke in flowery language. in regard 
to the Nonconformist tradition, Spurgeon's own family back- 
ground and conversion dove- tailed with it, and he constantly 
referred back to his early experiences in support of his 
position. hence Spurgeon came to the Bible with his puritan 
theology heavily infused with the attitudes produced by the 
synthesis of pietism, Nonconformism and Victorianism. Not 
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always consistent, conscious or rational, these attitudes 
nevertheless function as another .-aajor influence on his 
biblical interpretation. 
The methodological assumptions which Spurgeon brings 
to the iiermeneutical task are drawn primarily from three 
sources. There is first of all the various Reformation themes 
inherent in the Puritan tradition such as the literal- histor- 
ical interpretation, christocentric "spiritualizing" and the 
analogy of faith. There s, secondly, the Pietist theme of 
experience which we find expressed in Spurgeon in his doctrine 
of illumination. Finally we mention Spurgeon's pressing 
responsi`: ilities as a preacher and pastor. Like Wesley, 
Spurgeon's fundamental task was one of communication to 
of all levels of and intelligence. neces- 
sity he had to speak on the level at which he could be 
understood. Inevitably this demand influenced the manner 
in which he approached the Bible. All of these various 
methodological strands exert a strong influence on his inter- 
pretation of Scripture and tend to operate consciously though 
not always consistently in his exegesis. 
We must now turn our attention to how Spurgeon's pre - 
understanding, rooted in faith, but given its distinctive 
mold by Puritan theology, Pietist, Nonconformist and Vic- 
torian attitudes, and an eclectic methodology, comes to 
expression in the particular presuppositions of his approach 
to the Bible. 
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II. Spu.rgeon and the Bible 
Spurgeon understands the nature of the bible primarily 
in light of his Protestant Orthodox heritage. It is the 
inspired and infallible Word of God, the very words of God, 
revelation itself. "This volume," he writes, "is the writing 
of the living God: each letter was penned with an almighty 
finger; each word in it drooped from the everlasting lips; 
each sentence was dictated by the Holy Spirit. "10 Therefore 
it is absolutely inerrant, trustworthy and reliable. "This 
is the book untainted by any error; but is ;pure, unalloyed, 
Perfect truth. Why? Bec,use God wrote it."11 
Spurgeon marshal's a number of arguments to sueeort 
his view of inspiration not the least of which is that the 
Scripture claims such inspiration tor itself. Moreover, it 
has a grandeur of style which is above that of any mortal 
writing. The subjects upon which Scripture speaks are be- 
yond the human intellect; they have a singular majesty and 
Power in them which is evident when the Word is preached. 
Further, there is a marvelous omniscience in Scri? -;cure which 
is perceived by us when it unveils our inmost souls. It 
proves itself to be true in our experience. The writers of 
Scripture are honest in an uncanny way, revealing their 
own faults. Throughout the Bible there is an amazing unity 
of subject and the message of Scripture has a master simpli- 
city. Finally, the witness of the Holy Spirit in our hearts 
10 The New park Street Fì,1pit, London, 1555, Vol. I, 
p. 110. 
11 
Ibid., p. 112. 
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confirms our faith in Holy Scripture.12 
Such a high view of inspiration is necessary to secure 
our knowledge of God and His redemptive work in Christ. 
Without it, we would be lost. Those who do not hold this 
view have turned away from the faith. He writes in the 
preface to L. Gaussen's Theopneustica: The Plenary Inspira- 
tion of the holy Scriptures which he re- issued for his stu- 
dents in the pastor's training college that 
The turning -point in the battle between 
those who hold the 'faith once delivered 
to the saints' and their opponents lies 
in the true and real inspiration of the 
Holy Scriptures. If we have in the Word 
of God no infallible standard of truth, 
we are at sea without a compass.... We 
can have a measure of fellowship with a 
mistaken friend who is willing to bow 
before the teaching of Scripture if he 
can be made to understand it; but we 
must part company altogether with the 
errorist who overrides prophets and a- 
postles, and practically regards his 
own inspiration as superior to theirs. 
We fear that such a man will before long 
prove himself to be an enemy of the 
cross of Christ, all the more dangerous 
because he will professlloyalty to the 
Lord whom he dishonors. 
Perhaps intuitively aware of some of the difficulties 
the text itself presents for such a view, Spurgeon acknow- 
ledges that 
the Lord, in His Word, often uses language 
which, though it be infallibly true in 
its meaning, is not after the knowledge 
of God, but according to the manner of 
men. I mean this, that the Word uses 
similies and analogies of which we may 
1G Ibid., p. 110. See also Spurgeon, My Sermon Notes, 
London, 1887, Part IV, p. 399. 
13 -footed by..: a_. öti, ._._ di t. , P. 
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say that they speak humanly, and not ac- 
cording to the absolute truth as God sees 
it. As men conversing with babes use their 
broken speech, so loth the condescending 
Wo r d 14 
2ecause Scripture is the inspired Word of God, it follows 
15 that it is authoritative in all issues of religion and life. 
Its power overrides all the words of men. "Never book spake 
like this nook; its voice, being the voice of God, is power- 
ful and full of majesty." Further 'the Word is right, and 
we are wrong, wherein we agree not with it. The teachings 
of God's 'cord are infallible, and must be reverenced as such." 
Still in keeping with the reform.,,tradition of Pro - 
testant Orthodoxy, Spurgeon also argues for the perspicuity 
of Scripture. The Bible is an understandable boob, and should 
be read and studied by all believers. Evert,- Christian, as 
he is guided by the Holy Spirit, can comprehend in its pages 
all that is necessary for holy l _vine and salvation. As 
Spurgeon expresses it, the _ible "speaks the language of 
men. "17 
This leads to a related point, namely that the Scripture 
ives direction in every area of human .,ctivity. It is a 
13 
practical book, "our sweet companion" in th daily round 
of life. From reading the Scripture the believer will be 
strengthened to face every challenge and temptation, will 
be lifted out of doubt and despair, and will be able to 
14 Messages to the Multitudes, London, 1892, i->>. 43-44. > > > 
15 Carlile, op. cit., D. 145 f. 
16 Messages to the Multitudes, pp. 34, 47. 
17 Ibid., p. 43. 
18 Ibid., p. 33. 
16 
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detect theological error and gain confidence in his own 
Doti.ition. 
19 
Say =s Spurgeon: "The Word of God, as an infal- 
lible director for human life, should be sought unto by us, 
and it will lead us in the highway of safety."20 
The most important' message which the Bible contains 
is the story of salvation by faith in Christ. The Bii.le is 
a book which speaks of Christ on nearly every page and to 
catch a glimpse of him is to be transformed. Spurgeon writes: 
Jesus, the Sinner's Friend, walks in the 
avenues of Scripture as once He traversed 
the plains and hills of Palestine; you 
can see Him still, if you have opened 
eyes, in the ancient prophecies; you can 
behold Him more clearly in the four Gos- 
pels; He opens and lays b2re His inmost 
soul to you in the Epistles, and makes you 
hear the footsteps of His approaching ad- 
vent in the symbols of the apocalypse. 
The living Christ is in the Book; you be- 
hold His face almost in every page; and, 
consequently, it is a book that can talk.21 
Still another aspect of his understanding of the nature 
of the Bible is its elevation to the place of the sacred. 
Because it enshrines the words of God and the living heart 
of Christ it becomes an object of worship. It is essential 
to our eternal welfare as the mediator of God's savin- ;ord. 
As such it functions as a visible symbol of our salvation. 
Its words evoke religious sentiments and devotional im- 
pulses. Frequently the issue is not so much their under- 
standing as their ritualistic reiteration. Certain phrases, 
from the King James Version, repeated over and over again, 
19 The Park Street pulpit, London, 1859, Vol. IV, 
pp. 60 f. 
20 Messages to the Multitudes, p. 32. 
21 Ibid., p. 35. 
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carry the full force of sacred tradition and "bless the soul 
Spurgeon writes that it is "blessed to eat into the very 
soul of the Lible until at last you come to talk in Scrip - 
tural language; and yo 'r spirit is flavoured with the words 
of the Lord, so that your blood is Bibline, and the very 
essence of the Li.ble flows from you."22 
Such statements are more than poetic expression of the 
value of the Bible to the Christian communi.t The Bible's 
place in Spurgeon's thought is in many ways analogous to that 
of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin in some forms of 
Roman Catholicism. I:ike the Virgin, the Bible is the living 
symbol and mediator of oHr salvation; and like her freedom 
from all contagion of human imperfection, the Bible has the 
qualities of purity and perfection.23 " 0 Bible ", Spurgeon says 
in almost prayerful tones, "it cannot be said of any other 
book, that it is perfect and pure; but of thee we can de- 
clare all wisdom is gathered up in thee, without a particle 
24 
of folly." In words th_:t come close to bibliolatry, Spur- 
geon exhorts us "to love the Word of God with all our heart, 
and mind, and soul, and strength; with the full force of nur 
nature we are to embrace it; all our warmest affections are to 
be bound up with it." 
25 
Thus Spurgeon views the Bible as the inspired and author- 
itative word of God which _relievers are able to read with 
22 Quoted by Bacon, op. cit., r-.. 109. 
23 See James Barr, Old and New in Interpretation, p. 204. 
24 The New park Street pulpit, Vol. I, p. 112. 
25 Messages to the Multitudes, pp. 31 -32. 
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understanding as they seek direction for holy living and 
salvation. Because its words are the words of God and its 
essential message the living Christ himself, it should be 
reverenced and loved. But how is this sacred bank to be 
interpreted? What means should be utilized in order to best 
understand its life- giving content? Spurgeon suggests at 
least five guidelines for correct interpretation. 
Rule number one, 
. 
according to Spurgeon, is to under- 
stand each passage in its "first sense ", i.e. its literal 
or obvious meaning. "The first sense of the passage ", he 
writes, "must never be drowned in the outflow of your imag- 
ination; it must be distinctly declared and allowed to hold 
the first rank; your accommodation of it must never thrust 
out the original and native meaning, or even rush it into 
the background. "26 A passage should not be strained. One 
should be honest with the Word, avoiding any rerversion.27 
Spurgeon himself interpreted the text quite literally. IIe 
took its rromises at their face value and used them in his 
personal prayer life and his preaching. He understood the 
early chapters of Genesis as describing "hat actually hap- 
pened"t and resisted the inroads of science which called for 
re- evaluation of the traditional view. He says: "When men will 
not receive the Scripture testimony concerning God's creation, 
straightway they begin to form theories that are a thousand 
2 Lectures to My Students, London, 1881, First Series, 
p. 108. 
27 Commenting and Commentaries, London, 1876, p. 30. 
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times more ridiculous than they have endeavoured to make the 
Bible account of it.i4 
28 
In another context discussing the 
same subject he writes: "What is science? Another name for the 
ignorance of man. "29 To say that Spurgeon insisted that 
primary attention should be given to the literal sense does 
not imply that he accepted a critical historical approach 
to Scripture. He does acknowledge the need to study the 
historical situation in which a book was written, the context 
in which a particular text may appear and the author's intent 
in writing, but would never allow for any critical questions 
to threaten the seamless garment of Scripture. To the would - 
be critic he throws out the taunt: "But this is the Word of 
God; come, search ye critics, and find a flaw; examine it 
from its Genesis to its Revelation, and find error." 
30 
Nor does a commitment to the primacy of the literal sense 
disallow "spiritualizing". As a second guideline for the 
interpretation of Scripture, Spurgeon describes the method and 
application of a "spiritual" hermeneutic. Much of what he 
says on this point is said in the context of lectures on 
homiletics to his students. Preachers, as they prepare 
their sermons, should interpret the Scripture with reference 
to the spiritual meaning. "Within limit, my brethren," he 
says to young preachers, "be not afraid to spiritualize, 
or to take singular texts. Continue to look out passages 
of Scripture, and not only give their plain meaning, as you 
28 The New park Street Pulpit, Vol. IV, p. 59. 
29 Messages to the Multitudes, p. 286. 
30 The New Park Street Pulpit, .Vol. I, p. ill. 
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are bound to do, but also draw from them meanings which may 
not lie uuon their surface. "31 The content of the sermons, 
he cautions, must always be congruous to the text, but this 
should not limit a wise utilization of spiritualizing. He 
writes: 
The discourse should spring out of the text 
as a rule, and the more evidently it does 
so the better; but at all times, to say 
the least, it should have a very close 
relationship thereto. In the matter of 
spiritualizing and accommodation very 
large latitude is to be allowed; but 
liberty must not degenerate into license, 
and there must always be a connection, 
and something more than a remote connection- - 
a real relationship between the sermon 
and the text. 
In order to r.rvent liberty from degenerating into license, 
Spurgeon defines the legitimate range for spiritualizing. 
In the Old Testament, the best application of the principle is 
in typology. The experiences of the Israelites from the 
Exodus to the Exile provides a rich and fertile crop from 
which to harvest "spiritual" lessons concerning Christ and 
the believer's life. The spiritual principle can be applied 
to any part of Scripture in the form of metaphors and allegories. 
Still another manner of suiritualizing _is to generalize 
from minute and separate facts the great universal principles 
of the faith. From an isolated and ignored text, the inter- 
preter, if he exercises his creative imagination, can draw 
out a profound truth. Also, "the parables of our Lord in 
31 Lectures to My Students, First Series, p. 103. 
32 Ibid., Z°, . 74. 
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their expounding and enforcement afford the amplest scope 
for a matured and disciplined fancy, and if these have all 
passed before you, the miracles still remain, rich in sym- 
bolical teaching." 33 Spurgeon seems to have no qualms about 
using the text itself as a pretext for making a larger and 
more significant point. This is justified because of the 
"sacred" character of Scripture which gives it the power of 
speaking at different levels. 
A third guiding concept in the interpretation of Scrip- 
ture is the analogy of faith. Scripture is to be interpreted 
in terms of its central message. The whole is to interpret 
the part, a key passage an incidental one. "No one text", 
Spurgeon explains, "is to be exalted above the plain analogy 
of faith; and no solitary expression is to shape ol,:r theology 
for us."34 Because the essential content of Scripture is Jesus 
Christ, the analogia fidei leads to.a christocentric inter - 
pretation.. Spurgeon finds references to Christ throughout 
Scripture. A noteable example of his christocentric inter- 
pretation is his acceptance of the traditional interpretation 
of the Song of Solomon. This Hebrew love poem is understood 
by Spurgeon as an allegory of Christ's love for the church and 
more personally as an account of the believer's love relation- 
ship with hi.s Lord. In pious sentiment and Victorian language, 
he draws three lessons from the text "I am the Rose of Sharon, 
33 Ibid., n. 110. 
34 Commenting and the Commentaries, p. 31. 
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an tie Lily of the Valleys" (Song of Solomon 2:1): (1) The 
Exceedinf Delightfulnes of our Lord, (2) The Sweet Variety 
of His Delightfulness, and (3) The Exceeding Freedom of His 
Delightfulness.35 
A fourth principle of biblical interpretation is the need 
for the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The faithful believer 
who is open to the Spirit's illuminating power, will be led 
not only to a correct understanding of Scripture, but also 
to its living relevance. "As for believers", he writes, 
"the Holy Spirit often sets the Word on a blaze while they are 
studying it The letters were at one time before us as mere 
letters; _ut the Holy Ghost suddenly came ulion them, and they 
snake with tongues.... God the Holy Spirit vivifies the letter 
with His presence, and then it is to us a living Word indeed."36 
It is the Spirit of God who "delights to open "up the Word to 
those who seek his instruction.'37 
Finally we call attention to a fifth principle in Spur - 
geon's hermeneutical approach which we might call the pragmatic 
test. An interpretation of a passage will be confirmed as true 
if it produces results. He applied this notion both to the 
individual believer and to the preacher. The Christian will 
find a Scriptural interp retation to be true if it works in 
his experience, i.e. if it safely guides him through the 
trials and temptations of life. The preacher will discover 
35 My Sermon Notes, part II, p. 204. 
36 Messages to the Multitudes, p. 36. 
37 Commenting and the Commentaries, p. 32. 
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an interpretation of a text authenticating itself if it 
produces certain affects in the congregation. If it is 
a cor ect interpretation people will be converted and lives 
will be changed. When the _ iLle is rightly and sincerely 
»reached and received it carries its own illumination and 
power.38 
III. A Critical Appraisal 
As has been the case with all of tie interpreters we have 
considered thus far, so it is also with Spurgeon that his 
preunderstanding had both a positive and negative influence 
on his interpretation. On the positive side, we note Spurgeon's 
insistence on giving primacy to the literal -historical meaning 
in an interpretation. While not ar ays consistent in applying 
this principle, he did keep it central in his exegesis and was 
thus able to do justice to the text. A related positive ìoint 
is his continual stress on the need to understand the back- 
ground of each bo,k of the Bible and the specific context 
of each passage to be interpreted. 
Moreover we would mention the place given to the iTdble 
and its central message in his preaching. If God has allowed 
Himself to be known in history and uniquely so in the Christ - 
event, and if the Bible is the record of this disclosure, 
then the Bible should be given the place of priority in 
the preaching of the church. Spurgeon's preaching was 
always biblical and Christ- centered. Though many may disagree 
38 Cadile, or.. cit., I,. 146. 
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with his view of the nat re and interpretation of the Bible, 
few would question that he sincerely and el,quently pro- 
claimed its central message. 
Finally, we call attention to the place which he gave 
to faith as the necessary preunderstanding for a true compre- 
hension of the Bible. Only the man of faith as he is guided 
by the Holy Spirit is able to correctly interpret Scripture, 
which is to say that only the man of faith whose heart is 
open is able to receive the biblical message. He alone is 
able to perceive God's love. The man who stands outside of 
faith may possess information about the contents of fife Bible, 
but he will miss its essential messge. He does not "know" 
God by faitz in Jesus Christ. 
Yet these positive features which characterize Spurgeon ' s 
understanding of the Bible should not mislead us concerning 
its overall adequacy. His position fails for a number of 
reasons. Perhaps the primary weakness of his view is his 
elevation of the Bible to an object of worship. In addition 
to faith in Jesus Christ, the Christian must also have faith 
in the Bo "k. Faith has taken on another oie__ ect and in the 
process faces the possibility of being corrupted. There is 
for example the potential danger of focusing exclusive 
attention u on the statements of Scripture themselves rather 
than upon their subject. The door has been opened to pro- 
nouncing the hors's sacred as well as that to which they 
point. In such a view, revelation begins to lose its 
historical rootage. It becomes propositional. God has 
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dictated a book and it assumes more importance than His 
redemptive activity in history. 
And of course the sacred book cannot te subjected to 
historical criticism. There is no need. it is infallible. 
Its authors were not adverely affected by their historical 
circumstances. God spoke through their personalities and 
situations to insure the inerrant,; of His Word. Hence the 
dogma of verbal inspiration resists historical scrutiny. But 
such a view is surely a retreat from the modern era, an escape 
from all that is sound in biblical scholarship. How is it 
possible to understand the Bible at all if one does not begin 
with its historical study? Critical questions cannot be 
ignored. To do so is really to affirm that the message of 
the Bible is unimportant. The historical method is the only 
way we have of understanding what has happened in the past. 
If faith affirms that God has acted in the past, then it is a 
violation of faith not to study in the most thorough and 
accurate way possible the records o± this activity. The 
doctrine of verbal inspiration is really self- defeating 
because it does not allow honest historical study of the very 
historical events which it claims the Bible infallibly records. 
I -Iow is it possible to understand history without studying 
history? Surely what happened is important and if there is 
confidence that it did happen, what is there to fear from 
historical investigation? 
This general lack of a historical understanding of the 
3itle leads Spurgeon to accept principles of interpretation 
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which falsif the cleaning of Scripture. This does not imply 
that he intentionally distorts the Bible's meaning nor that 
he misses the sense of most of its passages and fails to 
comprehend its basic message. It does mean, however, that 
when he T' spiritualizesTT a passage, he obscures the original 
intention of the author and fails to state its primary meaning. 
We would not exclude in principle the possibility of messianic 
prophecy nor a christological interpretation of certain Old 
Testament passages, but would insist on the importance of 
historical study in determining the primary meaning of all 
Scripture. The application of the historical method, we would 
repeat, does not prohibit the preunderstanding of faith, but 
is necessary as a check -on the intruding biases which every 
interpreter possesses because of the limitations wh-_ch are 
imposed upon him by his own historical situation. 
Spurgeon's principle of the pragmatic test for the 
correctness of an interpretation is really not fundamental 
to his hermeneutical position and therefore should not be 
criticized as if it were. But as it stands, it does allow a 
passage to be interpreted in as many different ways as there 
are emotional reactions. The sluice gates are opened to the 
flood of subjectivity. There is no objective and historical 
test possible. If an interpretation "blesses the soul" or 
produces a convert, then it is true whether it has anything 
to do with the meaning of thë passage or not. This principle 
can lead to flagrant violations of the obvious meaning of 
(4-39) 
the text. ihile a sovereign God may overrule preaching 
based on exegesis of this sort, allowing for lives to be 
changed for the better, this certainly does not justify 
its use. 
Spurgeon's understanding of the nature and interpretation 
of the Bible stood in open conflict with the critical views 
of biblical scholarship. As a contrast to Spurgeon we turn 
now tc consider the tradition of Protestant Liberalism which 
largely accepted the presuppositions of these critical 
views in its approach to the Bible. 
Chapter Seventeen 
The Bible in Protestant Liberalism 
Harry Emerson Fosdick 
1. The Historical Roots of Fosdick's Thought 
The perennial problem of biblical interpretation is IOW 
to make the bible written in one situation and era speak with 
meaning and relevance to another situation and era. The 
. question has been: How is it possible to understand the 
Bible in such a way so that its universal message can be 
appreciated in a context which faces problems and employs 
thought forms far different from those of the biblical 
authors? Interpreters within the church, convinced that the 
Scriptures in some way are, contain or point to God's reve- 
lation, have been especially preoccupied with how to give 
the Bible its rightful place. 
In our study we have noted that the solutions to this 
proL:lem have varied from age to age and tend to reflect the 
preunderstanding of the interpreter seeking the solution. 
It has been our particular task, in the representative 
hermeneutical positions which we have considered, to determine 
the precise role of the author's preunderstanding in his 
interpretation of the biblical documents. We have observed 
that preunderstanding hás both a positive and negative role 
to play. positively, the interpreter's preunderstanding has 
supplied the attitudes and categories necessary for the 
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understanding of the biblical message, and without which 
no adequate interpretation would be possible. Negatively, 
we have observed that the interpreter's ureunderstanding has 
dated his effort, often limiting its application to his own 
generation. The two questions which we have asked in an 
effort to ascertain the lasting value of an interpretive 
approach are: (1) Has there been a recognition of the neces- 
sity for the preunderstanding of faith? and (2) Has due 
consideration been given to history both as the milieu of 
God's self -disclosure and as a method to filter out the 
negative influences of preunderstanding? We have argued 
that it is faith which is able to perceive the true meaning 
of the revelation to which the Scriptures point and that 
it is the historical method which is able to "get at" that 
revelation and prevent its distortion as it is translated 
into the idiom of a particular age by a hermeneutical method. 
One of the earliest approaches to the interpretation of 
the Bible was the allegorical, developed in its most system- 
atic form by Origen. Desirous of reconciling the Christian 
revelation with the prevailing neo- Platonic philosophy of 
his day, Origen resorted to allegorizing the Scripture. Al- 
though Origents method accomplished the goal of making the 
Bible more acceptable to his contemporaries, it was inadequate 
because it dehistoritized the redemptive events. In spite 
of this weakness, the allegorical method remained influential 
in the church for over a thousand years and did not receive 
a challenge which brought it to its knees until the Reformation. 
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It was Martin Luther who asserted that the Bible must be 
understood and interpreted historically if it is to be 
normative for the church. His christological hermeneutic, 
while tending to undermine the primacy of historical inter- 
pretation with its typological understanding of the Old 
Testament, was nevertheless balanced in giving to Scripture 
its rightful place of authority without denying the inter- 
preter the right to critically examine the text. 
Spinoza moved biblical interpretation down the road 
toward the modern understanding of Scripture with his insis- 
tence on the right of reason to question the Bible and all of 
its traditional interpretations. He argued that the Bible 
must be viewed as a product of history, not as a supernatural 
authority. Spinoza was correct in stressing the necessity 
of understanding the Bible historically, but he failed in 
not giving any place either to revelation as event or to 
faith in perceiving it by overestimating the all- sufficiency 
of reason. Both X'esley's and Spurgeon's views of the Bible 
were escapes from facing the implications of Spinoza's chal- 
lenge. Wesley, by assigning central importance to religious 
experience in the interpretation of the Bible, did not fully 
appreciate the historical dimension of sound biblical exegesis. 
Spurgeon, by elevating the Bible to the place of the sacred, 
moved it completely out of reach of all historical investiga- 
tion. But neither Wesley's pietism nor Spurgeon's protestant 
Orthodoxy could prevent the seeds planted by Spinoza from 
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bursting through the parched soil of the traditional views. 
In fact by the end of the eihteenth century the rational 
study of the Bible was developed to such an extent that hand- 
books of biblical interpretation setting forth the new method 
with its emphasis on a purely historical understanding of 
Scripture were being widely circulated.l People such as 
Lessing, herder and Eichhorn wrote historical analyses of 
the Bible employing the new method. Giving impetus to these 
initial efforts of historical criticism was the custom in 
the German universities of studying the Bible away from the 
control of the church. In the German universities there 
was a new and romantic sense of freedom in historical scholar- 
ship. It was felt that impartial objective research could 
solve the riddles of history. 
In the early part of the nineteenth century the critical 
historical method came to be regarded as the only legitimate 
kind of exegesis. Theologians such as Schleiermacher and 
Rîtschl, proficient in biblical criticism as well as theology, 
saw the historical method-as the means of constructing a 
belief system and reorganizing the material found in the 
Bible into new theological patterns. For many, the historical 
critical analysis of the bible became almost identical with 
exegesis. 
Underlying these efforts at theological reconstruction 
with their reliance on the critical study of the were 
1 Grant, o;, cit., p. 123. 
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certain implicit philosophical presuppositions. For example, 
many of these theologians understood the universe to be 
governed by inflexible laws of nature, and therefore rejected, 
as had their rationalistic forebears, the possibility of 
miracles. Moreover toward the middle of the nineteenth 
century, at the height of Hegelian influence, Hegel's 
distinction between eternal ideas and temporary forms was 
employed. Believing that all the world was the self- manifesta- 
tion of the divine mind, no distinctions were drawn between 
biblical writings and other writings. Such well -known theo- 
logians as F. C. Baur and David Strauss in the German world 
and Coleridge in England shared this basic approach. 
By the end of the nineteenth century there was a gen- 
eral agreement on the method and results of the historical 
2 
critical approach to the Bible. The consensus was due in 
large measure to the work of two men, one an Old Testament 
scholar and the other a church historian interested in the 
essential message of the New Testament. In the Old Tcsta- 
nient it was the work of Julius v elihausen whose rigorous 
scholarship had convinced the majority of biblical scholars 
that the books of the Old Testament could be chronologically 
arranged, and that its ideas showed the gradual evolution 
from primitive to advanced, as in all other religions. It 
was Adolph von Harnack's analysis of the New Testament which 
carried the same persuasive force as Welihausen in the Old 
Testament. Harnack asserted that the religion of Jesus had 
Ibid. , D. 130. 
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Teen distorted by Greek ideas but that, by careful his- 
torical study, one can discover in the Gospels his essential 
teaching regarding the Kingdom of Heaven, the Fatherhood of 
God and the ultimate value of the human soul and the need 
for the higher righteousness and love. 
The American Protestant L_: .eralism in which H.rry 
Tmerson Fosdick has played such an active role accepted, 
with only a few changes as bi lical scholarship progressed, 
this late nineteenth century consensus on the nature of the 
Bible. The motive behind their accc_ptance was supplied by 
the need to make it possible for an intelligent man to be 
a Christian. They believed that it vvas not a question of a 
new or an old theology, LLut of new or no theology. The old 
formulations based on an infallibly insired Bible could not 
;.e accepted in light of the new discoveries in biblical studies. 
In this liberal reconstruction of the Christian faith 
there were two essential elements, a new theological method 
and a fairly typical body of thought.3 One feature of the 
new method was its a tternpt to frame Christian theology in 
such way as to make it acceptable to the mod,.rn world. 
Man's conditions and his thought patterns, the liberal theo- 
logians contended, had altered radically since the creeds 
were formulated. Modern man is sirmly unable to appreciate 
the archaic sounding creeds. Christianity must be rethought 
and re-expressed in terms which are meaningful to the modern 
3 William Hordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant 
Theology, New York, pp. -101. 
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mind. The antiquated categories of a prescientific era 
can be dropped without destroying the essence of Christianity. 
The outward husk can be discarded without damaging the kernel. 
A second feature of the liberal theological method was 
its refusal to accept any doctrinal position on the basis 
of authority alone. All beliefs must stand up under the 
scrutiny of reason and experience. The mina of man, the 
literals believed, has the capacity of thinking God's thoughts 
after Him; indeed man's intuitions and reason are the best 
manifestation of the nature of God. The best in man is the 
revelation of God. The open -minded man can discover truth 
all around him, and all truth is God's truth regardless of 
its source. No issues are settled. New discoveries may 
change convictions which have come to be regarded as essential 
to the Christian relief system. With this outlook, the 
liberals welcomed the higher criticism of the -iúle and 
maintained that no religion is genuine if it is afraid of 
truth and attempts to protect itself from critical 
examination. 
As one would expect with this theological method, there 
was a great variety of ideas within Protestant Liberalism. 
Yet because of common concerns and a shared heritage and 
culture, there were underlying assumptions held ,y most 
representatives of the movement. Standing behind the ma--.n- 
stream of literal theology was the philosophy of Absolute 
Idealism, given its most elaborate form by Hegel and Lotze, 
(447) 
but reinterpreted on the American scene by Josiah Royce. 
Id alism began with the premise that if man is to have any 
confidence in his knowledge, he must assume a rational struc- 
ture to reality mart from his mind. Man's reason and logical 
Presuppositions are able to comprehend the world only if the 
world acts in accordance with them. Our minds are trust- 
worthy only if the world is ultimately Lased. on reason. Pro- 
testant Liberalism baptized this ,,remise and argued that all 
reality may Pe interpreted as the manifestation of a divine 
mind. The process of christianizing idealism was made easier 
by the fact that both ìïegel and Royce employed Christian 
terminology in their systems. 3ut to these men Christian 
octrines were inadequate symbols of rational truths known 
to man's reason. The central teaching of the Eible, that 
God has made Himself known in particular events of history, 
was considered the idealists as primitive and pre- philosophical. 
The liberals did not wholeheartedly accept all the 
teaching of idealistic philosophy, but they did make the 
notion of the immanence of God the foundation stone of their 
system. God, according to liberal thought, was dwelling in 
the world and working through nature. God accomplishes -his 
will by progressive change and natural law. Therefore the 
sensitive person can find God in the whole of life. This 
emphasis led to the denial that God was the cause of some 
occurrences in the world and that natural forces were the 
cause of others. God is working through all that happens. 
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It followed that if God were at work in the total world 
Process no special acts of revelation were necessary, nor 
did any one religious system have the corner on all truth. 
ether religions besides Christianity are also valid expres- 
sions of divine truth. in fact, even those who do not recog- 
nize God may in their allegiance and service to higher goals 
be a part of God's self- manifestation. 
Assimilated into this idealistic structure was the 
evolutionary notion of the inevitability of progress. This 
optimism stemmed from the Lelief that the evolutionary hy- 
pothesis could be employed as a category to explain the social 
as well as the liological development of mankind. The 
world, they argued, is inherently rational and reason is 
slowly overcoming the irrational. Society is progressively 
being improved. The ultimate victory of goodness is assured. 
The Bil.:le in this framework held no theoretical claim 
to preferential treatment, (though in practice, especially 
with Fosdick, it was given rreferential treatment). It 
was another book among the books of men to be studied scienti- 
fically. With the methods of higher criticism the liberals 
believed that it could be shown that the ideas in the Bible 
have gone through an evolutionary process. Revelation is 
progressive and the Bible is a record of man's response to 
revelation. At first, man's ideas concerning God were 4m- 
mature, Lut gradually as God disclosed more of Himself, these 
ideas becpme more mature, reaching their culmination in Jesus 
of Nazareth. 
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The exact place of Jesus in liberal thought varies 
from thinker to thinker. To some he is divine and the primary 
revelation of God and for others he is a great religious 
and ethical teacher. "Most all of the liberals were inter- 
ested in the search for the historical Jesus, believing 
that if scholarship could uncover the true Jesus of history, 
their ideas about him would be confirmed. In general, it 
was felt that Ilarnack's summary of the character and teach- 
ing of Jesus was accurate. Jesus was one with God in the 
sense that he perfectly fulfilled the demands of God in his 
life. All men have the same potential, and Jesus is unique 
only in that he perfectly lived out the will of God in his 
life. Man is not bound by his sin, but can, by education 
and following the example of Jesus, achieve his true humanity. 
Protestant Liberalism was inclined ,to be more interested 
in ethics than theology. The proof of authentic religion 
was not so much its system of doctrines as its good deeds. 
The pragmatic test of all religion is whether it is instru- 
mental in creating a better world in which to live. Although 
Protestant Liberalism and the Social Gospel movement were 
not identical, the two were difficult to distinguish in 
many of their concerns. The Kingdom of God was identified 
with an ideal society on earth and the chief problems to be 
solved before the Kingdom could be ushered in were world 
peace and relations between races and social classes. 
The main branch of liberalism, often called "Evangeli- 
cal Liberalism ", was characteristically dedicated to reason, 
openmindedness and making the Christian faith acceptable to 
the modern mood, yet it was firmly rooted in the Bible and 
the Christian tradition. The chief representatives of evan- 
gelical liberalism were convinced of the r< alitv of God and 
saw in Jesus the best ex ,ression of revelation. While un- 
able to endorse many of the tenets of the classical creeds, 
they were at one with the traditional faith in asserting 
Christ's Lordship over all of life. The Bible was not an 
infallible book, but the sensitive listener could hear the 
Spirit of God speaking through its pages. Christianity, they 
affirmed, must be relevant to modern times, but its unique- 
ness should not be sacrificed in an effort to placate every 
modern whim. It was this wing of liberalism to which Harry 
Emerson Fosdick gave his leadershir and service. 
The events of Fosdick's life can be stated briefly. 
He was 1: orn in Buffalo, New York on May 24, 1378 to a middle 
class family. His parents, both Christians, soon exposed 
their son to the tenets of the Baptist faith. Later during 
his college years at Colgate, Fosdick first î, e;gan to question 
the adequacy of the traditional belicis on which he had been 
raised to express his faith. he remarks: "In my youth the 
time came when the formal creeds to me were dust and ashes. 
I did not believe them. "4 Still a convinced Christian, 
Fosdick proceeded from Colgate to Union Theological Seminary 
in New York in .order to prepare himself for the ministry. 
1t Union he was exposed to the Lest tradition of liberal 
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Christian scholarship and soon found new categories in which 
to express his faith. He was ordained to the iiaotist ministry 
in 1903 and completed his Bachelor of Divinity degree in 
1904. He later did a Master's degree at Columbia University. 
1n the Autumn of 1904 he assumed the responsibility of 
pa storing; the First Baptist Church of Montclair, New jersey, a 
position wh: ch he held until 1915. In addition to his 
responsibilities as pastor, he became in 1908 an instructor 
in homiletics a.t his former seminary. In 1915 he returned 
to New York City to become minister of the large First 
Presbyterian Church and professor of practical Theology at 
Union. The more conservative Presbyterians not only thought 
it strange to cä11 an ordained Baptist to one of their more 
influential churches, but also found his liberal beliefs close 
to heresy. Ecclesiastical pressures made it nearly impossible 
for him to remain and he moved back to the Baptist ranks, 
taking over the pastorate at Park Avenue Baptist Church. 
Careful not to create another furor within the church, fte 
accented the ?.position at park Avenue only on thy, condition 
that it would be a creedless church and that all who desired 
to join would be accepted' into membership regardless of their 
doctrinal position. Later this same congregation built the 
present rrivers_.de Church whose pulpit Fosdick made famous 
with his dynamic preaching. He was soon recognized as one of 
the leading s--olkesmen of protestant Liberalism. No fewer than 
twenty universities including Harvard, Yale and rrincetoo 
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recognized his contribution by awarding him honorary doctorates. 
His radio broadcasts were heard across the nation and his 
many books were widely circulated. 
One of Fosdick's more influential sermons, preached in 
1935, reflects his commitment to the protestant liberal 
theological method with its openness to change. In this 
sermon, entitled "The Church Must Go beyond Modernism", he 
courageously attacked the weaknesses of the liberal position. 
He argued that liberal theology was preoccupied with intel- 
lectualism rather than life, dangerously sentimental, had 
watered down its concept of God and lost its ethical ground. 5 
I-Ie did not want to deny, the gains made by liberal theology over 
antiquarian orthodoxy, but was concerned to shift the liberal 
camp into a more realistic and hard -headed position, enabling 
it to challenge culture as well as accept its benefits. 
The foundation of the preundersta.nding with which Fosdick 
approaches the Bible, as it has been with most of the other 
thinkers we have examined, is faith. He believes that God 
is and that He has made Himself known in Jesus Christ. Yet 
faith is not without its cultural form, and the form which 
Fosdick's faith assumes is essentially that of the protestant 
Liberal tradition. 
Ideologically, Fosdick is convinced that new categories 
more in accord with the modern world must be found and utilized 
5 Fosdick, Successful Christian Living, London, 1937, 
pp. 174 ff. 
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in the communication of the Christian message. Modern man 
will find very little in the ancient creeds which will speak 
to his situation. That which has abiding value, "the deep and 
vital experiences of the Christian soul with itself, with its 
fellows, with its God"...must be "carried over int this new 
world and understood in the light of the new knowledge. "6 
Accordingly he accepts the predominant philosophical frame- 
work of his day. Evolutionary Idealism, Fosdick believed, 
provides modern man with categories in which to understand 
his faith without imposing authoritarian strictures. It 
allows the modern Christian to get away from conceptions of 
God which "have been shaped by 1_iccure- thinking set in the 
frame -work of the old world- view. "7 It helps him to assimilate 
modern science and evolutionary teaching, which point to the 
progressive development of rationality, into his religion, 
and religion, "as -professor Royce of Harvard kept insisting, 
is at heart loyalty -- loyalty to the highest we know. "9 In 
keeping with this philosophical framework is Fos'-ick's assumption 
that man at his best is the revelation of God. It is the 
human personalit' which supplies the key to the divine. God 
is immanent in the highest expressions of man's rationality 
and the most genuine aspects of his experience. Fosdick sums 
.up his view when he says: "In man at his best, then, Reality 
: 
6 Ibid., D. 175. 
7 Fosdick, Adventurous Religion, London, 1926, p. 62. 
8 Fosdick, The Secret of Victorious Living, London, 
1934, p. 16. 
9 Adventurous Religion, p. 144. 
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receives its clearest revelation --tdat is the faith of all 
high reli.gion.t'10 One of the distinctive marks of Christianity 
is that "it teaches men to hold a very lofty opinion of 
themselves. They are children of God, made in his image, 
destined for his character. "11 This comprehensive ideological 
construct, not always a consistent or a conscious feature of 
Fosdick'.- interpretation of Scripture, nevertheless functions 
as a major influence on it. 
The attitudinal center of Fosdick's ureunderstanding 
is his rejection of authority as the basis for framing a 
doctr:i nal position, and his openness to new truth at any 
level and from any source.12 Neither the Bible nor the 
classical Christian tradition and its creeds can dictate a 
closed and final theological system. The church must remain 
open- minded and be willing to be taught ne: truth. In fact 
the one "heresy in Christianity is...to believe that we have 
reached finality and can settle down with a completed system. "13 
These two attitudes, functioning dependently, consciously and 
consistently also constitute a major influence on his inter- 
pretation of the Bible. 
The clue to the methodological assumptions which Fosdick 
brings to idbli.cal interpretation can he found in his insistence 
that in the personality of Jesus one finds the embodiment of 
liberal ideals. It is possible "to get 1. .ack behind the 
10 ibid., p. 72. 
11 Fosdick, Twelve Tests of Character, London, 1523, p. 4. 
12 Fosdick, As I See Religion, New York, 1932, passim. 
13 Adventurous Religion, u. 5. 
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thoughts of the centuries about Him, and to see the man 
Christ Jesus Himself as He lives in the pages of the gospels .... 
The broad outlines of His personality are clear and cannot 
be obscured by details of intereretation."14 When such an 
effort is made, it becomes clear that Jesus, "whose divinity 
differs from ours in degree but not in kindtt,15 supplies 
Fosdick with the motive and insights for his liberal re- 
construction of the faith. Methodologically, then, Fosdick 
is committed to a critical historical approach to Scripture 
as the means of uncoverin` the authentic persorialit,,- of 
Jesus. 
We shall now examine how Fosdick's protestant liberal 
preunderstanding expresses itself in the rarticular nre- 
supo,ositicns of his hermeneutical system. 
:I. Fosdick's Understanding of the Bible 
Working with this preunderstanding, Fosdick frames what 
he calls a "n. -W" approach to the Bible. It is necessary, 
he believes, because most ministers find the use of the Bible 
a difficult enigma. They either avoid whole sections of 
Scripture or use it as a place to find texts on which to hang 
their own thoughts. "An intelligent understanding of the 
Bible" must be developed which does justice to the findings 
of modern critical study without sacrificing the abiding 
p. 3. 
14 Fosdick, The Manho,d of the Master, London, 1920, 
15 Fosdick, The Hope of the World, London, 1934, p. 127. 
value of Scriptural truth. 
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16 
The initial step in finding a hermeneutic which will 
accomplish this goal is to understand what sort of a book the 
Bible really is. The only way to find this out is to study it 
with the best critical methods available, i.e. higher criticism. 
Higher criticism is not an enemy, but a friend which uncovers 
when and why the books were written, who wrote them and to 
whom. This critical process, armed with the tools of modern 
literary, historical and archaeological research, has ('gotten 
a result, at least in its outlines, well as ured.t'17 
The result obtained from historical study of the Scriptures 
is the possibility of "arranging the manuscripts of the i_.ible 
in approximately chronological order and then tracing through 
them the unfolding growth of the faith and horses which come to 
their flower in the Gospel of Christ. "18 With the dating of 
the books it is possible to see the evolutionary development 
of the great ideas of Scripture from their simple and 
elementary forms, when they first appear in the earliest 
writings, until they come to-their full maturity in the 
latest. 19 Ages prior to the modern one had neither the 
scholarly instruments nor the idea of development and were 
therefore prevented from arriving at a correct interpretation. 
Inevitably the older interpreters tended to read the meanings 
16 Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, London, 1925, 
Pp. 11 -13. 
17 Ibid., r'. 16. 
Fosdick, Christianity and Progress, New York, 1922, 
p. 144. 
19 The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 17. 
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of the New Testament back into the Old, finding by the use of 
type, symbol or allegory nearly all of the New Testament 
message. The Bible was seen not as the record of developing 
ideas but as a source book for speculative truth. But we are 
now able to correct these mistakes because we know "that 
every idea in the Bible started from primitive and child1i .e 
origins hnd...grew in scope and height toward the culmination 
in Christ's gos_ el." 
20 
The only way to really know the Bible 
is to trace 'through the whole of Scrir_ture the development 
of its structural ideas. 
Thus the Bible which is often unappreciated or ignored 
because it appears ancient and difficult to read can be 
understood and followed in the modern world. The historical 
study of the Bible, involving a shift of mental presuppositions 
and categories can uncover the original, native meaning of 
any section in terms of the time when it was written. By 
the use of various disciplines (the study of the relevant 
languages, the discover.- and translation of ancient literatures-, 
textual criticism, history, archaeology and comparative 
religion), it is possible to discover in terms of its historic 
significance just what any passage Leant to the people who 
first wrote it and first read it.21 
In a later boob, 
22 Fosdick applies this concept to six 
20 Ibid., p. 21. 
21 Ibid., pn. 43 ff. 
22 A Guide to Unders Landing the Bible, London, 193H. 
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major strands of biblical thought: the ideas of God, man, 
right and wrong, suffering, fellowship with God and immortality. 
As an illustration of his method, let us look at his treatment 
of the idea of God. Fosdick asserts that Moses understood 
God as "the mountain God" much like Zeus or Olympus and many 
another primitive deity was understood.23 Yahweh, the mountain 
god of Sinai, had a number of characteristics. H. was a 
storm god, associated with violent exhibitions of nature's 
Power. He was th god of war, battling for his people and 
leading them to victory. he was also a tribal god, establishing 
a covenant with his people. In general he was described in 
anthropomorphic terms. When the wandering people finally 
settled in Israel, Yahweh became a territorial and agri- 
cultural deity. Gradually, his domain was enlarged to in- 
clude the sky, and he then could display, his power outside 
of his land. In time, as Yahweh came to be linked with the 
royal line and was identified with the traumas of Israel's 
social and political situation, there emerged a pure mono- 
theism. By the time of the New Testament, Greek ideas had 
further refined the concept of God. Thus the notion of 
Yahweh evolved from the primitive myth of "a mountain god 
in the desert until he became known as the 'God and Father 
of our Lord Jesus Christ'. 
24 
According to Fosdick, certain results follow from this 
23 Ibid., pp. 2 ff. 
24 Christianity ty and Progress, p. 4 5 . 
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kind of historical study of the Bible. For one thing, the 
Bible is restored to its rightful place. It can once again 
be viewed as a "whole Book "25 which records man's gradual 
awareness of God's progressive sell- revelation. The true and 
lasting contribution of Scriptural ideas can be perceived 
in their unified development. Rightly understood, "the abiding 
usefulness of the Book lies in its anneal to the unchanging 
spiritual needs and experiences of man." 
26 
Correctly inter- 
ureted, "the Pible is the supreme Book of spiritual life. 
There we touch a valid revelation of the character and will 
of God. It is a fountain that never runs dry, and the better 
it is known the better for personal character and social 
progress. " 27 Seen as the record of clan's experience of God, 
the Bible can speak relevantly to modern man. It is "a 
rriceless treasury of s:-,iritual truth, and frocs it have come 
the basic ideas and ideals on which clic be -t of o:-rr democratic 
culture is founded. " :28 
A second result of the historical examination of the Bible 
is that it saves us from the need of apologizing for immature 
stages in the development of the biblical revelation. The 
Bible no longer has to be conceived of as infallibly inspired 
and universally authoritative. But this does not mean that 
God had no part in its writing. Fosdick affirms that "the 
25 The Modern Use of the Bible, r. 36. 
26 Adventurobs Religion, p. 122. 
27 ibid., p. 98. 
28 Fosdick, Dear My:. Brown, London, 1962, p. 55. 
(460) 
Spirit of God was behind the rrocess and in it.... The under- 
side of the process is man's discovery; the upper side is 
God's revelation.t'G9 Yet the part God plays does not nullify 
the influence of the historical situation of the uiblical 
authors on their writing. For whatever inspiration may mean, 
it certainly does not mean that the biblical authors in their 
siting were lifted out of their own time and "provided with 
mental thought- forms, scientific explanations and world -views 
of a generation thousands of years unborn. "30 The Bible is 
inspired only in the sense that it is "rice in spiritual 
insight, vision, enlightenment, illumination. t,31 'There is 
certainly no place in religion for the attempt to reconcile 
the Bible with science. Such efforts alwa,.s miss the point 
because they do not accept the fact that the Lible says 
nothing about science. It knows nothing about science. 
Therefore to place it in opposition to evolution for example 
is "ludicrously false. "32 
It follows thirdly that one is saved from the old and 
impossible task of harmonizing the Bible with itself, i.e. 
making it sneak with a unanimous voice. The conflicts and 
contradictions need not be forced into come sort of strained 
a : artificial unity. "The idea ", writes Fosdick, "that the 
29 The Modern Use of the Bible, 3' >. 
30 Adventurous Religion, u. 95. 
31 Dear Mr. Brown, p. 55. 
J2 Adventurous Religion, u. 96. 
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Bible is a unanimous book upon one level is quite incredible 
to anti ̂ ne who knows the Bible at all."33 As the story of 
man's maturing religious conceptions, the Bible makes sense, 
but viewed as a systematic text -book on divine truth, the 
ible is completely misunderstood. 
But even with this understanding of the bible, the 
hermeneutical question still remains. How should the Bible 
be intern,reted to .i ve a message for modern man? In what way 
is this book, written by a variety of authors in many different 
ancient cultures, able to say anything to men in a scientific 
age? The nerve of Fosdick's answer to this question lies in 
his distinction between man's abiding experiences and their 
temporary expressions or categories.34 The universal truths of 
the Bible are cased in outmoded language <md thought- forms. 
The interpreter must uncover the "abiding experience" which 
1 buried beneath a prescientific world view. His task is 
to decode "the abiding meanings of Scripture from outgrown 
phraseology." 
35 
Fosdick gives several e>am1les which illustrate his 
hermeneutical method. The abiding truth that the personality 
will survive death wearsthe ancient garment of the resurrection 
3 6 
of the flesh. The notion of the physical return of Jesus 
33 What is Vital in Religion, London, 1956, p. 64. 
34 The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 60, r,p. 101 ff. 
J5 Ibid., p. 123. 
76 Ibid., p. 101. 
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Points to the final victory of righteousness upon the earth 
in the coming of the Kingdom of God.37 The references to 
angels is equivalent to affirming the nearness of God.'8 The 
importance of the miracle stories lies in their reminder to us 
that we need God's power in our lives.39 
There are, Fosdick recognizes, perils in this "new" 
approach to biblical interpretation. One peril is that the 
modern critical and analytical mind will often miss true 
spiritual values which are more easily discerned by naive and 
childlike faith. The title must be seen as "a book of vital 
personal religion "40 or its message will go unnoticed. A 
second danger is that the new categories which are constructed 
to hose the abiding experiences will lack clarity. in an 
effort to be emancipated from the bondage-of ancient categories, 
interpreters may neglect the formulation of new ones, and 
since the emphasis is upon experience, this neglect may lead 
to sentimental platitudes.41 A final peril is the nossibilit; 
of being disloyal to the ethics of Jesus. This "moral" 
peril consists of the difficult task of reproducing the 
spirit and quality of Scriptural living. 
42 
Conscious these perils, Fosdick turns to the primary 
task of ap lying his hermeneutical theory to the interpretation 
of Jesus. It is the Personality of Jesus which is at the heart 
37 lcid., p. 106. 
38 Ibid., p. 129. 
39 Ibid., rp. 132-165. 
40 Ibid., p. 177. 
41- Iúid. , p. 180. 
42 ibid., p. 188. 
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of the biblical message and which supplies direction to all 
high religion. The "abiding exeeriences of Christianity 
center in the Master.,43 The two primary categories employed 
by the early church to describe the personality of ,Jesus 
were Messiah and Logos. Jesus did not create these categories 
for himself, but they were already existing when he appeared. 
They were applied to him because they were the loftiest ones 
which the early Christians possessed and the only way they 
44 could understand "this supreme personalit- ." Yet the are 
inadequate and should not be to l-en literally. The first 
requisite of the modern interpreter of Jesus "is insight to 
look through not only the church's elaborate theologies about 
him, but even the New Testament's first phrasing of him, and 
to become acquainted with, enamoured of, the personality 
himself, around whom so many frameworks of interpretation 
45 
have arisen, and yet who hir self is greater than them all." 
The interpreter must try as thoroughly as he can to go "back 
to the historical .;esus." 
46 
What the interpreter discovers in this effort is a person 
who has bequeathed to mankind a rich heritage of religious 
ideas. 
47 
Jesus has given the world its most si--nificant 
idea of God. He has immeasurably heightened man's estimate 
of his own worth and possibilities. IIe has made us aware of 
43 Ttid., p. 20<. 
44 Ibid., p. 211. 
45 Lid., D. 215. 
46 It'd. 
47 Lid., pp. 217-227. 
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the possibility of moral reclamation and renewal. He has 
given the world its loftiest ethical ideals. The historic 
Jesus has passed on to men the supreme example of vicarious 
sacrifice. And finally he has supplied an object of loyalty 
for the noblest devotions of the generations since he came. 
Does such a notable contribution to mankind imply that 
Jesus is divine? Yes, he was divine, but his divinity was 
not primarily a doctrine but an experience, and one that all 
men have the possibility of sharing. In order to understand 
Jesus, one must get away from the creeds with their outworn 
categories and realize that for Jesus as with us tall the 
48 
best in us is God in us." The underlying presu :Losition of 
Fosdick's position is the conviction, not that there is a 
vast difference between God and man, but that God and man 
belong together. When we ascribe divinitt.' to Jess, we are 
saying that all men are potentially divine. The doctrine of 
tie incarnation is the hope of God's indwelling in every one 
of us. The uniqueness of Jesus is in. degree, not kind, and 
thus he is not only our Lord, but our brother and supreme 
example. 
Because Jesus ,fas divine, the revelation of the living 
God who seeks to be incarnate in every one of us, the DiLle 
which speaks of Jesus is revelatory. It is the personality 
of Jesus which makes the "whole Book vibrate with. expectancy." 49 
Indeed the message of the book is summed up in Christ. It 
48 Ibid., p. 261. 
49 'lid., p. 2b5. 
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should not therefore be interp-eted literally or legalistically, 
but in terms of the sbirit and character of Jesus. rïe has 
revealed the quality and principles of true living. 
Toward the end of his examination of the modern use of 
the Bible Fosdick adds an autobiographical note which serves 
as a summary of his position. He writes that from the 
naive acceptance of the Bible as of equal 
credibility in all its parts because 
mechanically inerrant, I passed years ago 
to the shocking conviction that such 
traditional bibliolatry is false in fact 
and perilous in result. I saw with, growing 
clearness that the Bible mut be allowed 
to say in terms of the generations when 
its books were written what its word in 
their historic sense actually meant, and 
I saw that often the historic sense was 
not the modern sense at all, and never 
could be.5° 
So, in order to prevent modern man from lesin, the Bible, 
its abiding message must be separated from its ancient 
categories, and the key to the separating process is the 
life and personality of Jesus. 
III. A Concluding Evaluation 
There is "abiding" value in the central motivation 
behind Fosdick's hermeneutical effort. He has taken seriously 
the advances of critical scholarship and rightly asserts that 
the Bible cannot be understo d apart from historical study. 
And in a valiant effort, he has attempted to preserve its 
message for the church with his distinction between abiding 
experiences and changing categories. The .ible should be 
studied historically and its message needs to be made under- 
50 Ibid., 257. 
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s tandable to modern men. Few would quarrel v th these 
objectives. 
Yet there is at least one potential weakness in his 
approach to the Bible. It lies not so much in his objectives 
as in their application. This potential weakness is his 
uncritical acceptance of and whole -hearted alliance with 
idealistic philosophy. Let us examine what problems this 
raises for Fosdick's herrneneutical system. 
In the first place, there is the fact that his idealism, 
translated int" Christian terminology, is now out of vogue 
and has little contemporary appeal. iihen linked with an 
evolutionary optimism, it appears sentimental and unrealistic. 
ut this is not the primary difficulty with Fosdick's inte7- 
pretive method. It is more an occupational hazard of all 
biblical interpreters who have the respónsibility of translating 
the biblical message into contemporary thought. Indeed, as 
we have been attempting to show, no biblical interpreter can 
ever be entirely free from the categories of the predominant 
philosophical moods of his day. 
But the greater difficulty of his system lies in failing 
to be self- conscious and critical about the conceptual 
structure which he adopts. The interpreter must ask whether 
the framework he employs is the best vehicle in which to carry 
the biblical message. The crucial question is: Does it 
maximize the Bible's relevance to believers without distorting 
the biblical message at any critical point? That Fosdick's 
interpretation of Scripture was relevant to his hearers we 
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have no doubt, but that he may have distorted the Bible's 
essential message is another question. 
The problem becomes especially evident when we observe, 
as a case in point, how the historical method is linked with 
evolutionary idealism. Taking his cue from Wellhausen, Fosdick 
assumed that by dating the writings of the Bible it would be 
possible to reconstruct the history of how its ideas developed 
from Drimitive beginnings in polytheism up through stages of 
belief in one ethical God. Yet modern historical scholarship 
does not support such an assumption. That Moses conceived of 
God as a localized mountain deity is simply not the case. 
Wellhausen, and Fosdick following in his tracks, rewrote history 
to fit Hegelian philosophy with its concept of evolutionary 
development. The problem is equally acute in Fosdick's inter- 
pretation of the New Testament in Harnackian categories. 
The view that Jesus is our Lrother and example, preaching the 
Kingdom of love and inspiring men with his dynamic personality, 
says more about Fosdick's liberal understanding than about 
Jesus. In short, Fosdick.has allowed his preunderstanding to 
unduly bias his historical judgments. One modern scholar has 
called Fosdick's A Guide 'to Understanding the Bible in which 
he develops this theme "an obituary to last century's scholar - 
ship."51 There is always the danger of an over -accommodation 
of the gospel in its deepest kernel to the dominant spirit and 
thinking of the time in a zealous effort to make its meaning 
and message relevant. That Fosdick may have done this in his 
interpretation of Scripture is a distinct possibility. 
51 Quoted by Horclern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant 
Theology, n. 105. 
SECTION IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCF. j`S I ON 
Chapter Eighteen 
Interpreting the Faith 
I. Summary of the Theme 
Our study of preunderstanding in historical and Biblical 
interpretation would not be comilete without some attempt to 
restate the main thread of our theme, to summarize the results 
of its application to representative interpretive approaches 
and to draw some conclusions for the general task of inter - 
pret-I Lion, We turn first to the theme itself. 
Our objective was to demonstrate the role of preunder- 
standing in the interpretation of the Christian faith. We 
began with the observation that preunderstanding is an ever 
present factor in all perception, apprehension and interpretation 
of reality. We read the signs which reality sends our way 
through our own particular set of assumptions and attitudes, 
assumptions and attitudes which we hold because of nur total 
life situation. 
We established four categories of type in which to 
analyze preunderstanding: the informational, the ideolo?'ical, 
the attitudinal and the methodological. We then suggested as 
a working hypothesis several ways which a preunderstanding 
may function in an interpretation of reality. It may function 
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as a major or minor, or positive or negative influence. It 
may be comprehensive or limited in scope, or independent 
of or dependent uron other assumptions and attitudes. It may 
operate consistently or inconsistently, rationally or ir- 
rationally, consciously or unconsciously or closed -mindedly 
or openendedly. These categories of type and function gave 
us the means of analyzing the specific preunderstanding of 
the intert)reters we considered in Sections II and III. 
As part of our argument in Section I, we stressed that 
preunderstanding has both a positive and negative role to 
play. The negative role we found to be obvious enough. 
s ,rhen the interpreter allows his nreunderstand.ing to distort 
his apprehension of reality, then his preunderstanding clearly 
has a negative influence. The positive role of preunder- 
standing is less Ireuently recognized. It consists of the 
simple fact that we can apprehend nothing without some prior 
structure. We wonld stare in uncomprehension if we do d not 
have some ca te<: ories in which to "make sense" out of that 
which we observe. We argued further along the same line that 
different asrects of reality suggest, even demand, an appropriately 
corresponding rreunderstanding to be present in the observer 
for them to be correctly grasped and interpreted. Assuming 
that the Christian revelation is no exception to this general 
rule, we set al out finding the appropriate preunderstanding 
necessary to its comprehension. 
In our investigation we maintained an "in ernalist" 
os;-_-tiom1, 3.. e. that the Christian faith must be interpreted 
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partly in its own terms, and an "externalist" view like that 
of 3ultn,ann who interprets Christianity in existentialist 
categories. 
1 
In keeping with the internali:t position, we 
argued that the Christian revelation demands that faith be 
present if it is to be understood. It is faith which is the 
necessary ;reunderstanding for the interpretation of Christianity. 
We defined faith in its classical sense with its component 
parts of cognition (i.e. faith that God is and has made 
Himself known in Christ) and trust (i.e. faith in God). 
Faith, defined as both cognition and trust, we said contained 
the minimum necessary, informational, ideological and attitudinal 
elements for an adequate interpretation of the Christian 
revelation. In support of our assertion that it is faith which 
is necessary in the interpretation of the Christian revelation, 
we reasoned, beyond the clear -cut biblical statements to that 
efect, that: (1) In most cases, it is only the man of faith 
who is open to the possibility that God is, and has revealed 
Himself in certain acts of history. (2) The man of faith 
stands in personal relationship to God. He "knows" God in 
Jesus Christ. Christian truth is not only factual but personal. 
God is !mown not just by way of history in His revelatory 
acts, but also as these acts are made contemporary in the 
life of the believer by the Holy Spirit. The Christian 
claims are confirmed by God in the believer's experience. 
(3) Finally, the man of faith has an attitude toward the facts 
See James Barr, Old and New in Interpretation, np. 
171 ff. for a discussion óT i'ñternalistt1 and "externalist" 
positions. 
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surrounding the appearance of Christ which is sympathetic. 
The man of faith has sensitivity and insight which give him 
the capacity to appreciate and identify with the Christian 
message. Efe has affinity and rapport with the material to 
be interpreted. 
But this internalist emphasis upon faith was balanced by 
the recognition that faith itself assumes a cultural form. 
Faith as a preunder_stan:ing takes shape in a particular 
historical era. Faith is never free from the predominant 
thought forms of its time. Indeed, faith is only made 
meaningful when it is expressed in these thought forms. 
.While faith has certain universal constants, these constants 
are inevitably and rightly conceptualized in terms of the 
external categories current in the cultural milieu. Hence 
faith as a preunderstanding has both an internal and external 
component. 
This led us on t the second major stn- -nd of our theme, 
namely the relationship of oreunderstanding to history and 
more specifically of faith to history. Believing that there 
is no such thing as "pure" faith, i.e. faith free from 
cultural conditioning, we argued that faith must be joined 
with the historical method in order to form an appropriate 
preunderstanciing for interpreting the Christian revelation. 
The historical method must serve as a means of fi7 terin.n nut 
the biases which inevitably accompany and distort faith. We 
called these biases the "negative influence of oreunderstanding" 
and suggested that it is only the rigorous application of 
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the historical method which prevents faith from postulating 
'whatever it wishes. 
An even more basic reason for the utilization of the 
historical method in the intero.retive task is the Christian 
contention that God has made Himself known in history and 
uniquely so in Jesus Christ. From a study of contemporary 
theories of hermeneutics (Chatter. 2) and revelation (Chanter 3) 
we learned that there is a growing consensus among theologians 
and biblical scholars that the interpretation of the Christian 
faith, because of its central affirmation cf God's self - 
disclosure in Jesus Christ, is intimately bound uU with 
the study of history. We then turned our attention to the 
role of preunderstanding in historical study (Chapter 4). 
We concluded among other things that : (1) 3ecause the his- 
torian does not have direct access to the series of events 
which he is examining and because he cannot escape the 
influence of his preunderstanding, his judgments have the 
character of probability, not absolute certainty. (2) 
Historical study need not necessarily be bound to a pre- 
supposition which excludes the possibility of postulating 
God as an active agent in'history. 
These conclusions cleared the way for a discussion of 
the implications of subjecting the Christian faith to 
historical examinatior (Chapter 5). Here we argued that: 
(1) The so ?rces regarding the Christian faith which are 
available to us (Scripture and tradition) must be s jested 
to a critical historical examination if we are to understand 
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them and the faith about which they speak. (2) The study 
of the biblical manuscripts and the Christian tradition (by 
the historical method) together with an openness to the 
possibility of God acting in history (faith) leads to the 
probability that God has revealed Himself in. the Christ- 
event. (3) Faith and history, then, constitute the minimum 
requirements for an adequate hermeneutic. 
II. The Ap= lication of the Theme 
We turned in Sections II and III from the theme itself 
to its application in representative historical and biblical 
interr:retations of the Christian faith. Our purpose in doing 
so was threefold: (1) to test the validity of our argument in 
light of the best representative interpretations of the faith 
which have appeared during the life of the church; (2) to 
analyze these representative interpretations by the main 
contentions of our theme; and (3) to discover, ,y this 
analysis, some guidelines for a constructive hermeneutical 
position. 
We focused our attention in Section II on six repre- 
sentative historical interpretations of the Christian faith. 
These six views were concerned primarily with interpreting: the 
broad sweep of Christianity in terms of its place in history 
and the meaning which it sup7_.lies to the rest of history. 
Our approach was to analyze the interpreter's areunderstanding 
in its format. ̂n, type and function, to discuss its role in 
his historical interpretation and then to evaluate his views 
in terns of our criteria of faith and historical study. 
Because of the survey nature of our treatment, we limited 
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our discussion of the interpreter's preunderstanding to 
those aspects of it which we judged to play. an important 
role in his interpretation of the Christian faith. Several 
conclusions were reached from this study which might bei 
summarized as follows. 
Negatively-, we noted that the Christian revelation 
tended to be distorted when either one of two essential 
elements to any adequate interpretation was missing. In the 
first instance, distortion took place when the preunderstanding 
of faith was either not present or completely overshadowed 
by another point of view. It was especially evident in 
Gibbon who forced Christianity to fit into the confines of :lis 
r 
rationalistic presuppositions and into the historical context 
of the decline of the Roman Empire. It as also apparent in 
Hegel whose Absolute Idealism distorted Christian beliefs by 
calling them prephilosophical expressions of rational truth. 
Less o.viously it existed in Harnack whose bourgeois liberalism 
created a Jesus in its own image. 
Secondly, we observed the danger, though not always the 
presence, of distortion when there was either little under- 
standing or neglect of the need to relate the Christian 
revelation to history. Augustine, because the ideas of history 
and historical study were as yet undeveloped, was unable to 
appreciate the historical nature of revelation and to critically 
examine the historical sources. Reacting off a p^sitivist 
view of history, Brunner created a realm of suer- history to 
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protect the redemptive events from historical skerticism, and 
thereby neglected to emphasize God's activity in the totality 
of history. Reinhold Niebuhr asserted that God is the prime - 
mover in all of history without negating the uniqueness of the 
redemptive events, but his undue pessimism and his use of the 
notions of myth and symbol in describing the redemptive events 
clouded his view with gloom and confusion. 
Posi ively, we learned that it is faith guided by his- 
torical study which supplies the clue to the interpretation of 
the Christian revelation and all of history. It answers the 
question of how the action of God in universal history is 
related tò His unique deeds in a special history and how these 
deeds in turn illuminate the meaning of God's action in the 
whole of history. While not pretending to put forward a 
full - fledged theology of history, we did make two minimal 
assertions. (1) The God of the biblical witness is an active 
agent in the totality of history. This means, on the neative 
side, the rejection of the position that God is active at some 
point of Kairos and not at others, or that the presence of God 
in salvation history, imp:-lies an absence of God in universal 
history. (2) The God of the biblical witness encounters and 
deals with the whole of history and the cosmos prolentically 
and prototypically through a special history, the history of 
the people of Israel and the Christ, so as to illumine His 
purposes and presence in and for the whole. We rejected the 
view which claims that the presence of God in universal history 
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renders meaningless or useless the s_:ecial action of God 
in the history of Israel and. in Christ. We thus co_acluded 
that to bifurcate Heilsgeschichte and universal history as 
distinct theological alternatives was to misunierstand the 
biblical witness to the God who acts in the one for the niany.2 
Such a bifurcation implies either the absence of faith or the 
neglect of history. 
In Section III we moved to a consideration of six 
representative interpretations of the biblical material itself. 
In these six views we were concerned to determine the role of 
preunderstanding in the inter_preter's conception and inter- 
pretation of the Bible. As we progressed we discovered 
tendencies similar to those ,resent in the historical inter- 
pretations examined in Section II. When the preunderstanding 
of faith was overshadowed by other presuppositions (e.g. Spinoza 
and to a lesser degree Fosdick) the biblical material was 
forced to fit those presuppositions. When historical study 
was not given its proper lace (Origen, Wesley, Spurgeon, and 
to some extent, Luther) there was a tendency to make the 
biblical material say whatever the interpreter's preunder- 
standing suggested. 
On the positive side we found that faith L:alanced by 
historical study was the key to a biblical hermeneutic. This 
led us to suggest a minimum directive for biblical exegesis. 
Faith, as a theological and christological affirmation, says 
2 See Thomas C. Oden, Contemporary Theology and Psycho- 
therapy, Phi ladelr hia 1967, pp. 134 t. 
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that exegesis should avoid, in its attempt to communicate 
Christianity to the present age, an over accommodation of 
the Liblical message to the current mood. The present age 
may inform, and rightly should inform, our exegesis, but an 
interpretation which gives primacy to the preunderstanding of 
faith argues that the present age must ultimately be brought 
before the forum of the Christian message. It affirms that 
Christ himself speaks; he comes to present himself to us in 
the pages of Scripture. Any other viewpoint which attempts 
to find in Scripture hints of eternal truths or ethical norms 
has imposed upon Scripture an alien point of view. Yet this 
"faith hermeneutic" is always checked by historical study 
to prevent the unbridled reign of subjectivity. The his - 
t<,rical method attempts to prevent faith from asserting its 
own hist :- rically conditioned distortions. 
Thus, in both historical and biblical interpretation, we 
find faith and history coming together in Jesus Christ. This 
of course does not mean. chat all who have faith and join. it 
with historical study will arrive at thesame conclusions 
in interpreting the Christian faith. Our conclusions will 
still be limited by the preunderstanding given to us by our 
age. he will still be making relative judgments which merely 
point to the absolute. On the other hand, these two guidelines 
serve as a perimeter within which a constructive hermeneutic 
can be framed for our time. 
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III. Mandates for Interpretation 
We have restated our theme and summarized the results of 
its application to representative historical and biblical 
interpretations. At the risk of being a bit repetitive, 
it might now be helpful to suggest some mandates which the 
recognition of preunderstanding impose on the interpreter 
as he turns to the Christian revelation. 
1. The in'ternreter must be cognizant of the fact that he 
cannot avoid possessing a preunderstanding. He will bring to 
the interpretive task certain assumptions and attitudes which 
will take various forms and function in a variety of ways. 
Some of these assumptions and attitudes will be consciously 
articul= ted and others will be almost totally unconscious. 
2. This means that the interpreter should have a certain 
amount of humility about his own formulations, realizing 
that they will only be an approximation or partial vision 
of the reality which he is attempting to interpret. His 
interpretation will inevitably bear the stamp of the cultural 
and historical era of which he is a. part. He will perform 
the task of interpretation in a context, not in a vacuum, and 
his 'work will reflect the modes of thought of this context. 
3. The interpreter should nevertheless pursue his task, 
taking heart from the fact that even the biblical testimony 
to the Christ -event is cased in the thought forms of the 
culture of the first century. Indeed, to rout the matter 
positively, the interpreter's responsibility is to formulate 
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the Christian faith in a manner which his generation can 
understand. This will involve translating the biblical 
message into a contemporar < idiom and employing concepts 
and categories which are external to the biblical material. 
4. In his effort to translate the Christian message into 
contemporary terms, the interpreter must be careful not to 
distort the essential message of the gospel. He should not 
so accommodate himself to the modern setting that he distorts 
the universal constant, the Christ- event, the self -disclosure 
of God in Jesus Christ. At what point the interpreter ceases 
communicating the Christian message, and begins to distort it, 
is not always easy to determine. And attempts to set up lists 
of essentials are not really satisfactory because these lists 
themselves are historically conditioned. Yet, provisionally, 
we might say that when the interpreter begins to deny the 
notion of a personal God who in love has made Himself known 
in Jesus Christ, then the interpreter has perhaps given up 
too much. 
5. In an effort to prevent distortion, the interpreter 
should attempt to be conscious as far as possible of his pre- 
understanding. He should know something of the ideological 
structure of his thinking, the basic attitudes he holds and 
the methodology he plans to employ. This self -consciousness 
will allow him to check and control the negative influence 
and accentuate the positive influence of his preunderstanding. 
6. Further, in the 'same vein, the interpreter should 
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attempt to frame a preunderstanding (hermeneutic) which will 
most adequately aid him in his interpretation. We suggested 
as minimum requirements for such a hermeneutic faith and 
historical study. Faith is that complex of assumptions and 
attitudes which ruts the interpreter "in touch" with that 
which is to be interpreted. But faith, because it always 
assumes a cultural form, must be checked by history. It is 
the study of history which performs the vital twofold function 
of preventing the interpreter's historically conditioned 
preunderstanding from distorting the given, and of `.iving 
aim access to the historical revelation in Christ. Faith 
gives historical study its direction and historical study 
protects faith against unchecked subjectivism. 
With these mandates, we conclude our study of preunder- 
standing in historical and biblical interpretation. 
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